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English abstract 
 
This dissertation addresses one of the most popular management control practices 
adopted worldwide over the last three decades: the practice of risk management. 
The current risk management literature has argued that our knowledge of the par-
ticularities of risk management practices is limited. It has been stressed that 
knowledge is particularly lacking about the long-term effects of practising risk 
management. This dissertation responds to these calls by carrying out two longitu-
dinal case studies of two large Danish public capital investment programmes, also 
known as mega-projects. The focus of the two studies has been on three key risk 
management-related aspects: (1) the translation of uncertainties into risks, (2) the 
relationship between frameworks and practices of risk management, and (3) the 
effects of practising risk management on knowledge and project management 
roles. The dissertation further advances current risk management literature into the 
study of mega-projects and draws upon actor-network theory. It consists of three 
papers, which each deals with one of the above aspects. 
 
The dissertation presents three major findings. Firstly, it is demonstrated that, con-
trary to expectations, only some types of uncertainties are included as risks, 
termed pure risks, while others, termed impure risks, are systematically excluded 
despite the finding that people found them relevant to include. This finding is ex-
plained with reference to technical risk devices as these were found to define the 
boundaries between what can and what cannot be defined as an acceptable risk 
and thus be included. Secondly, the dissertation demonstrates that by enacting cer-
tain realities of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, frameworks of risk management 
make the practice produce the risks that confirm its propositions and thus its suc-
cess. In addition, the dissertation shows that when provisional situations arise 
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which undermine the frameworks’ propositions, reconfiguring the risk manage-
ment control system, risk terminologies and the roles of actors become key actions 
performed to re-establish the practice. Lastly, the dissertation demonstrates that 
during project processes, new uncertainties emerge which challenge project and 
risk management objectives as new knowledge about the conditions is produced 
that cannot be included. In sum, this dissertation contributes by shedding light on 
how practices of risk management are constructed and the effects they produce 
over longer periods of time. 
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Danish abstract 
 
Denne afhandling omhandler en af de mest populære økonomistyringspraksisser i 
moderne tid: risikostyring. I risikostyringslitteraturen er det blevet fremført, at vo-
res viden om risikostyringspraksissers særlige karakteristika og dynamikker er be-
grænset. Forskere har yderligere understreget, at vores viden om de langsigtede ef-
fekter af risikostyring er begrænset. Denne afhandling imødekommer denne 
litteratur ved at beskrive to længerevarende casestudier af to større danske offent-
lige anlægsprojekter. Afhandlingen fokuserer særligt på tre risikostyringsrelatere-
de aspekter: (1) translationen af usikkerheder til risici, (2) forholdet mellem ram-
meværktøjer og risikostyringspraksis, og (3) virkningen af at praktisere 
risikostyring i forhold til viden og projektstyring. Afhandlingen bidrager endvide-
re ved at undersøge risikostyring i mega-projekter, hvilket tidligere studier kun har 
gjort i begrænset omfang. Afhandlingen trækker endvidere på aktør-
netværksteorien og består af tre forskningspapirer, som hver især tager udgangs-
punkt i hver af de tre nævnte aspekter. 
 
Afhandlingen bidrager på tre punkter. Den viser, at i modsætning til hvad man 
ville forvente er det kun visse typer usikkerheder, der indregnes som risici, såkald-
te pure risks, mens andre typer, impure risks, ekskluderes fra processen, men lever 
videre i praksis. Afhandlingen forklarer dette med reference til de risikostyrings-
værktøjer, der anvendes hertil, da de sætter grænserne for, hvad der kan accepteres 
som risici, og hvad der ikke kan. For det andet viser afhandlingen, at risikosty-
ringsrammeværktøjer ved at skabe visse forståelser af risici og risikostyring ender 
med at få praksis til at producere de risici, der bekræfter rammeværktøjernes po-
stuleringer. Afhandlingen viser endvidere, at der kan opstå situationer, hvor der 
bliver tvivl om de resultater, som risikostyringen producerer. Dette er en usikker-
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hed, som risikostyringen i sig selv producerer. I sådanne situationer kan risikole-
delsen begynde med at undersøge de anvendte metoder og derefter igangsætte en 
mere eller mindre omfattende omdefinering af risikostyringskontrolsystemerne, ri-
sikoterminologier og nøglepersoners rolle for på den måde at genetablere praksis. 
Afhandlingen viser for det tredje, hvordan der på grund af risikostyringspraksis 
som sådan opstår nye usikkerheder, der udfordrer projektet og risikostyringens 
målsætninger. Sammenlagt bidrager denne afhandling med at sætte fokus på den 
måde man laver risikostyring på, samt de effekter dette genererer. 
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Preface 
 
If undertaking a PhD project should be motivated by academic discussions, then I 
have failed horribly. I have spent days reading up on such discussions like all 
‘good’ students are supposed to. I have positioned my conference presentations 
and seminars to such discussions like all ‘good’ students are supposed to. I have 
referred to such discussions and engaged my writing with them like all ‘good’ stu-
dents are supposed to. In the beginning, however, I was unfamiliar with such dis-
cussions so how could I have been motivated by them? I was motivated by some-
thing different. I was motivated by something “out there”, something empirical, 
something I found interesting and at the same time confusing. I was motivated by 
the situation that everybody seemed to praise this new thing called ‘risk manage-
ment’ in large public capital investment programmes, and its ability to provide in-
creased certainty of meeting programme objectives, while people at the very same 
time seemed to know little about its effects. It was as if people had adopted this 
new form of management control, blindly pouring millions of euros into its con-
struction, which of course struck me as interesting because it seemed not to make 
sense, as people, at least broadly speaking, tend to be economically rational. As a 
result, I could not help thinking that there had to be more to this phenomenon. 
 
But how did I learn about the above development? In the words of one of the head 
project managers I spoke with: “Is there anything less sexy than dealing with risk 
management?” (O38, 2). In 2009 I was looking for a subject for my master thesis, 
and without going into too much detail I ended up looking into practices of risk 
management. It was at this point that I met the CEO of Rail Net Denmark, who 
told me they had just received government approval for undertaking a new large 
capital investment programme called the Signalling Programme. He explained that 
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the government had put up the requirement that in order to prevent cost overruns, 
all large public transportation capital investment programmes had to implement an 
all-embracing practice of risk management. He also explained that the government 
had implemented risk management without specifying how it should be imple-
mented and operated on large capital investment programmes; and he also ex-
plained that the Signalling Programme was the first public programme to be sub-
jected to this requirement and therefore was intended to serve as a pilot test 
programme and a role-model for other public organisations. 
 
To begin with, I found this situation to be a bit strange, as I could not help won-
dering how anyone could force someone else to abide by a practice they them-
selves were unfamiliar with. I therefore decided to meet key actors of the pro-
gramme and study the formal documents related to this new legislation and the 
programme. This was where I became aware that the government had been in-
spired by Professor Bent Flyvbjerg’s work on ‘reference class forecasting’, which 
had been implemented on similar programmes elsewhere.1 In collaboration with 
other academics, Flyvbjerg had shown that over the last 70 years, 9 out of 10 so-
called mega-projects ended up incurring cost overruns of between approx. 20 and 
45 per cent. Flyvbjerg had further recommended, among other things, the imple-
mentation of an all-embracing practice of risk management to improve project 
control. In studying this research, however, I discovered that these findings and 
recommendations had been based on psychological experiments as well as on 
comparison between budgeted and actual costs. This research had not examined 
actual project processes and the effects of the practising of risk management on 
                                                 
1 ’Reference Class Forecasting’ is a project forecasting / cost estimation method that seeks to counteract personal 
and organisational sources of optimism by completely ignoring the details of the project at hand (the conventional 
approach, an inside view) and instead sets the costs of the project by examining a class of similar projects’ cost af-
ter completion (an outside view). See (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 2008; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). 
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such processes. To sum up, I was struck by the observation that the government 
had legislated about risk management without knowing much about its effects. 
 
This was what caught my attention. I then spent the following approx. six months 
following how the Signalling Programme constructed the practice of risk man-
agement (main focus) and the effects it generated (secondary due to a limited time 
period). I learned that the practice involved many different types of actors who all 
wanted different things from risk management. The Danish Ministry of Transport, 
for example, sought to improve their monitoring capabilities, as they had been 
criticised by the National Audit Office of Denmark for not having adequately ex-
hibited this in the past. The Danish Ministry of Finance, however, wanted to in-
crease the probability that the programme was finalised within the prescribed time 
and costs in order to avoid another major cost scandal like the construction of the 
Danish Radio Building. Of course, these objectives did not necessarily contradict 
each other, but the project managers, for example, primarily wanted a reflection 
tool to improve their project management abilities, which meant that they more or 
less did not care whether risk values rose. The Ministry of Finance and the Na-
tional Audit Office, however, found this problematic, because to them this illus-
trated that the objectives of the programme had become more uncertain. 
 
In early 2011 I completed my master thesis. I always felt, however, that there had 
had to be more to risk management and its mechanisms than I had had time to un-
cover: I had “only” followed the programme for six months, and the programme 
was still running for another 10 years, so I always felt that something more was 
bound to happen. As the opportunity arose to apply for a PhD scholarship on risk 
management in mid-2011, the decision was thus straight-forward: I applied. The 
rest is basically history. I got the PhD scholarship and carried out another three 
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years of in-depth study, this time expanded to include the Hospital Programme, 
the construction of 16 large new Danish hospitals. I found and read up on academ-
ic literature, went abroad for seven months, took the required semester’s worth of 
PhD courses, taught for a full semester, presented my research at seminars, work-
shops and conferences around the world, performed the many administrative du-
ties (in my opinion far too many), wrote and rewrote my three research papers 
again and again, and then again, took a day or two off now and again (yes, that did 
happen), and ultimately wrote the “cape” surrounding this dissertation. 
 
I will not here go further into detail about everything that happened during the 
three-year PhD period as the present dissertation, hopefully, captures the outcome 
of this in much more detail. My aim has been to explain what initially motivated 
me to do this PhD project and write this dissertation. In the beginning, I was not 
motivated by contemporary academic discussions, as I still had to engage in them. 
Instead, I was motivated by an actual empirical development that made me ques-
tion whether there was not more to this phenomenon called ‘risk management’ 
than initially met the eye. Later on, I discovered how I could contribute to the aca-
demic discussions with that empirically-inspired knowledge. I hope this “detour” 
has not transformed me into a “bad” student, now that I have not done what 
“good” students are supposed to do, as described above. I hope the readers of this 
dissertation will find it interesting, perhaps even thought-provoking, and a tool to 
eventually allow us to better understand this concept called ‘risk management’ in 
large (public) capital investment programmes, the so-called mega-projects. 
 
This PhD dissertation is structured as an article-based dissertation. It consists of 
three papers which have each been given a separate chapter. To unite the papers, I 
have written a common introduction, background, method, literature review and 
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theory section that is placed before the papers, as well as a discussion and conclu-
sion section placed after the papers. The latter section synthesises the main find-
ings from the three papers and describes the contributions of the PhD project. It al-
so sets out directions for future research and describes the implications and 
limitations of this dissertation. I have further taken the reference lists out of the in-
dividual papers and created one common list of references at the end of this disser-
tation. I have done this to give the reader easier and more approachable access to 
an overview of the literature. 
 
Two of the papers have been presented to different audiences at conferences and 
seminars throughout the last three years. They have been presented with slightly 
varying content and titles. The first paper is co-authored with my main supervisor 
Peter Skærbæk, Department of Accounting and Auditing, Copenhagen Business 
School, Denmark, and the third paper with my co-supervisor Kjell Tryggestad, 
Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School, and Chris Harty, 
School of Construction Management and Engineering, University of Reading, 
United Kingdom. The second paper is authored by me alone. Below is an over-
view of publication progress, including conference and seminar presentations: 
 
 The first paper entitled: “The role of inscription devices in translating un-
certainties into pure and impure risks” has been presented, albeit under 
slightly different titles, at the: “7th International Conference on Account-
ing, Auditing & Management in Public Sector Reforms”, Milan, Italy, 4-6 
September 2012 (by myself); “Alternative Accounts 2013 Conference”, 
Toronto, Canada, 27-28 April, 2013 (by my co-author); “22nd Nordic 
Academy of Management Conference”, Reykjavik, Iceland, 21-23 Au-
gust, 2013 (by my co-author); “AOS Workshop”, Galway, Ireland, 22-24 
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September, 2013 (by myself); “The Danish Rail Conference, Copenha-
gen, Denmark, 14 May, 2014 (by myself); as well as at two different sem-
inars at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, 26 April 2013 and 
the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 3 May 2013 
(both by myself). The paper made it through the initial review round of 
Accounting Organizations and Society and is currently awaiting my and 
my co-author’s considerations before being resubmitted. This (working) 
paper is referred to as Themsen and Skærbæk (2014). 
 
 The second paper is entitled: “The performativity of enterprise risk man-
agement in large public transportation infrastructure projects”. It has so 
far only been presented at my final PhD seminar. It has been targeted to 
an accounting journal in its writing style, and I plan to submit it to an up-
coming management accounting conference. See below for a reflection 
on publication opportunities. 
 
 The third paper entitled: “Risk management and uncertainty in large in-
frastructure projects: What roles for knowledge and project manage-
ment?” has been presented at the “ARCOM Conference”, Portsmouth, 
UK, 1-3 September 2014 (by my co-authors). It went through a blind 
peer-review process for the conference with two anonymous reviewers 
who accepted it without revisions. It was presented in an abbreviated ver-
sion with a slightly different perspective and published as part of the con-
ference proceedings (Harty et al., 2014). My co-authors and I are plan-
ning to submit it to Organization Studies after the oral PhD defence. 
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I am well aware that all three papers have a substantial length (about 40 pages 
each) and that it may thus be difficult to get them published without making them 
shorter, as many journals only accept papers that have a maximum number of 
words less than that of my papers. In future, I will therefore scrutinise the papers 
with the purpose of examining how they can be reduced without losing their rich 
and detailed empirical descriptions. I am also aware that there are overlaps be-
tween the papers, because at least the first two papers are based on the same case 
study, namely the Signalling Programme. This may cause difficulties when it 
comes to publication, despite the fact that they examine different aspects of risk 
management and draw upon different theoretical concepts, and I will have to take 
that into consideration before I attempt to publish especially the second paper, as 
the first paper is already in review. 
 
Good luck with the reading 
Tim Neerup Themsen 
 
  
xviii 
 
  
xix 
 
Table of contents 
 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Risk management and mega-projects ............................................................. 1 
1.2. Current risk management literature ................................................................ 3 
1.3. Limitations of the current risk management literature ................................... 9 
1.4. The purpose of the present PhD project ....................................................... 11 
1.5. My theoretical perspective: actor-network theory ........................................ 13 
1.6. My method: case studies ............................................................................... 16 
1.7. Remaining dissertation structure .................................................................. 19 
2. The proliferation of risk management ............................................................ 25 
2.1. Worldwide risk management developments ................................................. 25 
2.2. Emergence of risk management in the Danish public sector ....................... 31 
2.3. The Signalling Programme ........................................................................... 40 
2.4. Overview of early developments .................................................................. 52 
3. Current risk management literature ............................................................... 55 
3.1. Classifying risk management literature ........................................................ 55 
3.1.1. Rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm ....................................................... 58 
3.1.2. Functionalist risk paradigm .................................................................... 65 
3.1.3. Social constructivist risk paradigm ........................................................ 72 
3.1.4. Structuralist risk paradigm ..................................................................... 83 
3.1.5. Post-structuralist risk paradigm .............................................................. 92 
3.1.6. Constructivist risk paradigm .................................................................. 96 
3.2. The literature’s impact on mega-projects ................................................... 103 
3.3. Implications, tensions and opportunities .................................................... 106 
4. Theoretical framework ................................................................................... 117 
4.1. Actor-network theory and its basic concepts .............................................. 117 
xx 
 
4.1.1. “The word actor” ................................................................................. 118 
4.1.2. “The word network” ............................................................................ 122 
4.1.3. “The word theory” ............................................................................... 125 
4.1.4. “And the hyphen!” ............................................................................... 127 
4.2. The application of actor-network theory in accounting literature ............. 130 
5. Method ............................................................................................................. 141 
5.1. Overall methodology of actor-network theory........................................... 141 
5.2. Method: case studies .................................................................................. 145 
5.3. “Units of analysis” ..................................................................................... 148 
5.4. Data collection techniques ......................................................................... 153 
5.4.1. Collection of documents ...................................................................... 153 
5.4.2. Observation studies .............................................................................. 156 
5.4.3. Semi-structured interviews .................................................................. 159 
5.4.4. Other data collection techniques .......................................................... 162 
5.5. Reflections on my own role ....................................................................... 164 
5.6. Practical challenges .................................................................................... 167 
6. The role of risk management inscription devices in translating 
uncertainties into pure and impure risks ...................................................... 171 
6.1. Abstract ...................................................................................................... 171 
6.2. Introduction ................................................................................................ 172 
6.3. The technologies of risk management ....................................................... 175 
6.4. Actor-network theory and risk management .............................................. 179 
6.5. Method........................................................................................................ 183 
6.6. The translation of uncertainties into risks .................................................. 186 
6.6.1. The Signalling Programme .................................................................. 186 
6.6.2. The Signalling Programme’s risk management frame ........................ 188 
6.6.3. The production of pure risks ................................................................ 193 
xxi 
 
6.6.4. The production of impure risks ............................................................ 200 
6.6.5. The effects of the production of pure and impure risks ....................... 207 
6.6.6. Epilogue ................................................................................................ 212 
6.7. Discussion ................................................................................................... 213 
6.7.1. The translation of uncertainties into pure and impure risks ................. 213 
6.7.2. The active role and effects of risk management inscription devices ... 216 
6.7.3. When the risk management frame meets other frames ........................ 218 
6.8. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 220 
7. The performativity of enterprise risk management in large public 
transportation infrastructure projects .......................................................... 223 
7.1. Abstract ....................................................................................................... 223 
7.2. Introduction ................................................................................................. 224 
7.3. The accounting literature on enterprise risk management .......................... 228 
7.4. The concept of performativity and its conditions of success ..................... 231 
7.5. Method ........................................................................................................ 234 
7.6. Background: The Signalling Programme and risk management ................ 237 
7.7. The performativity of enterprise risk management .................................... 241 
7.7.1. The initial configuration of the practice of risk management .............. 242 
7.7.2. The actualisation of the world of enterprise risk management ............ 245 
7.7.3. Growing concerns and continued pressure on the practice .................. 249 
7.7.4. The misfiring of enterprise risk management ...................................... 253 
7.7.5. The stabilisation of the predictions of enterprise risk management .... 258 
7.8. Concluding discussion ................................................................................ 265 
7.8.1. The performativity of enterprise risk management .............................. 265 
7.8.2. The misfiring of enterprise risk management ...................................... 269 
7.9. Future research and limitations of the current study .................................. 273 
xxii 
 
8. Risk management and uncertainty in large infrastructure projects:  
What roles for knowledge and project management? ................................. 277 
8.1. Abstract ...................................................................................................... 278 
8.2. Introduction ................................................................................................ 279 
8.3. Uncertainty and risk management according to the literature ................... 280 
8.4. An actor-network perspective on risk, uncertainty and knowledge ........... 285 
8.5. Method........................................................................................................ 289 
8.6. Risk management in practice: the Danish hospital construction  
programme ..................................................................................................... 291 
8.6.1. Background for the hospital programme ............................................. 292 
8.6.2. The development of the risk management frame ................................ 292 
8.6.3. Overflowing and emerging concerns in the building projects ............ 296 
8.7. Risk management in practice: the Signalling Programme ......................... 307 
8.7.1. Background .......................................................................................... 307 
8.7.2. The development of the risk management frame ................................ 310 
8.7.3. Overflowing and emerging concerns on the Signalling Programme .. 313 
8.8. Developing the overarching frame – RM practices and overflowing  
across the two programmes ........................................................................... 319 
8.9. Concluding discussion ............................................................................... 326 
9. Discussion and conclusion .............................................................................. 331 
9.1. Summary of the main findings ................................................................... 331 
9.2. Contributions of this dissertation ............................................................... 340 
9.2.1. The translation of uncertainties into pure and impure risks ................ 343 
9.2.2. The performative effects of risk management frameworks................. 345 
9.2.3. The processes of risk management in mega-projects .......................... 347 
9.3. Implications ................................................................................................ 348 
9.4. Limitations ................................................................................................. 353 
xxiii 
 
9.5. Future research ............................................................................................ 355 
10. References ...................................................................................................... 361 
10.1. Primary references .................................................................................... 361 
10.2. Secondary references ................................................................................ 365 
11. Appendices ..................................................................................................... 387 
11.1. Appendix 1: Annual Danish capital appropriations 2005 – 2014 ............ 387 
11.2. Appendix 2: Signalling Programme, organisational chart ....................... 388 
11.3. Appendix 3: Signalling Programme, timetable ........................................ 389 
11.4. Appendix 4: Signalling Programme, ‘traffic light assessment matrix’ .... 390 
11.5. Appendix 5: Signalling Programme, risk classification ........................... 391 
11.6. Appendix 6: Observation studies .............................................................. 392 
11.7. Appendix 7: Observed people .................................................................. 394 
11.8. Appendix 8: Interviews ............................................................................. 397 
 
  
xxiv 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This section introduces the subject of this PhD project, namely risk management 
in large public capital investment programmes, also known as mega-projects, and 
sets the scene for the remaining sections of the present dissertation. The section 
begins with an introduction to risk management and megaprojects, an overview of 
current risk management literature, and a description of the limitations of that lit-
erature. It then moves on to describe the purpose and overall research question of 
this project (the three papers have individual and more specific research ques-
tions), the theoretical perspective applied and the method relied upon, and it con-
cludes by giving an outline of the structure of the remaining dissertation. 
 
1.1. Risk management and mega-projects 
 
“Risk management and risk ‘talk’ are all around us. The risk-based de-
scription of organisational life is conspicuous. Not only private sector 
companies, but hospitals, schools, universities and many other public 
organisations, including the very highest levels of central government, 
have all been invaded to varying degrees by ideas about risk and its 
management”. (Power, 2004, p. 9) 
 
This PhD project addresses one of the most proliferated and standardised man-
agement control practices worldwide over the last three decades: the practice of 
risk management. This practice has moved up on the agenda of governments and 
companies alike to transform the very nature of what management means (Kaplan 
et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2008). We have all been “invaded to varying degrees by 
ideas about risk and its management”, in the words of Power (2004), and this goes 
2 
 
as well for “private sector companies, but also for hospitals, schools, universities 
and many other public organizations”. In these years we cannot perceive of organ-
isational management without mentioning the terms ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’; 
it has become synonymous with ideals of ‘good governance’ (Power, 2007). In 
this respect there is nothing new about the idea of performing risk management, 
this has been done for centuries, but today there is an almost religious belief in its 
abilities to ensure organisational objectives (Bernstein, 1993). Listed companies, 
for example, have to comply with stock exchanges’ listing requirements, which 
include notions of risk management (Christiansen & Koldertsova, 2009), and pub-
lic bodies generally have to cope with government white papers on the same sub-
ject (Power, 2007). We do indeed live in the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992b). 
 
One of the latest developments of risk management has been governments’ 
worldwide enforcement of comprehensive and holistic practices of risk manage-
ment in large public capital investment programmes.2 These programmes, known 
as mega-projects, refer to major infrastructure programmes with costs of more 
than US$ 1 billion or programmes that otherwise attract public attention or politi-
cal interests (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Governments have begun enforcing this prac-
tice because mega-projects have often ended up incurring substantial cost over-
runs, thus tying up public funds that could have been spent elsewhere. Over the 
last 70 years, nine out of ten transport infrastructure projects, for example, 
throughout the world have had cost overruns of an average of 45 per cent for rail 
projects, 34 per cent for tunnels and bridges, 20 per cent for road projects, and 28 
per cent for all other transport project types (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). This also goes 
for other types of mega-project such as power plants, dams, oil and gas extraction 
                                                 
2 See for example: HM Treasury (2003, 2004), Transportministeriet [The Danish Ministry of Transport] (2006, 
2008), Swiss Association of Road and Transportation Experts and The American Planning Association, cf. 
Flyvbjerg (2009), and The Australian Road and State Traffic Authority, cf. Liu et al., 2010. 
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projects, information technology projects, aerospace projects and weapon systems, 
where “the data show that other types of major projects are at least as, if not more, 
prone to cost overruns” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, p. 18, referring to other studies). 
 
1.2. Current risk management literature 
In the academic literature, the proliferation of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ has 
not gone unnoticed, and several academics have inquired into its prevalence from 
perspectives ranging from the rationalist-cognitive to socio-cultural (Gephart et 
al., 2009; Lupton, 1999). The literature taking the rationalist-cognitive perspective 
emerges from fields such as engineering, statistics, actuarial science, psychology, 
epidemiology and economics. This literature tends to regard the notion of ‘risk’ as 
dangers or hazards defined as “the product of the probability and consequences 
(magnitude and severity) of an adverse event” (Bradbury, 1989, p. 382). It focuses 
broadly on issues such as how well risks are identified and calculated, how accu-
rate applied models and calculation techniques are, how the assessment of risk ef-
fects can be optimised, and how inclusive predictive models assisting peoples’ as-
sessments are (e.g. McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; Slovic, 1987). “One question 
that tends not to be asked in this research is ‘How are risks constructed as social 
facts?’, for the nature of risk is taken for granted” (Lupton, 1999, p. 18). While 
most practitioners would acknowledge that rationalist risk assessment relies at 
least to a certain degree upon human judgment, which is not value-free, this per-
spective tends to treat risks as objective facts (Bradbury, 1989, p. 382). 
 
The rationalist-cognitive perspective thus understands ‘risks’ as pre-existing in na-
ture and in principle able to be identified and controlled through scientific meas-
urement and calculation, and the knowledge produced through this. It constructs 
individuals as calculating and emotion-free actors and assumes that they share the 
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same responses and preferences of the actors in utilitarian philosophy (Lupton, 
1999, p. 22). In this respect, cognitive scientists often use psychological models of 
human behaviour to identify the ways in which people respond cognitively and 
behaviourally to risk (See Gilovich et al., 2002; Slovic, 1987 for reviews of this 
approach). This literature regards risks “as the independent variable and people’s 
response to it as dependent”, as Mary Douglas (1985, p. 25) writes. It often focus-
es on measuring the relative influence of different cognitive factor such as ‘mental 
strategies’ or ‘heuristics’ used in making judgments about risk, and points to bias-
es related to this (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In re-
lation to mega-projects, this literature has also been concerned with improving the 
basis for making demand and cost forecasts and thus solving decades of cost over-
runs (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 2008; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). 
 
In relation to practices of risk management, another strand of literature has taken a 
functionalist perspective. From this perspective, ‘risk management’ is a neutral 
system fulfilling certain organisational functions with systematic differences oc-
curring due to varying contextual factors (Donaldson, 2003). This literature has 
been much concerned with identifying such contextual factors, or contingencies 
(e.g. Beasley et al., 2005; Collier & Woods, 2011; Paape & Speklé, 2012). The lit-
erature also includes studies of the relation between risk management and compa-
ny performance, indicating a strong positive correlation (Gordon et al., 2009; Hoyt 
& Liebenberg, 2011); as well as on improving actual risk calculation techniques 
(e.g. Imbeah & Guikema, 2009; Liu et al., 2010). In line with the rationalist-
cognitive perspective, the literature also assumes risks to be “the independent var-
iable” and the response of humans as “the dependent variable” and sees the pur-
pose of risk management as being about identifying, assessing and reducing the 
risks “out there”. This approach generally assumes humans to be calculating and 
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rational actors and does not take into account the mediating effects of such factors 
as relationships, institutions and political settings. This means that those studies 
drawing on this perspective, and the rationalist-cognitive, risk losing sight of the 
effects generated by the socio-cultural contexts in which risks are understood. 
 
The socio-cultural perspective on risk emphasises the very aspects that the ration-
alist-cognitive and functionalist perspectives tend to neglect: the social and cultur-
al context in which risks are understood and negotiated (Gephart et al., 2009; 
Lupton, 1999). This perspective roughly covers social constructivist, structuralist, 
poststructuralist and constructivist approaches. The scholars taking the social con-
structivist perspective tend to understand risk as being always embedded in cul-
tures (e.g. Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). This perspective still un-
derstands risks as being “out there”, but maintains that how we perceive them is 
embedded in cultures and thus neither static nor objective or individualistic. Such 
studies have been concerned with explaining variances between practices across 
organisations which all things being equal should be identical, how risks are con-
ceived of by local actors, and how risk management is made relevant to different 
actors (e.g. Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2009, 2011; Wahlström, 2009). Mary Doug-
las has argued that heuristics or mental models cannot merely be considered as 
“cognitive aids for the individual decision maker”, but “should be regarded as 
shared conventions, expectations and cultural categories that are founded on clear 
social functions and responsibilities” (Douglas, 1985, pp. 80-81). 
 
Still within this perspective, the literature has further examined the proliferation of 
risk management from an institutional perspective, pointing to the influence by the 
accountancy profession on the logics and promotion of the concept (Hayne & 
Free, 2014; Power, 2004, 2007). Power has shown that risk management has 
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emerged alongside corporate financial scandals that gave rise to corporate govern-
ance and internal control standards. These standards were developed by the ac-
countancy profession, which led to an intensification of auditing and control pro-
cesses as these standards, among other things, were upgraded to regulatory 
requirements. This led to increased legalisation and bureaucratisation of organisa-
tional management, because risk management created a new demand for evidence 
of action. Power has also shown how risk management became a pervasive logic 
of organising as organisations sought to legitimise themselves and their actions 
(Power et al., 2009). Other studies have also dealt with the linkage between risk 
management and auditing, from the new uncertainties this has brought about to its 
new audit possibilities (e.g. Knechel, 2007; Robson et al., 2007; Spira & Page, 
2003). In summary, these studies have all dealt with the pervasive influence of in-
stitutions on human behaviour and understanding through rules, norms and 
frameworks. 
 
The institutional perspective bears much resemblance to the structuralist perspec-
tive, as this perspective deals with the study of the underlying structures, hierar-
chies and categories that define practices and knowledge of risk and its manage-
ment. Two of the most prominent scholars in this field are Ulrik Beck (e.g. 1992b, 
1999) and Anthony Giddens (e.g. 1991). Beck has argued that modern (western) 
societies are turning into ‘risk societies’. In such societies, the production of 
‘goods’ such as employment and welfare are accompanied by the production of 
‘risks’ as an outcome, or “by-product”, of modernisation processes. According to 
Beck, the “risks of modernization” are “irreversible threats to the life of plants, an-
imals, and human beings” (Beck, 1992b, p. 13). He often shows anger towards this 
ever-hazardous nature of contemporary life and presents an almost apocalyptic vi-
sion of how risks will destroy humans and other living creatures. He further sym-
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pathises with the rationalist-cognitive perspective, because “hazards require natu-
ral-scientific categories and measuring instruments in order to be “perceivable” at 
all” (Beck, 1995, p. 162). He has later argued, however, that the rationalist-
cognitive perspective fails to realise the ways in which risks are manufactured and 
made politically dependent and thus falls short of dealing with risks (Beck, 2009). 
 
Beck has further argued that modern (western) societies are confronted with risks 
on an unprecedented scale and that the magnitude and global nature of risks are 
such that risks are becoming almost impossible to assess, reduce or avoid (Beck, 
1990, 1992b). He argues that risks are the result of human (political) decisions and 
that people (organisations, institutions) are now fighting each other over the distri-
bution of them. In this sense, Beck’s work shares many similarities with that of 
Anthony Giddens. Giddens also saw ‘risk’ as emerging from the realisation that 
the claims of modernity for human progress had been shown not to be as utopian 
as it once was thought (Lupton, 1999, p. 72). Giddens argues that with modernity, 
people can no longer rely on local knowledge, tradition, habits, religious precepts 
etc. to base their decisions on, as these traditional structures have broken down. As 
people still have to make decisions, and because hazards and dangers have come 
to be seen as the outcome of their decisions, this led Giddens to conclude that hu-
mans today believe that risks are more dominant than ever, thus that we live in a 
‘risk culture’, but this originates from increased reflexivity about these decisions, 
and not, as stated by Beck, from an actual increase of risks. 
 
Those taking a post-structuralist perspective have been concerned with the ways in 
which the discourses, strategies, practices and institutions serve to bring ‘risk’ and 
‘risk management’ into being, to construct it as a phenomenon. “In this view, risk 
is created through discourses, strategies and practices of institutions and takes the 
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form of a calculative rationality rather than a thing” (Gephart et al., 2009, p. 146). 
Michael Power has shown how ‘fraud risk’ must be understood in relation to the 
broader historicity of risk in which risk expands its reach as an organising practice 
category (Power, 2013). In doing so, Power challenges the common-sense idea 
that the present shape of fraud risk management is functionally necessary, required 
by fraud events (thus challenging the functional perspective). He suggests that 
‘fraud risk’ and ‘fraud risk management’ have turned into a ‘regime of truth’, a 
mechanism for governing and disciplining managers, “which has emerged from an 
expanding risk discourse and which shapes what it is possible to say with credibil-
ity” (Power, 2013, p. 542). From this perspective, there is more to ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’ than dealing with dangers and threats: “To calculate a risk is to mas-
ter time, to discipline the future” (Ewald, 1991, p. 207). 
 
To conclude, some scholars have taken a constructivist perspective and focused on 
the enabling effects of risk management technologies (e.g. Jordan et al., 2013; 
Kalthoff, 2005), the usefulness of inaccurate risk management models (Millo & 
MacKenzie, 2009), the linkage between accounting and risk management (Miller 
& O'Leary, 2007), and some of the unexpected effects that practices of risk man-
agement can generate (Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014). This literature has conceived 
of risks as pure constructs and examined the networks of associations between ac-
tors in which risks have been produced as objects. From this perspective, then, 
‘risks’ do not just represent ‘dangers’ that are “out there”; ‘risks’ themselves are 
constructions that come into existence when constructed as such (Hilgartner, 
1992). The literature based on this perspective has further focused on describing 
the networks of relations in which risk management has been carried out, which 
have been shown not to be limited to fixed organisational boundaries. This per-
spective has differentiated itself from the social constructivist perspective by al-
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lowing the role and effects of non-human actors to be taken into account, thus also 
acknowledging that risks can be constructs made by other actors than humans. 
 
1.3. Limitations of the current risk management literature 
The current risk management literature has advanced and expanded our 
knowledge about ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ from different perspectives ranging 
from the rationalist-cognitive to socio-cultural perspectives. The rationalist-
cognitive perspective has called our attention to potential human cognitive biases 
when identifying and assessing risks; the functional perspective to the importance 
of various contextual factors for determining differences between risk manage-
ment practices; the social constructivist perspective to the importance of under-
standing ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ to be embedded within cultural systems; the 
institutional perspective to the strong influence of the accountancy profession and 
its logic of auditability; the structuralist perspective to the emergence of ‘risk’ as a 
key modern macro phenomenon that differs from pre-modern ones; the post-
structuralist to the disciplining effects of risk management discourses; and the 
constructivist to the enabling effects of technologies and the importance of under-
standing the construction of risks as part of larger networks of associations that are 
not limited to human beings. However, despite its enlightening contributions this 
literature has not examined all aspects of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ and the 
current literature thus stands incomplete (e.g. Bhimani, 2009; Gephart et al., 2009; 
Miller et al., 2008; Van der Stede, 2011; Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014). 
 
One of the major areas about which we lack knowledge is the “the particularities 
of risk management characteristics in specific organizational settings” (Bhimani, 
2009, p. 4). The current risk management literature has tended not to focus on the 
mechanisms of practices of risk management as they develop through dynamic 
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processes over time. More specifically, the literature has tended to disregard the 
examination of the way in which risks are constructed as specific ‘risk objects’ 
through networks of relations. A few studies have sought to examine this (e.g. 
Jordan et al., 2013; Kalthoff, 2005), but this literature has been very limited and 
has focused mainly on the role of technologies. In general, this follows from the 
current literature’s reliance on the philosophies of science underpinning the above 
perspectives, where ‘risks’ and ‘risk management’ have not been regarded as pure 
constructions. Thus, this literature has not, for example, assigned a much active 
status to non-human actors such as technologies or devices and tools. It seems that 
our knowledge of the actual mechanisms of risk management is incomplete as “the 
potential of these theories to inform studies of risk and organization has not been 
fully developed or realized” (Gephart et al., 2009, p. 142). 
 
Furthermore, the current literature has largely not dealt with notions of ‘risk’ and’ 
risk management’ in large capital investment programmes, or mega-projects, but 
stayed within the “classical” limitations of either financial or non-financial com-
panies. This seems regrettable, as governments today to an increasing extent rely 
upon comprehensive and holistic practices of risk management in order to ensure 
the success of such projects. The only literature that deals with notions of ‘risk’ 
and ‘risk management’ on mega-projects has been written by scholars taking a ra-
tionalist perspective (See Flyvbjerg, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2008; Lovallo & Kahneman, 
2003). Lovallo and Kahneman (2003), for example, propose that organisations 
supplement traditional forecasting methods with what they term ‘reference class 
forecasting’. This method replaces the focus of traditional forecasting methods on 
the company’s own capabilities and expectations, with a simple statistical analysis 
of analogous efforts completed on other similar projects, which should lead to the 
production of more accurate forecasts and thus counteract “personal and organiza-
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tional sources of optimism” (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003, p. 61). Flyvbjerg later 
added that it was important to combine reference class forecasting with “good 
quantified risk assessment… during project implementation” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 
14). Flyvbjerg and the consultancy COWI further developed more specific proce-
dures for the British Department for Transport (Flyvbjerg & COWI, 2004). 
 
However, due to its focus on preventing human cognitive biases and curbing or-
ganisational sources of optimism, the rationalist-cognitive perspective has not fo-
cused on the empirical effects generated by practices of risk management. This 
perspective has drawn on methods such as psychological experiments and budget 
vs. total costs comparisons and has thus ignored the examining of risk manage-
ment processes as they take place in actual settings. As a result, we know little 
about what happens during project processes, how risks are constructed and man-
aged, how they influence project conditions, etc. Another result is that govern-
ments these years are imposing risk management as a management control prac-
tice on public agencies or state-owned enterprises although they only have little 
knowledge of its effects. If we further take it into account that millions of euros 
goes into this practice, this only adds to the relevance of inquiring into this situa-
tion. It thus seems extremely relevant that research is conducted into the practices 
of risk management in mega-projects, from a perspective that allows such effects 
to be examined. I will later argue that the constructivist perspective allows this 
(Section 1.5 and 3.3), but before that, I will describe the purpose of this project. 
 
1.4. The purpose of the present PhD project 
This PhD project examines the practices of risk management in mega-projects. I 
have chosen mega-projects because governments implement risk management 
practices in such projects these years with much faith in their effect, but with only 
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a little knowledge of it. As stated above, governments have introduced risk man-
agement to prevent cost overruns and ensure the success of mega-projects, and re-
ly on risk management practices to produce that effect. It would therefore be inter-
esting to examine the effects and the construction of risk management practices, 
both in order to examine whether such a curbing effect is actually produced, but 
also, more importantly, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms of risk 
management practices. As mentioned before, another reason for choosing this sub-
ject is the observation that the potential of academic literature on risk management 
to inform studies of risk and organisation has not been fully developed or realised, 
(e.g. Gephart et al., 2009). If we further take into account that identical, standard-
ised practices of risk management are implemented worldwide, which the next 
main section shows, this increases the relevance of advancing of our knowledge 
even further. I am guided by the following overall research question: 
 
How are practices of risk management on mega-projects construct-
ed, what effects are produced, and how can we understand them? 
 
As I seek to provide detailed and rich descriptions of practices of risk management 
in mega-projects by following such projects over a prolonged period of time, I 
have narrowed my scope to following two, however primarily one, mega-projects 
in the Danish public sector. I recognise that this to a large degree prevents general-
isation, but it should provide for interesting new context-specific knowledge to be 
learned about the mechanisms of risk management, which scholars are calling for. 
In light that standardisation of risk management takes place around the world, 
which Section 2 shows, this new knowledge should still be highly relevant outside 
the context of my two examined cases (see Section 9.4 for more on this). 
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In seeking to answer this research question, the analytical section of this disserta-
tion, Sections 6, 7 and 8, consists of three research papers which each deals with 
a separate aspect of the subject. The first paper focuses on the processes of trans-
lating uncertainties into manageable risks, i.e. how risk objects are constructed in 
practice, and the effects of risk management control systems. The second paper 
focuses on the relationship between frameworks and practices of risk manage-
ment, i.e. how frameworks drawn upon come to enact the practising of risk man-
agement. The third paper focuses on the relationship between risk management 
practices and project conditions, i.e. how risk management practices shape project 
conditions and the effects this has on knowledge and project management roles. 
 
1.5. My theoretical perspective: actor-network theory 
In the present PhD project I draw upon actor-network theory, which is a construc-
tivist and relational perspective. In following the actor-network theory, I do not 
consider risk as a static, objective phenomenon, like the rationalist-cognitive and 
functionalist perspectives tend to, or as embedded in cultural contexts, like the so-
cio-cultural perspective assumes, but as constructed and negotiated objects that 
serve as part of dynamic networks of interaction. In quoting François Ewald: 
“Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, any-
thing can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the 
events” (1991, p. 199). Furthermore, I take non-human actors such as devices and 
tools into account as “active” actors, on equal terms with humans. Having taken 
this overall perspective means that what I see as important is the ways in which 
certain linkages are drawn and the trajectories they take over time. This means 
that I understand practices of risk management as assemblages, or networks, of 
various different actors, both human and non-human, that interact and generate ef-
fects, which can then be traced, recorded and described. 
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In more detail, I draw particularly on the works of Michel Callon (e.g. Callon, 
1986, 1998c, 2007, 2009), but also on the work of Bruno Latour (e.g. Callon & 
Latour, 1981; Latour, 1991, 1993, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2005; Latour & Woolgar, 
1986) and John Law (e.g. Law, 1986, 2009; Law & Hassard, 1999; Law & Urry, 
2004) as Latour and Law have both been active in unfolding the overall philoso-
phy of science of actor-network theory. The following is a brief outline of the ben-
efits of having chosen actor-network theory, and it should be compared with the 
above sections about the current literature on risk management and the limitations 
of current risk management literature (see also Section 3). Subsequently, I will 
give a more thorough introduction to the fundamental, theoretical stand of actor-
network theory and its basic concepts, which I have been guided by in my three 
research papers (see Section 4). 
 
I have chosen actor-network theory for different reasons. The first (non-
hierarchical) reason is that actor-network theory allows me to go across organisa-
tional boundaries and follow the actual associations made by those involved. It al-
lows me to understand practices of risk management as network effects of the dif-
ferent actors’ associating work, doing what they determine should be risk and risk-
management related. This approach seems very suitable to examine public mega-
projects where often many different actors are involved, such as political parties, 
ministries, public agencies, consultancies and suppliers. All these actors can influ-
ence how practices of risk management end up being constructed and operated 
over time, and they should therefore be included and not confined to be seen as 
“contextual factors”. If we limit our study of risk management practices to exclude 
crossing boundaries, such as organisational or formal/informal boundaries, we 
may miss out on important actions and events. In summary, one of the advantages 
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of using actor-network theory is thus its strong emphasis that all types of associa-
tions must be taken into account, at least a priori (e.g. Latour, 1987). 
 
The second reason is that actor-network theory enables me to pay attention to the 
effects of risk management technologies or non-human actors in broader terms. In 
actor-network theory: “we account for the solid objective reality by mobilizing 
various entities” (Latour, 2005, p. 91), which “implies no special motivation of 
human individual actors, nor of humans in general” (Latour, 1996, p. 373). In this 
sense, non-human actors can be active mediators which “transform, translate, dis-
tort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour, 
2005, p. 39). Section 4 returns to what this means later. At this point I just want to 
stress that in general, actor-network theory adopts a view in which devices can be 
more than passive devices that transport meaning without transformation. This lat-
ter view, where non-human actors are understood as passive tools, has often been 
called upon by the above socio-cultural perspectives. In Kaplan et al.’s (2009): 
“Managing Risk in the New World”, for example, Mikes, who examines risk man-
agement from a social constructivist perspective, states that: “Models are not deci-
sion makers: people are. So the real issue is the culture that you have around mod-
elling” (Kaplan et al., 2009, p. 70). In this sense, the advantage of adopting actor-
network theory is the standpoint that actors “literally can be anything provided it 
is granted to be the source of an action” (Latour, 1996, p. 373). 
 
The third and last reason for my choice of actor-network theory is its strong em-
phasis that knowledge should be derived from examination of actual empirical as-
sociations between actors such as those to be expected from practices of risk man-
agement. As Latour (1996, p. 374) says about actor-network theory: “It does not 
say anything about the shape of entities and actions, but only what the recording 
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device should be that would allow entities to be described in all their details”. This 
means that actor-network theory places the burden of theories on the recording of 
entities and not on the specific shape that is recorded. In this sense, actor-network 
theory represents just as much a method as a theory, which fits nicely with my 
agenda of examining practices of risk management in mega-projects. As Latour 
further writes (1996, p. 374): “ANT [actor-network theory] is not a theory of ac-
tion, no more than cartography is a theory on the shape of coast lines and deep sea 
ridges; it just qualifies what the observer should suppose in order for the coast 
lines to be recorded in their fine fractal patterns”. In its essence, actor-network 
theory is thus about describing the ways in which practices of risk management 
are constructed rather than about explaining any underlying deterministic struc-
tures, cultures, systems, power relations, etc. It represents a toolbox of concepts 
for examining the assemblage of associations and their complex dynamics. 
 
1.6. My method: case studies 
In accordance with actor-network theory, this project thus continues along the path 
of “telling interesting stories” through empirical case studies, which can be under-
stood as in-depth and detailed descriptions of real-life situations (Law, 2009, p. 
142). One of the advantages of using case studies is that I can go “behind the 
scenes” of written documents and follow the actual practices of carrying out risk 
management as they take place in real time. This allows me to collect material that 
has not been captured by written reports that are typically prepared after events 
have unfolded and do not capture on-going negotiations or even conflicts. I can 
examine the actions of the people involved and shed light on the controversies, 
disagreements etc. that often constitute human interaction. I can ‘follow the actors’ 
and “describe the generative path of any narration”, as Latour (1996, p. 374) calls 
it, which includes following non-human actors such as control systems and the ef-
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fects they generate, and, of course, humans. To sum up, this enables me to track 
the networks of associations between those involved, without being limited by 
pre-set boundaries, and look “beyond the enterprise” (Miller, 1991, p. 757). 
 
Why did I choose mega-projects then? In 2009, the Danish parliament authorised a 
total renewal of the Danish rail signalling infrastructure which had aged up to the 
point that its technical lifetime had well overrun. This programme was named the 
Signalling Programme, which refers to the total renewal of all signalling equip-
ment ranging from basic train detection and point machines over the overall traffic 
management system to on-board train systems. I examine this as my primary case. 
The programme has a budgeted cost of DKK 23.7 billion and has been scheduled 
to run from 2009 to 2020 for the Copenhagen mass transit system and to 2021 for 
the regional lines.3 I have chosen this programme because it is the first Danish at-
tempt at implementing all-embracing risk management in large public capital in-
vestment programmes (Transportministeriet, 2006, 2008). This means that the in-
volved actors have been confronted with having to do something for the first time, 
which in turn, from a methodological point of view, means that associations be-
tween actors have not yet been stabilised, or black-boxed, and thus should be more 
prone to controversies (Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 2005, p. 31). Such contro-
versies, because “actors do something and don’t just sit there”, then generate more 
traceable information, which, all things being equal, represents the best opportuni-
ty for providing a good actor-network theory account (Latour, 2005, p. 128). 
 
I also examine the Danish DKK 41.4-billion Hospital Programme, which consists 
of a complete structural overhaul of the Danish public healthcare sector. In con-
                                                 
3 DKK 23.7 billion corresponds to approx. EUR 3.2 billion (~ 1 euro equals approx. 7.5 Danish kroner). Except for 
research papers one and two (Sections 6 and 7), I use DKK throughout the dissertation. 
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trast to the Signalling Programme, which represents one mega-project, the Hospi-
tal Programme consists of 16 hospital construction projects, also mega-projects, 
all of which have been organised as individual projects managed by the same 
number of individual project organisations. The Hospital Programme runs from 
approx. 2008 to 2020 depending on the individual hospital projects. It is important 
to stress that the Hospital Programme has been examined secondarily to the Sig-
nalling Programme and that only the third of the three research papers build on da-
ta collected from the Hospital Programme, and that only in combination with data 
collected from the Signalling Programme. Furthermore, I have personally “only” 
been engaged with this project by looking into formal and informal documents re-
lated to the project and attending seminars and workshops where key actors of the 
Hospital Programme have been present. My co-authors are the ones who have car-
ried out interviews and conducted most of the observations. As a result, more 
space has been dedicated to the Signalling Programme in the present dissertation. 
 
To describe my data collection techniques, I rely on the collection of documents, 
observation studies and semi-structured interviews. The first and most important 
of these techniques is the collection of documents (Callon, 1991). I have collected 
both internally produced documents, such as internal memos, risk reports and 
presentation material, and more formal publicly available documents, such as gov-
ernment legal documents, formal project descriptions and public available status 
reports. The second technique, observation studies, is equally important, as these 
studies allowed me to follow the discussions of the different people involved in 
risk management. I have both attended formal risk meetings and observed people 
having more casual chats about risks and risk management in the course of their 
workdays. The observation studies were carried out as non-participating studies, 
which meant that I did not interfere with the discussions that took place in the 
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meetings I attended. The third and last data collection technique I used was semi-
structured interviews conducted face-to-face with different people involved in risk 
management. This includes project managers, external consultants, train operating 
companies, civil servants, suppliers, and more. The strategy has been to interview 
those actors who according to my network-tracing activity held key positions. 
 
1.7. Remaining dissertation structure 
This subsection outlines the structure of the remaining dissertation and describes 
the content of its different sections. As this dissertation is article-based, this sec-
tion includes the abstracts of the three research papers. 
 
Section 2: “The proliferation of risk management”. This section situates the pro-
ject by describing the worldwide proliferation and standardisation of risk man-
agement and the emergence of risk management in the Danish public sector, with 
special focus on mega-project developments. This section also describes the 
events that preceded the Signalling Programme’s establishment and points to its 
wide entanglement with key public and private sector actors. This section has been 
included to stress the timeliness and relevance of my project and to stress the po-
tentially wide significance of my findings across types of organisations. 
 
Section 3: “Current risk management literature”. This section describes the cur-
rent academic literature on ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ and classifies it into dif-
ferent ‘risk paradigms’ dependent on its theoretical assumptions. This has been 
done to structure this section and to provide an overview of the current literature’s 
contributions and limitations. This dissertation primarily takes into account the lit-
erature originating from the field of management accounting, but supplements this 
with seminal work across various fields of science. It also takes into account lit-
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erature on mega-projects from across fields of sciences. The section ends by de-
scribing four avenues of future research to advance our knowledge of ‘risk’ and 
‘risk management’; four avenues which this dissertation covers in the three papers. 
 
Section 4: “Theoretical framework”. This section introduces the theoretical 
framework applied in this dissertation, actor-network theory, by elaborating on its 
basic concepts and underlying philosophical assumptions. This section does not go 
into detail of the more specific concepts that I rely upon in the three research pa-
pers; these concepts are introduced in the papers. This section also provides an 
overview of the major studies in the accounting literature that take on an either 
pure actor-network theory perspective or combine it with other theoretical per-
spectives, as well as the contributions made by these studies. 
 
Section 5: “Method”. The actor-network theory has methodological implications. 
This section begins by describing these implications. The remaining section has 
been divided into separate subsections dealing with: (1) the method chosen: (two) 
case studies, (2) the “units of analysis”, which refer to the “who, what, when and 
where” of the dissertation, (3) the techniques employed to collect my information 
and the considerations given to their application; (4) my reflections on my own 
role as an observer and what it means to study mega-projects, and (5) the limita-
tions that follow from carrying out case studies (i.e. the challenges of “following 
the actors”). 
 
Section 6: “The role of risk management inscription devices in translating uncer-
tainties into pure and impure risks”. This section represents the first of three ana-
lytical sections, which consists of my first research paper. The following is the ab-
stract of the paper: 
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The processes of translating uncertainties, the potentially infinite 
number of unknown, into a more limited amount of manageable 
risks have been defined as the cornerstone of risk management, but 
have not been the object of many longitudinal studies so far. This 
paper examines a practice of risk management pertaining to the 
carrying out of a large public capital investment programme and 
sheds light, in particular, on the role and effects of risk manage-
ment inscription devices. Drawing on the concepts of purification, 
framing and overflowing as advanced by actor-network theory, the 
paper shows that inscription devices, among other things, end up 
purifying the boundaries between which uncertainties can be in-
cluded and which excluded as risks. The paper theorises the in-
cluded risks to be the pure risks and the excluded risks to be the 
impure risks of the practice and shows that impure risks impair 
subsequent risk reduction. In contrast to pure risks, impure risks 
threaten the stability of the practice and its success in reducing all 
material risks. The paper contributes to current risk management 
literature by demonstrating the both enabling and constraining ef-
fects of inscription devices. 
 
Section 7: “The performativity of enterprise risk management in large public 
transportation infrastructure projects”. This section represents the second of three 
analytical sections, which consists of my second research paper. The following is 
the abstract of the paper: 
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In light of the implementation of frameworks of enterprise risk 
management in large public infrastructure projects, this paper ex-
plores the relations between enterprise risk management and an in-
depth examined practice of risk management. The paper demon-
strates that by performing certain realities of ‘risk’ and ‘risk man-
agement’, enterprise risk management made the practice construct 
the risks that confirmed its propositions. It further shows that the 
practice had difficulty sustaining the propositions of enterprise risk 
management over longer periods of time because situations arose 
which undermined those propositions. In these situations, the paper 
shows that reconfiguring the risk management control system, re-
defining risk terminologies, and redistributing the identities of ac-
tors became key conditions for stabilising the propositions of en-
terprise risk management. The paper concludes by stressing the 
importance of understanding the dynamic interaction between ma-
terial devices, language and identities of actors as conditions of 
long-term risk management success. 
 
Section 8: “Risk management and uncertainty in large infrastructure projects: 
What roles for knowledge and project management?” This section represents the 
third of three analytical sections, consisting of my third research paper. The fol-
lowing is the abstract of the paper: 
 
Risk management devices and practices are routine parts of deliver-
ing large infrastructure projects. Risk management places emphasis 
on quantifying risks and developing strategies to manage, control 
and mitigate them. This means that the contribution by the on-
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going production of knowledge during project processes is limited; 
instead, knowledge is positioned as upfront input to planning and 
specification. However, infrastructure projects are often character-
ised by long durations, by involving many actors at different stag-
es, and by a high degree of uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. 
This presents a problem for both risk management approaches and 
project managers: How can uncertain future conditions and unex-
pected events be reconciled with rational approaches to risk man-
agement? How is the production of new knowledge during project 
processes incorporated into risk management practices? What ef-
fects do risk management practices have on the on-going project? 
To address these questions, we draw upon two comparative case 
studies of large Danish infrastructure projects, using Callon’s 
(1998a) dual notion of framing and overflowing. The cases demon-
strate the emerging uncertainties that challenge project and risk 
management objectives as new knowledge about the conditions are 
produced during project processes, and describe the activities of 
project actors to both perform risk management as required, but al-
so manage emerging uncertainties and concerns. We conclude that 
dominant risk management approaches neglect the wider range of 
uncertainties that emerge during project processes and that overre-
liance on these approaches threaten the long-term value and effec-
tiveness of the project. 
 
Section 9: “Discussion and conclusion”. This section summarises the main claims 
from the three above-mentioned analytical sections / the three research papers. 
This section also describes the contributions of the dissertation by linking the main 
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claims made in the three analytical sections / the three research papers to the over-
all research question. This section also describes the implications of the findings 
for practice and practitioners, the limitations of this dissertation and sets out direc-
tions for future academic research. 
 
Section 10: “References”. All references from the dissertation’s sections, includ-
ing those from the three research papers, have been consolidated in this section to 
give the reader easier access to an overview of the literature. This section has been 
divided into primary and secondary references, where primary references refer to 
the (field) documents collected, and secondary references to the academic litera-
ture. 
 
Section 11: “Appendices”. This section contains the appendices of this disserta-
tion. All appendices (or references made to the same figures etc.) from the re-
search papers has similarly been consolidated. This has been done to avoid dupli-
cations and, again, to give the reader easier access to, in this instance, appendices. 
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2. The proliferation of risk management 
 
This section situates the project by describing both the worldwide proliferation of 
risk management and the emergence of risk management locally in the Danish 
public sector, with special focus on mega-project developments. The length of the 
three research papers did not allow a description of the wider entanglements, 
which is why this section elaborates on that. The section also defines risk man-
agement according to worldwide best-practice frameworks and sets out its basic 
conception, which bears many similarities to that of the rationalist-cognitive per-
spective. It goes on to show the winding trajectories of risk management as well as 
its close entanglement with key central government actors through time and space 
as it got implemented in the Danish public sector and in the Signalling Programme 
in particular. I have included this section to stress the timeliness and relevance of 
my project and to stress the potentially wide significance of my findings across 
sectors, industries and types of organisations. I have further included it to describe 
in further detail the developments that preceded the Signalling Programme’s par-
liamentary approval, developments that show the many different interests that the 
involved key public actors had invested in this practice. 
 
2.1. Worldwide risk management developments 
To begin with proliferation, the emergence of risk management can be ascribed to 
the development of corporate governance and the regulative control regime it 
brought about, which, in turn, was brought about by a range of corporate financial 
scandals (Power, 2007). In the mid-1990s, several corporate financial scandals, 
like the collapse of Baring Bank, led to criticism of current management and ac-
counting practices for not having prevented them. In response, several standards 
(guidelines, frameworks etc.) were produced around the world by committees ap-
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pointed by stock exchanges and the accountancy profession. Two of the major re-
ports were The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’s “Cadbury Report” 
on corporate governance principles (The Financial Aspects of Corporate Govern-
ance, 1992) and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission’s (COSO) “Internal Control – Integrated Framework Report” on in-
ternal control (COSO, 1992). In summary, these standards introduced formalised 
and holistic approaches for management to improve control of their organisations 
and their objectives. In the years that followed, more corporate financial scandals 
surfaced, such as Enron and WorldCom, which this time led to direct regulatory 
intervention. As an example, in 2002 the US government passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which prescribed that companies now had to produce an “internal con-
trol report”. 
 
One of the major elements of corporate (and later on public) governance from the 
beginning was the introduction of first risk assessments, and later actual risk man-
agement practices (IFAC, 2006). In 1985, the largest US accountancy associations 
sponsored the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commis-
sion (COSO) in an attempt to improve management control practices. In 1992, 
COSO produced their world famous standard “Internal Control – Integrated 
Framework” (COSO, 1992), as mentioned above, the application of which was 
rapidly expanded across the globe (COSO, 2004a). This framework had been pro-
duced to “keep the company on course toward profitability goals and achievement 
of its missions, and to minimise surprises along the way” (COSO, 1992, p. 1). The 
framework defined five key components, one of which was risk assessment, and 
stressed that this was an important element in dealing with these “surprises along 
the way” (COSO, 1992, p. 29). In 2004, due to the corporate scandals occurring 
around the turn of the millennium, but also to more general societal developments, 
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COSO separated risk management into its own framework: “Enterprise Risk Man-
agement – Integrated Framework” (COSO, 2004a). This framework was about 
more than just a separation of risk management, however; the framework “incor-
porated the internal control framework within it”, thus downgrading corporate 
governance and internal control to expressions of risk management (COSO, 
2004b, p. v; but see also Hayne & Free, 2014, for a detailed description of the in-
stitutional work that led to this, and Spira & Page, 2003, who term this “the rein-
vention of internal control”). 
 
COSO’s enterprise risk management framework has gained status as one of the 
world’s best-practice risk management frameworks and crystallises the core con-
ception of risk management across counties, sectors and types of organisations 
(Power, 2007, 2009). It has absorbed earlier concepts like operational risk man-
agement, insurance risk management, strategic risk management and financial risk 
management (Verbano & Venturini, 2011) and stands as the most well-known 
framework across the globe (COSO, 2001; Fraser et al., 2008). It further defines 
the same core conception of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ as do other best-practice 
national and international standards (See Raz & Hillson, 2005 for a comparative 
review). The Project Management Institute’s “A Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge” (PMI, 2004), for example, identifies risk management as one 
of the key drivers of project success, and The Institute of Risk Management, The 
National Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector, and The Association 
of Insurance and Risk Managers’ “A Risk Management Standard” (IRM et al., 
2002) do the same for all types of organisations. This also follows from frame-
works on project management in more general terms, where risk management has 
become a crucial part of ‘good’ project management (Winch, 2010; Winch & 
Maytorena, 2011). COSO ERM defines enterprise risk management as follows: 
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“Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in 
strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify poten-
tial events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its 
risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives”. (COSO, 2004, p. 2) 
 
The COSO ERM definition of risk management “captures key concepts funda-
mental to how companies and other organizations manage risk, providing a basis 
for application across organizations, industries, and sectors” (COSO, 2004, p. 2). 
This definition reflects broad fundamental ideas. It follows that risk management 
should be understood as: an ongoing and iterative process; affected by people at 
every level of an organisation; applied in a strategic setting; applied across the en-
terprise at every level and unit; designed to identify potential events that, if they 
occur, will affect the organisation, and to manage risks within its appetite; able to 
provide reasonable assurance to organisational management and board of direc-
tors; and geared to the achievement of objectives. The underlying premise is that 
every organisation exists to provide value for its stakeholders. COSO writes that 
“all entities face uncertainty” and that “the challenge for management is to deter-
mine how much uncertainty to accept as it strives to grow stakeholder value” 
(COSO, 2004, p. 1). This value can then be achieved by the inherent capabilities 
of risk management, which are: “aligning risk appetite and strategy; enhancing 
risk response decisions; reducing operational surprises and losses; identifying and 
managing multiple and cross-enterprise risks; proactively seizing opportunities; 
and improving the deployment of capital” (COSO, 2004, p. 1). 
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The COSO ERM and similar different frameworks are based on the same basic 
components that organisations are recommended to follow if they want to achieve 
the above ideals of value production, increased organisational control and comply 
with ‘good governance’ tendencies. In their essence, these frameworks can be de-
scribed as, firstly, defining the objectives of the organisation and aligning them 
with the organisation’s risk appetite. This includes setting the tone of the organisa-
tion, the emphasis on risk management, the objectives of the practice, the ethical 
values of the organisation and more. Secondly, internal and external events that af-
fect the achievement of the organisational objectives must be identified, distin-
guishing between risks and opportunities. Thirdly, risks must be analysed and as-
sessed in relation to their probabilities and consequences (or likelihood and 
impact) as a basis for how they should be managed later on. In this respect, organ-
isations are recommended to both exhibit quantitative calculations and qualitative 
judgment and plot these assessments into risk maps in order to generate overviews 
of the continued risk situation. Fourthly, management has to select appropriate risk 
responses ranging from acceptance, avoidance, reduction, sharing etc., and carry 
these out in order to match the pre-set risk appetite. And lastly, risk monitoring 
and control should take place to provide feedback on current risk developments to 
the effect that new risks are identified, current risks reassessed and new actions 
taken to ensure that the risk value is kept below the risk appetite. 
 
While COSO ERM and similar frameworks outline the benefits to be gained from 
implementing them, they also recognise that there are certain limitations connect-
ed to such implementation. It follows that despite the strong emphasis in the 
frameworks on calculation and rationalistic knowledge conditions, risk manage-
ment depends on human judgment, which can be “faulty” (COSO, 2004, p. 5). In 
addition, decisions on how to identify, assess and respond to risks need to consider 
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the relative costs and benefits; breakdowns can occur because of simple errors or 
mistakes; controls can be circumvented by the collusion of two or more people; 
and management has the capability of overriding employee risk management deci-
sions. It is those elements that “preclude a board and management from having 
absolute assurance as to the achievement of the entity’s objectives [my emphasis]” 
(COSO, 2004, p. 5). COSO ERM proposes, however, on the last page of the exec-
utive summary, that if all the actors involved, from board of directors, to senior 
management, other personnel, regulators, professional organisations, educators, 
consultants, etc., embrace this concept and embody and utilise its core understand-
ings, then “these benefits will be realized [my emphasis]” (COSO, 2004, p. 7). 
 
In conclusion, COSO ERM and similar frameworks reflect an understanding of 
‘risks’ as objective facts or truths, although they recognise that risks can be more 
than dangers or threats, and also opportunities. They also build on the logic that 
risks can be controlled through rationalistic planning and structured identification 
and assessment processes. They do acknowledge that humans may have cognitive 
biases and that processes are open for manipulation, but rather than recognising 
this as pre-conditions, they tend to attribute this to so-called “limitations” or what 
can be described as “deviations” from an otherwise rational approach. They fur-
ther encourage the reliance on statistical methods to calculate ‘risk levels’ from 
which proper courses of action can be taken, depending on the pre-set ‘risk appe-
tite’. In this connection, Power has compared their basic conception to the logic of 
that of a thermostat: “…which adjusts to changes in environment subject to a pre-
given target temperature” (2009, p. 849). In sum, COSO ERM and similar frame-
works thus end up becoming deeply rationalistic and functionalistic, which further 
because of their worldwide popularity now shape different organisations’ ap-
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proach to dealing with ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, including in public mega-
projects, to which the following Subsection 2.2 is dedicated. 
 
2.2. Emergence of risk management in the Danish public sector  
In the mid-1990s, around the same time that international corporate financial 
scandals were unfolding and discourses of corporate governance and risk man-
agement emerged, the country of Denmark watched as similar Danish public sec-
tor corporate scandals unfolded. One of the largest and most controversial cases 
was the Combus financial scandal. In 1995, Combus, the bus division of the state-
owned train operating company, DSB, was spun off into a separate state-owned 
company; see statute no. 232 of 04/04/1995 (Transportministeriet, 1995). Three 
years later after its establishment, however, Combus suffered financial problems 
as operating accounts showed a large deficit (Rigsrevisionen, 1999a). The Nation-
al Audit Office looked into the matter and arrived at the conclusion that Combus 
had “demonstrated financial imprudence” and that the Ministry of Transport as the 
governing administration “should have been aware of the inadequate management 
accounting practice exhibited [my translations]” (Rigsrevisionen, 1999a: I, 12). 
The National Audit Office further concluded that Combus had taken unnecessary 
risks when bidding for bus lines by only including very slim profit margins. This 
ultimately “contributed to the poor financial performance of the company [my 
translation]” (Rigsrevisionen, 1999a: I, 20-22). In the end, Combus was sold to the 
British company Arriva for the symbolic amount of DKK 100 and just barely 
avoided bankruptcy. 
 
In September 1998, the Danish Public Account Committee requested that the Na-
tional Audit Office look into yet another public financial scandal (Rigsrevisionen 
1999b). From 1995 to 1998, the Danish Road Directorate had reported cost over-
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runs on several minor capital investment programmes, which was a matter of con-
cern to the Danish Parliament. The Road Directorate has the direct responsibility 
of planning, designing, operating and maintaining all state-owned roads. In 1999, 
the National Audit Office published their report, which concluded that “12 out of 
15 programmes had budget deviations of more than plus-minus ten per cent of to-
tal costs [my translation]”, which amounted to more than DKK 1 billion (Rigsrevi-
sionen 1999b, I, 9). The National Audit Office attributed 82 per cent of that 
amount to changed project conditions caused by other government bodies than the 
Road Directorate, which thus mitigated the severity of the situation for the Road 
Directorate. At the same time, however, the National Audit Office wrote that “the 
Road Directorate should have anticipated the risk of extra costs during budgeting 
[my translation and emphasis]” (Rigsrevisionen 1999b, I, 10). The National Audit 
Office further emphasised “that no risk assessment and uncertainty calculations 
had been made” and found it “vitally important that such measures were made in 
future [my translations]” to avoid cost overruns (Rigsrevisionen 1999b, I, 21). 
 
The National Audit Office slowly began to define risk assessments as a precondi-
tion for proper management control and accounting. The above two scandals and 
the subsequent two reports were two of the first public investigations which ex-
plicitly stressed the importance of risk assessments in ensuring proper manage-
ment control. In 1999, the Ministry of Transport intensified its monitoring of the 
Road Directorate as they agreed to implement systematic risk assessment in all 
capital investment programmes in the Road Directorate’s jurisdiction 
(Vejdirektoratet, 2000, p. 37). In the second of the two 1999 reports, the National 
Audit Office commented that they found this measure significant for providing a 
“loyal, clear and transparent [my translation]” overview of budget conditions 
(Rigsrevisionen 1999b, VI, 175). In Denmark, the Ministry of Transport receives 
33 
 
on average approx. 80 per cent of all nation-wide capital appropriations, which 
means that the largest part by far of all capital investment programmes falls within 
their jurisdiction to manage (see Appendix 1). This means also that capital ex-
penditure scandals emerging from agencies under the auspice of the Ministry of 
Transport have the potential largest negative effects on total public capital ex-
penditure. The Ministry of Transport is responsible for the entire transport infra-
structure, which ranges from state road and railway networks to harbour, airport 
and postal facilities. The road and railway agencies receive the largest part by far 
of all capital appropriations, which makes developments in this area the most im-
portant for the control of total public capital expenditure. 
 
In the years between 2000 and 2005, this situation made things worse as Rail Net 
Denmark (Banedanmark), the agency that manages the railway infrastructure, also 
revealed management control problems like those of the Road Directorate (Rigs-
revisionen, 2002, 2004, 2005). In the Traffic Agreement covering the period from 
2000 to 2004, Rail Net Denmark had received DKK 530 million extra a year to 
catch up with past decades of maintenance and renewal backlogs (Finansminister-
iet, 1999). It followed that Rail Net Denmark had to obtain DKK 140 million of 
this amount a year from improved internal operational efficiency. In 2002, howev-
er, the National Audit Office reported that Rail Net Denmark had achieved the 
planned amount of railways improvement, but that this had been done without any 
systematic knowledge of what had needed improvement. This prompted the Na-
tional Audit Office to report that for many of the restorations projects that had 
been undertaken, Rail Net Denmark “failed to comply with the most basic finan-
cial management procedures and routines [my translation]” (Rigsrevisionen 2002, 
III, 149). The National Audit Office also criticised the fact that although Rail Net 
Denmark had achieved their DKK 140-million efficiency improvement, the organ-
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isation was unable to document whether these savings were caused by increased 
efficiency or by other factors (Rigsrevisionen 2002, IV, 262). 
 
As a consequence of the above-mentioned scandals, during this period, the Na-
tional Audit Office also criticised the Ministry of Transport for lacking oversight 
with all of its agencies and enterprises (Rigsrevisionen, 2004). In 2002, this led 
the Public Accounts Committee to ask the National Audit Office to undertake a 
full performance audit of the Ministry of Transport. In 2004, the National Audit 
Office reported that the Ministry Transport’s monitoring efforts had been unsatis-
factory, and the Audit Office pointed to severe management information problems 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2004, I, 57). They did approve of the fact that the Ministry of 
Transport had implemented a new management control system in 2003, but criti-
cised that the system had only been partly implemented and was “far from relevant 
[my translation]” (Rigsrevisionen, 2004, I, 15). In 2005, this culminated as the Fi-
nance Committee received word about ‘irregularities’ concerning state appropria-
tion acts from Rail Net Denmark. The National Audit Office looked into seven 
different cases and found that due to inadequate accounting information, certain 
dispositions had been made without appropriational approval. The National Office 
concluded that the Ministry of Transport’s oversight with Rail Net Denmark had 
been highly criticisable and that Rail Net Denmark’s management control was un-
satisfactory (Rigsrevisionen 2005, I, 89-94). In 2005, the CEO of Rail Net Den-
mark stood down.4 
 
It was not only in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport that capital invest-
ment programmes turned out to incur cost overruns. In 1999, the Danish National 
                                                 
4 See Justesen and Skærbæk (2010) for more details on the Ministry of Transport’s response to the National Audit 
Office’s critique between the years 1999 and 2004. They describe how the Ministry of Transport attempted to cope 
with the critique, among other measures by implementing a risk management system. 
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Broadcasting Corporation (Danish Radio) decided to gather the different parts of 
its organisation into one single building, which was to be constructed. The con-
struction costs had been budgeted at DKK 3 billion with an uncertainty margin of 
plus 15 or minus 10 per cent, meaning that the total construction costs had been 
estimated to end up somewhere between DKK 2.7 to 3.5 billion. It was also stated 
that Danish Radio expected the new headquarters to be completed by the end of 
2004. In September 1999, the Danish Parliament’s Finance Committee approved 
the construction act and agreed to finance about DKK 2.3 billion of the total costs 
through a state-guaranteed loan (the remaining costs to be financed by sale of ex-
isting buildings). Danish Radio planned to supervise the project themselves and 
therefore sat up a construction committee and a construction management organi-
sation. In late 1999, Danish Radio commenced the construction of what would lat-
er be known as the Danish Radio Building. The Danish Ministry of Culture had 
the oversight responsibility, as Danish Radio fell within their jurisdiction. 
 
The Danish Radio Building project turned out to be one of the largest Danish con-
struction scandals with total costs of approx. DKK 4.7 billion, which was DKK 
1.7 billion, or 57 per cent, over budget. In addition, the project went bad from the 
very beginning. In 2001, the construction programme had been delayed and the 
construction management organisation found inadequate. In 2002, the budget for 
constructing the prestigious concert hall had been overrun due to increased labour 
expenses. In 2003, MT Højgaard, one of the main contractors reported that the 
tendering material for the concert hall contained material errors which it would re-
quire large costs and delays to fix. In 2004, Danish Radio reported increased costs 
of advisory fees. In 2005, Danish Radio further had to realise that the parliament 
was unwilling to finance cost overruns of more than approx. DKK 300 million, 
which led to unwanted operational savings and construction compromises. In 
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2005, MT Højgaard announced that they had to postpone the completion date to 
the beginning of 2008, which led to organisational turmoil, as Danish Radio had to 
leave their existing premises by 2006. In the aftermath, 521 employees had to be 
laid off or let go in other ways; approx. DKK 300 million had to be saved annually 
in future; and the Chairman of the Board, the Director General, the Chief Financial 
Officer and the head project manager all had to step down (KPMG & Grant 
Thornton, 2008). 
 
The National Audit Office had been involved from the early stages of this scandal 
in its capacity of the government annual auditor of state-owned enterprise and 
agencies. In September 2006, the National Audit Office further launched a special 
investigation into the Danish Radio Building project (Rigsrevisionen, 2006). In 
November 2006, however, the Danish Parliament Administration received a re-
quest from the chairman of the Cultural Affairs Committee to examine whether 
the National Audit Office was legally competent to undertake such an investiga-
tion. In an article printed in the “Weekly Newsletter for Board of Directors” [Uge-
brev for bestyrelser] it had been claimed that the National Audit Office would be 
auditing their own work on the matter and was thus incompetent. The article based 
this claim on the National Audit Office’s audit protocol from 2005, which had 
stated: “The National Audit Office concludes that Danish Radio has had adequate 
focus on the risks that can extend the project or lead to extra costs, and on unfore-
seen costs for the rest of the project period [my translation and emphasis]” (Folke-
tingets Administration, 2006). The Parliament Administration found this situation 
problematic, and the National Auditor responded the following day by cancelling 
all on-going investigations into Danish Radio as “there can be no doubt concern-
ing the National Audit Office’s qualification and credibility [my translation]” 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2006, p. 1). 
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In 2007, the Danish parliament decided to conduct an investigation into the Danish 
Radio Building project with the purpose of “assessing the main causes of the in-
crease in costs of the building project” (Kulturministeriet [Ministry of Culture], 
2007). As the National Audit Office had itself withdrawn from the investigation, 
the auditors KPMG and Grant Thornton were contracted by the Ministry of Cul-
ture to carry out this task. KPMG and Grant Thornton came to the conclusion that 
the budget deviations primarily could be attributed to “poor management supervi-
sion” and “the lack of an effective management control system” stressing here 
“the lack of an effective risk management system” (KPMG & Grant Thornton, 
2008, p. 26-32). In more detail, the auditors argued that management had failed to 
take all material uncertainties into account and failed to properly assess the likeli-
hood and impact of those uncertainties that had been taken into account. This 
meant that the necessary actions to prevent cost overruns had not been taken and 
that “incomplete risk assessments therefore indirectly had contributed to the in-
crease in the cost of the Danish Radio Building” (KPMG & Grant Thornton, 2008, 
p. 263). In sum, the Danish Radio Building scandal led to strong pressure on all 
enterprises and agencies across the public sector to implement risk management. 
 
In 2006, this pressure was made into legislation on large public transport capital 
investment programmes, as the Danish Ministry of Finance [Finansministeriet] 
had become concerned with the technique applied to estimate total project costs. 
At that time, the most widely used technique was the ‘successive principle meth-
od’, or just ‘successive calculation’, which builds on statistics to integrate cost es-
timation with uncertainty analysis (Lichtenstein, 2000). The Ministry of Finance, 
however, had over some time experienced that projects using that principle tended 
to incur cost overruns (Finansministeriet, 2010). The Ministry also knew that pro-
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jects abroad (using similar techniques) suffered from the same tendency and that 
research had shown that this was due to strategic misrepresentation, meaning that 
successive calculation was open to political manipulation (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 
2002). Consequently, the Ministry of Finance decided to collaborate with the Min-
istry of Transport on developing what was later to be called the “New Budgeting 
Method”. On 24 October 2006, this method was introduced for projects under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Transport that had a separate appropriation in the Fi-
nancial Act or were legislated by parliament (Transportministeriet, 2006). 
 
The “New Budgeting Method” introduced several new aspects into budgeting on 
large transportation project. These included banning successive calculation and 
replacing it by the use of experience-based costs from prior projects 
(Transportministeriet, 2006). This meant that all future risk estimates had to be 
excluded from the calculations. In the recognition that cost overruns still might 
happen, however, and that funds would have to be available for such a contingen-
cy, an experience-based contingency reserve, or risk margin, of 30 per cent was 
added. In the guidelines accompanying the “New Budgeting Method”, it was also 
stated that management control practices had to be supported by a much more sys-
tematic approach to risk management (Transportministeriet, 2008). This was im-
plemented in order to ideally prevent the risk margin from being used and to en-
sure project objectives. It was further stressed that this practice had to be 
implemented and operated throughout the lifetime of the project, and rely on fixed 
operating and documentation procedures. It was also made compulsory to imple-
ment an IT-based risk management control system along with a long list of much 
more specific requirements. In this respect, the Ministry of Finance argued that 
practices of risk management were to be constructed on the basis of best-practice 
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frameworks referring to, among other aspects, the before-mentioned COSO-
framework (Finansministeriet, 2007). 
 
The reason why the “New Budgeting Method” was turned into law on 24 October 
2006 was because two days later, on 26 October 2006, the Danish parliament de-
cided to go ahead with one of the largest Danish mega-projects to date: the Signal-
ling Programme. In the period between 2000 and 2005, due to limited appropriat-
ed funds, Rail Net Denmark had not been in a position neither to perform 
maintenance of the signalling systems, nor to remove renewal backlogs, and by 
2006 this caused major delays, something which the parliament could not avoid 
acting upon if they wanted an operational train service. The Ministry of Finance 
wanted to improve the Signalling Programme’s chances of success, which is why 
the “New Budgeting Method” was approved immediately before the programme’s 
approval. The Signalling Programme ended up becoming the first Danish attempt 
at implementing the “New Budgeting Method”, including holistic risk manage-
ment, as a practice to prevent cost overruns. In 2010, four years after implementa-
tion of the method, the Ministry of Finance declared “New Budgeting Method” a 
success. Today, it serves as a best-practice illustration for the rest of the public 
sector on how to deal with ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ (Finansministeriet, 2010). 
 
The following subsection (Section 2.3) turns the attention to the Signalling Pro-
gramme and describes in more detail how it came into being, i.e. the actions and 
events leading up to the point where the project was given a green light. It is one 
thing to decide that organisations need to implement “best-practice risk manage-
ment” and another thing for organisations to articulate it, to translate “best prac-
tice” into “actual practice”. In the following subsection, I therefore describe how 
the practice of risk management was constructed. After this subsection, I will give 
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a brief overview of the main actions and events that happened in that (Section 
2.4). I end the main section after this, as the papers give a more detailed account of 
the action and events that took place after the programme had come into being. 
 
2.3. The Signalling Programme 
The Signalling Programme came into being with the parliamentary decision to 
look into the possibilities of a permanent solution to the above-mentioned deterio-
ration of the Danish rail signalling infrastructure (Finansministeriet, 2005). In 
2005 the conditions of the signalling infrastructure had decayed to the point where 
train operation became problematic due to massive delays (Banedanmark, 2009a). 
In that same year, the Danish parliament decided to grant DKK 20 million to Rail 
Net Denmark towards a systematic assessment of the severity of the conditions, 
and, if necessary, the establishment of different investment strategies for dealing 
with this (Finansministeriet, 2005). Booz Allen Hamilton, a consultancy company, 
was contracted to undertake this assessment. In 2006, they submitted their report 
showing that the Danish signalling systems had aged to the point where many of 
the present systems had overrun their technical service life (Booz Allen Hamilton, 
2006a). The report, called the ‘Signalling Analysis’, pointed to four different in-
vestment strategies with total replacement costs amounting to between DKK 25.8 
and 33.1 billion: three successive age-based replacement strategies and one total 
replacement-based strategy (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a, p. 117). Booz Allen 
Hamilton further calculated that about DKK 18 billion, or about 50-70 per cent of 
the total replacement costs, represented risk values, i.e. unforeseen costs and 
budgetary uncertainty in general (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a, p. 113). 
 
More specifically, Booz Allen Hamilton demonstrated that the existing signalling 
systems generated approximately 39,000 delayed trains every year and accounted 
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for about half of all the delays that Rail Net Denmark as the owner was responsi-
ble for (Banedanmark, 2009a). In Denmark, the rail network covers about 2,100 
kilometres of lines and 3,000 kilometres of tracks and serves about 560 train sets 
and engines from four major operators every day. The existing railway systems are 
equipped with traditional signalling equipment, i.e. colour light signalling, train 
detection by means of track circuits and points operated by electric point ma-
chines. It covers 6,837 signals, 2,864 point machines and 563 level crossing facili-
ties, which are all controlled by 77 CTC systems, with 364 associated substations, 
274 interlocking systems, 244 line block installations and 1,713 train detection fa-
cilities (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a, p. 29). The rail network can be divided into 
two areas; the main regional lines (f-banen), which cover all inter-city train traffic; 
and the Copenhagen mass transit system (s-banen). The regional lines are operated 
from three larger regional control centres and 11 smaller control centres, and the 
mass transit system is operated from one large control centre. The Signalling 
Analysis took into account the age, errors, state and maintenance requirements of 
all of the above and concluded that the total renewal strategy would be the eco-
nomically and technically best way to renew the systems (Banedanmark, 2009a). 
 
The concept of total renewal was described as replacement of all signalling 
equipment from basic train detection and point machines to the overall traffic 
management system as well as on-board train communication systems, regardless 
of age (Banedanmark, 2009a). The key elements described were that all regional 
network signalling equipment had to be replaced with ERTMS (European Railway 
Traffic Management System) level 2-based signalling technology and modern 
computer-based area interlocking and state-of-the-art central control systems 
(Banedanmark, 2009a). ERTMS is a mandatory common European standard for 
train control and train radio systems that has been implemented to advance in-
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teroperability across European countries. Similarly, all signals on the Copenhagen 
mass transit system network had to be replaced by a suitable metro/urban railway 
signalling system, i.e. a CBTC (Communication Based Train Control) system pre-
pared for driverless operation (Banedanmark, 2009a). The key elements also in-
cluded developing new national operational rules by adopting existing and proven 
sets of rules in accordance with European standards. Overall, the purpose of the 
total renewal strategy was to “implement the newest proven signalling technology, 
based on standard industrial hardware components, redundant system configura-
tions offering uniform system interfaces and high reliability” (Banedanmark, 
2009a, p. 9). The total renewal strategy was thus very ambitious. 
 
Booz Allen Hamilton reported this back to Banestyregruppen (a steering commit-
tee), which had been established with members from the Ministry of Transport, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Traffic Authority, Danish State Railways, and Rail 
Net Denmark (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006c). In 2006, when Booz Allen Hamilton 
presented their findings, Banestyregruppen was shocked by the calculated risk 
value of DKK 18 billion (I4, 12). Before the findings in the ‘Signalling Analysis’ 
came to its attention, Banestyregruppen had calculated with a risk value of approx. 
DKK 1 billion (I4, 12). Booz Allen Hamilton had used the successive calculation 
principle to calculate the risk value, and they had used the 50 percent fractile, 
which meant that the project had a 50 percent probability of being even more ex-
pensive. When especially the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transport 
heard this, they questioned whether less risky investment strategies could not be 
pursued (I4, 94). In response, Booz Allen Hamilton was therefore asked to come 
up with two investment variants on the total replacement strategy which could re-
duce the ‘value at risk’ (I4, 16, 94). Booz Allen Hamilton did so, and when the 
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original ‘Signalling Analysis’ was submitted, it included an extra report with an 
analysis of two investment variants’ (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006b). 
 
Booz Allen Hamilton was able to reduce the risk value from approx. DKK 18 to 
10 billion by primarily postponing the deadline across the network from 2016 to 
2020, which allowed for an extended roll-out period and thus reduced the risk of 
delays (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006c, pp. 33-34). This time, the total replacement 
costs were estimated to be about DKK 21.3 billion. Rail Net Denmark presented 
this to Banestyregruppen, where the representatives of the two ministries this time 
were less sceptical (I4, 130). The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Transport were still concerned with the size and complexity of the programme, but 
as expressed by one of the members of Banestyregruppen, this project was a “rock 
solid business case” that had to be undertaken (I4, 132). He explained that the en-
tire operation of the rail network depended on the signalling systems, and because 
they would basically soon no longer function, they had to be replaced, that is, as 
he said, if the government wanted public rail transportation to be available (I4, 
107). In summary, there was no disagreement about whether the project had to be 
undertaken, but the key actors were concerned whether the project could be com-
pleted within time and cost and thus not turn out as yet another public scandal. 
 
On 26 October 2006, the Danish parliament endorsed the “rock solid business 
case” and decided that Rail Net Denmark were to plan the coming years’ invest-
ments, within their current funding, based on the intention to implement a total re-
placement of the existing signalling systems (Finansministeriet, 2006). The par-
liament further allocated DKK 100 million towards a more detailed analysis of the 
different total replacement scenarios in which the completion date was set to be 
2018 and 2020 respectively. The agreement meant that Rail Net Denmark had to 
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establish detailed time plans, cost estimations and risk profiles for different total 
replacement scenarios; they had to propose two scenarios for the regional line, ad-
hering to the ERTMS recommendations, and two scenarios for the mass transit 
system (Finansministeriet, 2006). In addition, Rail Net Denmark had to develop 
more scenarios if during this work they found different, but better replacement 
scenarios in relation to Booz Allen Hamilton’s findings. The focus here was on 
time, cost and risks, and the project scenarios had to be so detailed that they could 
be used as a basis for potential later contractual procurement and thus move the 
project forward into its next phase (Banedanmark, 2008a). 
 
In the years between 2006 and 2008, Rail Net Denmark carried out this work 
through an established project organisation called the Signalling Programme, 
which later became the organisation responsible for managing the replacement 
programme (Banedanmark, 2008a). The Signalling Programme had its own ac-
count in the Financial Act and reported to Rail Net Denmark’s board of directors 
and the above-mentioned Banestyregruppen. To begin with, this organisation con-
sisted of three people and therefore lacked the competencies to carry out the as-
signed task (I4, 18). Consequently, the Signalling Programme contracted external 
consultants from Ramboll A/S (Denmark), Emch+Berger Group AG (Switzerland) 
and R+R Burger und Partner AG (Switzerland) as collaborators (Banedanmark, 
2008a). These consultancies had formed an international conglomerate together 
with Parsons (UK), RMCon (Switzerland) and Ramboll Management (Denmark) 
as sub-consultants, and had won the bidding. At the same time, the Signalling 
Programme began to hire more people on its own and thus develop into a more 
competent project organisation. In late 2008, Rail Net Denmark presented its find-
ings in two major reports, both named after the Signalling Programme organisa-
tion: ‘The Signalling Programme Background Report’ and ‘The Signalling Pro-
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gramme Decision Report’ (Banedanmark, 2008a, 2008b). These reports covered 
the findings made in extensive technical reports, two major project specification 
reports and an external quality assurance report. 
 
Rail Net Denmark divided the programme into two major subprojects: the regional 
lines network and the mass transit system (Banedanmark, 2008a). For the regional 
lines subproject, Rail Net Denmark established four different scenarios of varying 
duration and calculated the socio-economic impacts, total costs and risk profiles of 
each of them. The third scenario, scheduled from 2009 to 2021, was recommended 
because it had the best trade-off between the above factors (Banedanmark, 2008b, 
p. 11). The Signalling Programme expected this scenario to improve train punctu-
ality by approx. four percentage points due to the elimination of around 80 per 
cent of all signalling errors (Banedanmark, 2008b, p. 9). Also, ERTMS was ex-
pected to lead to more efficient infrastructure operation, maintenance and traffic 
control, increased safety levels on smaller train lines without automatic train con-
trol systems, and improved passenger information. The Signalling Programme fur-
ther expected cost savings of approx. DKK 6.7 billion during the 25-year lifetime 
of the ERTMS-based system once implemented. The total replacement costs for 
the regional lines were estimated to be approx. DKK 19.6 billion, and the risk val-
ue to be approx. DKK 2.8 billion. Combined, the Signalling Programme estimated 
savings of about 790,000 hours in passenger delays per year. 
 
For the mass transit system subproject, Rail Net Denmark similarly established 
four different scenarios of varying duration and calculated the socio-economic im-
pacts, total costs and risk profiles of each of them. In contrast to the regional lines 
network, this analysis showed that a total replacement in the period from 2009 to 
2020 had the unparalleled best socio-economic impacts, total costs and risk profile 
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(Banedanmark, 2008b, p. 15). The Signalling Programme also expected improved 
train punctuality, but in this case at a level of 0.8 percentage points, as well as im-
proved train capacity, increased safety levels and improved passenger information. 
The total replacement costs were estimated to be DKK 4.1 billion and the risk val-
ue to be DKK 0.6 billion. Combined with the DKK 2.8 billion risk value of the re-
gional lines subproject, this was therefore much lower than the original combined 
risk value of DKK 10 billion estimated by Booz Allen Hamilton. Rail Net Den-
mark explained that this reduction had been realised through the clarification of 
many technical issues, the establishment of a separate project organisation and an 
extension of the future phases (Banedanmark, 2008a). 
 
Between the preparation of the ‘Signalling Analysis’ and the ‘Signalling Pro-
gramme’ reports, however, the Ministry of Finance had grown tired of the calcula-
tion techniques applied on mega-projects, the successive calculation mentioned 
above (Finansministeriet, 2010). The Ministry of Finance had learned from expe-
rience that projects using successive calculation tended to produce unreliable es-
timations of total project costs. Booz Allen Hamilton had applied successive cal-
culation when they prepared the initial investment strategies, but as mentioned 
above, this calculation technique was banned for transport mega-projects with the 
parliament’s approval of the “New Budgeting Method”. Booz Allen Hamilton had 
estimated total costs of the two extra investment strategies to be DKK 21.3 billion 
(including risk values), but these costs now had to be reassessed in order to com-
ply with the new method. In practice this meant that Rail Net Denmark had to 
compare this programme to a reference class of programmes, but as such pro-
grammes did not exist, and because Rail Net Denmark wanted suppliers to bid on 
functional requirements (and then leave them to design their own system within 
those functional requirements) and not a long list of components, large parts of the 
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budget were therefore still the result of estimation. In addition, Rail Net Denmark 
had to exclude all risk estimates from the budget and instead apply the 30 percent 
risk reserve on actual prices. 
 
The ‘Signalling Programme’ report showed that by excluding risk values but still 
including the 30 percent risk reserve, total replacement costs could be reduced to 
DKK 19.6 billion for the regional lines subproject and DKK 4.1 billion for the 
mass transit system subproject (Banedanmark, 2008b, pp. 35-66). Combined, this 
amounted to DKK 23.7 billion, which was DKK 2.4 billion higher than Booz Al-
len Hamilton’s initial cost estimations of DKK 21.3 billion for the two extra in-
vestment variants. As Rail Net Denmark, however, had had to exclude risk values 
when using the “New Budgeting Method”, the actual total replacement costs 
amounted to DKK 23.7 billion minus 30 per cent, or DKK 18.2 billion. Compared 
to Booz Allen Hamilton’s estimate, this was thus DKK 3.1 billion lower, even de-
spite the fact that another approx. DKK 3 billion worth of components had been 
added since Booz Allen Hamilton’s initial assessment (Banedanmark, 2008b, p. 
67). This difference was important, as the “New Budgeting Method” introduced 
risk management in order to make sure that the risk reserve of 30 per cent would 
not be used, and thus that the programme could be completed within the reduced 
DKK 18.2-billion budget (Transportministeriet, 2008). 
 
In their approach to managing risks during the period 2006 to 2008, Ramboll, as 
one of the main advisors, took up the task of developing this required holistic and 
comprehensive practice of risk management (Banedanmark, 2008c). Ramboll de-
veloped what they described as a “state-of-the-art risk management system” 
(Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 5). In more detail, Ramboll described that they had fol-
lowed the PMBOK best-practice recommendations, which included: “deciding on 
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how to approach, plan, and execute the risk management activities, determining 
which risks might affect the programme and document their characteristics, priori-
tising risks for subsequent further analysis or action by assessing and combining 
the risks probability of occurrence and consequence of impact, numerically ana-
lysing the effects on overall programme objectives of identified risks, developing 
options and action to enhance opportunities and to reduce threats to programme 
objectives, tracking identified risks, monitoring residual risks, identifying new 
risks, execution risk response plans, and evaluating their effectiveness throughout 
the programme lifecycle” (Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 44). Overall, this system ena-
bled a structured approach to the identification, assessment, reduction and moni-
toring of risks throughout the lifetime of the programme and thus extended the 
system beyond the project specification phase (Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 6). 
 
In adhering to the requirements of the “New Budgeting Method” to support the 
risk management practice by an IT-based risk management control system, Ram-
boll further developed a risk register to keep track of the status of identified risks 
(Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 13). This system also made it possible to keep track of 
risk reducing measures, to generate status overviews of current risks, to keep track 
of responsibilities and actions, to present plans for risk reduction and to provide 
documentation (Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 46). In order to identify significant risks, 
Ramboll also implemented a standard 5x5 risk-rating matrix, or what would later 
be known as “the traffic light assessment matrix”, showing consequence on the x-
axis and probability on the y-axis (See Appendix 4). This matrix was categorised 
into high (red), moderate (yellow), and low (green). Ramboll also specified the 
five probability classes according to different numerical percentage intervals and 
the five consequence classes into cost, time, benefit, punctuality, and reputation 
intervals (See Appendix 5). The register further allowed for the calculation of the 
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amount of total costs at risk, the so-called ‘value at risk’ calculations, by summing 
up the cost assessments across all risks. Last of all, Ramboll also defined a risk re-
porting format which would include detailed descriptions of the current top-ranked 
risks, comments on overall development, plans for controls and the calculation 
‘value at risk’ (the total budget at stake). 
 
During this period, Ramboll managed to reduce the risks from the approx. DKK 
10 billion that Booz Allen Hamilton had calculated for the two additional invest-
ment variants to the DKK 3.4 billion described in the ‘Signalling Programme’ re-
ports. As mentioned above, this had largely been achieved through the clarifica-
tion and elaboration of technical details, the establishment of a separate project 
organisation and an extension of the tendering and roll-out phases. Furthermore, 
Ramboll mentioned that the risk value had been reduced due to detailed interface 
agreements with major train operating companies and because it had been decided 
to allow suppliers to take part in functional requirement specification. The major 
remaining risks were: lack of qualified staff; failure in tendering to secure the best 
value-for-money bid; lack of proper management skills; being a public project; 
lack of competition between suppliers; contractual disagreements; incorrect or in-
complete asset data; and lacks, uncertainties and faults in functional specification 
requirements (Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 5). In 2008, however, Ramboll handed 
over the report and the risk management system as they, like the remaining mem-
bers of the consultant consortium, had only been hired up until this point. 
 
On 29 January 2009, the Danish parliament decided to appropriate the DKK 23.7 
billion that had been estimated by Rail Net Denmark to fund the total replacement 
of the Danish rail signalling infrastructure (Transportministeriet, 2009a). The Sig-
nalling Programme had thus come into existence and had received a ‘green light’ 
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to renew the signalling infrastructure on the Copenhagen mass transit system be-
fore 2020 and the regional lines before 2021. Rail Net Denmark had agreed to 
meet two central political milestones where acceptance had to be given before the 
programme could move forward: (1) before publishing the tendering documenta-
tion; and (2) before the signing of the final contracts. It also followed from the 
government approval that funds would be appropriated only to bring forward the 
programme to its next political milestone. Rail Net Denmark further agreed to re-
port on the Signalling Programme’s progress and status in its bi-annually status 
report to the Danish Ministry of Transport, in Rail Net Denmark’s annual reports, 
and in relation to the bi-annual follow-up on the Traffic Agreement for 2007, plus 
in an extended status report around each of the two milestones, both of the latter 
also to be handed in to the Ministry of Transport (Banedanmark, 2008b, p. 18). 
 
In 2009, Rail Net Denmark again decided to contract external consultants as ad-
visers, both to compensate for missing competencies, but also in order to reinforce 
the organisation with international experts. Rail Net Denmark had another bidding 
round, and this time they employed Ramboll (Denmark), Atkins (Denmark), 
Emch+Berger (Switzerland), and Parsons Group International (UK), who had 
formed a new consultancy conglomerate, as advisers to the remaining project 
phases. This time the contract was for the remaining lifetime of the programme. 
The Signalling Programme employs about 120 people on average throughout the 
period from 2009 to 2020/21, of whom about 40 are full-time employees and 80 
are external consultants, although more are needed during implementation 
(Banedanmark, 2008a). The main tasks of constructing and implementing the sig-
nalling systems are handled by major suppliers, which are to be contracted. In the 
remaining phases of the programme, the Signalling Programme is primarily re-
sponsible for preparing the tendering material, carrying out contract negotiations 
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and subsequently following up on whether the suppliers adhere to the contractual 
obligations. Besides this, the Signalling Programme is responsible for educating 
relevant people from the main organisation, Rail Net Denmark, to undertake the 
new tasks arising and for ensuring coordination between the old and the new sig-
nalling infrastructure. 
 
The Signalling Programme has been established as its own division in Rail Net 
Denmark and divided into five major subprojects: F-banen (the conventional / re-
gional lines network), S-banen (the mass transit system network), Operational 
Rules, Civil Works, and Related Projects. The conventional / regional network (f-
banen) and the mass transit system (s-banen) projects relate to the implementation 
of the signalling equipment and are by far the two largest subprojects. Operational 
Rules handles the development of the new safety and regulation documents re-
quired for getting approval to change the signalling system, and it also supports 
the other subprojects on technical-legal issues. Civil Works manages the construc-
tion of the required physical infrastructure, including two new traffic control cen-
tres; and Related Projects manages all other subprojects of which the On-board 
and the GSM are the largest. On-board manages the replacement of all on-board 
equipment for mainline trains and thus supports the F-bane subproject. GSM man-
ages the implementation of new radio and data communication. Besides these five 
major subprojects, the Signalling Programme also has a range of technical and 
programme support units such as Quality Assurance, Contracting, Financial Man-
agement – and Risk Management. See Appendix 2 for an organisational chart. 
 
The Signalling Programme goes through different phases. This section has provid-
ed an overview of the project proposal and the project specification phases that 
preceded the parliamentary approval of the project. Appendix 3 gives an overview 
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of the remaining phases for the two main projects, the f-bane and the s-bane pro-
jects. It shows that from 2009/2009 to 2011/2010, the programme undergoes the 
procurement phase, during which the tendering material is produced; the design 
phase runs from 2012/2011 to 2014/2012 and covers the detailed designing of the 
actual components to be implemented; the test phase runs from 2015/2013 to 
2017/2015, where the signalling equipment will be tested on specific low-traffic 
train lines, and the roll-out phase runs from 2018/2015 to 2021/2020, where the 
programme has to pass the test as all rail lines have to have their signalling sys-
tems replaced. The first and especially the second research paper (the first and 
second analytical sections; Section 6 and 7) provide more information about what 
took place during those later phases up until the year 2014. 
 
2.4. Overview of early developments 
The figure below summarises the main events that led to the establishment of the 
Signalling Programme and the first Danish holistic practice of risk management in 
mega-projects. It shows the initial problematisation, which happened from 1997 to 
2006; the contracting of Booz Allen Hamilton and the preparation of the initial 
strategies, which happened during 2006; the establishment of the Signalling Pro-
gramme as a separate project organisation and the detailing of project specifica-
tions, which happened from 2006 to 2008; as well as the government allocation of 
funds to bring the Signalling Programme forward and the beginning of the opera-
tion of the practice of risk management, which happened from 2009 and onwards. 
I started my observation of the organisation in late 2009 when the programme or-
ganisation was preparing to move forward into the procurement phase. As I de-
scribe the events that happened after this later on in this dissertation, I will not go 
more into detail with the Signalling Programme at this point. 
53 
 
 
  
(continues below) 
5/9-2006 
RND & BAH hand in the 
‘Signalling Analysis’ re-
port; two new strategies in-
cluded; risk values reduced 
to approx. DKK 10 billion 
4/11-2005 
Signalling systems 
need replacement; 
RND receives funds 
to examine the ex-
tent of the problem 
1997 – 2005 
NAOD and MoF problem-
atise public agencies’ con-
trol practices; recommend 
risk management as a so-
lution to this problem 
2006 
MoF and MoT are 
sceptical toward the 
signalling investment 
strategies and the size 
of the risk value 
2006 
RND & BAH work on 
four signalling invest-
ment strategies; risk val-
ues amount to approx. 
DKK 18 billion 
2000 – 2005 
MoT attempts to imple-
ment risk management as 
part of new strategy with-
in its jurisdiction; largely 
fails its purpose 
Figure 2.1: The main events leading up to the establishment of the Signalling Programme
Spring 2009 
RND contracts a new con-
sultant consortium; the first 
Danish holistic practice of 
risk management is estab-
lished in mega-projects 
29.1.2009 
Parliament decides to allocate 
DKK 23.7 billion to the total 
replacement of all Danish rail 
signalling; risk value approx. 
DKK 3.4 billion  
December 2008 
RND collaborates with a 
consultant consortium to 
produce the ‘Signalling 
Programme’ reports; in-
cludes a comprehensive 
risk management setup 
26/10-2006 
Parliament approves  
the ‘Signalling Analysis’; 
work commences on 
more detailed project 
specifications 
24/1-2006 
Parliament turns the “New 
Budgeting Method” into 
law, which includes an em-
phasis on holistic risk man-
agement for the first time 
Fall 2009  
Consultants begin to 
operate the risk man-
agement practice; IT-
based control system 
implemented 
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3. Current risk management literature 
 
This section describes the current academic literature on ‘risk’ and ‘risk manage-
ment’. I have classified this literature into different perspectives, or what I term 
risk paradigms, according to its theoretical assumptions. I have done this to struc-
ture the current literature and to provide an overview of its theoretical contribu-
tions and limitations. I want to stress that the literature on ‘risk’ and ‘risk man-
agement’ originates from several fields of science. In this dissertation I primarily 
focus on the literature originating from the field of management accounting. As I 
also focus on mega-projects, I include literature from other fields of science, such 
as project management, which deals with this. Lastly, I also take seminal work 
across various fields of science into account as these have typically contributed to 
our general understanding of the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. The 
following, however, should not be taken as a complete review of all risk manage-
ment literature from all fields of science. At the end of this section, I also explicate 
on some of the tensions/gaps in this literature and describe why studying them 
would be relevant, thus setting the scene for this dissertation’s later contribution. 
 
3.1. Classifying risk management literature 
In this dissertation, I structure the current literature on risk management according 
to the notion of ‘paradigms’, which means that I focus on the general theoretical 
assumptions and laws that I consider as governing this literature. The term ‘para-
digm’ was originally coined by Thomas Kuhn in 1962 in his treatise “The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions”, which came to be a landmark in the history, phi-
losophy and sociology of science (Kuhn, 1962). The term refers to the “theoretical 
assumptions and laws and the techniques for their application that the members of 
a particular scientific community adopt” (Chalmers, 1999, p. 108). It also refers to 
56 
 
the application of common methods to a variety of situations, to the techniques 
and instruments necessary for bringing the laws of the paradigm to bear upon the 
world, and to recognised and accepted metaphysical and methodological princi-
ples (Chalmers, 1999, p. 112). In structuring the current risk management litera-
ture, and other types of literature, paradigms can thus be used to group studies that 
approach the nature of what should be studied, how to inquire into this, how to in-
terpret the findings, etc., in the same way (Lukka, 2010). 
 
In short, Kuhn termed the notion ‘paradigm’ to argue that science did not progress 
via linear accumulation of new objective knowledge, but underwent periodic revo-
lutions, or what he called ‘paradigm shifts’, in which new modes of theoretical in-
quiring emerged. Kuhn argued that scientific disciplines tended to have periods of 
‘normal science’ characterised by scientists adopting the same theoretical assump-
tions and laws, i.e. the same paradigm. Over time, however, more and more anom-
alies arose that could not be solved within the established paradigm, and when 
these began to threaten the very assumptions of the paradigm, the paradigm went 
into crisis. If such anomalies continued over time and resisted the attempts by the 
paradigm’s members to remove them, this further led to scientific revolutions in 
which new and rival paradigms would emerge. If one of these new paradigms, in 
turn, attracted the allegiance of enough scientists, this could lead to the current 
paradigm being replaced by the new one. This new paradigm would then dominate 
new ‘normal science’ until yet again a new crisis emerged, which, in turn, would 
lead to new scientific revolutions, and so on. 
 
In relation to risk management and the notion of ‘normal science’, academic 
scholars have argued that the risk management literature contains no common the-
oretical assumptions on which the literature has been based (Gephart et al., 2009; 
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Lupton, 1999). This literature has drawn on theoretical assumptions, methodolo-
gies, instruments, etc., from a variety of more established fields of science like so-
ciology, psychology, statistics and economics. Kuhn’s argument was that ‘normal 
sciences’, or what he called mature sciences, were characterised by being gov-
erned by one single paradigm. This distinguished it from more immature ‘pre-
sciences’ in which disagreement about fundamentals ruled, and where many dif-
ferent theories, methods and techniques were applied to make sense of the phe-
nomenon (Chalmers, 1999, p. 110). In the words of Kuhn, then, current risk man-
agement literature cannot be termed ‘normal science’ and should, at least for the 
moment, be termed ‘pre-science’ or an immature science, which, in turn, only 
seems to justify the need for explicating these key assumptions. In the following, I 
therefore: (1) classify the literature into paradigms in order to learn more about the 
fragmented field of risk management, and (2) use this classification as a stepping 
stone to point to unexplored aspects of risk management that future research, such 
as my own in this respect, could examine in more details. 
 
In the following, I have classified the literature into paradigms that range from ra-
tionalist-cognitive to socio-cultural perspectives (See Gephart et al., 2009; Lupton, 
1999 for similar classifications, however not applying the notion of paradigms). I 
acknowledge the argument that the literature could have been classified different-
ly, like the classification of literature into ‘positivist’ and ‘non-positivist’ or alter-
native types of research (Baxter & Chua, 2003), into ‘mainstream’, ‘interpretive’ 
and ‘critical’ studies (Chua, 1986), or into ‘consulting’, ‘basis’, and ‘critical’ gen-
res of research (Lukka & Granlund, 2002). I could also have categorised the litera-
ture more narrowly around specific types of assumptions rather than the broad no-
tion of paradigms, like into ‘assumptions about the nature of science’ and 
‘assumptions about the nature of society’ (Burrel & Morgan, 1979), or into differ-
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ent ‘scientific discourses’ which could range from normative to interpretive, criti-
cal and dialogic (Deetz, 1996). I have chosen my approach because I found that it 
best reflected the literature I have read and because I found it well suited to posi-
tion my actor-network theory approach and thus flesh out the relevance of this dis-
sertation. To sum up, I decided on my approach not because I found it more right 
or wrong, but because I found it to make a difference for my research agenda. 
 
More specifically, I have classified the current risk management literature accord-
ing to its epistemological and ontological perspectives on ‘risk’ on ‘risk manage-
ment’ from which elements such as methods, techniques and instruments typically 
follow. In doing this, I have focused on the theoretical stands expressed by the au-
thors of the literature themselves. As many scholars in the field of risk manage-
ment do not explicitly reflect on this aspect, however, I have also had to supple-
ment this approach with different approaches. I have here looked at the key 
theoretical concepts employed, the general use of language, the references made to 
other researchers, and how the findings have been interpreted. These elements 
have been fruitful approaches to the classification of the current risk management 
literature. In some instances, however, I have come across works by researchers 
who have referred to key academic texts from incommensurable paradigms, which 
have made the classification more difficult. In these cases, I have classified the 
works as belonging to one paradigm. I recognise that this may not do justice to the 
researcher’s intentions, and the following classification should therefore be taken 
as my interpretation of the current risk management literature. 
 
3.1.1. Rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm 
One of the main approaches to ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ in both management 
accounting and project management literature as well as more generally in the lit-
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erature can be classified as a rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm. It originates from 
fields of science such as actuarialism, statistics, engineering, epidemiology, eco-
nomics and psychology (Gephart et al., 2009; Lupton, 1999; Power, 2007; Renn, 
1992). The literature in this paradigm regards the notion of ‘risk’ as being “the 
product of the probability and consequences (magnitude and severity) of an ad-
verse event” across the different fields (Bradbury, 1989, p. 382). This literature 
thus brings together notions of dangers, harm and hazards with the calculation of 
probability and seeks to anticipate “potential physical harm to human beings or 
ecosystems” (Renn, 1992, p. 59). In this perspective, the debate tends to revolve 
around how well risks have been identified or calculated, the level of seriousness 
of the effects of risks, how accurate is the science used to measure and calculate 
risks, and how inclusive are the causal and predictive models that have been con-
structed to understand why risks occur (Lupton, 1999, p. 18). It seldom focuses on 
practices or processes of ‘risk management’ (See Renn, 1992, 1998). 
 
In addition, the rationalist-cognitive perspective understands ‘risks’ as pre-existing 
in nature, which in principle allows them to be identified and controlled through 
scientific measurement and calculation and the knowledge produced through such 
techniques (Lupton, 1999, p. 18). While most risk management practitioners 
would acknowledge that ‘subjectiveness’ is an evitable element of human judg-
ment, and consequently not value-free, this perspective treats calculations as if 
they were objective facts, or truths, “out there” (Bradbury, 1989, p. 382). In actu-
arialism, for example, one of the great tenets that distinguishes it from bets or lot-
teries is that risks are calculable; they exist “out there” as objective facts to be 
modelled (Ewald, 1991). It must be possible to establish both a valid statistical ta-
ble on the regularity of certain events and a calculus of the probabilities that these 
events will have an effect, and often also when and where. In broader terms, the 
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more rationalist literature in this paradigm, such as, again, actuarialism, but also 
statistics, engineering and epidemiology, all tend to focus on rationalist risk analy-
sis methods. These methods have been developed to identify and avoid the causes 
of risks and/or to mitigate the unwanted consequences of the risks in order to im-
prove the well-being of humans or society at large (Renn, 1992, p. 59), or the 
overall financial performance of firms (e.g. Alviniussen & Jankensgard, 2009). 
This means that this literature has focused on developing models, methods, etc., 
which “optimises” the relationship between the risks “out there” and the processes 
of identification and assessment “in here”. 
 
The literature on economics has focused on translating perceptions of physical 
dangers or other undesired effects into subjective utilities, with the base unit de-
scribing the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction associated with a possible ac-
tion (Renn, 1992). This perspective thus similarly understands risks as being ob-
jective facts, but focuses more on the subjective (dis)satisfaction with the potential 
consequences of the dangers. In economics, this serves two major purposes: (1) 
subjective (dis)satisfaction can be measured for all consequences, including psy-
chological or social effects; and (2) subjective (dis)satisfaction allows a direct 
comparison between risk and benefits across different options (Renn, 1992). If 
risks can be expressed like this in terms of utilities, this allows their integration in-
to decision processes in which costs and benefits can be assessed, compared and 
prioritised. As risks denote possible costs and not actual costs, they also have to be 
weighted by their probability of occurrence and discounted, hence the often used 
probability x consequence calculation. Economic theory here regards risk analysis 
as part of a larger cost-benefit consideration in which risks are the expected utility 
losses resulting from an event or an activity (Renn, 1992). The goal of economics 
in this respect is to allocate resources in order to maximise their utility for society. 
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In contrast, but still within the same risk paradigm, the psychological literature has 
studied the opinions that people express when they are asked, in a variety of ways, 
to evaluate hazardous activities, substances and technologies (Slovic, 1987). This 
perspective assumes that the majority of people rely on intuitive risk judgements, 
typically called ‘risk perceptions’, and attempts to develop techniques for deter-
mining the factors underlying these judgements. A major development in this area 
has been the measurement of the relative influence of different cognitive factors 
such as ‘mental strategies’ or ‘heuristics’ (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1982). This litera-
ture has identified more or less persistent biases in people’s ability to draw infer-
ences from probabilistic information. In particular, psychological experiments 
have shown that “difficulties in understanding probabilistic processes, biased me-
dia coverage, misleading personal experiences, and the anxieties generated by 
life’s gambles cause uncertainty to be denied, risks to be misjudged (sometimes 
overestimated and sometimes underestimated), and judgement of fact to be held 
with unwarranted confidence” (Slovic, 1987, p. 281). This literature has further 
indicated that initial perceptions about risks are resistant to change (Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980) and that presenting the same information in different ways, like using 
positive or negative language, alters people’s perceptions and actions (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). 
 
Some psychology-based researchers have also used a psychometric approach to 
develop different hazard taxonomies that can be used to understand and predict re-
sponses to risks (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic et al., 1984; Starr, 1969). This ap-
proach makes use of psychophysical scaling and multivariate analysis techniques 
to produce quantitative representations or ‘cognitive maps’ of risk attitudes and 
perceptions. In this literature, people make quantitative assessments of the current 
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and desired riskiness of different hazards and the desired level of regulation of 
each of them. These assessments are then related to assessments of other proper-
ties such as: “(i) the hazard’s status on characteristics that have been hypothesized 
to account for risk perceptions and attitudes (for example voluntariness, dread, 
knowledge, controllability), (ii) the benefits that each hazard provides to society, 
(iii) the number of deaths caused by the hazard in an average year, and (iv) the 
number of deaths caused by the hazard in a disastrous year” (Slovic, 1987, p. 821). 
This literature views the hazard “as the independent variable and people’s re-
sponse to it as dependent” (Douglas, 1985, p. 25) and contrasts different groups of 
people’s perceptions of risks such as lay people and experts. 
 
The psychometric literature has shown that the concept of ‘risk’ has different 
meanings for different people and depends on different variables that shape indi-
vidual risk estimations and evaluations (Gilovich et al., 2002; Slovic, 1987). The 
literature, for example, has shown that lay people perceive risks closer to them as 
being more serious than do experts whose assessments, on the contrary, are more 
consistent with technical estimates on fatalities (Slovic et al., 1980). It has also 
been shown: that people are willing to tolerate higher degrees of risks from volun-
tary activities than from involuntary hazards and from activities seen as beneficial 
rather detrimental (Starr, 1969); that perceived characteristics such as familiarity, 
control, catastrophic potential, equity, and level of knowledge also seem to influ-
ence the relation between perceived risk, perceived benefit and risk acceptance 
(Fischhoff et al., 1978); that dangers or hazards that carry the highest signalling 
value also carry the highest perceived seriousness, which further correlates with 
the amount of media attention (Slovic et al., 1984); that people’s general mood af-
fects risk perception (Johnson & Tversky, 1983); and perhaps most of all that per-
63 
 
ceived risks are quantifiable and predictable across different groups that all have 
concerns that need to be taken into account (Slovic et al., 1982; Slovic, 1987). 
 
The literature in the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm regards individuals as cal-
culating and emotion-free actors and assumes that they share the same responses 
and preferences as those held by the actors in utilitarian philosophy (Lupton, 1999, 
p. 22; Renn, 1992, pp. 58-59). “In examining the individual’s response to risk, this 
research provides a subjectivist interpretation within a realist paradigm”, accord-
ing to Bradbury (1989, p. 384). This assumption, however, has often been the 
source of critique and limitation. In economics, for example, decisions on risks are 
often considered to be collective that require aggregation of individual utilities; 
but because utilities are subjective, they cannot be averaged by means of any logi-
cally valid method (Renn, 1992, p. 62). It might also be that transactions impose 
risks (externalities or social costs) on third parties who might not benefit from 
those transactions, but due to the same narrow individualistic focus this tends not 
to be taken into account. It also happens that people, out of compassion, sacrifice 
their own interests to the benefit of others, something which goes against the ra-
tionalist paradigm. In a similar vein, the psychological research on risk manage-
ment, due to its strong emphasis on the individuals expressed preferences, judge-
ments, and perceptions, also has trouble aggregating these into any logically 
consistent whole. 
 
The literature also contains an inherent epistemological inconsistency. It perceives 
risks as being objective facts, but rather than studying the risks “out there”, the 
current literature in this paradigm studies people’s perceptions or expected utilities 
(Bradbury, 1989). If people always perceive and behave rationally, as it is as-
sumed by the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm, then inferences from this seem 
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possible. In this respect, however, studies have shown that people do not always 
process information or structure decisions rationalistically (Schoemaker, 1982). 
The rationalist-cognitive perspective also disregards the symbolic meanings that 
humans give to things, events and risks. It confines the concept of perception to 
mean how humans see and understand the world through their senses and brains, 
without acknowledging the ways in which cultural conceptual categories mediate 
that assessment. It thus fails to examine how risks are constructed as social con-
structs, “for the nature of risk is taken for granted” (Lupton, 1999, p. 18). In this 
paradigm “there is an unintended emphasis on perceptual pathology”, as Douglas 
writes (1985, p. 3). People tend to be positioned outside cultural or political 
frames within which interactions take place and within which beliefs, relationships 
and emotions are forged and identifies shaped. This is convenient for psychomet-
ric statistical testing and modelling and for distributing probabilities over time, 
space and context, but it reduces and over-simplifies such phenomena (Lupton, 
1999, p. 23). 
 
In summary, the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm has thus contributed to the 
current risk management literature by producing strong and very often complex 
mathematical models used to calculate risk probabilities and consequences. The 
understanding of ‘risks’ as objective facts and the management of such facts as 
danger prevention has allowed calculations of both societal and organisational 
risks (Renn, 1998). The cognitive literature has contributed to this by pointing out 
mental biases and contrasting different views of risks across different groups of 
people such as experts and laypeople. This literature has allowed more advanced 
studies on models that have taken this into account and attempted to develop more 
sophisticated methods to avoid the limitations of the human being. The strength of 
this paradigm, however, has also been its limitations, and the literature has pointed 
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to several limitations in its presumption of human beings as rationalist and utility-
optimising. In the same vein, the literature has pointed to potential limitations, as 
the paradigm has lost focus on the contextual factors such as social and cultural 
structures by not engaging in examining risk management as a ‘situated social 
practice’, i.e. “as an activity that more or less skilful people in organizations do in 
particular ways given particular contexts” (Chua, 2007, p. 489). 
 
3.1.2. Functionalist risk paradigm 
Another stream of literature which is strongly represented in the management ac-
counting and project management literature on ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ can 
be classified into what I term a functionalist risk paradigm. Like the rationalist-
cognitive risk paradigm, this literature understands ‘risks’ as being objective facts 
that have to be identified, assessed and reduced through structured and “scientific” 
approaches. However, in contrast to the rationalist-cognitive risk perspective, 
which focuses on human perception of risks and statistical modelling of occur-
rences and consequences, this literature focuses on practices of risk management. 
In addition, this literature understands practices of risk management as being func-
tional systems that it is imperative for organisations to adapt in order to satisfy 
fundamental organisational needs. In relation to risk management, these needs 
would be the reduction, avoidance or elimination of risks that prevent the organi-
sation from reaching its objectives or otherwise hamper organisational processes. 
It also builds on the premise that explanations of this imperative lie in situational 
causation rather than in the consciousness of actors (Donaldson, 2003, pp. 44-45). 
This perspective thus holds that internal and external situations, also known as 
contextual factors or contingencies, determine the most optimal way organisations 
should structure, for example, their practices of risk management. 
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In explaining this major assumption, the functional paradigm posits that if organi-
sational decision-makers fail to adapt practices of risk management in ways that 
best fit the situation and produce the best outcomes, the organisation will suffer 
from suboptimal risk performance (Donaldson, 2003, p. 45). If this suboptimal 
performance persists over longer periods of time, this will lead to pressure on 
management to restructure the practice. This pressure, however, does not come 
from cognitive biases, although they may have been the cause of suboptimal per-
formance, but from external factors such as market competition. If organisations 
are unable to compete over longer periods of time, they tend to be eliminated from 
the population, and because management and managers rarely want to lose their 
jobs, this produces a strong incentive to adapt the practice of risk management to 
better fit the situation. “Going further, because organizational decision-makers are 
forced by the situation and the performance imperative to adopt a particular op-
tion, they may do so even if it runs counter to their thinking” (Donaldson, 2003, p. 
46). This means that the situation will determine the structure without any kind of 
moderation by managerial ideas; there will be “an irresistible tendency for organi-
zational managers to choose options that conform to the situational imperative” 
(Donaldson, 2003, p. 45). 
 
The literature in this paradigm has largely been focused on explaining the contex-
tual factors or contingencies that determine the risk situation of the organisation, 
and also how practices of risk management relate to notions of performance and 
value. This literature has thus generally sought to explain systematic differences 
between practices of risk management with reference to varying contextual fac-
tors. One of the first accounting studies that attempted to do this was Liebenberg 
and Hoyt (2003), who looked into the financial and ownership characteristics of 
US firms by comparing firms that had adopted holistic risk management between 
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1997 and 2001 with a size- and industry-matched control sample consisting of 
firms that had not adopted holistic risk management. While their findings suggest-
ed that these characteristics had little influence on the structure of risk manage-
ment practices in both the sample and control firms, they did find that firms with 
greater financial leverage were more likely to appoint a chief risk officer. As earli-
er studies had found that chief risk officers were more likely to reduce the costs 
associated with the ‘risk-shifting problem’5 and to communicate the firm’s risk 
profile to external stakeholders, they concluded that firms with greater financial 
leverage were more likely to achieve these benefits as well. 
 
Other early functionalist accounting studies on risk management have also looked 
into factors that could determine differences between practices of risk manage-
ment (Beasley et al., 2005; Colquitt et al., 1999; Kleffner et al., 2003). Colquitt, 
Hoyt and Lee (1999), for example, found that factors such as firm size, firm indus-
try, and the background and training of the risk manager determined the degree to 
which holistic risk management had been adopted; Kleffner, Lee and McGannon 
(2003) showed that encouragement from the board of directors, the influence of 
risk managers, and compliance with stock exchange guidelines were three main 
factors that explained the adoption of holistic risk management; and Beasley, 
Clune and Hermanson (2005) found that the stage of risk management implemen-
tation was positively related to the presence of a chief risk officer, board inde-
pendence, apparent support for risk management from the chief executive officer 
and chief financial officer, the presence of a Big Four auditor, entity size, and enti-
                                                 
5 “Shareholders have an incentive to alter the firm’s risk profile after contracting with fixed claimants such as debt 
holders. Because debt holders anticipate such behaviour, they increase their required rate of return on credit provid-
ed to the firm… ERM [enterprise risk management, also known as holistic risk management] systems provide a 
way for firms to make a credible commitment against such behaviour because they facilitate better disclosure of the 
firm’s risk exposure” (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003, p. 43). 
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ties in the banking, education, and insurance industries. All of the above were ex-
plorative studies, however, based on questionnaires sent out in national contexts, 
but they did take into account a variety of both public and private sector actors. 
 
In contrast to the above two studies, Woods (2009) attempted to develop an actual 
contingency theory on risk management by looking in more detail into the deter-
minants of one risk management practice over a longer period of time. She exam-
ined the Birmingham City Council’s risk management practice and found that this 
practice, including its adopted control system, was dependent upon three core con-
tingencies: central government policies, information and communication technol-
ogy, and organisational size. She argued that these contingencies determined the 
selection and operation of risk management practices, including their control sys-
tems. In 2011, Collier and Woods (2011) attempted to move forward that contin-
gency theory by testing Woods’ three contingencies by means of a transnational 
comparison of four UK and Australian local authorities (two large, two small). In 
short, they found that these three contingencies were indeed significant for differ-
entiating practices of risk management, but only comparatively within the same 
national context, not across these as anticipated. Collier and Woods further tested 
their findings against the explanatory power of other theoretical perspectives (in-
stitutional, resource dependent and political). They concluded that contingency 
theory provided an incomplete explanation of how risk management control sys-
tems developed and called for more pluralistic approaches to the study of risk 
management. 
 
The literature has also studied the contextual factors that determine the relation be-
tween practices of risk management and the performance of firms. Gordon, Loeb 
and Tseng (2009) examined 112 US firms that disclosed the implementation of 
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their risk management activities in their 2005 reports to the US Securities and Ex-
change Commission. They found that the relation between risk management and 
firm performance was contingent upon the proper match between risk manage-
ment and the following five contingencies: environmental uncertainty, industry 
competition, firm size, firm complexity, and monitoring by the board of directors. 
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) further modelled the determinants of the adoption of 
risk management and the effects of risk management on firm value in the insur-
ance industry. They looked into the disclosures on risk management made by 117 
publicly traded US insurance companies over an 8-year period from 1998 to 2005. 
They came to the conclusion that risk management did indeed enhance firm value 
and that the following factors determined the degree of its adoption: firm size, 
firm leverage, firm asset opacity, external stakeholder pressure, the hedging of 
risks through reinsurance, life insurers, reduced firm market value over time, and 
international firm diversification (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011, pp. 805-810). 
 
While the above literature focused mainly on US firms and on enterprise risk 
management implementation at an aggregate level, Paape and Speklé (2012) ex-
amined the implementation of enterprise risk management in 825 Dutch headquar-
tered organisations. Their findings showed (1) that in consistency with earlier 
studies, the extent of enterprise risk management implementation was determined 
by regulatory environment, internal factors, ownership structure, and firm and in-
dustry-related characteristics; (2) that perceived risk management effectiveness 
was associated with the frequency of risk assessment and reporting, as well as 
with the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques; but also (3) that no evi-
dence was present suggesting that the application of COSO ERM improved effec-
tiveness, and that the quantification of risk tolerances (the risk appetite), the in-
volvement of lower levels of management, and having retrospective data or 
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prospective information contributed to this. Paape and Speklé thus contributed by 
extending the findings of earlier US-based findings to European organisations, 
thus creating a more solid contingency theory on the implementation of (enter-
prise) risk management, but perhaps primarily by exploring the relationship be-
tween specific enterprise risk management design choices and perceived risk man-
agement effectiveness. 
 
Lastly, the literature has also been engaged in demonstrating the effectiveness of 
different risk management models compared to different contextual factors (See 
Imbeah & Guikema, 2009, for a review of these highly technical different mod-
els). This literature has primarily focused on describing different types of risks re-
lated to large projects and how well the different models have been able to take 
these into account. In other words, this literature has focused on determining the 
optimal model compared to differentiated risk settings related to large projects. 
Imbeah and Guikema (2009), for example, although focusing primarily on pro-
moting one type of model, compare the effectiveness of different models with 
their ability to take into account three types of risks: ‘budget risks’, ‘schedule 
risks’ and ‘technical risks’; and Liu, Wehbe and Sisovic (2010) compare the accu-
racy of different ‘hybrid approaches’, referred to as approaches tailored to the or-
ganisations’ unique operating environments, with ‘conventional fixed contingency 
approaches’. The latter refers to generic approaches such as subjective judgement, 
sensitivity analysis, real options analysis and Monte Carlo simulations (Akintoye 
& MacLeod, 1997). They find that the average accuracy of different types of pro-
jects completed using ‘hybrid approaches’ compares significantly favourably to 
the ‘conventional fixed contingency approaches’ and propose a reliance on the 
former rather than the latter. 
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The above studies have all indicated that much can be learned from studying the 
contexts surrounding organisational practices of risk management, and that specif-
ic factors such as organisational size seem to influence the development of such 
practices. As in the case of the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm, however, the 
functionalist research also neglects the effects of social, cultural and political rela-
tions. This means that the studies that draw on this perspective, or on the rational-
ist-cognitive perspective, lose sight of how associations, institutions, beliefs, etc., 
may affect how risks are understood and negotiated. In the functionalist perspec-
tive, these elements tend to be dismissed as disturbances that might affect single 
entities but over time lose their effect, as organisations tend to be driven much 
more by functional mechanisms such as its survival. If, for example, one group of 
actors disagree with the way risk management is practised, and, all other things 
being equal, hold the social position to change it, this will be irrelevant from the 
functionalist perspective if stock exchanges’ listing requirements say otherwise 
and the organisation wishes to remain listed. Over time this situational imperative 
will crowd out the effects of the beliefs of these actors, as the situation leaves 
them open to sanctioning, and possibly replacement, by their supervisors. 
 
The functionalist paradigm thus assumes that in the long term, people end up be-
having rationalistically, and that systems or practices of risk management move 
slowly towards an optimal and most effective structure through mechanisms of se-
lection and adaption. It assumes that problems related to risk management must be 
caused either by suboptimal models or by “implementation deficits and operation-
al friction” (Power, 2009, p. 849). Whatever is the case, this assumption helps to 
justify the argument for developing more accurate models; because if persistent 
deficits or frictions exist, this must be because the optimal model has not been ap-
plied. This perspective does not take into account that perhaps the absolutely op-
72 
 
timal risk management system does not exist, as all actors without exception are 
immersed in socio-cultural settings and thus that all systems might be “sub-
optimal”. It further simplifies the function of risk management to deal only with 
improving organisational effectiveness, which it equals to value generation and 
thus does not take into account that risk management could also be about generat-
ing other effects such as disciplining managers or justifying managerial decision-
making. Collier and Woods (2011) indicated this by arguing that contingency the-
ory represented an incomplete approach and had to be supplemented by different 
approaches. 
 
3.1.3. Social constructivist risk paradigm 
In later years, the literature on risk management has begun to examine the social 
and cultural significance of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, something which has al-
so had an effect on the literature on management accounting and project manage-
ment. This literature has emphasised the very aspects that the rationalist-cognitive 
and the functionalist risk paradigms have disregarded or downplayed as less rele-
vant (Gephart et al., 2009; Lupton, 1999). This literature has focused on the ways 
in which cultural structures, categories and hierarchies serve to define knowledge 
and practices of risk management, how notions of risks are used to establish and 
maintain conceptual boundaries between groups of people, how macro-social pro-
cesses relate to the emergence of risk and risk management ideas, how risk and 
risk management serve to discipline groups of people, how humans give meanings 
or experience risks in micro-context, and similar areas (Lupton, 1999, pp. 24-34). 
In the following I identify three risk paradigms that this literature in my view can 
be divided into, based on the current risk management literature relevant for man-
agement accounting and project management. I have termed the first one the so-
cial constructivist risk paradigm because it focuses on explaining risk manage-
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ment practices as constructions made by humans. I acknowledge the argument that 
this risk literature could have been subdivided even further into more detailed cat-
egories (See Renn, 1992). 
 
In describing the theoretical assumptions of the social constructivist risk paradigm, 
the literature in this paradigm considers risks as always being embedded in hu-
man-constructed cultures that give them meaning (e.g. Douglas, 1985; Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1983). In comparison with the rationalist-cognitive and the functional-
ist risk paradigms, this literature also considers risks as facts or effects of events 
“out there”. In contrast, however, this literature maintains that because our percep-
tion of risks is always embedded in cultures, they cannot be termed objective, con-
stant or individualistic. It assumes that what we identify, measure and manage as 
risks are always constituted on the basis of our pre-existing knowledge: “Although 
the material and social worlds are experienced by most individuals as objective, 
pre-existing realities, these realities involve the reproduction of meaning and 
knowledge through social interactions and socialization and rely upon shared defi-
nitions” (Lupton, 1999, p. 29). Seen from this perspective, risks are always con-
structed and negotiated as part of larger networks of human beings and their inter-
actions; they are always the product of value-dependent world views. So-called 
“expert judgements” of risks are no more “objective”, “neutral” or “unbiased” 
than those of other groups of people, such as laypersons; they are also constructed 
through cultural and social processes. 
 
In contrast to the rationalist-cognitive and functionalist risk perspectives, the liter-
ature in this perspective thus largely focuses on examining how concepts of risks 
are part of different world views and describe the dynamics related to this 
(Lupton, 1999). This literature does not reject the notion that decisions based on 
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statistical probabilities can be beneficial compared to specific risk decisions, but it 
maintains that these decisions will be too narrow to be used as a basis for social 
acceptability (Bradbury, 1989). As the acceptability of risk management depends 
on the values of those involved and influenced, and because different people hold 
different values, risk management must take cultural and social aspects into ac-
count. If not, tensions, conflicts and resistance can emerge which may reduce risk 
management effectiveness. In addition, rationalistic models per se cannot merely 
be considered “cognitive aids for the individual decision maker”, but “should be 
regarded as shared conventions, expectations and cultural categories that are 
founded on clear social functions and responsibilities” (Douglas, 1985, pp. 80-81). 
In the social constructivist risk paradigm, the focus of investigation thus changes 
from the individual’s risk perceptions and the improvement of rationalist risk 
management models to that of social processes, rationalities, beliefs, institutions, 
policies and values (Renn, 1992, p. 71). 
 
One of the significant contributions in this paradigm has been made by Anette 
Mikes, who sought to explain the differences between the risk management prac-
tices of large banking organisations in apparently similar situations (Mikes, 2009, 
2011). Mikes (2009) presented field-based evidence from two large banking or-
ganisations which showed systematic variations between risk management prac-
tices. In explaining this, Mikes pointed towards the existence of different ‘alterna-
tive logics of calculation’ or what she conceptualised as ‘calculative cultures’. She 
defined these as “senior managerial attitudes towards the use and implementation 
of highly analytical calculative practices” (Mikes, 2009, p. 21), and found that 
these calculative cultures in practice were polarised around the enthusiasm or 
scepticism towards risk measurement and modelling. She termed the former calcu-
lative idealism, in which the adherents aimed at managing risk through quantifica-
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tion and modelling, and the latter was termed calculative pragmatism, where ad-
herents relied more on judgement, experience and feelings and often distrusted 
numbers. In showing this, Mikes also bordered the functionalist paradigm as she 
argued that calculative cultures did not only shape perception of risks, but also de-
termined management predilections towards risk management and served as “im-
portant constituents of the fit between risk control systems and organizational con-
texts” (2009, p. 20). 
 
Mikes (2011) later confirmed her initial findings through an extended case study 
involving another five banking organisations. She found that relentless risk meas-
urement was contingent on her earlier termed calculative cultures. “While the risk 
functions of some organizations have a culture of quantitative enthusiasm and are 
dedicated to risk measurement, others, with a culture of quantitative scepticism, 
take a different path, focusing instead on risk envisionment” (Mikes, 2011, p. 
226). In addition, she attempted to explain the dynamics of the development of 
these alternative cultures by examining the boundary work of risk experts (Mikes, 
2011). She found that risk experts were important for understanding the expansion 
and limitation of the different types of calculative cultures. The quantitative-
enthusiast risk experts, for example, expanded what she termed first-order meas-
urements (initial risk quantification) into new domains of risk, and used these 
measurements to create second-order measurements (risk aggregation), which 
could not only be used for risk-adjusted performance but also to expel other 
groups of actors that “trespassed” on their domain. These experts created new 
manageable realities which, in turn, could be the objectives of economic calcula-
tion and “protected their autonomy and helped them defect criticism and displace 
blame in the face of apparent risk management failures” (Mikes, 2011, p. 241). 
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In contrast, Mikes (2011) found that the quantitative-sceptic risk experts combined 
first-order measurement with what she termed ‘envisionment’ practices based on 
the controller’s own mental models, prior experience and intuition. These experts 
expanded softer techniques such as discussion forums into the envisionment of 
non-calculable strategic risk objects and produced alternative future scenarios and 
expert opinions on emerging risk issues. They “de-emphasized risk models in de-
cision making; they saw their roles as devil’s advocates, searching for relevant in-
telligence and channelling it to the apex of the organization” (Mikes, 2011, p. 41). 
In contrast to the quantitative-enthusiast experts, however, these controllers lacked 
analytical mystique, which weakened their position as a distinct expert group. This 
in turn left the boundaries between them and the rest of the organisation blurred 
and porous, but because decision-makers in the business lines found their assess-
ments more relevant for “getting things done”, their success as experts was main-
tained. In summing up her findings, again showing her social constructivist but al-
so functionalist risk approach, Mikes concluded that “the boundary-work of risk 
experts is contingent upon the calculative culture they display and can result in 
very different styles and dynamics of risk control” (2011, p. 241). 
 
In relation to the social constructivist risk approach, Mikes (2009, 2011) contrib-
uted by showing the importance of understanding the culture of different groups of 
actors (risk experts, top management) for constructing practices of risk manage-
ment. In this respect, Wahlström (2009) added to the social constructivist literature 
on banking organisations by examining the perception of different banking staff 
groups of Basel II risk measurement requirements. Wahlström focused on how 
different groups of staff perceived the strengths and weaknesses of Basel II’s risk 
measurement requirements. He found that positive perceptions were generally 
supported by banking staff who worked directly with risk measurement, such as 
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risk managers, project leaders and headquarters staff directly involved in imple-
mentation. In contrast, negative perceptions were held by banking staff primarily 
involved in operational assignments, such as internal auditors, heads of retail divi-
sions, and credit officers. In explaining this difference, Wahlström argued that 
“both groups are included to take account of information that meshes well with 
their existing frames of reference and are thus more included to value changes that 
accord with their own viewpoints” (2009, p. 53). In this respect, Wahlström con-
ducted 25 interviews across four large Swedish banks, and his study represents an 
initial attempt to link different people’s perceptions of risks with different organi-
sational positions within banks in light of new regulatory requirements. 
 
In the social-constructivist literature, I have also classified the literature drawing 
on institutional theoretical assumptions. One of the most comprehensive studies in 
the management accounting literature has been made by Arena, Arnaboldi and 
Azzone (2010), who studied three non-financial companies’ risk management 
practices over a seven year period. Their findings contribute to our understanding 
of the trajectory of enterprise risk management implementation organisations as it 
encounters pre-existing logics. These trajectories, or dynamics, were found to be 
framed by three elements: (1) risk rationalities, which denote the discursive and 
visual domains that frame how uncertainties are conceptualised into risks; (2) the 
roles of those involved, which primarily include the chief risk officer, but also risk 
specialists, internal auditors and management accountants; and (3) technologies, 
which denote the complex set of practices, procedures and instruments enacted to 
accomplish the management and control of risks. In this sense, Arena et al. drew 
upon a social constructivist understanding of ‘risks’ as “those phenomena that are 
conceptualized and managed as risks” in contrast to that of ‘uncertainties’, which 
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for them were used to “denote the wider range of [objective] events that can affect 
the organization” (Arena et al., 2010, p. 660). 
 
In more detail, Arena et al. (2010) found that enterprise risk management was real-
ised in different ways across the three companies, depending on the risk rationali-
ties, embedded actions of experts, and technologies, as the practice encountered 
pre-existing control practices. In the three companies, enterprise risk management 
was realised according to the risk rationalities of ‘compliance’, ‘corporate govern-
ance’, and ‘pervasive performance’, respectively. These rationalities shaped the 
conceptualisation of risks, “differently instilling an urgency to better understand 
and control future threats” (Arena et al., 2010, p. 671). These rationalities further 
entailed different structures of intentionality and programmatic actions, which 
were put into effect through, and later influenced by, the involvement of uncer-
tainty experts. These experts sought to conduct and expand enterprise risk man-
agement through their embedded actions, which subsequently affected risk ration-
alities. This was not straightforward, however, as these actions were carried out in 
competition with pre-existing control practices and their experts, the pre-existing 
understanding of their roles, and the nature of their businesses. Lastly, this inter-
play between roles and rationalities was played out between more or less decou-
pled or embedded risk management technologies. Arena et al. found that the or-
ganisational meaning attributed to enterprise risk management differed depending 
on the adopted technologies, which in turn were determined by the experts’ em-
bedded processes of translation. 
 
Within institutional theory still, Michael Power examined the proliferation of risk 
management, including its embedded calculable logics, and pointed to the strong 
influence of the accountancy profession (Power, 2004, 2007). Power (2004, 2007) 
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showed that risk management emerged alongside corporate financial scandals, 
which gave rise to principles of corporate governance and internal control stand-
ards. These principles and standards were largely developed and/or promoted by 
the accountancy profession, which led to an intensification of auditing and control 
processes. These processes were subjected to a ‘logic of auditability’, that is, “a 
logic in which the demand for things to be auditable and for things to be seen to be 
auditable are almost identical” (Power, 1996, p. 312). As corporate governance 
principles were implemented simultaneously around the world as part of stock ex-
changes’ listing requirements (See Christiansen & Koldertsova, 2009) and gov-
ernment white papers, this led to increased legalisation and bureaucratisation of 
organisational management (Power, 2007). In turn, these demands generated new 
risks for reputation, so-called secondary risks, as risk management had become 
equal to good governance, and as organisations knew that poor reputation led to 
poor financial performance (Power, 2007). 
 
Hayne and Free (2014) demonstrated how the process of arriving at this “best-
practice worldwide status”, defining the language of governance and senior man-
agement responsibilities, was anything but straightforward. Hayne and Free 
looked more closely into the relationship between COSO as an institution and the 
actors that were central in its formation and diffusion, or what they termed the 
supply side of risk management. They found that several forms of institutional 
work were applied, including theorising, rhetorical appeals, mythologising, and 
constructing normative networks and educations. This work was non-sequential, 
often serendipitous, and at times heavily reliant on a web of member entities. 
Hayne and Free contributed by showing that the emergence of the COSO ERM 
framework as the “ultimate” platform for risk management had nothing to do with 
“better”, “optimal”, or more “effective” types of risk management, but had every-
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thing to do with the interests of what they termed the “hybridized professional 
group” that ended up being involved in promoting the concept. In this respect, lit-
erature has shown that risk management has turned out to become a pervasive log-
ic of organising to legitimise organisational actions (Power et al., 2009). 
 
Other studies have engaged with the linkages between risk management and audit-
ing to demonstrate how business risk auditing emerged on the basis of the growth 
of risk management theories and processes (Knechel, 2007); how business risk 
auditing legitimised and widened auditors’ jurisdictional claims over other areas 
of expertise through i.a., embedding the logics of risk management in its method-
ologies (Robson et al., 2007); how internal auditors seized the new opportunities 
that emerged with the reinvention of internal control as risk management to pre-
sent themselves as risk management experts (Spira & Page, 2003); and how audi-
tors’ risk assessments were driven by the fear of making mistakes and how cogni-
tive processes are mobilised and defence strategies deployed to change that fear 
into a feeling of comfort (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014). To sum up, these studies 
have contributed by pointing out the close linkages between auditing and risk 
management developments during the last decades the general (risk) work of audi-
tors. The latter study has even supplemented social constructivism with a psycho-
dynamic perspective by also exploring the things “beneath” the actor’s actions “in 
the deep and autonomous structures of subjectivity” and the interplay with audit-
ing (social) practices (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014, p. 285). 
 
Outside the literature on auditing, but still within the management literature, Colli-
er and Berry (2002) conducted four comparative case studies with the aim of un-
derstanding how managers perceived and managed risks in the budgeting process. 
In short, they found that managers created their own domains of risks which 
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shaped their perception, but also that these were isolated from the budgeting pro-
cess, which was dominated by (non-risk) target setting, and even more from the 
actual content of the budget, from which risks were excluded. In the four cases, 
during the process of making the budget dependent on the constructed risk do-
mains the companies thus considered a number of risks, but ended up excluding 
them. In sum, this reflects the more general behavioural finding of March and 
Shapira (1987), who found that managers indeed took risks and exhibited risk 
preferences, but that the processes that generated those observables were “some-
what removed from the classical processes of choosing from among alternative ac-
tions in terms of the mean (expected value) and variance (risk) of the probability 
distributions over possible outcomes… Managers are quite insensitive to estimates 
of the probabilities of possible outcomes; their decisions are particularly affected 
by the way their attention is focused on critical performance targets” (March & 
Shapira, 1987, p. 1404). 
 
To sum up, the social constructivist literature has contributed by demonstrating the 
importance of understanding that all risk management practices are mediated by 
the institutional or social environments within which they are implemented. The 
different understandings that groups of actors hold of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ 
may determine how risks are constructed, managed and reduced. These under-
standings have further been shown themselves to undergo changes over time as 
they encounter pre-existing rationales of other people, different predilections to-
wards quantification, and organisationally embedded technologies. This perspec-
tive has also shown how the institutional work of people involved in risk man-
agement shapes the proliferation of risk management standards. In contrast to the 
functionalist risk paradigm, literature reflecting this stand has shown how this has 
happened for reasons other than a ‘situational imperative’, but from institutional 
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work mainly carried out by the accountancy profession which has shaped the 
logics of risks and its necessity. This has also contrasted the rationalist-cognitive 
risk paradigm as models, such as the COSO ERM, have expanded not due to their 
accuracy or lack of bias, but due to the pervasive influence of institutions on hu-
man behaviour and understanding through rules and norms.6 
 
The social constructivist risk paradigm gains strength from the acknowledgement 
that cultural and social environments, institutions, etc., affect how people under-
stand risks and thus have to be taken into account (Douglas, 1985; Lupton, 1999). 
This strength, however, has also been argued to be its main weakness. It has often 
been claimed that “theory is to be judged by its predictive powers” (Friedman, 
1953, p. 8), but because social constructivists tend to examine “only” a few prac-
tices, they are unable to generalise across contexts. From this perspective, theory-
building thus becomes problematic, and social constructivists often have to be 
content with “only” providing (detailed) context-relevant findings. In contrast, 
both the functional and the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigms derive their 
strength from attempting to produce predictive theories/models that can be gener-
alised across much wider contexts. This may lead to simplified, biased and super-
ficial models, as argued by socio-cultural researchers, but because people need 
models for large scale decision-making in order to reduce uncertainty, an inaccu-
rate model may still be more useful than none (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009). The 
social constructivist risk paradigm thus suffers from the “weakness” that generali-
sation becomes problematic, that is, unless based on comprehensive case studies. 
 
                                                 
6 In the social constructivist risk paradigm there have also been lengthy discussions, going back several years, on 
risk and blame (e.g. Douglas, 1985). These discussions have also taken place in the management literature (e.g. 
Hood, 2002; 2007) and accounting (e.g. Skærbæk and Christensen, forthcoming). I have decided to leave the notion 
of blame outside the scope of this dissertation as I did not find evidence of such aspects at present. 
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Another limitation has been pointed out by (pure) constructivists. It follows that 
the literature within the social constructivist risk paradigm has treated notions of 
risks as representations of events “out there” and not as pure constructions. It has 
thus approached the notion of ‘risk’ through the perception of them held by groups 
of people, treating perceptions and definitions of risks as the dependent variable 
(Hilgartner, 1992). This makes the social constructivist fall short by the same cri-
tique as the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm did, only for the individual, who 
was here also treated as the dependent variable (Douglas, 1985). “Treating percep-
tions and definitions of risk as the dependent variable… leads to a one-way analy-
sis that neglects the dynamics of technological change” (Hilgartner, 1992, p. 39). 
It neglects the finding that risk and risk management become incorporated into 
technologies and shape their evolution. In Kaplan et al.’s (2009): “Managing Risk 
in the New World”, for example, Mikes, who examines risk management from a 
social constructivist perspective, states that: “Models are not decision makers: 
people are. So the real issue is the culture that you have around modelling” 
(Kaplan et al., 2009, p. 70). It is statements like the above that have been critiqued 
by constructivists for downplaying the importance of technologies. 
 
3.1.4. Structuralist risk paradigm 
As mentioned earlier, I identified three risk paradigms within the larger socio-
cultural risk paradigm into which contemporary risk management literature can be 
classified. The section above dealt with the social constructivist risk paradigm, and 
this subsection deals with what I have termed a structuralist risk paradigm. This 
paradigm bears many resemblances to the social constructivist perspective, but it 
also diverges in important aspects. Like the social constructivist literature, this lit-
erature, for example, also assumes that underlying structures, institutions, etc., de-
fine the knowledge of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. In contrast to the focus of so-
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cial constructivists on “micro”-social practices, however, the literature in this par-
adigm focuses far more on “macro”-social processes. The literature in this para-
digm sees these as characteristic of late modern societies and examines the linkage 
between them and the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. These processes 
include “reflexive modernization, or the move toward criticism of the outcomes of 
modernity, and individualization, or the breaking down of traditional norms and 
values” (Lupton, 1999, p. 25)7. This subsection focuses on the insights primarily 
offered by Ulrich Beck (e.g. 1992b, 1999) and Anthony Giddens (e.g. 1991) and 
how they have contributed to our understanding of ‘risk’. 
 
In the structuralist risk paradigm, Beck has become one of the most prominent 
figures referred to by academics when characterising modern society’s perception 
of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ (Gephart et al., 2009). Beck characterised modern 
(western) societies as transitional societies marked by their overlapping concern 
with both the distribution of scarce ‘goods’, such as wealth or employment, and 
the distribution of risks. He termed societies preoccupied with the distribution of 
risks for ‘risk societies’ and argued that modern societies were heading towards 
becoming still more concerned with this. He also identified two key conditions 
that explained this: (1) the attained level of productivity and the persistence of the 
welfare state; and (2) the explosion of new risks brought about by increased levels 
of productivity like pollution, toxins, radiation etc. (Beck, 1990). In short, Beck 
thus argued that risks were self-made by humans, increasing, and caused as a “by-
                                                 
7 “At its simplest, modernity is a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more de-
tail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transfor-
mation by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a mar-
ket economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy: Largely as 
a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order. It is a so-
ciety – more technically, a complex set of institutions – which unlike any preceding culture lives in the future rather 
than in the past” (Giddens & Pierson, 1998, p. 94). 
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product” by the very same processes of modernisation that had solved years of 
‘goods’ distribution problems. The central problem would now be to manage risks 
so “they neither hinder the process of modernization nor oversteps the limits of 
what may be reasonable accepted” (Beck, 1990, p. 53). 
 
Beck also understood risks as real threats or dangers “out there”, albeit man-made, 
and argued that they had developed into becoming “irreversible threats to the life 
of plants, animals, and human beings” (Beck, 1992b, p. 13). He argued that risks 
no longer could be confined within the boundaries of nation states, like the effects 
of the nuclear meltdown of the Chernobyl power plant; that they had come to 
elude direct human perception, like chemical toxins; and that they often caused 
systemic and irreversible damage, like radiation. “Even the rich and the powerful 
are not safe from them, not only as health hazards, but also insofar as they endan-
ger legitimization, possessions, and profit” (Beck, 1990, p. 54). To make things 
worse, he argued, the magnitude and global nature of risks was such that risks 
were becoming more and more difficult to assess and reduce or avoid (Lupton, 
1999, p. 62). Beck sympathised with the rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm as 
“hazards require natural-scientific categories and measuring instruments in order 
to be “perceivable” at all” (Beck, 1995, p. 162). As risks had become non-
localisable with long-term unforeseeable effects and complex causes, however, ra-
tionalistic calculations were now poor strategies for dealing with risks; the de-
mands for rationalisation might even have increased rather than decreased general 
uncertainty (Beck, 2009). 
 
Beck further argued that the increased amount of risks could be attributed to hu-
man activity and increased levels of human knowledge compared to pre-modern 
societies where risks like famines, natural disasters and plagues were attributable 
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to “the looming power of gods and demons” raining down on mankind from the 
“outside” (Beck, 1992a, p. 98). Flooding, for example, can be traced back to the 
effects of global warming, which in turn can be traced back to carbon dioxide pol-
lution, which in turn can be traced back as a “by-product” of factories, ships, aero-
planes, cars, etc., which all represent consequences of industrialisation, which has 
been brought about as the result of human activity / decision-making. Beck also 
argued that because risks were man-made, it was also the responsibility of people, 
firms, state agencies and politicians to prevent or reduce them. These actors all in-
fluence the production and distribution of risks through the decisions they make, 
the decisions made by political groups being those with the “toughest” conse-
quences. Beck argued that ‘risk management’ becomes the large-scale political 
and societal practice where organisations and political groups come to struggle 
over the risks and how to distribute them. 
 
Beck introduced the notion of ‘reflexive modernization’ to describe his observa-
tion that because risks had been “induced and introduced” by modernisation, they 
could also be controlled and reduced through political intervention (Beck, 1992b, 
p. 21). He described the concept of risk as being related to reflexivity, because 
anxieties about risks served to pose questions about current societal structures and 
thus induced motivation for change. The concept, however, did not merely denote 
‘reflection’, but also ‘self-confrontation’ or the observation that modern risk socie-
ties had come to understand themselves as (world) risk producing entities (Beck, 
1999). For Beck, this critical reflection on the dangers of industrialism and mod-
ernisation constituted the difference between industrial societies and risk societies 
and was what would lead to the “possibility of a creative (self)-destruction for an 
entire epoch: that of industrial society” (Beck, 1994, p. 2). He argued that what we 
thought to be scientific progress had now turned modern societies on the path to 
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self-destruction as an unintended consequence of modernisation. In turn, this had 
increased uncertainty for people as old societal structures were crumbling, ques-
tioned scientific progress and inventions as many new risks had been caused by 
these, and created conflicts between those producing risks (experts, industries etc.) 
and those consuming them (citizens). 
 
The concept of reflexive modernisation is closely related to that of individualisa-
tion, which is also important to Beck’s view of modern societies. Individualisation 
means that with modernisation, people now have to produce their own biog-
raphies, as traditional norms and certainties are absent (Beck, 1994, p. 13). Indi-
vidualisation is the other side, the private side, of reflexive modernisation. Beck 
described how modernisation brought with it a transformation that removed previ-
ously accepted social roles such as gender and social classes. Individualisation is 
thus an outcome of modernisation processes, both re-structuring older societal in-
stitutions but also re-structuring how people ought to construct themselves as indi-
viduals. It is further dependent on decision-making, as it assumes agency, or “the 
ability to shape one’s destiny through self-determination and identification” 
(Lupton, 1999, p. 70). It involves freedom to choose, but freedom in conformity 
with internalised demands of choosing. It was once fixed or pre-determined what 
one had to do with one’s life, such as fixed roles in family, marriage, work, educa-
tion, all determined by societal structures, but these roles are now left open to 
choice. This means that people now pursue their own interests, and this generates 
new uncertainties; to choose the wrong kind of university degree, to get divorced, 
to become unemployed, etc., represent the individual’s failure as a human being 
rather than the result of broader social patterns. In turn, this turns ‘risk manage-
ment’ into an everyday practice that all human beings have to undertake to avoid 
insecurity, anxiety, unease, or simply to avoid failing in the aspects of life. 
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Beck’s work shares many similarities with that of Anthony Giddens. Giddens also 
saw modernisation as being characterised by the two extremes of globalising in-
fluences on the one hand and personal dispositions on the other (Giddens, 1991, p. 
1). Giddens argued, like Beck, that late modernity was characterised by the break-
down of traditional roles, norms, habits, etc., and that this had an effect on the 
conduct and meaning of everyday life. In contrast to Beck, however, Giddens 
stressed modern institutions as the key to the nature of these characteristics, rather 
than the attenuation of basic human needs. Giddens argued that modern institu-
tions had come to structure the individual’s everyday life, but also that institutions 
were themselves structured by individuals’ actions. “For Giddens the key features 
of modernity are institutional and individual reflexivity combined with the reor-
ganization of time and space and the expansion of disembedding mechanisms” 
(Lupton, 1999, p. 73). He explained the latter to be mechanisms that take social re-
lations out of their specific time/space context and apply them to wider locales, 
like expert knowledge systems. Such systems deploy “modes of technical 
knowledge which have validity independent of the practitioners and clients who 
make use of them” (Giddens, 1991, p. 18). Other disembedding mechanisms were 
symbolic tokens, like money, or objects with standardised values that serve as me-
dia of exchange. 
 
In relation to the time-space continuum, Giddens argued that pre-modern societies 
were characterised by the coincidence of time and space dominated by localised 
activities, while modern societies had moved towards disconnecting space from 
location. In pre-modern societies, experiences and traditions were very much con-
fined to specific localities, but with the rise of modernisation came also the bring-
ing together of experiences and knowledge. Modern institutions were at the heart 
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of this movement, as they brought notions of “we” with them and thus unified 
people across the world. Giddens argued, much like Beck, that this drive for pro-
gress represented by modernisation, the globalisation and disembedding mecha-
nisms, had led to an amplification of the effects of risks. If “the economy” goes 
wrong, for example, as with the recent financial crisis, this will affect billions of 
people rather than just one nation or one group of people. In this respect, Giddens 
argued differently than Beck. Giddens argued that due to modernisation, people 
had become more aware of the threats of the world and thus that risks were 
thought to be greater, while Beck claimed that modernisation had actually in-
creased the amount of risks produced, which prompted the need to avoid them. 
 
Giddens agreed with Beck that risks represented dangers or threats, that they were 
constructed by humans, humans who were part of modern societies, that the ef-
fects of them had been amplified, but not that they had increased in number. Gid-
dens also termed modern societies “risk cultures” (Giddens, 1991, p. 3). However, 
Giddens disagreed with Beck when it came to the nature of ‘reflexivity’. Giddens 
agreed with Beck that ‘reflexive’ referred to the increased self-awareness of both 
individuals and societies of the contingent nature of expert knowledge and social 
activity, but where Beck inferred that this had led to increased distrust of experts 
and societal progress, Giddens argued that the progressive separation of space, 
time and location and the disembedding mechanisms had led to a dependence on 
more trust. He argued that this, however, was not related to trust in people, but 
trust in abstract systems, like the system of expert knowledge. As Lupton writes: 
“People now cannot simply rely on local knowledge, tradition, religious precepts, 
habit or observation of others’ practices to conduct their everyday lives… Rather 
they must look principally to experts they do not personally know and are unlikely 
to ever meet to supply them with guidelines” (Lupton, 1999, p. 75). 
90 
 
 
Giddens also argued that modern societies were characterised by doubts about the 
validity of these expert systems, because organisations and people had become 
more aware that experts tended to produce conflicting findings. In modern socie-
ties, as these conflicting findings were now spreading across the world at large, 
this held the potential to generate misleading knowledge and thus new uncertain-
ties. In relation to risk management, for example, because organisations rely on 
worldwide expert (scientific knowledge) systems to produce reliable risk assess-
ments of future hazards, and because experts (scientists) disagree on how to do 
this, such assessments end up becoming imprecise. In general, Giddens argued 
that such knowledge-ambivalence had led people to become more cynical and 
sceptical about modern society and the abstract expert (knowledge) systems. In 
pre-modern societies, reflexivity was largely structured by the traditions estab-
lished within the time-space organisation of individual communities. In modernity, 
however, reflexivity has taken on a different structure that relies less on traditions 
to justify actions and much more on expert systems; but these produce conflicting 
findings which force people into becoming self-reflective. “Living in a “risk socie-
ty” means living with a calculative attitude to the open possibilities of action, posi-
tive and negative, with which, as individuals and globally, we are confronted in a 
continuous way in our contemporary social existence” (Giddens, 1991, p. 28). 
 
In summing up this subsection, the structuralist risk paradigm, here represented by 
Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, has contributed by demonstrating how macro-
societal developments have had an influence on the character of ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’. Beck and Giddens have both contributed by showing how the no-
tion of ‘risk’ has become a central concern in contemporary society emerging 
from the processes of modernisation. Risks are seen to have changed character 
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from being associated with “the forces of god or nature” to be the result of human 
decisions and actions, and therefore also human intervention. Beck and Giddens 
have also contributed by showing that ‘risk management’ has primarily become an 
activity of all organisations and individuals. As traditional structures have broken 
down, people and organisations need to reinvent themselves to succeed, and be-
cause risks follow as “by-products” of their decisions, they need to be contained. 
Both scholars have also pointed to the political nature of risks and risk manage-
ment, singling out ‘reflexivity’ as a primary response to uncertainty. They may 
disagree on whether to trust or distrust experts, or expert knowledge, but both have 
showed that more extensive scepticism has followed scientific progress; both have 
showed that social conflicts and acts of negotiation now stand as central parts of 
any ‘risk management’ practice for humans as well as organisations. 
 
Some major criticism has been directed at this perspective. Lash (1993) argues 
that reflexivity cannot only be understood through cognitive categories, but also 
has to be understood through aesthetics or hermeneutic self-interpretation. He ar-
gues that not all people have the freedom to construct their own narrative but often 
find themselves to be constrained by various elements such as their financial cir-
cumstances, geographical location, etc. It has also been pointed out that Beck and 
Giddens have derived their conclusions based on speculation rather than on empir-
ical studies and thus know very little about everyday practices (Lupton, 1999). 
Thus they may have directed our attention to the importance of understanding 
risks as a modern phenomenon, but they provide little guidance as to how people 
should go about dealing with risks. As Hanlon (2010) further proposes: Beck’s 
understanding of expertise and knowledge “underplays the historical and contem-
porary importance of lay practice and knowledge, its relations with expertise and 
its long politicisation” (Hanlon, 2010, p. 217). Hanlon recommends that we return 
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to lay experience and social struggle to examine how people give meaning to 
risks, how they produce them and how they act upon them. See Lupton (1999) and 
Hanlon (2010) for further references to critiques of this risk paradigm. 
 
3.1.5. Post-structuralist risk paradigm 
The last of the three socio-cultural risk paradigms into which I have identified and 
classified current risk management literature can be termed a post-structuralist risk 
paradigm. This section describes the management accounting literature in this risk 
paradigm, albeit limited, and how this literature has contributed to our understand-
ing of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. Overall, these studies have been inspired by 
the work of Michel Foucault and have focused on concepts such as governmentali-
ty, discourse, dispositif, power and knowledge. Michel Foucault was concerned 
with how mechanisms of power affected everyday life (e.g. Foucault, 1970, 1977, 
1981). He understood power not as something to be “acquired, seized or shared, 
something one holds on to or allows to slip away", but as relational, something 
that become apparent through being exercised (Foucault, 1981, p. 94). The con-
cepts mentioned all deal with various aspects of this through approaches such as 
discourse analysis or genealogy study of developments over the course of history. 
Combined, the contributions to the literature in this perspective have primarily 
dealt with the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, relying on these concepts 
to examine how ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ relate to notions of power. 
 
The post-structuralist paradigm must be distinguished from the structuralist para-
digm. The structuralist risk paradigm has focused mostly on macro-structures that 
have led to the increased production of risks and/or the stronger awareness of 
them. In contrast, the post-structuralist risk paradigm focuses on the ways in 
which discourses, strategies, practices and institutions serve to bring risks into be-
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ing (Lupton, 1999). The post-structuralists thus approach the notions of ‘risk’ and 
‘risk management’, like other subject matters, from a meso-level structural per-
spective. In addition, this paradigm does not assume risks to exist “out there” me-
diated by human beings, as do the social constructivist and the structuralist risk 
paradigms, but as constructions produced through these discourses, strategies, 
practices and institutions. The literature in this paradigm assumes that discourses, 
etc., produce “truths” about risk, risk regimes, or risk dispositifs, which impinge 
upon social relations and become the basis for action. This literature claims that it 
is through these regimes or dispositifs that we know ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. 
In contrast, the structuralist paradigm claimed that modern societies were charac-
terised by the freedom of agency led on by the processes of modernisation (struc-
ture) and rejected the idea of a post-modern society (Lash, 1993). 
 
One of two studies identified drawing upon this understanding of ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’ comes from Michael Power, who has sought to explain the emer-
gence of ‘fraud risk’ relying on Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’ or ‘apparatus’ 
(Power, 2013). The concept of dispositif can be defined as a system of relations 
that can be established between “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting 
of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, adminis-
trative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). 
Power argues that ‘fraud risk’, and its management, has emerged as a highly artic-
ulated, transnational web of ideas and procedures which frame the future within 
present organisational action. He further examines its broader historicity and ar-
gues that ‘fraud risk’ has emerged to become part of a more extensive risk man-
agement discourse for talking about, acting on, and governing organisations. This 
discourse – or more precisely dispositif or apparatus – consists of more than just 
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words, namely also of standards, rules, ideas, roles, procedures, routines, etc., all 
focused on ‘risk’ and risk control systems. He suggests that ‘fraud risk’ and ‘fraud 
risk management’ have turned into a ‘regime of truth’, a mechanism for governing 
and disciplining managers, “which has emerged from an expanding risk discourse 
and which shapes what it is possible to say with credibility” (Power, 2013, p. 542). 
 
The above study by Power links to his earlier studies, which show how risk man-
agement has emerged alongside notions of corporate governance and internal con-
trol promoted by the accountancy professions (Power, 2007). “The language of 
organizational justification consists in being able to demonstrate conformity to 
standardized elements of a risk management system”, as Power writes about what 
the developments have led to (2007, p. 185). In relation to this, ‘fraud risk man-
agement’ represents the latest particular and specific effect of this general rise of 
an expansive risk management process (Power, 2013, p. 541). In this way, ‘fraud 
risk management’ should not be mistaken for having been implemented by organi-
sations attempting to adapt to an increased number of situations of people commit-
ting fraud, like academics within the functionalist risk paradigm would have ar-
gued, but rather as a new (post-modern) logic of organisation; a distinctive mode 
of governing the enterprise (Power, 2013, p. 541). 
  
The second identified study focuses on how risk management as phenomenon has 
retained its importance after its “evident failure to manage risks” during the latest 
financial crisis by focusing on the notion of power (Huber & Scheytt, 2013). In 
doing this, Huber and Scheytt also rely on Foucault’s concept of dispositif, but 
supplements this with Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the “permanent state of ex-
ception” (Agamben, 1998, 2005). Like Power, they conclude that a strong risk 
management dispositif made out of institutions, regulation and models lies at the 
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heart of risk management. This dispositif shapes organisational balances of power 
as it reproduces larger societal values and determines organisational responses to 
‘risk’. In relation to Agamben’s concept of “the permanent state of exception”, the 
exception here being the financial crisis and the aftermath “the permanent state”, 
this allows elites to “play” with people’s fear and anxiety, which, in turn, may lead 
to even stronger calls for risk management – calls “which cannot be rescinded af-
ter the initial state of exception has ended” (Huber & Scheytt, 2013, p. 88). By 
this, they argue that risk management could be used as a powerful resource to 
augment, undermine or even replace other forms of management control. 
 
The above two studies have contributed in general by showing how dispositifs 
have become means of ordering the social and material worlds through their 
methods of rationalisation and calculation of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. These 
dispositifs have rendered uncertainty and disorder more controllable; they have 
brought ‘risk’ into being and therefore also the management of it either by institu-
tions or by experts or consultants. The post-structuralist risk paradigm, however, 
also suffers from certain limitations. The question of how risk-related discourses 
and strategies operate, how they may be taken up, negotiated or resisted by those 
who are subjected to them, remains under-examined (Lupton, 1999). Huber and 
Scheytt acknowledge this when they admit that their “normative statements can be 
understood as idealistic, if not naïve”, and explain that “the focus remains with 
more empirically focused research projects to deepen the analysis of the reasons 
for the continuing prominence of risk management” (Huber & Scheytt, 2013, p. 
97). Foucault himself, however, said that he was simply not interested in such 
matters; he had no intention of second guessing specific actions at the individual 
or organisational (micro) level (See Power, 2013, p. 541). 
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Furthermore, the literature in this paradigm, including the above two studies, does 
not distinguish between one person and the next, but assumes that groups of peo-
ple, such as managers, experts, etc., are the same. This literature thus downplays 
what the social constructivist literature has shown, namely that people are differ-
ent and act differently depending both on the cultural settings and on their own 
preferences, interests, and the like. And this also applies to the literature taking the 
structuralist risk paradigm described here. For example, to conclude that “elites” 
can exploit the “permanent state of exception” brought about by the recent finan-
cial crisis to “augment, undermine or even replace more traditional forms of man-
agement control” is very speculative, as it leaves it to empirical studies to deter-
mine who these “elites” are – not to mention who the “non-elites” would be and 
how they could be defined. It does of course direct our attention to potential new 
ways of approaching ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ and equip researchers with the-
ories to do so, but when they are proposed detached from actual studies of prac-
tice, how useful can they be as guidance for empirical case studies? The post-
structuralist risk paradigm thus gains strength when it focuses on the meso-level 
and does indeed do well in combination with institutional perspectives, but it has 
difficulties dealing with the examination of “micro” associations, differences be-
tween people, etc. 
 
3.1.6. Constructivist risk paradigm 
One more risk paradigm should be mentioned, which I have termed the construc-
tivist risk paradigm. This paradigm has emerged especially in recent years, and it 
extends the social constructivist paradigm while still holding distinct theoretical 
assumptions that differ from that paradigm. It has a very strong focus on ‘risks’ as 
pure constructs made not only by human beings but also by non-human actors 
such as technologies, devices and tools, through complex networks of relations. 
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“A risk object, therefore, is not a static, objective phenomenon, but is constantly 
constructed and negotiated as part of networks of social interaction and the for-
mation of meaning” (Lupton, 1999, p. 29). It also insists that analysis should be 
based on examinations of actual associations and not be pre-limited to “artificial” 
boundaries like ‘an organisation’ or ‘a company’. This means carrying out exami-
nations at the micro-level, which again differs from the structuralist and post-
structuralist macro- and meso-level focuses respectively. It further a priori per-
ceives the ability of different types of people, such as experts or lay people, to 
construct risks to be the same. It thus does not give priority to certain actors, either 
human or non-human, for understanding how risks are constructed. 
 
The constructivist paradigm thus differentiates itself from the other risk para-
digms. The rationalist-cognitive risk paradigm understood ‘risks’ as objective 
facts that had to be identified through structured and systematic methods, models 
and processes. In contrast the constructivist risk paradigm, as mentioned above, 
understands risks as pure constructs made by humans, and also non-humans, 
which only exists qua their construction as such by those actors. The constructivist 
risk paradigm thus extends the social constructivist risk paradigm by arguing that 
construction of risks also depends on non-human actors. These non-human actors 
are perhaps even co-constructed to facilitate the construction of risks and thus also 
serve as mediators in the perception of risk, much similar to what the socio-
cultural settings do for the social constructivists. The constructivist risk paradigm 
differs even more from the functionalist risk paradigm, where ‘risk management’ 
and its organisation and implementation in the long term will be shaped by the 
‘situational imperative’. In contrast, constructivists understand practices of ‘risk 
management’ as the outcome of complex networks of relations that take different 
trajectories depending on the interactions taking place. Thus this paradigm bares 
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the strongest resemblance to the post-structuralist risk paradigm, where ‘risk’ and 
‘risk management’ are also assumed to be constructs, with the major exception 
that the constructivist risk paradigm focuses on “micro-level” associations and not 
meso-level developments when it comes to explaining how risks and practices of 
risk management are constructed. 
 
One of the larger management accounting studies in this paradigm was made by 
Miller, Kurunmäki and O’Leary, who examined the implications of accounting 
and hybrids for the management of risks (Miller et al., 2008). Miller et al. found: 
(1) that the existing literature had tended to neglect the ‘hybrid practices, process-
es and expertise’ through which uncertainties were actually managed; (2) that the 
management of organisations had begun to transform around notions of risk and 
risk management, but in ways that also neglected the wide range of uncertainties 
related to hybrid practices; and (3) that accounting practices were central to this 
situation, as these practices always attempted to make visible and calculable the 
hybrids that it encountered, while at the same time it became hybridised itself 
through encounters with other disciplines. In documenting this, Miller et al. drew 
on data from three sources: (1) two previous case studies; (2) an examination of 
the literature on hybrids through the last two decades in social sciences; and (3) 
earlier literature in especially accounting related to hybrids. They concluded by 
stating that they found it a matter of concern that when so much actual risk man-
agement took place outside formal practices, why did so little academic literature 
deal with this. They thus called for more research into actual practices of risk 
management. 
 
Another study was made by Kalthoff (2005), who looked into the role of technical 
devices in framing the performance of economic calculations and risk manage-
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ment. Kalthoff regarded activities of calculation as epistemic practices that ques-
tion the routines of everyday life, but which themselves are routine practices per-
formed by technical devices. In relation to risk management, calculation consti-
tutes the object it calculates; it brings it into existence, frames and fixates it; 
reveals it as an object (Kalthoff, 2005, p. 73). Kalthoff also stressed that in addi-
tion to “calculating something”, calculation had to be understood as “calculating 
with something”. Kalthoff then applied the above understanding of calculation to 
two large international banks with integrated risk management practices (however 
providing only scarce details regarding data). He arrived at three core findings: (1) 
that banks constitute companies anew through the application of technical devices 
when making lending decisions, that is, banks convert potential clients’ annual re-
ports into their own format by applying computer programmes to calculate eco-
nomic figures such as ratios (calculating something); (2) that the products of tech-
nical devices, i.e. the now transformed annual reports, are used in risk negotiation 
processes between bank subsidiaries and headquarters (calculating with some-
thing); and (3) that economic writing (such as output computerized statements) has 
performance consequences as symbolic machines. 
 
Millo and MacKenzie continued the research into technical risk devices by exam-
ining the intertwined relationship between the emergence, ascendance and estab-
lishment of financial risk management techniques and financial derivatives mar-
kets (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009).8 More specifically, they studied the growth of 
financial risk management applications that made use of the Black-Scholes-
Merton option pricing model in the period between the late 1960s and the early 
1990s. They found that understanding the success of this model had more to do 
with its communicative and organisational usefulness rather than the accuracy of 
                                                 
8 Millo and MacKenzie refer to both Kalthoff, 2005, and Miller & O'Leary, 2007. 
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the results it produced (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009, p. 638). This model allowed 
clearer communication inside trading organisations, reduced the complexity of fi-
nancial data, enabled more efficient decision-making, solved the operational chal-
lenge of the clearing house when calculating the level of risk-based deposits re-
quired of traders, and created consensus among market participants, such as 
trading firms, options clearing houses and the securities regulators, to the degree 
that the Securities Exchange Commission used it to legitimise its regulatory deci-
sions. Millo and MacKenzie even showed how market participants continued to 
use this model after the market crash in October 1987, albeit knowing that the 
model was empirically inaccurate. 
 
In a similar vein, Jordan, Jørgensen and Mitterhofer (2013) advanced our 
knowledge about technical risk devices in their study of the relationship between 
management control and risk management by investigating the role of risk maps in 
project management settings. Jordan et al. found that risk maps served as ‘mediat-
ing instruments’ that allowed the “distributed actors to adjudicate interests, build 
confidence in and associate with ‘the project’ and its progress over time” (Jordan 
et al., 2013, p. 158). This was in contrast to earlier studies that had shown that risk 
maps primarily had to do with increased attention being paid to early warning sig-
nals and the production of audit trails (e.g. Power, 2007). The concept of ‘mediat-
ing instruments’ was here coined by Miller and O'Leary (2007) to indicate the link 
between the concepts of accounting inscription, mediating machines and market 
devices. Jordan et al. describe how “mediating instruments “directs the attention to 
the ways in which particular inscriptions mediate the relations between distributed 
actors, distinct imperatives and domains within a socio-technic network” (Jordan 
et al., 2013, p. 159). Jordan et al. then attributed this finding to the different quali-
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ties of risk maps, such as their figurative and diagrammatic outlook, commensura-
tion, prospective and evaluative connotations, and flexible zones of normality. 
 
Rocher (2011) found that the technical risk devices themselves rarely were well-
defined objects that were accepted or rejected without alternatives. He argued that 
technical devices had to be understood not as “a simple act of application of pre-
determined functions and goals through neutral intermediaries”, but rather as “a 
process” undergoing transformation when confronted with different actors’ inter-
ests (Rocher, 2011, p. 76). In drawing on actor-network theory and Callon’s four 
moments of translation (Callon, 1986), and on the basis of a single case study of 
the implementation of a technical risk device in a French local government, 
Rocher found that acceptance of the device depended upon a complex web of in-
terrelations in which technique and actors were intertwined. He showed how the 
device contained meanings and utilities that were not initially considered by their 
designers and which were later highlighted by the actors using the device, who in 
this way “reinvented” the device. Rocher concluded by recommending that more 
research be conducted into “how translations continue to work once a management 
device is implemented in an organization” (Rocher, 2011, p. 78). 
 
The above four management accounting literature studies have all looked into the 
enabling role of risk management devices and have shown that these are far from 
“neutral” or “objective” devices that people apply linearly and without problems. 
The studies have showed that risk management devices take on different trajecto-
ries during implementation, trajectories that to a wide extent depend on their (per-
ceived) usefulness rather than their accuracy. In this respect, the literature has 
tended not to focus much on the limiting role of these devices, their constraining 
or restricting effects, if any, on risk management practice. Kalthoff showed that 
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risk calculations became the subject of negotiation between actors with different 
interests, as calculated figures created boundaries within which decisions were lat-
er made. In the same manner, Miller et al. showed that ‘enterprise risk manage-
ment’ ignored the hybrid practices, processes and expertise left outside the bound-
aries of ‘an enterprise’, where much of the actual reduction of uncertainty took 
place; and Jordan et al. indicated that something was left outside risk maps as 
these shaped boundaries of risk management. None of these studies, however, fol-
lowed which unexpected effects, like limiting or constraining the practice of risk 
management, these technical risk devices were capable of producing. 
 
It appears that only one study has attempted to respond to this by looking into how 
practices of risk management (not its technologies) can lead to the generation of 
new uncertainties that would not have existed without risk management. Vinnari 
and Skærbæk (2014) looked into the implementation of risk management in a 
Finnish municipality and focused on the unexpected effects, or uncertainties, gen-
erated during its application. In doing this, they traced the developments of this 
practice of risk management over several years and through two major scandals, 
relying on an analysis of public and confidential documents and semi-structured 
interviews. They drew on actor-network theory, but used different concepts than 
did Rocher, namely the concepts of framing, overflowing and reframing. They 
found that (due to its framing) risk management, besides reducing uncertainty also 
created unexpected uncertainties (overflows) that would otherwise not have 
emerged, including: uncertainties related to legal aspects of risk management solu-
tions, uncertainties related to the definition and operationalisation of risk man-
agement, and uncertainties related to the resources available for expanding risk 
management. They authors then tracked these developments and showed the dy-
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namic development of risk management over time as well as the changing roles of 
those involved. 
  
To sum up, the constructivist literature has contributed by showing the contingent 
nature of risk management going beyond the social-constructivist notion of “cul-
tural, social and political environments” by describing actual practices of risk 
management. Combined with the assumption that non-human devices must also be 
included, this has allowed the literature from this risk paradigm to examine the 
role of technical devices in much more detail. The literature from this paradigm 
has further demonstrated that practices of risk management might themselves end 
up producing uncertainties, which of course challenges the core ontological as-
sumption of ‘risks’ as objective facts that is held by the rationalist-cognitive and 
the functionalistic risk paradigms. To wrap up this subsection, the constructivist 
risk paradigm, like the social constructivist risk paradigm, has been criticised for 
not providing accounts that can be generalised across organisations, sectors and 
counties. In response, however, this literature has claimed that what these organi-
sations, sectors and counties have lost in generalisability, they have gained in con-
text-specific knowledge and levels of empirical details. 
 
3.2. The literature’s impact on mega-projects 
Before I describe the tensions within current risk management literature and the 
relevance of engaging with these, before I describe what scholars have called the 
incompleteness of our current knowledge of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ and the 
inadequacy of the current theories to explain (all) empirical findings, I would like 
briefly to explain what impacts the current risk management literature has had on 
risk management in mega-projects. I find that it is important to mention this, first 
of all because this dissertation deals with contemporary methods of risk manage-
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ment, which, as I will explain later, to a wide extent draws on resources from the 
rationalist-cognitive perspective’s ontological and epistemological understanding 
of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, and secondly because this demonstrates how little 
research has actually been applied on the study of mega-projects from a manage-
ment accounting perspective, and thus that there is ample opportunity to increase 
our knowledge of this. 
 
The literature in the rationalist-cognitive perspective has been shown to have a 
significant effect on the development of (project) risk management standards 
(Power, 2004, 2007, Winch & Maytorena, 2011). This literature has shown that 
risk management standards assume ‘risks’ to be objective facts “out there”, which 
can be identified, assessed and reduced by means of highly structured and rational-
istic risk management processes. These processes are to be integrated across all 
other organisational processes, aligned with organisational objectives, and applied 
throughout the lifetime of the organisation. If the organisation does this properly, 
it makes sure that all risks are taken into account and that the organisation reaches 
its objectives. To do all of this also requires defining a ‘risk appetite’ or the value 
of risks that the organisation is willing to accept. This appetite serves as the 
threshold against which all subsequent planning, identification, assessment, reduc-
tion, monitoring, etc., are conducted in order to eventually evaluate whether the 
practice has been successful. In Power’s own words, risk management operates 
like a thermostat: “which adjusts to changes in environment subject to pre-given 
target temperature” (Power, 2009, p. 849 ). 
 
One strand of literature that has had an even more direct effect has been the litera-
ture on ‘optimism bias’, defined as unrealistic expectations about the future 
(Weinstein, 1980). This literature has affected approaches to project management 
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through the notion of the ‘planning fallacy’, i.e. the inability to predict accurate 
project completion times (Buehler et al., 2002). The literature has shown that 
planners tend to take on an “inside view”, which means that they focus narrowly 
on the project at hand, the objectives of that project, the resources needed, the un-
certainties that prevent the success of the project, and so on. This, however, leads 
to optimistic forecasting and consequently project cost overruns (Buehler et al., 
2002). Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) have proposed that organisations supple-
ment this method with a simple statistical analysis of analogous efforts completed 
in other similar projects. They call this an “outside view”, or ‘reference class fore-
casting’, i.e. “an objective forecasting method that counteracts the personal and 
organizational sources of optimism” (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003, p. 61). The 
method completely ignores the details of the project at hand, and it involves no at-
tempt at forecasting the events that would influence the project’s future course. In-
stead it examines the experience gained from a class of similar projects, lays out a 
rough distribution of outcomes for the reference class, and then positions the cur-
rent project in that distribution. 
 
The literature from the other perspectives seems not to have had an impact on 
practice. It might be argued that the functionalist research should have had an im-
pact due to the amount of contingencies found, but at least with the Danish public 
sector this seems to have had no impact whatsoever. This is not to say that practi-
tioners do not take into account elements such as project size, project objectives, 
etc., when implementing risk management, but this seems to take place more on 
grounds of common sense than by reference to academic literature. In addition, it 
tends to take place in parallel with government regulation, which does not either 
refer to academic literature in other areas than the rationalist-cognitive. In the US, 
for example, the American Planning Association has endorsed ‘reference class 
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forecasting’ and encouraged all planners to use this method to improve project vi-
ability (American Planning Association, 2005). In the UK, HM Treasury has rec-
ommended all British governmental departments to adjust project cost, benefit and 
duration estimations using ‘reference class forecasting’ (HM Treasury, 2003, 
2004). In Denmark, the Ministry of Transport has similarly implemented a new 
budgeting method inspired by the ideas of ‘reference class forecasting’ 
(Transportministeriet, 2006), and the ‘Swiss Association of Road and Transporta-
tion Experts’, see Flyvbjerg (2009), as well as ‘The Australian Road and State 
Traffic Authority’, see Li et al. (2010) are involved with the same. 
 
3.3. Implications, tensions and opportunities 
Overall, the current risk management literature has advanced and expanded our 
knowledge about ‘risk’ as a phenomenon per se, and ‘risk management’ as a man-
agement control practice seen from different risk paradigms ranging from the ra-
tionalist-cognitive to the socio-cultural and constructivist paradigms. These para-
digms have advanced our knowledge by each having its own key focus, which 
allows them to see things differently and thus supplement each other. The rational-
ist risk paradigm, for example, produced mathematical ways of modelling risks in 
order to allow calculations of the probability and impact of these across time, 
space and location. The cognitive risk paradigm continued along this line of think-
ing, but drew on various psychological methods to demonstrate that the human 
perception of risks is systematically biased and that different groups of people 
perceive risks systematically differently. The functional perspective took a differ-
ent path and focused more on the practices of risk management and the various 
contextual factors that could determine differences between these practices, and 
subsequently how organisations should design them in order to optimise risk man-
agement effectiveness. In combination, these perspectives relied much on the 
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same strong realist approach to ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ and thus supple-
mented each other well to further the development of for them more optimal and 
better risk models. 
 
In contrast, the social constructivist risk paradigm broke with the idea of risks as 
being objective or neutral facts and regarded them as always being embedded 
within cultural, social and institutional systems/settings. The literature in this par-
adigm showed that the ways in which risks and practices of risk management were 
understood depended, for example, on top management predilection towards quan-
tification and the boundary-work of risk experts. This literature also pointed to the 
strong influence of the accountancy profession by shaping the logic of best-
practice approaches to risk management (logic of auditability). The structuralist 
risk paradigm maintained a similar understanding of ‘risk’, but focused on ex-
plaining this with reference to processes of modernisation, that is, it took a macro-
level perspective. The literature in this paradigm further had a normative-critical 
agenda, as risks were perceived as something that posed a threat to humanity and 
thus had to be eliminated. In summary, these two risk paradigms took what can be 
called a weak constructivist or realist perspective to supplement the stronger real-
ist approach of the rationalist-cognitive and the functionalist risk paradigms. They 
demonstrated the importance of taking into account the cultures, institutions and 
structures that surround the perceptions of risk and practices of risk management 
in order to fully understand them. 
 
The last two risk paradigms, the post-structuralist and the constructivist, were both 
set apart by taking a strong constructivist approach to the understanding of risk. 
The post-structuralist risk paradigm pointed to the disciplining effects of risk man-
agement dispositifs or discourses and how these shaped the logics of practices of 
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risk management. This perspective focused on meso-level developments and thus 
supplemented the structuralist macro-level perspective and complemented the so-
cial constructivist perspective. In contrast, the constructivist perspective focused 
on actual interactions or associations taking place in for example organisations, 
and how risks were dealt with through these practices. This paradigm pointed to 
the enabling effects of technologies and the importance of understanding the con-
struction of risks as part of larger networks of associations not limited to human 
beings. It further demonstrated that practices of risk management could them-
selves produce new uncertainties, and it thus pointed to potential complex rela-
tions between risk management and other practices. In combination, all of the 
above risk paradigms – from the rationalist-cognitive to the socio-cultural and the 
constructivist perspective – have advanced our knowledge in different ways. 
 
Despite its interesting contributions, however, the above literature in these para-
digms has not paid attention to all aspects of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ and 
must therefore be termed incomplete or inadequate to explain (all) empirical de-
velopments. As notions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ have proliferated in recent 
years to the extent of transforming organisational management, this makes ad-
vancing our knowledge of this most relevant. If companies, for example, rely on 
practices of risk management and their embedded logics to improve management 
decision-making, knowing the effects of this seems relevant. In a similar vein, 
now that governments implement holistic risk management to curb cost overruns 
and ensure project success, knowing what risk management will imply seems rel-
evant. This has also been recognised by prominent scholars, who are now calling 
for more research into especially organisational practices of risk management and 
the linkage to notions of ‘corporate governance’, ‘management control’ and 
broader notions of organisational management (e.g. Bhimani, 2009; Gephart et al., 
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2009; Kaplan et al., 2009; Mikes, 2011; Miller et al., 2008; Power, 2009; Van der 
Stede, 2011; Young, 2011). In recent years, well-known journals have even pub-
lished special issues on the subject, such as Organization Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 2-
3, from 2009, and Management Accounting Research, Vol. 24, Issue 2, from 2013. 
 
One of the major aspects listed as an area about which we lack knowledge is “the 
particularities of risk management characteristics in specific organizational set-
tings” (Bhimani, 2009, p. 4). It follows from the above literature review that the 
current risk management literature has tended to disregard the mechanisms of risk 
management practices as they develop over longer periods of time. As Rocher 
(2011, p. 78) states: “It would be interesting in the future to study how translations 
continue to work once a management device is implemented in an organization”. 
Or as Miller et al. (2008, p. 962) states: “But, if hybrids are where so much of the 
action is, and if so many social scientists from so many disciplines have empha-
sised their importance for two decades or more, why are they not given greater 
prominence in risk management?”. Both of these two quotes illustrate the fact that 
researchers are calling for more research into what Bhimani termed “the particu-
larities of risk management”, that is, how risk management develops over longer 
periods of time. Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014) did follow one such practice over a 
longer period of time, but they stayed within the formal boundaries of ‘a munici-
pality’ and did not follow the “the hybrid practices, processes and expertise”. 
 
In this sense, Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014) did the same as most other risk man-
agement scholars; they looked “behind the scenes of risk management to its actual 
organizational settings” (Mikes, 2009, p. 19, my emphasis). Arena et al. (2010), 
Mikes (2009, 2011) and most of the contingency-based studies did the same when 
they limited themselves a priori to examining the risk management practices of 
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fixed organisational entities such as financial or non-financial companies. In con-
trast, Hayne and Free (2014) followed Miller et al.’s (2008) notion of “hybrid 
practices, processes and expertise” and examined how COSO ERM proliferated 
through hybridised processes to ultimately become the worldwide “best-practice” 
risk management standard. Hayne and Free, however, pursued this at the institu-
tional meso-level and did not engage with “the particularities of risk management” 
at the micro-level as recommended by Bhimani (2009). This means that despite 
the highly interesting nature of the above studies, we still know very little of how 
“micro-level practices” develop over longer periods of time or the translations 
they undergo (Rocher, 2011). Thus, the first subject that emerges as something fu-
ture research could engage in is looking further into the particularities of specific 
practices of risk management going across organisational boundaries in order to 
understand the complex dynamics, or the trajectories, they take over longer peri-
ods of time.  
 
The current literature across the different risk paradigms has further tended to dis-
regard the examination of the ways in which risks are constructed first as specific 
“objects” and then as “risky” through networks of relations (Hilgartner, 1992). In 
general, this follows from the current literature’s reliance on the philosophies of 
science that underpin the above perspectives. In the rationalist-cognitive risk para-
digm, for example, risks have been perceived as objective facts “out there” and 
treated “as the independent variable and people’s response to it as dependent” 
(Douglas, 1985, p. 25). This also follows from the psychometric studies mentioned 
above, where the relative influence of different cognitive factors have been 
mapped in relation to people’s perception of different types of risks (Slovic, 
1987). This has been critiqued by the social constructivist risk paradigm, as it 
leads to a one-sided analysis of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ that tends to neglect 
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the cultural, social and institutional settings. As Hilgartner points out, however, 
the social-constructivist risk paradigm is hit by the same critique as “their explana-
tions often have a similar structure” (Hilgartner, 1992, p. 39). This also goes for 
the post-structuralists, who consider risks to be determined by “variables” such as 
dispositifs, discourses, power-relations, etc. The constructivist risk paradigm 
seems to be the only risk paradigm that allows for the understanding and examina-
tion of risks as the “dependent variable” (Hilgartner, 1992). 
 
The literature in the constructivist paradigm, however, has not made the construc-
tion of “risk objects” subject to their inquiry – particularly not how these objects 
are made “risky” rather than “beneficial”, or something else. This literature has 
mainly focused on describing the enabling role of technologies or technical risk 
devices and the various trajectories they take as they become useful to certain ac-
tors. In this sense, the current constructivist literature has tended to focus on 
demonstrating that models are neither accurate nor linearly applied to solve 
straightforward issues of identifying and managing the so-called risks “out there”. 
A second future avenue for research thus relates to going into these “particularities 
of risk management” and examine (1) how “risk objects” are constructed, and (2) 
how such objects are translated over longer periods of time through hybrid net-
works of association. Doing this may advance our knowledge of whether all things 
are indeed translated into risks or whether some uncertainties are excluded from 
practices of risk management – and then what effects this generates for organisa-
tional management over longer periods of time. In the light of the current situation 
that ‘risk identification’ has become one of the key pillars of all types of risk man-
agement practices that are carried out on a regular basis by practitioners (e.g. Raz 
& Hillson, 2005; Winch, 2010) , it seems most relevant to inquire into this. 
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It also appears that very few studies investigate the distinction between the broad-
er notion of ‘uncertainty’ as the potential infinite unknown and the narrower no-
tion of ‘risk’ as uncertainty made calculable (Callon et al., 2009). This distinction 
was brought to attention by the economist Frank Knight, who argued that only 
risks could be subjected to calculation and quantification (Knight, 1921). In con-
trast, Knight argued that uncertainty referred to unmeasurable events arising from 
“the impossibility of exhaustive classification of states” (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993, 
p. 459). The literature has mainly focused on showing that standards / frameworks 
tend to ignore this distinction (e.g. Froud, 2003; Winch & Maytorena, 2011) or 
that “uncertainty/risk reduction” per se can lead to unwanted consequences, like 
loss of project relevance (Kreiner, 1995), lack of broader value-orientation 
(Morris, 2010), or a false sense of control (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). It has also 
been suggested that uncertainty management might be better than risk manage-
ment (Chapman & Ward, 2011), and that uncertainties are dealt with outside of 
formal risk management practices (Corvellec, 2009; Miller et al., 2008). Thus, it 
seems that there is a lack of research into (1) how uncertainties are translated into 
objects, (2) how objects are distributed according to their “risky” characteristics, 
(3) what the effects of these processes are, and (4) the dynamics of this over a 
longer period of time. 
 
It would be relevant to look into the relationship between uncertainties and risks, 
because when frameworks understand both as “calculable entities”, as prior re-
search has shown, then practices of risk management “risks” that people become 
overconfident. If people believe that the practices of risk management have taken 
all uncertainties into account, they have little reason to stop up to consider risks 
before making their decisions. This can lead to even further negative consequenc-
es, such as people becoming frustrated, angry and/or pessimistic. If events happen 
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that people thought had been handled by the practice, but now realise they had not, 
due to the limited focus on “calculable entities”, they might turn risk averse and 
lose faith in the practice altogether. This may lead them to become ineffective and 
afraid of making decisions of which the outcome is unknown. This is of course all 
speculation, but that is why it would be relevant to examine the relationship be-
tween uncertainty and risk within actual practices of risk management and track it 
over time. This might reveal unexpected effects that have not yet been considered 
by either the current literature or practitioners working with this area, which in 
turn might advance our understanding of risk management and its effects. 
 
In this respect, the current risk management literature has also tended to ignore the 
more limiting or constraining effects that non-human actors such as technologies 
or technical risk devices may have on risk management practices. This is despite 
the situation that contributions to the literature in the social constructivist risk par-
adigm (e.g. Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2009, 2011) and the contingency-based 
functionalist risk paradigm (e.g. Beasley et al., 2005; Collier & Woods, 2011; 
Gordon et al., 2009; Kleffner et al., 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Paape & 
Speklé, 2012) have demonstrated the importance of taking non-human actors into 
account. This literature, however, has tended to focus on technical risk devices as 
passive devices that “simply” improve human possibilities of carrying out more 
effective risk management. In an extension of this, the literature in the constructiv-
ist risk paradigm (e.g. Jordan et al., 2013; Kalthoff, 2005; Millo & MacKenzie, 
2009) has demonstrated that technical risk devices also become more active medi-
ators in the practice of risk management. Except for Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014), 
however, this literature has tended to neglect the “unexpected effects” that these 
non-human actors can produce, in spite of the situation that this has been shown 
elsewhere in the accounting literature to be important (e.g. Chua, 1995; Qu & 
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Cooper, 2011; Quattrone, 2009; Quattrone & Hopper, 2006; Robson, 1992; 
Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2010).9 
 
The above-mentioned missing focus on the potential constraining effects of risk 
management devices thus opens up a third element that we lack knowledge about 
and which future research could engage in, namely the more detailed effects of 
devices. To list only a few of the more common risk management techniques that 
future studies could focus on: “risk premium calculation, risk adjusted discount 
rate, subjective probability, decision analysis, sensitivity analysis, Monte Carlo 
simulation and stochastic dominance” (See Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997, p. 36); or 
the perhaps most commonly used technique these years: the traffic light assess-
ment matrix, or risk maps (See Jordan et al., 2013; Power, 2007). As stated by 
Winch (2010, p. 347) in the Oxford Handbook of Project Management: “[technol-
ogy] lies at the heart of the [risk management] process which is used to assign re-
sponsibility and accountability for risks, monitor their status and prioritize action”. 
On this background, examining the role of non-human actors and their potential 
constraining effects on the identification, assessment, reduction and monitoring of 
risks thus seems most relevant. This has also more explicitly been called for by 
scholars within constructivist research (e.g. Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014). 
 
The fourth and last avenue for future research I would like to mention refers to the 
situation that the current literature has largely not dealt with the notions of ‘risk’ 
and ‘risk management’ in large capital investment programmes, or mega-projects. 
This seems unfortunate, as present-day governments to an increasing extent rely 
on comprehensive practices of risk management to ensure that projects are viable. 
                                                 
9 See Section 4.2 for a more detailed description of “classic” actor-network theory studies in the accounting litera-
ture, and Section 6.3 for a brief description of papers looking into the effects of technical devices. 
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As shown in the previous subsection, the literature that has primarily dealt with 
the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ in mega-projects has been written by 
scholars taking the rationalist-cognitive perspective. They have focused on notions 
such as ‘optimism bias’ and ‘strategic misrepresentation’ in order to demonstrate 
that we need to take an “outside view” to counteract “personal and organizational 
sources of optimism” (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003, p. 61, but see also Flyvbjerg, 
2006, 2008). This includes implementing practices of risk management as institu-
tional check-and-balances to improve accountability and transparency and reduce 
incentives to manipulate project forecasts (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 2011). The literature 
in the rationalist-cognitive perspective, however, has not focused on the empirical 
effects generated by practices of risk management. It builds on psychological ex-
periments and statistical project budget vs. total cost comparisons and thus down-
plays the insights provided by the constructivist perspective that processes cannot 
be neglected. This means that we know little about what happens between the 
points when forecasts have been made and projects are handed over. 
 
It also means that present-day governments are imposing risk management as a 
management control practice on public agencies or state-owned enterprises with-
out knowing much about the effects it has on actual project processes and subse-
quently project viability. If we further take into account that millions of euros go 
into the implementation and operation of such practices, this just adds to the rele-
vance of looking into this. In this sense, mega-projects are high-risk projects that 
are highly exposed to the so-called ‘black swans’, those high-impact, hard-to-
predict and rare events that lie beyond the realm of normal expectation (Taleb, 
2007). This seems to suggest that practices of risk management will be inaccurate 
or incomplete, something which Millo and MacKenzie (2009) demonstrated, but 
where does this leave us? If practices of risk management are to produce certainty 
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regarding events with potentially negative effects on project objectives, can they 
do so? “If accuracy includes a fundamental practice-dependent dimension, then 
can the usefulness of a practice become a substitute for its lack of accuracy?” 
(Millo & MacKenzie, 2009, p. 652). These questions are difficult to answer, but to 
make an attempt to do so requires at least going into practice and examine this. 
 
In summing up this section, it seems that our knowledge of the actual mechanisms 
of risk management is incomplete and that “the potential of these theories to in-
form studies of risk and organization has not been fully developed or realized” 
(Gephart et al., 2009, p. 142). In relation to mega-projects, it even seems as if the-
ories have informed governments to implement risk management on “weak theo-
retical grounds” (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 340). In the three research papers included in 
this dissertation I will deal with the current academic literature on ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’ and attempt to advance our knowledge of these concepts. In short, I 
will look into: (1) the construction of risk objects including the relationship be-
tween uncertainties and risks and the effects of technical risk devices (both ena-
bling and constraining), (2) the relationship between theories (or more specific, 
frameworks) and practices of risk management, and (3) the effects of risk man-
agement on conditions of knowledge and project objectives. I will look into this 
over longer periods of time and on mega-projects, thus continuing the constructiv-
ist tradition of going into the details of everyday practices to the “hybrid practices, 
processes and expertise” through which all of this takes place. I hope that by look-
ing into these subjects, and doing so in relation to (public) mega-projects, I will be 
able to advance our knowledge of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. 
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4. Theoretical framework 
 
This section introduces the theoretical framework applied in this dissertation, ac-
tor-network theory, by elaborating on its basic concepts and underlying philosoph-
ical assumptions. This section does not go into details of the more specific con-
cepts that I rely upon in the three research papers; these concepts are introduced in 
the papers. In this section, I also explain what relying on actor-network theory has 
meant for the way I perceive ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, and I describe how 
other management accounting studies have drawn upon actor-network theory and 
what contributions this has led to. I need to stress up front that actor-network theo-
ry breaks with the conventional idea of a distinction between epistemology and 
ontology; it even breaks with the “classic” purpose of a theory: to explain some-
thing. It is neither radical nor reductionist or deconstructivist, however, but rather 
relationalist and constructivist in its philosophical underpinnings. 
 
4.1. Actor-network theory and its basic concepts 
 
“I will start by saying that there are four things that do not work 
with actor-network theory; the word actor, the word network, the 
word theory and the hyphen! Four nails in the coffin”. 
– Bruno Latour (1999a, p. 15) 
 
If there is one thing that has always been true about actor-network theory, it is that 
actor-network theorists have always been ambivalent towards the task of defining 
its core concepts or the elements that constitute its very “essence”. These have 
been debated on several occasions when actor-network theorists, as demonstrated 
above, have insisted on not defining its core concepts and rather let this lack of 
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definition be its definition. In 2005, however, Bruno Latour realised that despite 
everything that may have been wrong with its name, that name had been adopted 
by people, and therefore had to have some value after all: “I have to apologize for 
taking the exact opposite position here as the one taken in Bruno Latour (1999[a, 
see the above quote]). Whereas at the time I criticized all the elements of this hor-
rendous expression including the hyphen, I will now defend them all, including 
the hyphen” (Latour, 2005, p. 9, note 9). Why, then, do I insist on defining actor-
network theory when there seems to be so much ambivalence towards it? Well, 
because how else could I stay true to actor-network theory without starting out be-
ing ambivalent towards the objective I seek to pursue! And to make things worse, 
I will begin with exactly what Latour wrote was wrong, but now right, with actor-
network theory; I will begin by defining “the word actor, the word network, the 
word theory and the hyphen!” 
 
4.1.1. “The word actor” 
 
“An “actor” in ANT is a semiotic definition – an actant –, that is 
something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It im-
plies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of hu-
mans in general. An actant can literally be anything provided it is 
granted to be the source of an action”. (Latour, 1996, p. 373) 
 
The most fundamental concept in actor-network theory is the word/concept ‘ac-
tor’. In actor-network theory the concept of actor refers to “the moving target of a 
vast array of entities swarming toward it” (Latour, 2005, p. 46). It refers to some-
thing that acts and therefore implies no special motivation of human actors, but al-
lows plants as well as rocks and tools and devices to be actors; they just have to be 
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“granted to be the source of an action”. This means that actors take their form and 
acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities; actors “have 
no inherent qualities”, they have no essence (Law, 1999, p. 3). This does not mean 
that actors are determined by other actors or that objects act on their own; ham-
mers do not require you to hit the nail; the television does not require that you 
watch it, and so on. Actor-network theory means that it matters whether you hit 
the nail with or without the hammer; it means “any thing that does modify a state 
of affairs by making a difference is an actor” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). In relation to 
risk management, actor-network theorists would argue that it makes a difference 
whether you describe objects as risky with or without the use of risk identification 
tools or assess them with or without calculation techniques. Plainly and simply 
put: “If an actor makes no difference, it’s not actor” (Latour, 2005, p. 130). 
 
Latour has argued that actor-network theory originated from three studies: Michel 
Callon’s “Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scal-
lops and the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay” (Callon, 1986), John Laws’ “On the 
Methods of Long-Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation and the Portuguese Route 
to India” (Law, 1986), and Latour’s “The Pasteurization of France” (Latour, 
1988), cf. Latour (2005, p. 10). These three studies were all characterised by de-
scribing exactly how different actors granted other actors – human as well as non-
human – to be the source of an action. Callon (1986), for example, showed that 
scallops had to be interested, enrolled and mobilised, just like human actors such 
as fishermen and other scientists, for three scientists to complete their research 
programme. The three researchers had to convince the scallops to continue exist-
ence in new waters where parasites, varying temperatures, currents and predators 
threatened their success. Similarly, the three researchers had to convince the fish-
ermen not to catch the scallops, and the rest of the research community that their 
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ideas, methods, etc., were sound. In the end, the scientists managed to mobilise the 
scallops and provide evidence for their findings to satisfy the scientists, but even-
tually the fishermen betrayed them all and harvested the scallops for money. 
 
One of the consequences of perceiving actors as sources of other actors’ actions is 
that actors turn into flows; they become circulating entities with distributed char-
acteristics that vary over time, space and location depending on the relation to 
those other actors (Latour, 1996). This means that actors will always be subject to 
negotiation and trials-and-error between other actors with different interests. An-
other consequence is that because actors are assumed to be the (temporary) out-
come of a long struggle, they cannot a priori be divided into large or small actors, 
or into macro and micro actors (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 280). This is not to say 
that these categories do not exist; actor-network theorists do not deny that some 
actors are stronger, bigger or more superior than others, but only that this relies on 
examinations of relations. A third consequence is that human identities cannot be 
understood as something that can be determined by actors through intellectual ap-
plication alone; “nor are they the result of values, norms or institutions which re-
duce actors to the status of the ‘cultural dope’ so justifiably ridiculed by Gar-
finkel” (Callon, 1998a, p. 252). The actor’s identity is variable: “his or her 
objectives, interests, will and thus identity are caught up in a process of continual 
reconfiguration” (Callon, 1998a, p. 253). 
 
Latour also distinguished between two types of actors: intermediaries and media-
tors. He defined the first type as those which “transport meaning or force without 
transformation” (Latour, 2005, p. 39). He compared intermediaries to ‘black box-
es’, which he together with Callon elsewhere defined as “that which no longer 
needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of in-
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difference” (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 285). Based on my observations, in relation 
to risk management this could for example be the control system used to register 
identified risks and track their status over time. In normal circumstances, this con-
trol system would not be questioned but rather assumed to provide the output risk 
information corresponding to the earlier input risk information. In contrast, Latour 
defined mediators as those which “transform, translate, distort, and modify the 
meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p. 35). In con-
tinuation of the above example, if the system for some reason broke down, result-
ing in data loss, this would cause managers not to know the status of their risks 
and thus potentially mean that some risks were not managed. In this case, the con-
trol system had turned into a mediator actively distorting the information it was 
supposed to carry. 
 
In writing texts, such as research papers or dissertations, Latour has further 
stressed that “good” texts are those that describe a string of actions where each 
participant is treated as a full-blown mediator. He writes: “To put it very simply: 
A good ANT account is a narrative or a description or a proposition where all the 
actors do something and don’t just sit there. Instead of simply transporting effects 
without transforming them, each of the points in the text may become a bifurca-
tion, an event, or the origin of a new translation. As soon as actors are treated not 
as intermediaries but as mediators, they render the movement of the social visible 
to the reader” (Latour, 2005, p. 128). In contrast, “bad” texts are those that only 
designate a handful of actors as the causes of others, “which will have no other 
function than to serve as a backdrop or relay for the flows of causal efficacy.” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 130). It is the type of account that waters down translation into 
transportation, into displacement, without transformation. It simply transports cau-
sality through mere intermediaries. In this sense, with arguments such as media-
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tors “render the movement visible to the reader”, actor-network theory has me-
thodical implications for what and how to collect data. I will not go further into 
detail here, however, as the next section looks into this in much more detail (see 
Section 5). 
 
4.1.2. “The word network” 
The second word/concept ‘network’ is closely entangled with the term ‘actor’. In 
actor-network theory, the word ‘network’ refers to filaments or fibrous, thread-
like, wiry, stringy, ropy and capillary associations drawn between entities. It does 
not refer to the common-sense understanding of networks as pre-fixed entities 
such as computer networks, sewer systems, or exclusive groups of people (Latour, 
2005). It would be a common mistake, Latour (1996) argues, to ascribe such a 
fixed and stable meaning to networks. ‘Network’ is a concept used to describe 
something; not a thing out there that needs to be described (Latour, 2005, p. 131). 
Actor-network theory thus reverses the “classic” understanding of the concept. It 
does not start from universal laws and regard contingencies as deviations or par-
ticularities that should be either eliminated or protected (or, in relation to risk 
management, identified in order to optimise its function); it starts from “irreduci-
ble, incommensurable and unconnected localities”, which then “sometimes end in-
to provisionally commensurable connections”, a process we call a network 
(Latour, 1996, p. 370). In this way, ‘networks’ have a fundamental, philosophical 
importance: 
 
“Literally there is nothing but networks, there is nothing in be-
tween them, or, to use a metaphor from the history of physics, there 
is no aether in which the networks should be immersed”. (Latour, 
1996, p. 370) 
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It follows that actor-network theorists perceive networks as both the “how” to per-
ceive the world and the “being” of the world; “there is no aether in which net-
works should be immersed”; there are nothing except networks. This dissolves the 
traditional dichotomy between ontology (being) and epistemology (perception); 
we bring the world into “existence” through our perception/understanding of that 
world. This further means that you would never be able to go out and point to a 
network; networks have no material essence or existence per se; they are brought 
into existence through the associating work of actors. In addition, these networks 
are not relativistic, but relational, meaning that they could be different, and most 
often are, but they are never random, or just so (Law, 1999, p. 6ff). This also 
means that one network never exists; no one reality exists; there are always more 
realities, more networks; networks are multiple, located, performed and enacted, 
i.e. ontologies are made (Mol, 1999). There are always multiple, co-existing “pos-
sible states of the world” (Callon, 1998b, p. 4). This also means that actor-network 
theory breaks with the “classic” understanding of ‘risks’ as ontological facts or 
truths “out there”; risks are constructs, performed associations (Latour, 1986). 
 
The reason why I stated that the word ‘actor’ was related to the word ‘network’ is 
that actors are those that give meaning to the abstract notion of networks through 
their associating work (which brings other actors into existence). “There is not a 
net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the 
world outlines, traces, delineates, describes, files, lists, records, marks, or tags a 
trajectory that is called a network” (Latour, 1996, p. 378). The words ‘actor’ and 
‘network’ are therefore “two sides of the same coin” and may best be grasped 
through the term ‘actor-network’ (Callon, 1998b, p. 8). These actor-networks fur-
ther need to be stabilised (framed) to enable predictive and effective interaction 
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between actors (Callon, 1998a). If not, there would be no common language, no 
societies, no markets, no families, etc., there would be only disorder (overflows). 
This does not mean that actor-networks can be “finalised” somehow; actor-
networks are always open for negotiation, always fluid and changing, never stabi-
lised “for good”. In relation to risk management in mega-projects, for example, 
project managers are responsible for carrying out risk management as part of their 
work descriptions. This has been written down in their employment contracts. In 
principle, however, just because the project managers have bound themselves to a 
contract, this does not necessarily mean that they always follow it; they can al-
ways choose to act differently and thus “betray” their commitment to it and the ac-
tor-network. 
 
The notion of network breaks with different dichotomies. Firstly, it breaks with 
the difference between far/close, the notion of distance. Just because two elements 
have a close, geographical proximity, this does not mean that they are closely con-
nected; and conversely, just because two elements are far apart, this does not mean 
that they are distantly connected. In the Signalling Programme, for example, the 
European Parliament can be infinitely closer than the Danish Traffic Authorities, 
because European regulations may have a stronger impact than local Danish legis-
lation does. Secondly, it breaks with the difference between small scale and large 
scale. This distinction seems to denote that some actors are ranked higher, or are 
bigger, like “macro” institutions or society, compared to lower ranked “micro” 
family relations. The notion of ‘network’ allows us to dissolve both of the above 
distinctions by focusing on connections or associations instead. These imply no a 
priori hierarchical order of relations. In actor-network theory, one network is never 
bigger than another one; it is longer and more intensely connected. Instead of op-
posing the individual level to the mass, or agency to structure, in actor-network 
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theory the focus is on tracking how a given element becomes strategic, or “im-
portant”, through the number of associations it commands (Latour, 1996, p. 372). 
 
Thirdly, actor-network theory breaks with the distinction between inside/outside. 
This distinction is often related to notions of ‘space’, ‘layers’, ‘surfaces’ or ‘terri-
tories’, which always assume that there is something in between and thus that 
boundaries would have to be established to delimit these notions. In actor-network 
theory, there is nothing in between networks; there are only actors laying out nets, 
associating elements with other elements; only networks that are either expanding 
or not. This does not mean that actor-network theory does not include boundaries; 
‘networks’ are all about boundaries. The only question that needs to be asked, 
however, is whether a connection has been established or not (and who made it, 
and how etc.). This is a great force of actor-network theory. It means that it is pos-
sible to focus on tracking the actual associations made, irrespective of organisa-
tional boundaries, geographical territories, space, layers, hierarchies etc. If any-
thing, these are effects of the associating work of actors; effects that can be 
captured with the notion of actor-networks. 
 
4.1.3. “The word theory” 
The previous two subsections have brought us back to the starting point: “If [ac-
tor-network theory] is a theory, of what it is a theory?” (Latour, 1999a, p. 19). In 
reply to this question, actor-network theory is a theory about “what the recording 
device should be that would allow entities in all their details to be described” 
(Latour, 1996, p. 374). It focuses on the recording of things, the description of 
processes, and not on the specific outcome of the recording, the potential things 
“hidden” behind what was recorded that needs explanation. In consistency with 
the previous two subsections: “actors know what they know and we have to learn 
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from them not only what they do, but how and why they do it” (Latour, 1999a, p. 
19). If we focus on the collective, stabilised network and attempt to explain it, we 
will limit the role of actors to that of informers offering cases of well-known out-
comes: “You have to grant them back the ability to make up their own theories… 
Your task is no longer to impose some order, to limit the range of acceptable enti-
ties, to teach actors what they are, or to add reflexivity to their blind practice. Us-
ing a slogan from ANT, you have ‘to follow the actors themselves’” (Latour, 
2005, p. 12). 
 
Actor-network theory thus insists on the absolute freedom and infinite pliability of 
the actors and does not impose on them an a priori definition of their capacities. It 
does not become an empiricist account, though. It is not about providing mere de-
scriptions of relations that otherwise require explanation. Actor-network theory 
makes a strong theoretical commitment to the relational or political ontology of 
networks and thus how the world is brought into existence through the actors’ de-
scription of it (Latour, 1996). This means that the descriptions provided by the ac-
tors, which the researcher tracks, are all the explanation required: 
 
“The very divide between description and explanation, hows and 
whys, blind empiricism and high theorizing is as meaningless for 
ANT as the difference between gravitation and space in relativity 
theory. Each network, by growing, “binds” the explanatory re-
sources around it, and there is no way they can be detached from its 
growth. One does not jump outside a network to add an explanation 
– a cause, a factor, a set of factors, a series of co-occurrences; one 
simply extends the network further”. (Latour, 1996, p. 376) 
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Actor-network theory is also not reductionist or deconstructive. “Nothing can be 
reduced to anything else, nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything 
may be allied to everything else” (Latour, 1988, p. 158). Actor-network theory 
does not seek to discover the new “big bang” of the universe from which to de-
duce its evolution, a new Archimedean point, nor does it attempt to deconstruct 
networks into mere associations: quite the contrary. In actor-network theory, at-
tempts are made at understanding the development of heterogeneous networks and 
the effects they produce, such as certainty, agreement and stabilisation, but also 
uncertainty, disagreement and destabilisation, or better, movements between these. 
In actor-network theory, a text, a description, an account, a dissertation adds to the 
network it describes; it does not subtract something from it; it does not deconstruct 
the network as if the produced account stood above or outside the network looking 
down on it. In studying risk management, actor-network theory is thus a theory to 
capture the developments over time of practicing this; the processes not the result; 
the construction of risks, not risks constructed. 
 
4.1.4. “And the hyphen!” 
The last word I want to describe is the “hyphen”, the “-“ between the word ‘actor’ 
and the word ‘network’ in “actor-network”. The hyphen sheds light on the im-
portance of connections, associations, relations or interrelations. In capturing these 
by just one word, actor-network theorists have used the broad notion of ‘transla-
tion’. This word denotes the active process of both “transformation/displacement” 
and “transportation” in which stabilised associations represent rare and always 
temporary achievements (Callon, 1986). It also indicates that association is not 
just some random, or worse, passive process, which would correspond to transpor-
tation without transformation. This would be the risk management control system 
described above, before it crashed and simply transported input information from 
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one meeting into a risk report that could be read at a later point in time. In con-
trast, translation refers to the work of mediators, like the control system after it 
crashed, which suddenly made it difficult to carry out risk-reducing actions be-
cause the information provided had been distorted. In defining translation more 
specifically, Callon and Latour state as follows: 
 
“By translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, cal-
culations, acts of persuasion and violence, thanks to which an ac-
tor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority to 
speak or act on behalf of another actor or force”. (Callon & 
Latour, 1981, p. 279) 
 
The concept of translation thus implies that associations are always mediating; it is 
associations that induce two mediators into co-existence (Latour, 2005, p. 108). 
These associations always develop non-linearly and dynamically, and never ra-
tionalistically or causally determinable. The only associations that would transport 
causality would be those consisting of a series of intermediaries that would simply 
transport without transformation; they would represent black-boxed relations. In 
contrast, translation is the process of: “… displacement, drift, invention, media-
tion, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some degree modi-
fies the original two” (Latour, 1999b, p. 179). It is through translation that certain 
actors expand the network and entangle with other actors; it is through translation 
that effectiveness, predictability and stability can be achieved; it is through trans-
lation that trials-of-strength take their trajectories; and it is through translation that 
“good” texts are produced. In relation to risk management, studying this as a phe-
nomenon would therefore mean tracking the series of translations that take place 
in relation to events such as: the construction of uncertainties as risks, the inven-
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tion of technical risk devices and their application, the distribution of risk roles 
and identities, the relationship between frameworks and practices of risk manage-
ment, the negotiations taking place in the practising of risk management, the rela-
tionship between risk management and project conditions, the effects produced by 
risk management, and more. 
 
In “Pandora’s Hope”, Latour (1999b) illustrates what he means by translation by 
refuting two typical statements: “Guns kill people” and “People kill people; not 
guns”. The first, he argues, is a materialistic claim: the guns acts by virtue of ma-
terial components irreducible to the specific person firing the gun. The second is a 
social constructivist claim: the gun is a tool, a medium, “a neutral carrier of will” 
(Latour, 1999b, p. 177). If the person firing the gun is good, he will use it wisely, 
for example, for self-defence; in contrast, if the person is bad, the person will use 
it, for example, for murder. What does the gun add to the shooting? Latour argues 
that to the materialist: everything. The gun is what makes the person a criminal. In 
contrast, to the social constructivist, the gun adds nothing to the action; the action 
was carried out by a person, the gun being only the medium which adds neither 
“goodness” nor “badness” to the person firing it. Latour, however, refutes both ac-
counts. To the materialists, he argues that the gun on its own cannot kill anyone, 
and to claim so would be to say that people’s personalities are determined by 
whatever they hold in their hands; and to the social constructivists, he says that to 
claim that the gun merely transports the will of the person would be to claim that 
we are already from birth determined as being either good or bad (Latour, 1999b, 
p. 177). 
 
Latour then presents his own account of the two statements. “Who, then, is the ac-
tor in my vignette? Someone else (a citizen-gun, a gun-citizen)” (Latour, 1999b, p. 
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179). He explains that people are different individuals with or without the gun in 
their hand: “I define you by whatever you have (the gun), and by the series of as-
sociations that you enter into when you use what you have (when you fire the 
gun), then you are modified by the gun – more so or less or, depending on the 
weight of the other associations that you carry. This translation is wholly symmet-
rical. You are different with a gun in hand; the gun is different with you holding it. 
You are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object be-
cause it has entered into a relationship with you.” (Latour, 1999b, p. 179). Latour 
continues and argues that the gun is now something else from the gun-in-the-
armoury or gun-in-the-drawer, but through a series of translations (someone 
picked it up), it has now turned into a gun-in-the-hand. “The twin mistake made 
by the materialists and the social constructivists is to start with essences, those of 
subject or those of objects… It is neither people nor guns that kill” (Latour, 1999b, 
p. 180). Responsibility for action must be distributed across networks of relations. 
 
The following subsection looks into how different accounting studies have applied 
actor-network theory and the contributions made. These all build on those four 
basic concepts outlined in this section: “the word actor, the word network, the 
word theory and the hyphen!”, but supplements them with more specific and ad-
vanced actor-network theory concepts. 
 
4.2. The application of actor-network theory in accounting literature 
This subsection provides an overview of the major studies in the accounting litera-
ture that take on an either pure actor-network theory perspective or combine it 
with other theoretical perspectives, as well as the contributions made by these 
studies. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the wide applicability of ac-
tor-network theory and the range of contributions made, and not to thoroughly 
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cover all actor-network theory studies in the accounting literature. See Justesen 
and Mouritsen (2011) for a more elaborate account of actor-network theory in-
spired accounting studies throughout the years. Justesen and Mouritsen cover the 
wide range of Latourian-inspired accounting papers and the yet unexplored poten-
tials of Latourian actor-network theory to advance our knowledge. As Justesen 
and Mouritsen “only” cover Latourian approaches, however, see also Skærbæk 
(2009) and MacKenzie (2006) for two key papers that have drawn on Michel Cal-
lon’s work and advanced our knowledge through this. In the following, I will not 
distinguish between those two approaches. Instead, I seek to give a broad intro-
duction to the key contributions to the accounting literature made by scholars who 
draw on actor-network theory as a whole. I end this subsection by presenting a rel-
atively unexplored application of actor-network theory in the accounting research, 
which might be drawn on to advance accounting research. I apply this approach to 
my three research papers. 
 
The first few references to actor-network theory began to appear in the accounting 
literature in the late 1980s (Hines, 1988; Pinch et al., 1989), but the major studies 
that manifested actor-network theory’s position were not published until the early 
1990s (Miller, 1990, 1991; Preston et al., 1992; Robson, 1991, 1992). Miller 
(1990) examined the interrelations between accounting and the state, drawing up-
on the Foucauldian understanding of “rationales, programmes, values and ideals” 
and combining this with a Latourian understanding of the transformative effects of 
“devices and technologies” (Miller, 1990, p. 333). Miller showed that rather than 
being distinct essentialist entities, both “accounting” and “the state” were the ef-
fects of contingent historical processes. He went on to show that technologies me-
diated between the general and abstract level of political rationales and ideals and 
the immediate context of local accounting practices. Through ‘inscription’, these 
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technologies made it possible to translate rationales of government into local prac-
tices by allowing ‘action-at-a-distance’, the two concepts involved referring to the 
actor-network theory concept (See Latour, 1987). He also showed, reciprocally, 
that political rationalities accorded significance and meaning to quite mundane 
calculative accounting routines, “allowing practitioners to articulate their potential 
contributions far beyond their individual organizational practice” (Miller, 1990, p. 
334). 
 
In contrast to the above examination of accounting as phenomenon, Miller (1991) 
later went into the detail by examining one specific accounting innovation: the 
discounted cash flow technique. By again using the Latourian concepts of ‘transla-
tion’ and ‘action-at-a-distance’ and the Foucauldian concept of ‘programmes’, but 
this time also the Latourian concept of ‘problematization’, Miller found that the 
discounted cash flow technique made it possible for governments to ‘act-at-a-
distance’ on the economy without intruding into the private sphere of managerial 
decisions. He showed that concerns about investment decisions in firms were 
problematised and constructed as concerns for overall economic growth. He then 
showed how translatability was established between political programmes aimed 
at improving this growth and the discounted cash flow technique used for individ-
ual investment decisions. In both of these studies, however, Miller (1990, 1991) 
was concerned with particular accounting innovations or changes and did not gen-
eralise upon his findings, and therefore he also recommended that more similar 
studies be conducted, going “beyond the enterprise” (Miller, 1991, p. 757). 
 
Robson (1992) was one of the scholars who rose to this challenge. Robson looked 
into accounting numbers as ‘inscriptions’, like Miller (1990, 1991) drawing on 
Latour’s understanding of this concept (Latour, 1987). Robson defined inscription 
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in relation to accounting as: “the material and graphical representations that con-
stitute the accounting report: writing, numbers, lists, tables” (Robson, 1992, p. 
685). Robson found that rather than being privileged representations that corre-
sponded to reality, accounting numbers were inscriptions that enabled certain 
kinds of action, including ‘action-at-a-distance’, or long-distance control. He fur-
ther found that accounting inscriptions displayed a strong mixture of mobile, sta-
ble and combinable qualities. Numbers inscribed buildings, people, products, etc., 
into numerical quantities that were transportable across entities, practices, and 
contexts; numbers are “powerful explanations” that can be modelled as needed 
(Robson, 1992). In this sense, Robson applied the theoretical framework for study-
ing accounting change that he had embarked on with his publication the year be-
fore (Robson, 1991). Robson (1991) suggested that accounting change had to be 
studied as a ‘process of translation’, which he defined as “the process through 
which particular accounting statements, calculations and techniques are subject to 
a translation into wider social, economic and political discourses” (1991, p. 566). 
 
In contrast to Miller’s and Robson’s studies above, which mainly drew on the no-
tions of ‘inscription’, ‘action-at-a-distance’, and ‘calculation’, Preston, Cooper and 
Coombs (1992) drew upon the notions of ‘black-box’, ‘fabrication’ and ‘network’. 
Preston et al. examined a budgeting system in the British National Health Service 
during the processes of ‘fabricating’ this and thus before it was established as a 
“finalised” system. In this sense, Preston et al. adhered to Latour’s methodological 
recommendation of studying things “in action”, which was in contrast to Miller’s 
(1990, 1991) more Foucauldian-inspired genealogy approach.10 In more detail, 
Preston et al. examined how debates about the conditions faced by the British Na-
                                                 
10 This dissertation also insists on adhering to this methodological point. The following section on method will ex-
plain in more detail what studying things “in action” means (see Section 5). 
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tional Health Service, about the levels of funding, modes of management, respon-
sibilities of doctors and administrators, were translated into an initiative to develop 
a budgeting system. Preston et al. showed how fabricating this system was a frag-
ile and uncertain activity and that encountered resistance ended up shaping the 
system. Fabricating the budgeting system was therefore an on-going translation 
process that took place in networks of relations, networks which themselves were 
under translation. Their study contributed by pointing out the non-linear processes 
through which accounting systems were developed and all the work taking place 
before the system eventually ended up being ‘black-boxed’ and apparently stable. 
 
The above-mentioned studies from the early 1990s were supplemented by other 
key studies during the following years. In contrast to Miller’s (1990, 1991) and 
Robson’s (1991) focus on “programmatic” discourses, these studies, however, 
were characterised by looking into “micro”-level interaction and by explaining ac-
counting change through that. One such key study was the one made by Chua 
(1995), who examined three Australian hospitals while drawing on notions of ‘ex-
perts’, ‘networks’, ‘inscription’ and ‘fabrication’ from actor-network theory. She 
showed how accounting figures were fabricated by a network of enrolled “fact 
builders” (academics, hospital personnel, government officials and Common-
wealth bureaucrats) and software; these actors produced the “economic reality” 
that accounting was supposed to depict. She further showed how expert-generated 
inscriptions created faith in and generated credibility to the produced accounting 
figures and helped persuade actors to “content themselves” with these numbers 
and the produced reality. Along the same line of inquiry, Mouritsen (1999) 
showed how two different management control forms dominated strategic options 
as they each attempted to control organisational space differently. He showed how 
“questions of technologies could not be separated from questions of governance, 
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the boundaries of the firm and the status of the customer”; i.e. that management 
control forms fixated specific “realities” (Mouritsen, 1999, p. 53). 
 
Briers and Chua (2001) represents another “micro”-level interaction-oriented pa-
per. Briers and Chua looked into an aluminium construction company’s imple-
mentation of an activity-based costing system. They drew on basic actor-network 
theory concepts and combined them with Star and Griesemer’s notion of boundary 
objects as “…objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to several local needs 
and the constraints of several parties employing them, yet robust enough to main-
tain a common identity across sites” (1989, p. 393). They showed how networks 
of heterogeneous machines, ‘boundary objects’, local actors and cosmopolitans 
could change an organisation’s accounting and productive capabilities. They also 
showed that understanding activity-based costing as a boundary-object could ex-
plain how diverse interests could be stabilised across local and global contexts. 
Jones and Dugdale (2002) continued the inquiry into activity-based costing, but 
argued that rather than being studied “in action”, activity-based costing had to be 
studied as a phenomenon. Through studying it over the last decades they found 
that activity-based costing could not be attributed to a single author, but that it had 
turned into an effect of a contingent series of translations taking place between 
computer systems, consultancies, academics and the “global change in production 
and markets” (Jones & Dugdale, 2002, pp. 157-158). In concluding the latter, they 
further drew upon the work of Giddens and found that activity-based costing had 
turned into a disembedded expert system, albeit one that was formed mutually 
with the construction of the actor-networks that created it. 
 
Another key study was made by Gendron, Cooper and Townley (2007), who 
looked into how the Office of the Auditor General of Alberta (Canada) acquired 
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the expertise to measure government performance in the light of new public man-
agement reforms. They drew upon “three features of fact building, namely, labora-
tories, networks and the observation that the fate of a factual claim rests in its re-
ception by others” (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 103). In this way, they showed how 
‘expertise’ should be understood as being founded in fact-building rather than as 
an inherent property of being part of a profession. In this respect, they found that 
‘expertise’ required a strong network of relations, the undertaking of local experi-
ments, the production of specific inscriptions, as well as subsequent validation by 
practitioners. In this, they stressed that the production of ‘inscriptions’ in occupa-
tional practice sites, which were those operated by government audit offices, and 
the collective process of validation that subsequently took place in the practitioner 
community, were significant for explaining the construction of support networks 
around claims of expertise (Gendron et al., 2007, p. 101). In sum, Gendron et al. 
(2007) demonstrated what was also demonstrated by later studies, namely that ex-
pertise or actor-networks are fragile and costly (laboratory) constructions that re-
quire continued work. 
 
In arriving at the above conclusion, another three key studies looked into this frag-
ile characteristic of networks, but this time focusing on the unexpected effects 
produced by those networks as a result of their construction. This literature has 
drawn on Michel Callon’s work, and especially the dual notion of framing and 
overflowing, framing being defined as the processes of setting boundaries around 
interactions, and overflowing being defined as those relations not contained within 
the frame (Callon, 1998a).11 Christensen and Skærbæk (2010), for example, 
looked into the work of consultancies and the purification of accounting technolo-
                                                 
11 The first paper/analytical section and the third paper/analytical section elaborate more on these two concepts (see 
Sections 6 and 8; see also Skærbæk (2009) for a thorough application of these concepts). 
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gies. They showed how consultancies with their “scientific equipment” managed 
to “provide ‘faith’ to accounting systems and to settle controversies with sceptical 
and resisting groups that threaten to destabilize the innovations”. (Christensen & 
Skærbæk, 2010, p. 524). In more detail, they showed how consultancy outputs 
such as consultancy project reports, seminars and briefings were key parts of the 
framing of accounting practices aimed at ensuring their smooth operation. The no-
tion of purification here refers to the “processes that progress ideas toward ac-
ceptance and agreement where those ideas were previously” and adds depth to the 
dual notion of framing and overflowing by pointing to the work required to stabi-
lise frames.12 
 
Skærbæk (2009) also drew upon framing and overflowing and combined them 
with Callon’s (1986) four moments of translation (problematisation, inter-
essement, enrolment, and mobilisation). Callon defined those moments as the con-
stitution of different phases “during which the identity of actors, the possibility of 
interaction and the margins of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited” (Callon, 
1986, p. 203). Skærbæk then examined how the National Audit Office of Denmark 
manoeuvred to make the Danish Defence Forces receptive to a performance-
accountability project in the period 1990 to 2007. The case was that the Danish 
Defence Forces had initiated the implementation of a new accounting system 
called DeMars, which led to a stream of overflows, such as resistance from mili-
tary officers, which destabilised it. Skærbæk contributed by showing how the Na-
tional Audit Office, at least provisionally, managed to contain the overflows and 
stabilise the construction. He also demonstrated how this manoeuvring by the Na-
tional Audit Office led to problems regarding their identity of ‘modernizers’ on 
                                                 
12 I will get back to this later, as purification (framing/overflowing) has not been applied much in the accounting lit-
erature and thus represents an avenue for advancing our knowledge of the effects of accounting systems, such as 
risk management control systems, or accounting as a general phenomenon. 
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the one hand, i.e. participants in providing the reasons for change and defining its 
designs, and as ‘independent auditors’ on the other hand, i.e. agents of legitimising 
the construction in which they participated themselves. Skærbæk’s case study, 
represented one of the larger studies carried out according to Latour’s methodo-
logical principle about following actors “in action”, a principle also insisted on by 
Chua (1995) and Preston et al. (1992). 
 
Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010) continued applying Callon’s notion of framing 
and overflowing, this time looking into the role of accounting devices in perform-
ing corporate strategy and based on a case study of Scandlines, a Danish ferry 
company. Extending the works of Mouritsen (1999) and Briers and Chua (2001), 
they found that the accounting devices adopted did not only fit the strategy in a 
subordinate role, but that the adopted strategy was successively adopted in and 
mutually constituted by the accounting devices. They also found that contrary to 
common knowledge, the strategic actor or centre was not the CEO, but seemed to 
transgress such hierarchical boundaries. The strategic actor(s) was whoever was 
constituted as such as they acquired calculative equipment, such as accounting de-
vices, which meant that sometimes it was management, sometimes people from 
outside the organisation. In sum, the corporate strategy was thus an “emerging 
calculative collective”; accounting devices were actively (as mediators) involved 
in enacting and framing an independent “outside”, and in formulating and impos-
ing a strategy of adaptation (Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2010, p. 122); these devices 
performed corporate strategy by mobilising lay people and concerned groups. 
 
There are also other key accounting contributions. Quattrone and Hopper (2005), 
for example, examined how a particular management accounting technology, 
SAP, mediated relations of distance, integration and management control in two 
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different organisations; Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) examined how two compa-
nies pursued the integration of management and control through enterprise re-
source planning systems that were actor-networks themselves and thus not only 
mere technologies, but made up of heterogeneous relations; these systems enabled 
and constrained what could be modelled and made visible through the ways in 
which they represented notions of space and time; Chua and Mahama (2007) ex-
amined the challenges that emerged when accounting control had to translate rele-
vant dimensions of inter-firm alliances into performance/accounting measures; 
challenges that emerged due to accounting control being part of a larger network 
of relations that materially influenced its operation; and MacKenzie (2009) exam-
ined how greenhouse-gas emission markets were constructed, turned into prices 
and costs and made visible and exchangeable. In sum, these studies shed light on 
the notions of ‘time’ and ‘space’, ‘distance’ and ‘integration’, and demonstrated 
how calculation and technologies were fluid, transportable and constitutive parts 
of these notions. 
 
In wrapping up this subsection, there seems to be one way (but probably also 
more) that current accounting literature could advance, drawing on actor-network 
theory. This relates to the above-mentioned concept of ‘purification’. This concept 
can be used to shed light on the effects produced by accounting systems and not 
“just” how these systems have originally been produced through networks of rela-
tions. This latter aspect was the central contribution of many of the early key stud-
ies, such as Miller (1990, 1991), Robson (1991, 1992), Preston et al. (1992), but 
also later studies, e.g. Chua (1995), Mouritsen (1999), Jones and Dugdale (2002), 
Gendron et al. (2007) and Skærbæk (2009). These studies showed how accounting 
systems, or accounting per se, were fabricated through networks of relations, and 
tracked how, for example, accounting expertise or budgeting systems were con-
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structed; i.e. these studies sought to explain the often taken-for-granted nature of 
accounting. In contrast to this, purification can be used to follow the effects or the 
work of accounting systems, the chains and trials they undergo. Latour (2004) 
calls this a shift from “matters of fact” to “matters of concern”, or “a multifarious 
inquiry launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, 
sociology to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist 
and to maintain its existence” (2004, p. 246). 
 
Latour does not think that we should remove ourselves from studying associations; 
on the contrary Latour assumes that rather than focusing on the networks of actors 
that have brought the “thing” into existence, the focus should be even more 
strongly on the “thing’s” associations. This was also shown by some of the above-
mentioned studies. Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010), for example, followed how 
accounting devices performed strategic options and mobilised various groups of 
actors in mutual constitutive relationships, and thus how these devices entangled 
and disentangled, attached and represented, with other actors over time; and Quat-
trone and Hopper (2005) demonstrated how it was SAP’s attachments and not 
SAP itself that constituted its identities, which also differed between two organisa-
tions. In this respect, other concepts than purification can be used, but concepts 
that focus on how accounting systems, inscriptions, accounting as a phenomenon, 
etc., associate, attach, gather and entangle with other actors, represent an interest-
ing avenue to advance our knowledge. In this respect, Callon’s notions of framing 
and overflowing (Callon, 1998a), but also that of performativity (Callon, 2007, 
2010) represent concepts that could be used to do this (See also MacKenzie, 2006, 
2007, who applied this to financial accounting and the construction of markets). 
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5. Method 
 
To continue the observations made in the previous section, because of its particu-
lar theoretical assumptions, actor-network theory has methodological implications 
for researchers who want to stay loyal to its basic conception. The previous sec-
tion indicated this several times by stressing the notion of focusing on associations 
or translations and following the actors “in action”. This section begins by first re-
capping the methodological stand of actor-network theory. The second subsection 
describes the method chosen: (two) case studies. The third subsection looks into 
what I term “units of analysis”, which refers to the “who, what, when and where” 
of the study. The fourth subsection looks into the “how” of the method, meaning 
what data collection techniques I employed to arrive at my findings and the con-
sideration I gave their application. The fifth subsection contains my reflections on 
what it means to study mega-projects, and also what my participation did to the in-
formation I collected. My claim is that I did not interfere with what I studied, but 
it follows that when one follows a practice over a longer period of time, it is not 
possible to remain completely detached from those involved and thus potentially 
influence them. I end this section by describing some of the limitations of the “fol-
lowing the actor” approach and of listening to actors hands-on. 
 
5.1. Overall methodology of actor-network theory 
 
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly 
one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit 
facts”. 
– ‘A Scandal in Bohemia’, Sherlock Holmes 
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If we disregard the fact that Sherlock Holmes was looking for criminals with all 
that entails, the above passage from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s (1891) “A Scandal 
in Bohemia” might as well have been taken from a Bruno Latour description of 
actor-network theory’s methodological stand. In “Reassembling the Social”, for 
example, Latour wrote: “At this point, the last thing to do would be to limit in ad-
vance the shape, size, heterogeneity, and combination of associations [“to theorize 
before one has data”]” (Latour, 2005, p. 11). Instead, Latour argued that scholars 
had to start by paying attention to actual empirical details and not draw any con-
clusion until after having examined them thoroughly. In that sense, however, 
Latour would disagree with Sherlock Holmes that theorising was to present “solu-
tions” to problems, meaning that what we need to arrive at the “truth” of some-
thing. Latour would insist that theories are no more than extensions of already ex-
isting networks of relations; there are no absolute “truths”, nothing behind the 
curtain; only associations, and then more associations. Latour turned away from 
pragmatism and headed towards relational constructivism. As with most turns, 
however, it was not at all straightforward. It all began with a misunderstanding: 
 
“ANT is the story of an experiment so carelessly started that it took 
a quarter of century to rectify it and catch up with what its exact 
meaning was. It all started quite badly with the unfortunate use of 
the expression ‘social construction of scientific facts [my empha-
sis]”. Latour (2005, p. 88) 
 
In “Reassembling the Social” from 2005, referring back to the subtitle of “Labora-
tory Life” from 1979, Latour wrote that the expression ‘social construction’ had 
unfortunately been used to describe the philosophy of science underpinning actor-
network theory. In 1979, “Laboratory Life” had the subtitle: “The Social Con-
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struction of Scientific Facts”, but fellow academics had mistaken it as referring 
only to human (and not all) interactions (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, p. 281). In 
2005, Latour attempted to correct this misunderstanding by “Reassembling the 
Social”, which is also the title of his book. In this book, Latour argued in general 
terms that current social scientists had used the adjective ‘social’ to describe both 
the processes of assembling and the nature of what was assembled (Latour, 2005, 
p. 1). He then showed how ‘the social’ could not be understood as a kind of mate-
rial out of which things were made and returned to the original meaning of ‘the 
social’ as the tracing of associations. In having redefined the notion of ‘the social’ 
this way, Latour argued that actor-network theory indeed represented a social con-
structivist approach, but taking the common understanding of ‘social’ into ac-
count, he “contended” with actor-network theory being a constructivist approach. 
 
In actor-network theory, constructivism refers to the “account for the solid objec-
tive reality by mobilizing various entities whose assemblage could fail” (Latour, 
2005, p. 91). Latour illustrates this by referring to a building. He describes that a 
building can be understood as the assemblage of a range of human work on mate-
rials such as clay bricks, wooden planks and steel beams. It is not enough to un-
derstand this as only human work. Neither is it enough to understand it simply as 
the work of humans on materials; the materials are important actors, but they also 
have to be shaped in order to look like a building. A successful construction of a 
building thus depends on its associating abilities. In the words of Latour, humans 
and non-humans together have to be mobilised in a specific way, and only when 
this has been accepted or recognised by other actors, the building has achieved its 
“objective reality” as a building. Callon would say that the interaction between 
human and non-human actors would have to be framed in a specific way to be 
successful in becoming “a building” (Callon, 1998a). 
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The point I seek to illustrate is that it is the association, the relation between enti-
ties which is crucial for understanding, for example, practices of risk management. 
A building is not an a priori kind of social material, it is not a pre-given entity, it is 
an assemblage, a temporary, stabilised process, and one that can always be “de-
molished”. It depends on the continuous mobilisation, the assembling of entities. 
In this, actor-network theory becomes “a method to describe the deployment of as-
sociations… a method to describe the generative path of any narration” (Latour, 
1996, p. 374). It is about trying to catch up with actors’ “often wild innovations in 
order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, 
which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could 
best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish” (Latour, 
2005, p. 12). It is by doing this that we come to understand the “objective reality” 
of, for example, practices of risk management. In my approach to examining prac-
tices of risk management, I have been guided by this point. In overall, this means 
that what I do is seek to trace associations. 
  
To operationalise this “tracing of associations”, Callon (1986) has developed three 
methodological principles. The first concerns ‘agnosticism’. It entails that the sci-
entist, or observer, must remain impartial among actors engaged in controversies, 
must not censor actors as they speak about themselves or any other matter of their 
interest, and must not judge an actor’s statement or analysis (of the social envi-
ronment). The second principle refers to ‘generalised symmetry’. This principle 
refers to the rule that the observer must not simply repeat the analysis suggested 
by the actors he is studying; the observer must use a single repertoire applicable 
across all actors to make sense of his findings. The repertoire chosen can be left to 
the discretion of the observer, but the observer must select the one that seems the 
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best suited to his task at hand. The only requirement is that the selected repertoire 
must be capable of capturing the work of both human and non-human actors and 
that it thus does not give any actors priority over other actors. All selected vocabu-
laries are equally valid, but the observer must afterwards convince his colleagues, 
through his writing, that he made the right choice. In his 1986-paper, Callon chose 
the (generic) vocabulary of “translation” (Callon, 1986). 
 
The third and last principle concerns ‘free associations’. This principle demands 
that the observer must abandon all a priori distinctions, such as those between na-
ture (or the natural) and society (or the social), human and non-human, agency and 
structure, macro and micro, description and explanation, far and close, strong and 
weak, etc. Instead, the observer must remain open to the examination of associa-
tions (and then treat distinctions as effects of these associations, if this is at all rel-
evant). In addition, the observer cannot impose any type of pre-established analyt-
ic grid on associations; the observer must “follow the actors in order to identify 
the manner in which these define and associate the different elements by which 
they build and explain their world” (Callon, 1986, p. 201). The observer must de-
scribe the associating works of actors and then on the basis of gatherings of such 
associations construct and reconstruct the actions and events that make up the ac-
tor-network studied. In this sense, Callon’s principle of ‘free associations’ relates 
to Latour’s concepts of mediators and intermediaries, i.e. the observer must re-
main open to examination of all types of associations, but only those that mediate 
to other associations will be visible (See also Callon, 1998b, pp. 9-10). 
 
5.2. Method: case studies 
In choosing a method that enables me to adhere to Michel Callon’s above-
mentioned methodological principles, I have chosen case studies, understood as 
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in-depth and detailed descriptions of real-life situations. In the words of John Law: 
“[actor-network theory] is grounded in empirical case studies”, and we can only 
understand actor-network theory “if we have a sense of those case studies and how 
these work in practice” (Law, 2009, p. 141). In relation to the tracing of associa-
tions, the by far largest benefit of choosing case studies is that it allows going into 
the details of “messy” practices. It allows following the actual associating work as 
it unfolds through time and space rather than limits to following only the outcome 
of such processes, which amounts to either stabilised associations, or none. It al-
lows going “behind the scenes” of formal written documents, such as financial re-
ports, which tend only to demonstrate the type of information that key actors have 
agreed upon. As I seek to examine the construction of practices of risk manage-
ment, the effects they produce over time, and how we can understand them, going 
into actual “messy” practices seems imperative for making a solid contribution. At 
least it allows me to provide thick empirical details and to look “beyond the enter-
prise” (Miller, 1991, p. 757) and into “the particularities of risk management char-
acteristics in specific organizational settings” (Bhimani, 2009, p. 4). 
 
I have already described the two cases I have decided to draw on: the Danish DKK 
23.7 billion railway signalling renewal project, called the Signalling Programme, 
and the Danish DKK 41.4 billion hospital construction programme, called the 
Hospital Programme. These two projects are both mega-projects in terms of hav-
ing high public attention and a budget of more than USD 1 billion. I have also ex-
plained that the Signalling Programme was chosen because it adhered to the fun-
damental actor-network theory’s methodological requirement that a case be 
chosen in which the associations have not yet been black-boxed. This means that 
something new must be present, something changing, something that someone or 
something holds relevant as important and which transforms that which it was 
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supposed to transport. The Signalling Programme represents such a case, as it was 
the first programme that was subjected to the government requirement to imple-
ment comprehensive/holistic risk management. This meant integrating this princi-
ple across all subprojects, and at the strategic top management level as well as at 
the operational project management level, which only few of the involved actors 
had attempted before, and then only on a non-required basis. This enforcement of 
risk management led to controversies and many other trajectories over time. 
 
The Hospital Programme similarly represents a programme in which risk man-
agement had to be implemented and where the actors did not know how to ap-
proach it; this time, however, the requirement was not caused by legislation, but 
by earlier construction scandals. These scandals had led the National Audit Office 
of Denmark to recommend the implementation of risk management in order to 
strengthen management accounting practices. It had also led the Hospital Pro-
gramme to acquire assistance from KPMG, who also strongly recommended the 
implementation of risk management. The Hospital Programme is further been di-
vided into 16 major hospital construction projects, which are each managed sepa-
rately by local project management organisations under the auspices of the five 
Danish Regions. In practice, this division meant that not one, but 16 project organ-
isations (and thus many more actors) were faced with practising risk management 
for the first time, which all things being equal resulted in a multiplication of the 
complexities of implementing and operating risk management, compared to the 
Signalling Programme. In other words, these not-one-but-sixteen practices were 
indeed “messy” and far from being black-boxed. 
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5.3. “Units of analysis” 
This leads me to describe the “who, what, when and where” of my method, or 
what I call the “units of analysis”. This and the following subsection focus on the 
Signalling Programme, as this case is my main case and because I have spent by 
far more time collecting data from this project. As I stated earlier, my two co-
authors on the third research paper, which deals with the Hospital Programme (to-
gether with the Signalling Programme), have conducted most of the observation 
studies and all the interviews related to this programme. The initial considerations 
made regarding selecting the proper “unit of analysis” and the subsequent collect-
ing of data have therefore been done by them. In contrast, I have been solely re-
sponsible for deciding on the “units of analysis” and how to approach the collec-
tion of data related to the Signalling Programme, and therefore this section focuses 
on this. This includes the consideration I gave to carrying out the data collection, 
as well as the consideration I gave to my own role in the Signalling Programme, 
plus the limitations of following and describing associations. 
 
With respect to the Signalling Programme, I followed Latour’s notion of “follow-
ing the actors”, meaning that, as in the studies by Preston et al. (1992), Chua 
(1995) and Skærbæk (2009), to mention three key accounting studies, I traced as-
sociations between actors that were involved in practising, in my case, risk man-
agement. This “following the actors” perspective, however, poses two major prob-
lems: (1) where should this tracing begin, and (2) how do you know when you 
have “completed” the tracing? In answering the first question, Latour wrote that 
you always start in the middle of things, “in medias res”, and that “that is excellent 
because there is no better way” (Latour, 2005, p. 123). There will always be things 
you will not know, always be “crucial events” that took place before you arrived, 
always be things you thought you knew, but which you actually did not know; and 
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after weeks, months or years of data collecting, you have to realise that most of the 
gathered descriptions must be sacrificed to fit the small number of pages related 
your writing format. So what did I do? I began by looking at Rail Net Denmark’s 
website, http://www.bane.dk, and more specifically the section which at that time 
contained information about the Signalling Programme.13, 14 
  
This website provided me with scarce, but still very useful information as it pre-
sented the key project managers and the programme management of the Signalling 
Programme and also contained much background material on the programme. This 
gave me an overview of the people that I knew I had to attempt to make contact 
with. At the time, however, I did not have access to Rail Net Denmark or the Sig-
nalling Programme organisation, so it was crucial to first establish contact. After 
this had been established, a meeting was set up at the beginning of 2010 with the 
board of directors of Rail Net Denmark (and not just the Signalling Programme 
organisation). At this meeting, it was agreed that I would get access to the Signal-
ling Programme, its employees, its internal documents, etc. I also received hun-
dreds of pages of background material for the Signalling Programme including 
material for the recently constructed risk management practice, which I went back 
home and read (which included Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; and 
Banedanmark, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
After the initial board meeting, I made contact with the then risk manager (who 
was later moved to a different position due to re-organisation), the senior consult-
ant in charge of risk management, the programme director and two senior project 
managers. I held interviews with them, and it was agreed that I was to follow all 
                                                 
13 See the first half of the section “Preface” for a more elaborate description of what I did, as this dates back to be-
fore I began this PhD dissertation when I were about to write my Master’s thesis. 
14 For the English website, see: http://uk.bane.dk. 
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formal risk meetings for the remaining part of the Signalling Programme (until 
2020/21). It was also arranged that I would follow the day-to-day work of key pro-
ject managers; this was dropped, however, as it became evident that only very 
small parts of their work related to actual risk management.15 It was also arranged 
that I was to conduct interviews with two more key actors who had been involved 
earlier, but who now had left the organisation. I did those interviews later. In addi-
tion, it was agreed that I would use the risk meetings to establish new contacts, as 
the practice had been organised so that all parties involved with risk management 
would at some point be invited to these meetings. I met 79 people this way, most 
of whom I met on several occasions. 
 
I will not go into my entire “network-tracing” activity, as it will be too compre-
hensive to account for and make comparatively little sense to the reader. I did es-
tablish a journal in which I noted down when I met the people I met, their job 
function, at what kind of meeting I met them, the number of times I met them, 
their full names, etc. I will comment more on this when I explain how I ap-
proached participating in the meetings I did. I did not make notes of when and 
how I got hold of all the documents I did, but I scanned every single internal doc-
ument I got hold of (unless I was told not to) and filed them. I also carried out sys-
tematic reviews of newspaper articles on a bi-annual basis; I downloaded all the 
formal documents I could find, I asked people for documents I heard mentioned or 
read about in other documents, I e-mailed people later on about this when I got to 
know them; and I tracked the people I heard mentioned more than once or twice 
                                                 
15 In 2011 and 2012, this was taken up again on two different occasions; the former again related to following pro-
ject managers, which ended up being dropped for the same reason as stated above; the latter related to following 
one of the risk consultants during his/her work when he/she was present at “Banehuset” (the main building of Rail 
Net Denmark). I did that for one day, but because this work resembled what I had already learned from casual chats 
after meetings and from interviews, I dropped continuing this. 
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(as many people’s named were dropped in conversations) and approached them 
for interviews. Finally, I also followed the report “trails”, meaning that I ap-
proached the people or their organisations that, for example, had produced or re-
ceived the report. 
 
I have included three appendices that re-present the people I met along the way. I 
have excluded the names for reasons of confidentiality, but have kept their job ti-
tles to demonstrate the extent of the actor-network traced. A few notes on this are 
appropriate here: One, I attempted on several occasions to make contact with the 
Danish Ministry of Finance, and I even had people from within Rail Net Denmark 
and the Danish Ministry of Transport to attempt this on my behalf. So far, it has 
been unsuccessful, and I am therefore still attempting to do this. Two, I never 
found traces of the involvement of the National Audit Office of Denmark, except 
for the period before the Signalling Programme was approved, even though I 
asked people explicitly about this. I find this lack of involvement surprising. Ac-
tors have explained that the reason is that the Signalling Programme has remained 
on schedule and within budget (and has even returned money to the state). I have 
not pursued this further, again here adhering to actor-network theory methodolo-
gy, as I have “followed the actors” who made a difference, the mediators, and I 
have found no indication that the Audit Office was such a mediator. 
 
The lack of involvement by actors who at a first glance would be considered im-
portant to the project brings to mind one important actor-network theory point, 
namely that actor-networks are never stable: new actors can be involved, some can 
lose their effect, some betray the practice, etc. This means that the actor-network 
described throughout this dissertation must not be regarded as a permanent list of 
the important actors in the Signalling Programme: these actors were important at 
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the time they were recorded, there could have been more, and there certainly will 
be more as the programme keeps developing. This leads me to the second question 
posed by Latour: How do you know when to stop your network tracing activity? 
Latour himself explained that there is no final answer to that question. In a record-
ed dialogue with a PhD student, Latour responded to this question by saying: 
“You stop when you have written your 50,000 words or whatever is the [disserta-
tion] format here, I always forget” (Latour, 2005, p. 148). Latour thus stressed the 
practical constraints that always go with writing texts, such as the dissertation 
format or the time available. In that sense, I have never stopped my collection of 
data; I have attempted to collect as much information possible within the limita-
tions of the available time, the willingness of the actors to participate etc. After my 
collection of data I have then posed more specific research questions that would 
capture the associations I traced, without losing the complexity of these (see the 
three research papers for those questions). 
 
In summing up this subsection, I did not pre-define the actors to be involved, but 
rather traced associations according to Callon’s methodological principles of “free 
associations”, focusing on the actors’ own descriptions of their worlds (of risk 
management). I further traced all actors, both human and non-human, according to 
the effects they generated, thus leaving out the intermediates and focusing on the 
mediators (Latour, 2005, p. 128). I should mention that an important mediator that 
underwent massive transformation was the IT-based risk management control sys-
tem that had been implemented to assist the operation of the risk management 
practice. I will later in this dissertation describe in more detail how this actor 
translated and brought other actors into existence. It was thus not only humans, or 
more specifically, employees, that I followed, but also all sorts of other actors. I 
followed actors such as project managers, programmers, consultants, suppliers, 
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civil servants, financial controllers, managers, newspapers, databases, projectors, 
presentation material, laptops, risk agendas, status reports, white papers, decision 
reports, investment proposals, audit reports, to mention but a few. See Appendices 
7 and 8 for overviews of human actors traced. See also primary references in the 
reference list for key non-human documents. Otherwise, I refer to the three re-
search papers for descriptions of other non-human actors like the IT-based risk 
management system. 
 
5.4. Data collection techniques 
This subsection describes the data collection techniques I employed, which in-
clude three formal techniques: collection of documents, semi-structured interviews 
and non-participation observation studies, and a range of more informal tech-
niques. The latter techniques include email correspondence with key actors, casual 
conversations before and after risk meetings, as well as during breaks, confidential 
conversations held without the recording devices turned on, conference attendance 
where people from the Signalling Programme would be present, informal observa-
tion of people working at their work stations, as well as lunch-break smalltalk. 
These techniques have all been employed with due consideration to the above-
mentioned methodological principles. In the following, I will refer to data as in-
formation. 
 
5.4.1. Collection of documents 
The first and most important information tracing technique employed is the collec-
tion of documents (Callon, 1991). I have collected several hundreds of pages of 
written documents related to the Signalling Programme and its practice of risk 
management. These documents include both “external documents”, such as the 
background and investment reports, but also “internal documents” such as pre-
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pared risk status reports or meeting agendas. I approached the challenge of collect-
ing documents by first downloading all the documents I could find on the Rail Net 
Denmark homepage, http://www.bane.dk. This provided me with background in-
formation on the Signalling Programme, including information on technical solu-
tions, financing, risk management, contractual strategies, organisation, stakeholder 
coordination, as well as numerous references to other documents. I then proceeded 
by looking into those references that were mentioned repeatedly, which led me to 
information about the “New Budgeting Method” and the formal documents sur-
rounding it. In sum, this slowly led to more and more documents being collected, 
including government white papers, auditing reports, traffic agreements, consul-
tancy reports, legal instruments, etc.  
 
I have referred to all those documents I could find that pertained to the bringing 
into existence of the Signalling Programme and its practice of risk management. I 
thus adhered to the actor-network theory’s methodological principles. As I was 
doing so, however, I was also becoming still more involved in day-to-day devel-
opments. This meant that I also began to collect “internally” produced documents 
such as risk status reports, project status reports, strategic risk plans, presentation 
material, internal classified reports, charts, etc. These documents provided me 
with knowledge of the formal information that was produced inside the organisa-
tion and to whom it was circulated; sometimes to project managers, sometimes to 
programme management, sometimes to the risk management team, and sometimes 
to the Ministry of Transport. With respect to the first paper, which deals with the 
translation of uncertainties into risks, this provided me with specific information 
about the risks that were constructed, which I was then later able to compare with 
the processes by which they were constructed. In connection with the second pa-
per, which focuses on the relationship between frameworks and practices of risk 
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management, the documents provided me with information on the formal aspects 
of the construction and re-construction of the Signalling Programme’s risk man-
agement practice; and for the third paper, which deals with risk management, un-
certainty and the roles for knowledge and project management across my two ex-
amined mega-projects, the documents helped me to understand the similarities and 
differences between the two programmes. 
 
Besides the above-mentioned hard-copy documents, I also collected electronic 
documents that were circulated through emails or the Outlook Calendar meeting 
invitation function, where documents could be attached. I attempted to obtain as 
many of these documents as I could get my hands on, although I recognised that 
most of this type of information was inaccessible for me. These documents includ-
ed risk meeting agendas, risk status lists, overviews of risk reducing actions, ‘val-
ue at risk’ charts, overviews of risk assessment classifications, reporting standards, 
etc. I used most of these documents to get an understanding of the meetings before 
I attended them, the overall status of risk management, its development over time, 
and the key actors of the practice (as I got to know who the participants were). 
This information was all extracted from the IT-based risk management control 
system. I therefore made sure that I gained access to this, also in order to follow 
how this information was extracted. In relation to the second paper, this access 
was what enabled me to draw conclusions on the importance of the control system 
and to produce the description of ‘value at risk’ developments. This access also 
enabled me to contrast output information with the input information on the con-
struction of risks that I obtained through observations (see next subsection). 
 
By connecting the documents to the overall research question, I was able to de-
scribe in great detail how the practice was framed, that is, how the practice of risk 
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management was constructed, and how it changed over time. The “external” doc-
uments illustrated the broad, overall background information, while the “internal” 
and electronic documents showed the more local and specific elements of this 
construction. However, this leaves out the important part of the “following the ac-
tors” principle, namely the processes taking place before the production of docu-
ments. Consequently, I have supplemented the gathering of information from doc-
uments with the technique of conducting observation studies. The documents did 
provide an understanding of the roles of the different actors, when and where risk 
management was practised, the purpose of the practice, how to define the notion 
of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, but not the effects of the processes of actually 
carrying this out. The documents “black-box” the actual empirical developments 
taking place, the frustrations, negotiations, disagreements, etc., that form an inte-
gral and important part of the practice. In order to answer the second part of my 
overall research question about the effects of the practice over time, the collection 
of documents thus cannot stand alone as a collection technique. 
 
5.4.2. Observation studies 
The second technique relates to the conduction of observation studies. As men-
tioned before, I have used this technique to allow me to “follow the actors”, i.e. to 
follow the associating work of actors related to the practising of risk management. 
This includes the conversations, discussions, negotiations, conflicts and everything 
else that may take place between actors that would have remained hidden if I had 
not pursued this. In relation to the research question, the observation studies have 
enabled me to examine the effects generated by the processes of practising risk 
management. In relation to the first paper, this has allowed me to compare the 
constructed risks with the construction of risks and thus the things that are debat-
ed, disagreed upon and perhaps excluded. This may reveal unexpected effects. In 
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relation to the second paper, the observations have allowed me to examine the re-
lationship between the ways practices are framed and the ways they are actually 
carried out; and in relation to the third paper, they have allowed me to examine the 
effects of practising risk management on the conditions of the knowledge and the 
role(s) of project management. 
 
The observation studies were conducted as non-participating studies, meaning that 
I never interfered in the interaction taking place. It did happen that people asked 
my opinion, but unless I was asked about my name or other simple matters not re-
lated to the practice of risk management, I refrained politely from answering. The 
majority of all observation studies were conducted at different types of physical 
risk-related meetings (see Appendix 6 for an overview of observation studies). It 
was in these meetings that actors would identify and describe new risks, reconsid-
er the status of already existing ones, assess risks according to the logic of proba-
bility and consequence, describe and follow up on actions taken to reduce risk, 
distribute risk ownership, evaluate progress, close risks as needed, solve conflicts, 
discuss opportunities for improvements, approve or disapprove of risks, coordinate 
further meetings, etc. In sum, I observed the construction of more than 500 risks 
and hundreds of risk-reducing actions from 79 different risk management involved 
actors, many of whom were observed more than once, in 41 different meetings 
(see Appendix 7 for an overview of observed persons). These persons were most 
of the studied actors of the practice, because it was exactly through their participa-
tion in these meetings that they were brought into the practice. 
 
At the physical risk meetings I took extensive field notes. I never recorded the 
meetings, as the programme management and the head consultants did not want 
the participants to deliberately avoid speaking about sensitive or confidential in-
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formation (such as contractual prices). I agreed to this, and in the first 14 meetings 
I used pen and paper to take down notes. I was later granted permission to use my 
laptop, which I did in the remaining 27 meetings. After the meetings, I would tran-
scribe my notes in order to forget as little as possible. I would also write down the 
numbers of risks included, dividing them into new risks and reassessed risks, and 
also write down the number of risks excluded, dividing them into duplicates, new, 
and closed ones. I would also note down the number the risk was assigned in the 
control system, so that I could search on these numbers later in order to follow the 
risk’s development over time. I used the “included/excluded” information in the 
first paper and stopped noting this at meeting no. 30, as this was where the first 
paper stopped due to the boundaries defined by its research question. In the last 
two years, new and different types of meetings were added that were not about 
producing risks but rather about reassessing the practice per se (risk forums) or 
approving risks (approval meetings). In total, I produced more than 400 pages of 
transcribed observation notes over the four year study period. 
 
In 2012, the IT-based risk management system underwent a restructuring. The 
control system could now be engaged by the users themselves through the Inter-
net, which allowed them to construct risks and communicate online. In response to 
this, I therefore also began conducting observation studies “at-a-distance”, mean-
ing that I was now able to follow the construction of risks from my laptop without 
being physically present in the meeting room. The consultants operating the prac-
tice still held regular risk meetings in which risks constructed online were reas-
sessed, so the physical meetings were still very much relevant. From 2012 and 
onwards, however, I always cross-referenced my notes from the meetings during 
transcription with changes made to the control system online after the meetings in 
order to make sure that I captured all elements of the interactions noting down 
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both my observations from the meetings and the changes made after when this was 
the case. This cross-referencing sometimes revealed interesting findings, for ex-
ample when changes were made to the system that did not match the description 
put forward in the meeting. This discrepancy sometimes led to unexpected effects, 
as when risk ownership was distributed to the wrong person or when assessments 
were registered as being higher/lower than described. In sum, 23 observation stud-
ies were cross-referenced like this and notes taken on any discrepancies. 
 
5.4.3. Semi-structured interviews 
The third and last source of information is interviews. I have conducted a total of 
19 interviews with different risk-involved individuals, including risk consultants, 
the programme director, project managers and civil servants to mention a few (see 
Appendix 8). I did contact more potential interviewees than these, but most of 
them never responded to my emails or cancelled our meeting – and those I did in-
terview often required me to schedule more than one appointment before we man-
aged to meet. The interviews were all semi-structured, which means that I pro-
duced an interview guide with the questions I wanted to ask, but at the same time I 
made sure that the questions were open-ended. The purpose of choosing semi-
structured interviews was to limit the discussion to risk management related mat-
ters while at the same time allowing the interviewees to speak freely about the 
things they found interesting in relation to this subject. I further refrained from 
predefining the length of the interviews, which meant that there was no pressure 
on me to interrupt the interviewees’ answers to get my questions answered, and no 
pressure on the interviewees to limit their own descriptions, which allowed them 
to talk for as long as they wanted. In practice, this lack of time pressure led to in-
terviews of varying length between on average one to two hours (see Appendix 8). 
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In my approach to the interviews, I also always asked the interviewees up front 
whether they would permit me to record the conversation. I would always stress to 
each interviewee that if they were going to be quoted, their contribution would be 
anonymised to prevent them from being recognised. All interviews were recorded. 
The fact that I recorded them, however, meant that several actors would tell me 
before the interviews that they could not guarantee that they would be able to an-
swer my questions in all details. My response to this was to explain to them that I 
needed to record the interview as part of a proper academic conduct, but we 
agreed that we could continue the conversation afterwards. In practice, I often had 
long talks after the recording had been stopped, which allowed me to learn much 
new information I would not otherwise have gained access to. I promised not to 
quote that information or to divulge who had given it to me, which is the reason 
why I have not provided an appendix on this as I did with the number of inter-
views and observations. However, nothing prevented me from trying to obtain that 
knowledge elsewhere, in fact I was encouraged to, such as by explicitly asking 
other people about this or collecting documents containing that information. In ac-
cordance with the actor-network theory’s mantra of “following the actors”, I fol-
lowed that trail multiple times, which almost always led to more “usable” sources 
of information. 
 
In adhering to Callon’s (1986) principle of ‘agnosticism’, I have strived not to ask 
questions that would make it seem as if I was siding with specific actors. I have 
always stressed that I was there to explain and make sense of the practice of risk 
management as an independent and impartial academic (and thus I sought to ex-
plain that I did not have any other agendas). I have also always avoided explaining 
my working hypothesis or ideas, as this might affect the interviewees’ responses, 
just as I have been careful not to let the working hypothesis and ideas affect the 
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way I asked my questions. I further emphasised before all interviews that the in-
terviewees were free to decide whether they wanted to participate or not and that 
there would be no repercussions or hard feelings. I did stress that I had the pro-
gramme management’s approval to be in the organisations, but I did that to en-
courage them to speak freely about confidential matters they would otherwise 
have left out. I also made a point of stressing to them that if they later regretted 
doing the interview, or wanted to retract certain statements, I would always re-
spect that and refrain from using the interview or the retracted statements. In prac-
tice, no interviews were retracted, but some statements were altered in the tran-
scription due to the often quite graphic language used by interviewees to underline 
their opinions. 
 
The interviews were afterwards transcribed, in the sense that I listened to the re-
cording and wrote down everything, from what was said, to laughs, interruptions, 
and non-verbal communication. With respect to the latter, I took photos of white-
board drawings and had the interviewee email documents referred to during the in-
terview, which I then inserted into the transcription, etc. I attempted to capture 
everything I could think of during the interviews and the subsequent transcription. 
When using exhibits, such as quotes, from those interviews (and this goes also for 
the observation studies), I always did my best to translate them into more readable 
sentences, including translating them from Danish into English. In addition, I al-
ways explained to each interviewee that I would email the transcripts to them af-
terwards to allow them to validate the content. This provided me with the oppor-
tunity to ask them follow-up questions on things I was unclear about, which I did 
on some occasions. It also provided the interviewees with the opportunity to elab-
orate on statements and/or retract statements as mentioned above. In practice, not 
much new information came out of this, but it did on some occasions help me cor-
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rect things I thought I had understood. In sum, I ended up with approx. 600 pages 
of transcribed interview data (or about 1000 pages including the observation notes 
mentioned above). 
 
In analysing the transcripts, I have adhered to Callon’s (1986) methodological 
principle of ‘free association’ which means that I did not apply any analytical grid 
to pre-determine what information would be relevant. Instead, I went back and 
forth reading transcripts, doing more interviews (and observations), reading the 
transcripts again, looking at documents, following the IT-database system chang-
es, listening to the interviews, reading the transcripts again, and so on and so forth 
throughout the four years I carried out my network-tracing activity. I have not ap-
plied any formal IT-based coding software either. I used notes to my transcripts 
combined with “comments” inserted into the document; I drew timelines, gave 
numbers to risks and triangulated my notes with the IT-based risk management 
system. I listened to the actors, did not privilege any of them, did not pre-select 
them because of their titles (expect when I approached the organisation for the 
first time), did not predefine their importance just because some were louder than 
others in meetings; they were all the result of my network-tracing activity and not 
the other way around. In combination with the two other formal techniques (and 
the informal ones described in the next subsection), this allowed me to get an un-
derstanding of the activities and events that formed the practice of risk manage-
ment, in this context not to be understood as being limited to the boundaries of the 
formal established practice. 
 
5.4.4. Other data collection techniques  
Besides the three formal data collection techniques mentioned above, I also col-
lected information, or traced actors, using a variety of other more informal tech-
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niques. One was the many small-talk conversations I had with various participants 
in risk meetings before, during and after meetings – especially when meetings 
were delayed, postponed, or otherwise rescheduled. This provided me with valua-
ble information about actors, who they were, how they perceived risk manage-
ment, and generally helped me to find my way around the organisation. These 
conversations were also valuable for locating new actors to interview and to figure 
out what were the interesting questions to ask, and how people felt about the 
whole risk management practice. I also participated in two large practitioner’s 
conferences, the “International Risk Management Conference”, 1 December 2011, 
and the “Danish Rail Conference 2014”, 14 May 2014, both held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark. This gave me the opportunity to meet people involved in the Signalling 
Programme, but also other people from different organisations, and learn more 
about other approaches to risk management and larger societal developments. 
 
As I got to know people better, I also started having informal (or perhaps formal, 
but information provided here was never quoted) email correspondence with key 
actors, who would send me written material, information about upcoming events 
and the like. This provided me with new documents, new contacts, clarification of 
things, and more. It also served to build closer contact with people, something that 
I discuss further in the next subsection. I also had smalltalk conversations with 
people walking from building to building between meetings and during coffee 
breaks, as well as with people at their workstations after meetings. Lastly, as men-
tioned earlier, I also followed one of the risk consultants around for one day, but 
because this added little new knowledge to what I already knew, I stopped doing 
this and decided to pay more attention to other things, such as scrutinising status 
reports, attending formal meetings, and following changes made to the online-
accessible IT-based risk management control system from 2012 and onwards. In 
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sum, all of these informal data collection techniques allowed me to sharpen my 
knowledge about which meetings it was best to participate in and who to inter-
view, and it also gave me knowledge about the things that went unsaid. 
 
5.5. Reflections on my own role 
It is obvious that when one meets the same people for a longer period of time, irre-
spective of the situation, it becomes increasingly difficult to remain an “impartial, 
neutral observer”. In this subsection, I discuss the major occasions on which I was 
drawn into the practice and how I subsequently dealt with this. I have done this to 
demonstrate that I am well aware that all descriptions of networks necessarily 
must extend these. This subsection thus shows how I ended up affecting the very 
network I attempted to describe without interference. In the beginning, however, 
this rarely happened. At meetings, people would acknowledge my presence by 
greeting me, but in all other aspects, they would conduct the meetings without 
looking at me or speaking to me, which for me indicated that they were unaffected 
by my presence. It did not take many months, however, before people learned 
about what I was doing and would sometimes say things that were hinted at me to 
make sure I wrote them down. The most obvious example of this was when, dur-
ing an assessment of a risk, a senior consultant from one of the subprojects inter-
rupted the risk consultant who had organised the meeting and whispered to me that 
the risk they had just assessed as “red” was actually “yellow”, but that it was im-
portant for him to flag it as “red” in order to get the management’s attention.16 
 
It was rarely more than that, however, and I noted it down into my meeting notes 
whenever this happened. In the last year or so of my network-tracing activity, 
                                                 
16 In consequence, I should mention that the risk consultant organising the meeting overheard that comment and 
challenged the senior consultant from the subproject to reconsider his assessment, which he did with a smile. 
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however, due to the high turnover rate of project managers, I moved from being 
“the new guy” at the meeting to being the “academic expert” who had been there 
from the beginning. And truth be told, I had been there since the programme had 
consisted of seven people, and towards the end it had more than 120 employees, 
and just as many external people who came and went. I would therefore start hear-
ing comments like “if you don’t know what to do, ask that guy” and the senior risk 
management consultant even once, although in jest, proposed that I could manage 
the upcoming risk meetings if he fell ill, because I had more experience than any 
of the other (junior) consultants. On several occasions I also began to note when 
the participants forgot things; as when information was filled into the wrong field 
in the IT-based risk management control system; or when the explanations given 
by junior consultants to project managers about how to do risk management were 
wrong compared to how the practice had been framed. 
 
Although I appreciated the kind of trust that was now shown to me, it also made 
me aware that I had to be extra careful about not saying anything during meetings. 
I therefore did not do that, and I continued to stay in the background without tak-
ing any part. Outside meetings, I attempted to do the same, but (naturally) more 
and more interest started to build up concerning my findings. I was still very de-
termined not to speak about this, but as I judged that having the trust of the people 
around me was more important I did begin to share my findings, although I was 
very careful to only give this to people I had already observed multiple times, or 
already had conducted an interview with. I also made sure to only give infor-
mation to those people I had met several times and whom I knew also provided 
me with information they did not necessarily have to give (thus those I trusted). I 
must stress that I never provided normative suggestions on how to improve the 
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practice, although I was often asked to, and nor did I share any confidential infor-
mation with people from outside the Signalling Programme. 
 
In all aspects I found no evidence that explaining the things I observed made the 
strategic centre of the practice (the programme management, senior consultants, 
and ministries) alter the way associations were drawn. In 2014, however, I agreed 
to give a formal presentation of my three research papers, which included pointing 
out findings like limitations, constraints and unintended effects of the established 
risk management practice. In this meeting, many of the key actors I had met along 
the way attended, from consultants, to head project managers and members of 
programme management. While I do not know the outcome of this meeting yet, 
looking back I have to conclude that I was no longer the “neutral observer” I once 
thought I was, but very much an active mediator of the actor-network I had been 
studying. Unwittingly, I had added to the network, as Latour (e.g. 2005) writes 
that all good texts must do because it cannot be otherwise if texts are not to be in-
termediaries and thus unimportant. Looking back, I therefore only see this in-
volvement as positive, although it does cause practical challenges that have to be 
overcome so not to affect those that I have been following too much. 
 
So what did I learn? I have learned that studying risk management in a large pub-
lic capital investment programme requires sensitivity to the multitude of stake-
holders involved; everybody who has something to gain and to lose. This require 
that one never privileges one group of actors, but remains impartial in order not to 
risk getting mixed up in political power plays. I have also learned that believing 
that risk management is practised only through formal practices implemented in its 
name captures little information about the actual handling of uncertainty. In these 
types of projects, uncertainty prevails at every corner; and uncertainty (not risks) 
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is handled in many places within and outside the main project organisation. In re-
lation to the first point about the importance of understanding the multitude of 
stakeholders, dealing with uncertainty involves dealing with political decisions 
that are far removed from the work of the project managers, and vice versa, tech-
nical decisions being made at the operational level are far removed from the world 
of politicians; and all carry uncertain elements that interact when mega-projects 
such as the Signalling Programme are undertaken. It involves actors such as the 
National Audit Office, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Finance, consul-
tancies, project managers, controllers, train operators, contractors, suppliers, sub-
contractors, sub-suppliers; but also actors such as communication units deciding to 
develop smoke, trains not braking, IT-systems breaking down, doors being kicked 
in, and much, much more. Dealing with risk and uncertainty means dealing with 
all of these – that is, continuously for the 11 or 12 years that the Signalling Pro-
gramme has been scheduled to last until its completion. 
 
5.6. Practical challenges 
 
Consultant (X2): “X79, you are the new guy, any problems?” 
Consultant (X79): “Do I have problems! I have so many overdue 
[risk] actions because I do not understand what’s 
going on and I cannot even seem to give any intel-
ligent responses. This thing [the risk system] is so 
difficult and filled with acronyms that it’s hard to 
understand the risk descriptions. I had one [risk] 
and I didn’t understand the first seven words of its 
description because they were all acronyms!” 
[Laughs from around the table]. 
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Consultant (X77): “I have the same issue”. 
Consultant (X2): “I think we all have that issue”. 
 
As I have stated many times before, I have “followed the actors” as my overall 
approach to conducting the case studies. I doing this, I have been confronted with 
the challenge of grasping what the actors were describing. It often followed that 
highly technical terms were used to describe uncertainties and risks, but also the 
project, its subprojects, its progress, and project management / engineering work 
in general. As the above exhibit taken from a conversation between three risk con-
sultants shows, it was not just I who had that problem. However, it still does not 
take away that “following the actors” can be quite difficult at times. Just to men-
tion some of the more common acronyms: ERTMS, BAFO, PMO, OI, TOC, TSA, 
TCC, S-ISA, G-ISA, FTN, CW, ED, AT and OHS. I managed to learn those, but 
even though I did, they were often used together with not so common terms which 
made it difficult to follow conversations at times – especially because new terms 
kept being introduced. 
 
Consequently, I cannot guarantee that I have always understood the complexities 
of things; I may unjustly have attributed greater meaning to certain sentences. I 
have taken as many precautions as possible by doing more observations, collecting 
more documents, conducting more interviews, but this uncertainty will still prevail 
to some degree. I cannot guarantee, either, that if I had done one more interview or 
one more observation, then things would have had to be described differently. I 
have done interviews and observations to the extent that I did not learn anything 
new, but again, because the programme relentlessly moves on without my partici-
pation, there will always be things that are left unsaid and events that I did not 
hear about. In an attempt to deal with this further, I did conduct interviews with 
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people I thought it could be interesting to speak with, but who were not directly 
involved. This never led to interesting findings, however, and I continued my “fol-
lowing the actors” tracing. By having met 79 different people who are directly in-
volved, however, I do believe that I would have heard about more people if they 
had been key actors in the operation of risk management.17 
 
 
  
                                                 
17 See Section 9.4 for further discussion of the limitations of this dissertation. 
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6. The role of risk management inscription devices in translating 
uncertainties into pure and impure risks 
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6.1. Abstract 
The processes of translating uncertainties, the potentially infinite number of un-
known, into a more limited amount of manageable risks have been defined as the 
cornerstone of risk management, but have not been the object of many longitudi-
nal studies so far. This paper examines a practice of risk management pertaining to 
the carrying out of a large public capital investment programme and sheds light, in 
particular, on the role and effects of risk management inscription devices. Drawing 
on the concepts of purification, framing and overflowing as advanced by actor-
network theory, the paper shows that inscription devices, among other things, end 
up purifying the boundaries between which uncertainties can be included and 
which excluded as risks. The paper theorises the included risks to be the pure risks 
and the excluded risks to be the impure risks of the practice and shows that impure 
risks impair subsequent risk reduction. In contrast to pure risks, impure risks 
threaten the stability of the practice and its success in reducing all material risks. 
The paper contributes to current risk management literature by demonstrating the 
both enabling and constraining effects of inscription devices. 
 
Keywords: uncertainty, risk management, inscription, purification, actor-network 
theory 
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6.2. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the concept of risk management has moved up on the 
agenda of governments and companies alike, transforming the management of or-
ganisations, including management control practices (e.g. Kaplan et al., 2009; 
Power, 2007). In these years, the scope of concepts such as corporate governance 
and accounting cannot be grasped without looking into notions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’ (Power, 2004; Spira & Page, 2003). These notions have been insti-
tutionalised through various guidelines, standards and frameworks (e.g. 
Christiansen & Koldertsova, 2009; McCrae & Balthazor, 2000; Power, 2007). Or-
ganisations ranging from private sector companies to: “…hospitals, schools, uni-
versities and many other public sector organizations, including the very highest 
level of central government, have all been invaded… by ideas about risk…” 
(Power, 2004, p. 9). In its simplest form, according to best-practice (enterprise) 
risk management standards, the argument goes that if an organisation is able to 
handle uncertain events with potential negative impacts on its objectives, this may 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the organisation’s ob-
jectives (See also Raz & Hillson, 2005). These standards thus promise ideals of 
enterprise-wide control, value production and good governance causing organisa-
tions worldwide on to implement risk management (e.g. Power, 2007). 
 
One of the latest developments of risk management has been the fact that govern-
ments have enforced comprehensive practices of risk management onto multibil-
lion public capital investment programmes around the world.18 These pro-
grammes, known as mega-projects, are defined as major infrastructure 
programmes costing more than US$ 1 billion, or programmes that otherwise at-
                                                 
18 For more information see for example: ‘HM Treasury’ (2003, 2004), ‘The Danish Ministry of Transport’ (2006, 
2008), ‘Swiss Association of Road and Transportation Experts’ and ‘The American Planning Association’ cf. 
Flyvbjerg (2009) and The Australian Road and State Traffic Authority’ cf. Li et al., 2010. 
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tract public attention or political interests (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Such pro-
grammes have been known to incur substantial cost overruns. Over the last 70 
years, these programmes have on a worldwide basis seen cost overruns averaging 
between 20 and 45 per cent for 9 out of 10 programmes (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). 
Notable examples of this are the Channel Tunnel, the Great Belt Link or the Syd-
ney Opera House. These programmes evolved into becoming some of the worst 
construction expenditure scandals in terms of budgeted vs. actual costs. As a re-
sult, governments are now enforcing risk management with the ideals of value 
production, good governance and enterprise-wide control onto such programmes 
to supplement traditional project risk management practices. 
 
In the accounting literature, the proliferation of risk management and the transla-
tion of uncertainties into risks have not been the subject of much research. With 
the introduction of formalised and standardised risk management templates, Miller 
et al. (2008) suggest that the ability of organisations to manage the full range of 
uncertainties has been diminished. Power (2009) supports this when he discusses 
an inherent ‘intellectual failure’ regarding the rationality of such templates. He ar-
gues that practices of risk management constructed around them could be at worst: 
“the risk management of nothing”. Mikes (2009, 2011) shows that systematic var-
iations between practices exist and suggests that this indicates the co-existence of 
alternative cultures of risk management. Arena et al. (2010) provide further evi-
dence for this when they attribute this divergence to different risk rationalities, ex-
perts and applied technologies. Collier & Woods (2011) argue that differences can 
be determined by the three contingencies of central government policy infor-
mation, communication technology and organisational size. Vinnari and Skærbæk 
(2014) show that practices of risk management may produce its own uncertainties; 
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and Jordan et al. (2013) suggest that risk maps may serve as ‘mediating instru-
ments’, enabling confidence-building and the resolution of different interests. 
 
The above literature has contributed to an awareness of the potential limitations of 
current best-practice risk management templates and the (social) structures of risk 
management practices. This literature, however, has tended not to examine pro-
cesses of translating uncertainties into risks ‘in action’ over longer periods of time, 
including looking into the potentially more active role and effects of risk man-
agement inscription devices.19, 20 As a result, the current literature has ignored the 
effects of inscriptions for both enabling and constraining organisational action and 
thus for shaping practices of risk management. This paper contributes to the cur-
rent literature by showing: (1) that some uncertainties are included as risks, while 
others are excluded as either uncertainties or risks depending on whether agree-
ment on this matter exists or not; (2) that by enabling and constraining these pro-
cesses, inscription devices end up purifying the boundaries between which uncer-
tainties can be included and which excluded as risks; and (3) that the risk 
management frame intersects with other frames during project processes, such as 
the government budgeting practice, which affect the practice. 
 
In providing evidence for these findings, this paper examines the risk management 
practice pertaining to the carrying out of the Danish EUR 3.2-billion public rail-
way capital investment programme called the Signalling Programme. This pro-
gramme covers the total renewal of all Danish railways signalling equipment and 
                                                 
19 This paper draws on the broad definition of uncertainties as ‘all the things that are unknown’ and risks as the nar-
rower and more limited amount of uncertainties which have been made manageable, the object of rational decision-
making, through calculative practices (Callon et al., 2009, p. 19ff; Miller et al., 2008, footnote no. 7). 
20 An inscription device can be defined as consisting of two things: the inscription being anything having a visual 
display like accounting sheets; and the device being the tool that produces the inscription, such as an IT-system. 
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relies on an extensive risk management practice to ensure project objectives dur-
ing project processes, including an expert developed and operated risk manage-
ment database. The Signalling Programme is an interesting field of study because 
it was (and is) the first large capital investment programme in Denmark to be re-
quired by law to implement the comprehensive type of risk management described 
above (Transportministeriet [The Danish Ministry of Transport], 2006, 2008). 
This risk management approach generated debate and controversies among the 
participants in the investment programme about how to define the boundaries of 
the practice, including how to perform risk management. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The first section reviews the current 
accounting literature on risk management and inscription devices and introduces 
the concepts of framing, purification and overflowing as advanced by actor-
network theory. The second section elaborates on our method and the data collec-
tion techniques used. The third section, our analytical section, which is divided in-
to subsections, contains a description of the Signalling Programme, the risk man-
agement frame, the production of pure risks, the production of impure risks, the 
effects of the production of pure and impure risks and concludes with an epilogue. 
The fourth section discusses our findings in relation to three themes: the transla-
tion of uncertainties into pure and impure risks, the role and effect of risk man-
agement inscription devices, and what happens when the risk management frame 
meets other frames. The fifth and last section concludes the paper. 
 
6.3. The technologies of risk management 
In recent years, the accounting literature has begun discussing the limitations of 
what has now emerged to become worldwide best-practice risk management and 
its relationship with the management of uncertainty. Miller et al. (2008), for ex-
176 
 
ample, suggest that current best-practice risk management templates/systems re-
main too focused on ‘enterprise’ relevant risks and has neglected what they term 
‘hybrid practices, processes and expertise’, through which much of the actual 
management of uncertainty happens. They argue that the consequences of this 
may well be that “the ability of these systems to manage the full range of uncer-
tainties that organizations face is diminished” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 944). In ex-
amining the conceptual level of UK’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which pos-
tulates to improve risk management by transferring public sector risks to private 
sector companies, Froud (2003) arrives at similar conclusions. She argues that the 
rhetorical justification of PFI rests on a limited understanding of risks as ‘quantifi-
able things that can go wrong’ and thus neglects the broader notion of (unquantifi-
able) uncertainties, which makes PFI’s success limited. Hanlon (2010) recognises 
the same. He further recommends that academics return to the examination of lay 
people’s understanding of risk to advance our knowledge of this concept. 
 
In his research on understanding the limitations of these templates, Power (2007) 
argues that risk management has become more about an intensification of auditing 
and control processes and less about “classic” operational risk reduction. This res-
onates well with the emergence of risk management as part of internal control 
sparked by the corporate financial scandals throughout the 90’es and up until now 
(Spira & Page, 2003). Power further suggests that the rationality of best-practice 
risk management with its promise of reduction of all material risks may be an ‘in-
tellectual failure’ (Power, 2009). He explains that practices constructed around 
best-practice frameworks for those who believe to be able to take all material risks 
into account at worst could be “the risk management of nothing”. It turns out to be 
more about reputational risk management (Power et al., 2009) and/or an individu-
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alisation and responsibilisation project aimed at getting managers to govern them-
selves (Power, 2013). 
 
The accounting literature has also looked into structures of risk management prac-
tices and suggested that the transition from the world of templates to the world of 
practical realities has made risk management fluid and disparate. Arena et al. 
(2010) conclude that this can be explained by different risk rationalities clashing 
during the implementation of risk management between experts using technolo-
gies to shape these practices. Woods (2009) and Collier & Woods (2011) examine 
cross-national public risk management practices and argue that practices can be 
explained/determined by, but not limited to, three contingencies: central govern-
ment policy information, communication technology and organisational size. An-
other contribution to the literature is made by Mikes (2009, 2011) and her seven 
case studies of banking risk management practices. Mikes shows that the differ-
ences can be explained with reference to alternative logics of calculation, which 
she conceptualises as different ‘calculative cultures’. Some organisations have a 
culture of “quantitative enthusiasm” dedicated to risk measurement and modelling, 
while others have a culture of quantitative scepticism where risk values are re-
garded as trend indicators. In order to explain these dynamics, risk experts further 
engage in boundary work to expand and sometimes to limit such practices, this 
boundary-work being “contingent on the calculative culture they display” (Mikes, 
2011, p. 241). 
 
The above literature has contributed to an awareness of the potential limitations of 
current best-practice risk management templates and to the structures that may ex-
plain the variations between practices of risk management. In doing so, the current 
literature has focused less on the force of inscription devices for mobilising the 
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boundaries of risk management and the effects those devices have on the process-
es of risk management. These inscription devices have been shown elsewhere in 
the accounting literature to be important (e.g. Chua, 1995; Qu & Cooper, 2011; 
Quattrone, 2009; Quattrone & Hopper, 2006; Robson, 1992; Skærbæk & 
Tryggestad, 2010). Chua (1995), for example, shows how expert-generated in-
scriptions produced faith which allowed for accounting changes to come about; 
Skærbæk & Tryggestad (2010) show how accounting tools such as the pay-back 
method can actively participate in forming of the strategy to be decided upon; and 
Qu & Cooper (2011) show how inscriptions can complement and serve the needs 
of humans but are not always able to produce the intended effects. This perspec-
tive, however, has not been applied in the risk management literature, so examin-
ing this may expand our understanding of risk management practices and add to 
our knowledge of the effects of inscription devices in general. 
 
The current risk management literature, however, has shown that practices of risk 
management have become highly technological. Collier & Woods (2011) illustrate 
the importance of communication technologies for enabling practices across dif-
ferent countries; Arena et al. (2010) and Mikes (2009, 2011), as previously men-
tioned, show how different risk management experts draw upon technologies in 
order to construct practices; Winch (2010), focusing on project management of 
large investment programmes, argues that risk management devices have moved 
to ‘the heart of doing risk management’; and Jordan et al. (2013), drawing on 
Miller & O'Leary’s (2007) notion of “mediating instruments”, find that technolo-
gies enable distributed actors to resolve different interests and build confidence 
with the project and its progress over time. In combination, however, these studies 
do not look into the more active role and effects of inscription devices and how 
they may create controversies, that is, how they may produce their own overflows, 
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which may constrain the very practice they set out to enable. In this respect, the 
above studies are consistent with the early literature on accounting inscriptions 
which did not grant inscriptions an active role (Busco & Quattrone, forthcoming). 
 
The current literature also tends to be limited to the study of risk management 
within formal organisational boundaries and not crossing such boundaries to fol-
low the actual actors involved, i.e. the hybrid practices of risk management de-
scribed by Miller et al. (2008). If we examine practices of risk management related 
to public sector organisations such as those that manage capital investment pro-
grammes, trespassing boundaries becomes paramount. Such organisations are af-
fected by numerous actors such as ministries, politicians and consultancies, who 
may all in some way influence the organisations’ way of practising risk manage-
ment. If we limit ourselves in advance, through the design of our studies, from 
crossing organisational boundaries, we risk missing out on important events, ac-
tions or actors. Consequently, we cannot fully agree with Mikes (2009, p. 19) that 
we have to look: “behind the scenes of risk management to its actual organization-
al setting”, because we also have to cross those boundaries and look into specific 
associations between the actors involved. Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014) even ad-
vise future research to study this in more detail because, as they demonstrate, risk 
management practices may possibly produce its own uncertainties. In addition, 
other scholars are calling for more research into risk management practices (e.g. 
Bhimani, 2009; Gephart et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Van der Stede, 2011). 
 
6.4. Actor-network theory and risk management 
In analysing the processes of risk management, including the role and effects of 
inscription devices, this paper draws upon the concepts of framing, overflowing 
and purification as advanced by actor-network theory (Callon, 1998a; Callon et 
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al., 2009; Latour, 1993).21 As we understand these three concepts, they all emerge 
from the broader notion of translation, which can be defined as the process of: “… 
displacement, drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist 
before and that to some degree modifies the original two” (Latour, 1999b, p. 179). 
This implies a non-linear development and a dynamic process of “displacement 
and transformation” in which stabilised associations represent rare and always 
temporary achievements (Callon, 1986). In re-presenting the work on translation, 
the concept of framing refers to the organisation and guidance of associations in 
order to: “…establish a boundary within which interactions… take place more or 
less independently of their surrounding context” (Callon, 1998a, p. 249). This pro-
cess depends on commitment by human actors, but also on material arrangements 
such as, precisely, inscription devices. 
 
The concept of framing makes little sense without that of overflowing, which re-
fers to all the possible things that can go wrong; all the potential associating work 
between actors not contained within the frame (Callon, 1998a, p. 252). In this re-
spect, all things can never be contained within one frame at all times, so overflow-
ing also directs attention to the fact that an all-embracing frame can never be 
achieved. To Callon, overflowing represents the norm and framing the exception 
that it requires substantial investments to both establish and maintain over longer 
periods of time (See Callon, 1998a). In relation to studying the processes of risk 
management, framing and overflowing thus direct attention to the transformative 
and often unexpected effects that humans and non-humans can assume in co-
producing risks. In relation to the role and effects of inscription devices more spe-
                                                 
21 Some years after Pentland’s (1993) seminal work of how audits produce comfort and purity, theoretical interest 
in purification has proliferated (See: Christensen & Skærbæk, 2010; Gendron et al., 2013; Young, 2014). 
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cifically, these concepts emphasise the dual notion of both enabling and constrain-
ing processes of producing risks. 
  
The concept of purification adds to those of framing and overflowing by referring 
to the active processes of turning ideas or things that were once controversial or 
devalued into acceptable and unchallenged constructions or “facts” (Latour, 
1993). The concept of overflowing, however, implies that “facts” are facts only to 
the extent that they can always be contested and refuted. This was expanded upon 
by Latour (1993), who rejected the modernist conception of the distinction be-
tween nature (the pure) and society and its dirty politics (the impure) and argued 
that even “hard facts”, pure facts, represented constructions. To illustrate this, 
Christensen & Skærbæk (2010, p. 524) used purification to explain how consul-
tancy companies with their “scientific equipment”, albeit only provisionally, be-
came involved with translations to: “… provide faith to accounting systems and to 
settle controversies with sceptical and resisting groups that threatened to destabi-
lize the innovations”. This paper uses the concept of purification to shed light on 
the possible purifying role and effects of risk management inscription devices on 
the processes of translating potentially disputed uncertainties into well-defined, 
accepted and manageable risks, e.g. into fact-like risks. In other words, we suggest 
that inscription devices can be more active mediators in the processes of translat-
ing uncertainties into risks than has been recognised by earlier risk management 
literature. 
 
In an extension of the literature on purification, this paper also emphasises the ef-
fects of the processes of translating uncertainties into risks, that is the “product” 
and its consequences, or what we in the context of risk management term the pro-
duction of pure and impure risks. The concept of pure risks refers to those uncer-
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tainties that have been accepted as risks and included into the practice of risk 
management; and the concept of impure risks refers to those uncertainties that 
have been proposed as risks by some actors but due to disagreement have been re-
jected from the practice of risk management. It is important to emphasise that pure 
and impure risks are relational constructs, which means that the same risk can be 
constructed as pure for someone at one time and then later found impure for 
someone at another time, and vice versa. The distinction between pure and impure 
risks, however, refers to more than an analytical distinction. It is important to rec-
ognise that whether a risk has been included in the practice as pure or excluded 
from it as impure lead to different empirical effects. It is also important to recog-
nize that pure/impure risks must be distinguished from uncertainties as the former 
denotes those elements that have been taken into account and the latter those that 
have not and thus remain unknown at least for the majority of the people involved. 
 
In drawing on the concepts of purification, framing and overflowing, we anticipate 
to find that the expert-operated risk management inscription devices will guide the 
possible uncertainties considered as risks because these devices creating catego-
ries, steps and criteria which frame the practice. When applied, these inscription 
devices will fixate the ‘possible states of the world’ and thus establish boundaries 
between what can be included into and excluded from the practice as manageable 
and agreed-upon risks. If project managers, for example, propose something on 
their own, define their own ‘state of the world’, e.g. their own risk, their proposal 
may not be included if not accepted by the expert devices. This does not mean, 
however, that the programme might not benefit from the effects of the proposed 
practice, or that actors other than devices are without importance, so we need to 
take the effects of the practice into account. Overall, we are guided by the follow-
183 
 
ing questions: how are uncertainties translated into manageable risks, and what are 
the role and effects of inscription devices? 
 
6.5. Method 
In accordance with actor-network theory methodology, we continue along the path 
of “telling interesting stories” (Law, 2009), which means that we draw upon case 
studies, or rather one case study, as our method. In defining case studies, they can 
be understood as in-depth and detailed descriptions of real-life situations, which 
make up “good” descriptions (Latour, 2005, p. 137). We have decided to use this 
method because it allows us to trace the hybrid processes of actual risk manage-
ment, including the role and effects of inscription devices. In the words of Latour 
(1996), it allows us to describe “the generative path of any narration”, and thus to 
track the associating work of actors across formal organisational boundaries: “… 
to catch up with their often wild innovations” (Latour, 2005, p. 12). The authors 
have examined the Signalling Programme ‘in action’ from late 2009 until 2012 
and gathered documents dating back to the late 90’es, when talks about risk man-
agement emerged within the Danish public sector. The period of late 2009 to 2012 
corresponds approx. to the two first phases of the Signalling Programme: the con-
ceptual project definition phase and the procurement phase. 
 
The paper relies on a collection of documents, observation studies and semi-
structured interviews as the main empirical sources to inform our study. In the 
course of the period under study, the first author collected several hundreds of 
pages of written documents pertaining to both the overall investment programme 
and the risk management practice. The material includes an examination of the 
content of the risk database, which contains all information of the agreed-upon and 
accepted risks. These documents have provided background information on the 
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programme, more detailed information on the construction of the risk management 
practice, and information about actual risks. This empirical source enabled us to 
reconstruct the actions and events that make up the programme and to get an un-
derstanding of the risks included in the practice, e.g. the pure risks of the practice. 
It should be noted that the first author also attended conference presentations, par-
ticipated in informal chats, and had several informal conversations and an exten-
sive email correspondence with several actors. 
 
In examining the translating of uncertainties into risks, however, documents alone 
do not illustrate what takes place during the translation process, and consequently 
the first author also made observation studies over the last three years. The obser-
vations allowed us to follow the actors ‘in action’ (Latour, 2005, p. 128) while the 
participants were constructing the actual risks and to show the controversies that 
arose out of the process. The observation studies were carried out at operational 
risk meetings, cross-risk review meetings and risk workshops, which were where 
all formal risk identifications and assessments were made. The first author also 
planned to carry out observations of everyday work practices among the project 
managers; this was dropped, however, as it produced very few relevant observa-
tions, as project managers spend very little time on risk-related work duties com-
pared with other duties. The observation studies were organised as non-participant 
studies, which means that the first author stayed in the background and never in-
terfered with the on-going interaction. Instead, the first author took more than 300 
pages of extensive field notes, which were subsequently transcribed to make sure 
that as little as possible was forgotten. At the formal meetings and workshops, 
more than 50 different risk owners were observed assessing or reassessing approx. 
440 uncertainties as pure risks and approx. 120 uncertainties as impure risks. The 
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observation studies also provided insight into the construction of a large number 
of risk reducing actions. 
 
Our third and last data collection technique was to conduct 15 interviews with dif-
ferent actors involved in risk management, including risk consultants, a number of 
project managers, programme management and various stakeholders. The first au-
thor conducted these at different intervals in the course of the examined period. 
The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that we used an interview-guide to 
structure our initial questioning while still remaining open to whatever direction in 
which the interviewees wanted to bring the conversation. This allowed the inter-
viewees to provide their own accounts of whatever they found relevant and inter-
esting, without straying too far away from the subject of risk management. As the 
interviews were not limited to any predefined length, the interviewees further had 
time to communicate their own understandings of risk management and to follow 
their own ideas, express their own frustrations etc. for as long as they wanted. 
Each interview lasted from one to two hours and was recorded and transcribed. In 
addition, it was explained to each interviewee that they would receive the tran-
script afterwards to allow them to could validate the content. This allowed us to 
formulate follow-up questions, which we did on several occasions. It was also ex-
plained to each interviewee that if they were going to be quoted, their contribution 
would be anonymised to prevent them from being recognised. 
 
The three techniques allowed us to trace the mediating human and non-human ac-
tors that circulated the practice of risk management and to cross-validate our find-
ings (Latour, 2005, p. 129). The actors were neither preselected nor predefined 
when we began the examination, but were identified on the basis of our network-
tracing activity to include only those actors that did something, the mediators. This 
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includes both human actors, such as the project managers, and non-human actors 
(Callon, 1998a, p. 255), such as the risk database. This made it possible for us as 
observers to seek to remain faithful to the actor-network-theory methodological 
principles of: agnosticism, that we as analysts should remain impartial; generalised 
symmetry, that in case of conflicting viewpoints we explain them in the same 
terms, i.e. that we do not only repeat the interviewees’ own interpretations, but 
choose interpretations that will hopefully convince the reader; and free associa-
tions, that the social world is not privileged over nature and the material world 
(Callon, 1986, pp. 200-201). In accordance with these principles, we sought to im-
pose neither our own interpretation nor our own “analytical grid” before listening 
to the actors: We have listened to the actors first and not privileged any view-
points, and then together with the other sources reconstructed actions and events 
as they unfolded. 
 
6.6. The translation of uncertainties into risks 
 
6.6.1. The Signalling Programme 
In the beginning of 2009, The Signalling Programme came into being as the Dan-
ish Parliament decided to fund a EUR 3.2-billion programme of renewing all Dan-
ish railway signalling before the year 2020/21 (Banedanmark, 2009a). This in-
cluded replacing all signalling equipment from basic train detection and point 
machines to overall traffic management systems. As the government-owned or-
ganisation managing railways infrastructure in general, Rail Net Denmark was 
given the responsibility of implementing this programme. The Danish railway 
network includes 2100 km of lines and 3200 km of tracks and serves about 560 
train sets and locomotives from four major operators on the conventional network. 
The green light was given because the Danish signalling system had aged to the 
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point where many of the existing signalling systems had exceeded their technical 
service lifetime. The existing signalling systems caused approx. 39,000 train de-
lays per year and accounted for about half of all delays. It was thus responsible for 
a considerable deterioration of the overall train traffic service level, which meant 
that it was imperative for the government to take action (Banedanmark, 2009a). 
 
The Signalling Programme employs about 120 persons of whom about one-third 
are full time employees and two-thirds are external consultants, but the manpower 
turnover varies as the programme progresses over time (Banedanmark, 2008a). 
The Programme has been set up as its own division within Rail Net Denmark and 
is divided into five major subprojects: F-banen, S-banen, Operational Rules, Civil 
Works and Related Projects (see Appendix 2). The conventional / regional net-
work (F-banen) and the mass transit system (S-banen) projects are the objects of 
the implementation of the signalling equipment and are the two largest subpro-
jects. The Operational Rules subproject handles the development of new safety 
and regulation documents needed for getting approvals for changing the signalling 
system; the Civil Works subproject manages the construction of the required infra-
structure, including two new traffic control centres; and Related Projects manages 
all other subprojects, of which the On-board subproject and the GSM subproject 
are the largest. The On-board subproject manages the replacement of all on-board 
equipment for mainline trains and thus supports the F-bane subproject, and the 
GSM subproject manages the implementation of a new radio and data communica-
tion technology. The Signalling Programme has further been divided into five pro-
ject phases: conceptual, procurement, design, testing and roll-out (see Appendix 3 
for an overview of the timetable of the programme, however excluding the con-
ceptual phase as the timetable was produced at the end of this phase). 
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One of the government’s requirements for approving the programme was the im-
plementation of risk management with its ideals of enterprise-wide control, value 
production and good governance (Transportministeriet, 2006, 2008). On several 
occasions, Rail Net Denmark had been criticised for its recurring management ac-
counting problems (Rigsrevisionen [National Audit Office of Denmark], 2002, 
2004, 2005) 22, and worldwide large capital investment programmes were known 
to incur huge cost overruns. The Danish Ministry of Finance wanted to avoid this 
from happening and therefore enforced “best-practice” risk management inspired 
by private sector developments (Finansministeriet, 2010). The Signalling Pro-
gramme became the first programme in Denmark to attempt implementation sub-
jected to this legislation (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a). The Signalling Pro-
gramme, the Danish Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Finance, however, 
knew little of how to approach the implementation. The Signalling Programme, af-
ter due processes, therefore contracted Ramboll A/S (Denmark), Emch+Berger 
Group AG (Switzerland) and R+R Burger und Partner AG (Switzerland), whom 
had formed a consultancy conglomerate (Banedanmark, 2008a). This conglomer-
ate recommended implementing the worldwide best-practice project management 
framework PMBOK’s section on risk management (PMI, 2004). The following 
section describes how this framework framed the construction of the practice. 
 
6.6.2. The Signalling Programme’s risk management frame 
The Signalling Programme’s risk management practice has been designed around 
several PMBOK-inspired documents which frame the purpose of the practice, the 
roles of the actors, and when, where and how risk management should be conduct-
ed. To begin, the overall objectives are stated as follows: “...to increase the proba-
                                                 
22 See also Justesen & Skærbæk, 2010, who demonstrate how accounting problems went beyond Rail Net Denmark 
to many of the public agencies / state owned enterprise under the auspice of the Danish Ministry of Transport, who 
further themselves were under strong critique from the National Audit Office of Denmark. 
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bility and impact of positive events, and decrease the probability and impact of 
events adverse to the project” (Banedanmark, 2007, p. 1). To be able to achieve 
this, the risk consultants (about five persons) have been appointed as the managers 
or the risk experts of the practice. The consultants are responsible for the success-
ful outcome of the practice, which primarily includes producing risk agendas, or-
ganizing risk meetings and producing risk status reports. The consultants further 
participate in all risk meetings, operate the risk database, instruct all newcomers 
and correct experienced actors to make sure that all uncertainties are turned into 
manageable risks the exact same way. 
 
The formal documents also include the programme’s project managers as the risk 
owners, meaning that they are responsible for participating in all risk meetings and 
for identifying, assessing and reducing all risks (Banedanmark, 2007, p. 19). The 
project managers are the largest group of actors and number more than 50 persons, 
although this number changes through the programme’s lifecycle, depending on 
the subproject. The documents also identify programme management, which is the 
programme director, the programme manager and the head of secretariat, as risk 
owners when identified risks concern overall programme level risks. In this re-
spect, the programme management also have to approve any prepared risk status 
reports, and thus, together with the (senior) risk consultants, have been framed as 
the strategic centre of the practice. Last but not least, the documents also include a 
definition of various stakeholders as risk specialists of the practice, such as finan-
cial controllers, safety managers, suppliers and train operating companies etc. 
They are often invited by the risk consultants to participate in meetings (especially 
workshops) to provide input on relevant risks. 
 
190 
 
In the organisation of the practice, the processes of risk management have been 
framed around the following four major steps: risk identification, risk assessment 
(qualitative and quantitative), risk response planning, and risk monitoring and con-
trol. The risk identification step involves “...determining which risks might affect 
the project and documenting their characteristics” (Banedanmark, 2007, p. 1). The 
risk assessment step involves “…prioritizing risks for subsequent further analysis 
or action by assessing and combining their probability of occurrence and impact… 
[and]… numerically analysing the effect on overall objectives of identified risks” 
(Banedanmark, 2007, p. 1). The risk response planning step involves 
“...developing options and actions to enhance opportunities, and to reduce threats 
to project objectives” (Banedanmark, 2007, p. 1); and the fourth and last step, the 
risk monitoring and control step, involves “...tracking identified risks, monitoring 
residual risks, identifying new risks, executing risk response plans, and evaluating 
their effectiveness throughout the project life cycle” (Banedanmark, 2007, p. 2). 
These processes are described by the formal documents as iterative and should be 
conducted throughout the lifecycle of the programme. 
 
In order to assist the risk consultants’ management of the practice and its process-
es, the consultants have developed a risk database with a risk database manage-
ment tool (in the following just called the database). The database has been devel-
oped to serve the main purpose of registering and organising all identified and 
assessed risks. In addition, the consultants can use the database to provide over-
views of risks owned by specific actors or across specific subprojects and thus 
produce status reports, calculate risk values, and keep track of risk owners and 
their risk-reducing actions. In allowing for this, the database has been designed 
around a “meta-language risk description method”, which requires that the in-
volved actors describe risks as follows: “As a result of <definite cause>, <uncer-
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tain event/risk> may occur, which would lead to <effect on our objectives>” 
(Banedanmark, 2007, p. 6). The database has also been designed around a “traffic 
light assessment matrix”, which is a 5x5 risk rating matrix that allows for the as-
sessment, visualisation and grading of risks into low (green), moderate (yellow) 
and high (red) boxes (see Appendix 4). The risk owners are required to assess 
identified risks using this matrix related to five cost, time and/or punctuality im-
pact categories x five probability interval categories (see Appendix 5). The con-
sultants require that the risk owners, using their best judgment, follow these pre-
scriptions if risks are to be added into the database and thus included into the 
practice (Banedanmark, 2007, p. 4ff). 
 
The database has been designed to encompass the entire framework of the prac-
tice, including the processes of risk management. ‘Figure 6.1’ shows the main risk 
window of the database, which all participants can observe at all risk meetings. In 
the upper left part of the screenshot, the database requires that the involved actors 
identify new risks according to the “meta-language risk description method”. If we 
look to the left, centre and upper-right of the screenshot, we can see where the ac-
tors have to fill in their assessment of the risks using the categories and logics of 
the “traffic light assessment matrix”, including documenting and categorising the 
risks they propose as well as describing and selecting risk owners. In the bottom 
left-hand part of the screen, the actors fill in information on risk response plan-
ning; and lastly, the “menu options” to the right illustrate the options that the risk 
consultants have for risk monitoring and control. Overall, the database thus be-
comes the centre of calculation. 
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The risk management practice consists of three types of meetings: operational risk 
meetings, cross-review risk meetings and risk workshops. The first, operational 
risk meetings, are held approx. six times a year per subproject between one or 
more risk consultants and one or more project managers from the subproject in 
question. These meetings focus on the identification and assessment of risks relat-
ed to individual subprojects that affect the objectives of the programme. The sec-
ond type of meeting, cross-review risk meetings, are held approx. four times a 
year between one or more risk consultants, the head project managers across dif-
ferent subprojects, and members of programme management. These meetings fo-
cus on the major risks across subprojects before the production of status reports 
Figure 6.1: Risk management database screenshot, main risk window
Step 1: Risk Identification 
Step 2: Risk Assessment 
Step 3: Risk Response Planning 
Step 4: Risk Monitoring 
and Control 
193 
 
showing the highest ranking risks threatening the objectives of the programme. 
The third and last type of meeting, risk workshops, are held whenever major 
events have taken place for which the involved actors want to assess the new risk 
situation. The participants are one or more risk consultants, and, depending on the 
situation, project managers, stakeholders and/or programme management. All 
types of meeting are framed by the invitations produced by the risk consultants. 
These invitations indicate: the invited (and thus uninvited) actors, the time, dura-
tion and location of the meeting and, often, the required minimum amount of risks 
to be taken into account. 
 
This section has shown how the practice of risk management has been framed and 
how the database has been designed as the prime risk management device to facili-
tate the process of translating uncertainties into risks. The risk consultants 
equipped with the database have furthermore designated themselves as the experts 
of the practice, and because they organise and participate in the risk meetings they 
are able to ensure that the other participants follow the requirements of the con-
structed and framed practice. The scene has thus been set for an examination of 
the processes of translating uncertainty into what we term the pure and impure 
risks of the practice, including the role and effects of such devices as the risk data-
base. 
 
6.6.3. The production of pure risks 
The process of producing risks takes place in the above-mentioned risk meetings 
and begins with the re-identification and re-description of the risks on the agenda 
followed by the participants’ proposals of new risks. In this identification process, 
the participants always attempt to adhere to the “meta-language risk description 
method”. The observation studies show that out of the more than 560 translations 
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observed, the approx. 440 included risks have been identified by participants ad-
hering to this method. The following exchange is representative of the approx. 440 
conversations that ended with the risk being included and illustrates the process of 
identifying new risks as it takes place across risk meeting types. The exchange 
took place at an operational risk meeting for the Operational Rules subproject. 
Prior to the meeting, the risk consultant participating had invited the head project 
manager and one of his experienced railway operations and management consult-
ants. The following exchange takes place towards the end of the meeting after the 
three participants have reassessed the risks on the agenda: 
 
““I have a new risk I would like to include”, the subproject’s con-
sultant said. “Interesting, please go ahead”, the risk consultant re-
sponded. The subproject’s consultant began to explain that the 
train operating companies (TOCs) were responsible for making the 
operational guidelines for their train drivers. He continued and 
said that they should add the risk that these companies would not 
have the guidelines completed at the time of the deployment of the 
signalling system. He explained that this meant that the train driv-
ers would not be able to interpret the signalling system information 
and hence not be able to operate the trains, which would cause all 
train traffic in Denmark to break down. “So this is just stakeholder 
management”, the risk consultant stated and recorded what the 
subproject’s consultant had said into the risk database’s ‘risk de-
scription’ field. “Ah yes, you can say that”, the head project man-
ager interjected, smiling. “But the situation is much more complex 
than just ‘stakeholder management’”, he added. He explained that 
the problem was that the TOCs were not willing to do anything 
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about it and also that the Signalling Programme, not to mention 
the subproject itself, had no authority to force them to do so. He 
continued and explained that only the Danish National Safety Au-
thority (NSA) could force the TOCs to do something about it – and 
they had done nothing about it so far… The risk consultant, who 
had been entering something into the risk database’s ‘risk cause’ 
field, now asked the other two if they could agree to this. On the 
projector screen the following could be seen: “TOCs are responsi-
ble for issuing and getting approval of the operational rules for 
their staff”. The head project manager and the subproject’s con-
sultant both replied that they agreed with this. The subproject’s 
consultant interjected, however, that he would like the risk consult-
ant to add a “however” to the sentence as he did not feel the de-
scription captured the complexity of the discussion. The risk con-
sultant asked him what he meant by that. The subproject’s 
consultant told him to write the following: “TOCs are responsible 
for issuing and getting approval of the operational rules for their 
staff; however, these rules must be ready before early deployment 
scheme”. The risk consultant wrote the new sentence down. He al-
so wrote the effects of the risk into the ‘risk effect’ field of the data-
base: “Delays and increased costs”. The others did not comment 
on that”. (O3, 4-8) 
 
The above exchange illustrates how the participants follow the “meta-language 
risk description method” when identifying risks: the participants always begin 
with something uncertain, something still open to definition, but through the pro-
cess they end up describing something well-defined and manageable. In the ex-
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change, the actors began their discussion with what the uncertainty was about 
(TOCs not preparing guidelines on time), how to understand the cause of this 
(TOCs not willing to do this) and the effects of this (TOCs causing all train traffic 
to break down). In the process of writing down the definition, however, the risk 
consultant only wrote those aspects down that fitted the method. He did not cap-
ture all the discussions, the intrinsic complexities, the disagreements, just what fit-
ted the cause, risk title and effect fields of the database, which was three sentenc-
es. In this example, the discussion about whether this “just” related to stakeholder 
management was left out, and the potential traffic breakdown effect was reduced 
to mere “delays and increased costs”. 
 
The observation studies show that assessing the probabilities and impacts of risks 
are also considered by the participants before uncertainties are included as risks 
and recorded in the database; the above-mentioned approx. 440 included risks all 
contain assessments. In this process, the participants all exhibit their best judg-
ments when conducting risk assessment and adhere to the “traffic light risk as-
sessment matrix” and its assessment categories. The participants all attempt to as-
sess the proposed risks against the five impact assessment categories of time and 
cost impact and the five probability assessment categories of percentage intervals. 
If disagreements emerge, the consultants, like before, settle such disagreements by 
referring to the database and shaping them according to the requirements of the 
practice. The following exchange shows what happened right after the participants 
from before “completed” their identification: 
 
… “So let us move to the risk assessment”, the risk consultant said 
and moved the mouse cursor down to the risk assessment catego-
ries and selected the categories: ‘cost f-banen’, ‘time f-banen’, 
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‘cost s-banen’ and ‘time s-banen’. The others did not comment, but 
looked to the end of the wall with the projector screen. “So how 
can we assess the risk”, the risk consultant asked. The subproject’s 
consultant answered by saying that for ‘time s-banen’ and ‘cost s-
banen’ the ‘probability’ should be set to ‘highly likely’ (20 to 65 
per cent). If the TOCs had not finalised the guidelines before the 
following year, he explained, this would delay the deployment of 
the signalling system on s-banen. He explained that the deployment 
on s-banen was scheduled to begin at the start of next year. He also 
noted that this would not only cause delays but also additional 
costs as the programme could end up being put on standby until the 
TOCs completed their guidelines. The risk consultant selected the 
‘highly likely’-box from the ‘probability’ risk categories related to 
‘time s-banen’ and ‘cost s-banen’. The subproject’s consultant 
continued: “For f-banen, we will have another year before early 
deployment scheme, so I think we should select the ‘probability’ to 
be ‘likely’ (5 to 20 per cent) for ‘time f-banen’ and ‘cost f-banen’”. 
“And are you sure about that”, the risk consultant asked with scep-
ticism in his voice. “Yes, this is one of our major risks”, the risk 
consultant replied. The risk consultant checked the ‘likely’-box 
from the ‘probability’ categories related to ‘time f-banen’ and 
‘cost f-banen’… Okay, so what can we say about the ‘consequence’ 
of the risk”, the risk consultant asked. “Is it ‘high’ for both s-banen 
(time and cost) and f-banen (time or cost) or what do you think?” 
he asked… The subproject’s risk consultant and the head project 
manager began to discuss this. The subproject’s consultant said 
that he thought the ‘consequence’ for ‘time s-banen’ and ‘cost s-
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banen’ should be set to ‘high’ and the ‘consequence’ for ‘time f-
banen’ and ‘cost f-banen’ should be set to ‘moderate’. The head 
project manager agreed. The risk consultant, however, kept on ask-
ing them if they were sure about that. The participants began to 
discuss this. In the end, the subproject’s consultant and the head 
project manager agreed to lower the assessment of all ‘conse-
quences’ to ‘moderate’ with the exception of ‘time s-banen’ where 
‘high’ was selected. The risk consultant made all the adjustments 
to the database and said that the risk for ‘time s-banen’ was now 
assessed as ‘red’ (3, 4) and the others as ‘yellow’ (3, 3), referring 
to the traffic light matrix with the mouse cursor. The participants 
could observe the mouse cursor and the plotting on the projector 
screen”. (O3, 9-12) 
 
The exchange shows how the actors followed the ‘traffic light assessment matrix’ 
and assessed the risk according to the five different cost and time impact catego-
ries and the five different probability percentage interval categories. In this ex-
change, the participating risk consultant selected the categories before asking the 
participants to do the assessment without getting any reaction from them, which 
shows that they did not disagree with the approach taken. The participants did dis-
cuss whether the risk had to be assessed as “high” or “moderate”, and they did 
have lengthy discussions about this, but they never once discussed the relevance of 
the categories themselves. The participating risk consultant in charge of the data-
base thus limited the many ways the assessment could have been conducted. The 
risk consultant further entered their assessment into the database by marking the 
categories suggested by the participants, and the participants could all observe the 
visualisation of this on the projector screen. 
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The observation studies show how the following more formal information is also 
produced before risks are included: which project phases, categories, variants and 
subprojects the risks relate to, the current status of the risk, and who owns the 
risks. The approx. 440 included risks have all been designed with this information, 
which the risk consultants have recorded in the database without giving cause to 
much discussion. In ‘Figure 1’, this information represents the “categorisation” 
and “documentation” fields besides the information on risk number, initial date 
and revision date, which the database fills in automatically whenever “new” risks 
are added or “old” risks revisited. Sometimes, however, discussions emerge as to 
who should be the owner of the risk, as some actors do not feel comfortable being 
responsible for something they feel they cannot do anything about. The exchange 
from before can be continued to illustrate this, which also wraps up the construc-
tion of that risk: 
 
“…The risk consultant notes down the subproject’s consultant and 
the head project managers as risk owners. He asks them what they 
think of this. The subproject’s consultant disagrees. He says he be-
lieves the project managers from the two major subprojects (f-
banen and s-banen) should be responsible. He explains that the 
operational rules subproject people have done what they can – 
without any luck – and that if more pressure should be put on the 
TOC, this should come from s-banen’s and f-banen’s project man-
agers. The risk consultant says he understands but also insists on 
keeping the head project manager as owner in order to ensure that 
proper attention will be given to the risk. The subproject’s consult-
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ant and the head project manager agree, and they decide to move 
on”. (O3, 12) 
 
In summary, this section has shown how approx. 440 out of 560 observed risks be-
ing constructed have been designed by participants following the “meta-language 
risk description method” and the “traffic light assessment matrix” and other more 
formal information. If any disagreement or controversies emerged about how to 
describe and assess risks, the risk consultants settled these with reference to the 
structure of the database. The consultants further excluded disagreements and con-
troversies from the database when entering the proposed risk-related information, 
that is, the included risks were purified by the consultants equipped with the risk 
database, which as an outcome made these risks look like “facts”. The risk con-
sultants in charge of the database purified the practice of translating uncertainties 
into risks by reducing the potentially infinite number of ways the translation could 
have been done. In short, these included risks have now been made manageable 
and reducible to the practice and they have come to represent what we term the 
pure risks of the practice.23 
 
6.6.4. The production of impure risks 
The inscriptions produced from the database, that is, the formal documents pro-
duced from the practice to illustrate its progress, give the impression that all pro-
posed and relevant risks have been included without controversies. The observa-
tion studies, however, show that approx. 120 out of 560 produced risks end up 
being rejected despite having been found relevant by the actor(s) proposing them. 
The observation studies further show that approx. 100 out of 120 rejected risks are 
                                                 
23 It should be mentioned that risks can be included despite disagreement; however, this only happens if the disa-
greement exists between other participants than the risk consultants or programme management.  
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rejected in strong disagreement. The following section looks into how this hap-
pens by giving three examples of exchanges illustrating how uncertainties pro-
posed as risks end up being contested, rejected and considered impure for the 
practice. 
 
As the previous section showed, the participants must describe the cause-and-
effect relation between the proposed uncertain event and the programme’s objec-
tives in order for the uncertain event to be included as a (pure) risk. The first ex-
change shows how an uncertain event with a potential negative effect on the ob-
jectives of other entities was excluded despite the proposing actor’s argument that 
it had effects on the Signalling Programme’s objectives. We enter the exchange 
immediately after the project manager has suggested that the signalling system 
might affect small private train operating companies’ communication abilities and, 
ultimately, their survival: 
 
““What do you mean”, the risk consultant operating the database 
asks. The project manager explains that the new signalling system 
requires that the operators invest in proper train communication 
hardware. He continues and explains that the small operators 
might not have the necessary capital to make the investment and 
thus not be able to operate. “They will not survive”, he states. The 
risk consultant replies that this situation relates to the operators’ 
objectives. “It’s out of scope and irrelevant for us”, he adds and 
explains the purpose of the practice using the mouse cursor to 
demonstrate the cause, risk and effect fields. The project manager 
looks frustrated and gazes around the table. The others look down 
and seem to ignore him. The project manager adds that if the train 
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operating companies do not survive, this may turn out to be a prob-
lem for the people using trains to commute to and from work. He 
says this might all turn out as one big media scandal which may 
threaten the programme. The risk consultant says he knows nothing 
about that and ends the discussion. They move on”. (O2, 18) 
 
This exchange illustrates how the proposed risk of small train operators not being 
able to survive was rejected, found impure, for the practice because the risk was: 
“… out of scope and irrelevant for the practice”. The exchange also illustrates that 
this happened because the consultant, equipped with the database, the projector 
and the mouse, visually could show the project manager that his proposed risk did 
not fit the categories of the database. It follows from the ways the practice has 
been framed that cause-and-effects had to be directed at the objectives of the Sig-
nalling Programme – and not small train operators. The risk consultant could now 
make this argument by moving the mouse cursor to the fields and visually show 
the project manager that these fields had to be filled in. As the project manager 
could not provide this information (because his risk did not have direct effects on 
the Signalling Programme), this meant that the risk was rejected as such. The risk 
was still seen as a risk by the project manager proposing it, however, but that mat-
tered little as he could not argue “against the system”. Other exchanges illustrate 
similar findings (e.g. O28, 8). 
 
As the previous section also showed, the processes of translating uncertainties into 
risks also includes the assessment of risks according to the ‘traffic light assess-
ment matrix’ with its assessment categories of time and cost. The second exchange 
shows how proposed risks related to effects on something different than time 
and/or cost categories are not included and found impure because they do not fit 
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into that matrix. At the beginning of the programme, the risk consultants held an 
operational risk meeting with the project managers and the financial controller 
from one of the larger subprojects. The following exchange takes place during the 
assessment of one of the risks on the agenda for that meeting and relates to not 
having sufficient resources to complete the contract negotiation phase of the sub-
project: 
 
“The financial controller interrupts the assessment and asks why 
they do not assess the effects of this risk on the quality of the pro-
gramme. If they lack the resources to complete the contract negoti-
ation phase, the controller states, this has to affect the quality of 
the signalling system. The controller says she knows this is her first 
meeting but suggests they add another risk concerning this issue. 
Almost before anyone has time to react, one of the risk consultants 
replies by saying that: “...one cannot assess risks according to 
anything else but the categories included in the database” showing 
her these categories with the mouse cursor on the project screen. 
The controller looks surprised but does not respond to this state-
ment. The remaining four participants did not comment on the sit-
uation, and the two consultants pressed for the meeting to contin-
ue”. (O1, 17) 
 
The above exchange illustrates how the risk consultant in charge of the database 
and its entanglement with the ‘traffic light assessment matrix’ rejected the assess-
ment of a risk that related to anything else but time and cost categories. In this ex-
change, the risk consultant in charge of the database left the proposition whether 
the lack of resources could affect the final quality of the programme as irrelevant, 
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as impure, for the practice. The other participants did not enter this discussion, and 
the meeting went on leaving the controller baffled at having her proposition re-
jected without at least a discussion. Other exchanges serve as similar illustrations 
of how also proposed risks with effects on later ‘operations’ and/or ‘maintenance’ 
of the new signalling system are not included (e.g. O8, 16; O23, 9). 
 
The third exchange illustrates how proposed risks related to day-to-day operations 
are rejected as risks for the practice (the term was coined by project managers) de-
spite the finding that the participants suggesting them disagree. At the beginning 
of 2012, the risk consultants called a risk workshop on behalf of the head project 
manager of a newly merged subproject between two communications related sub-
projects. The workshop had eight participants, including one risk consultant, two 
external consultants employed with the subproject and five project managers from 
the subproject. The following exchange takes place after the participants have 
brainstormed on all possible risks and during the subsequent presentation of their 
results: 
 
“The risk consultant gives the floor to [a] project manager and 
asks her to describe one of the risks she identified. The project 
manager explains that she cannot extend the employment period of 
key personnel on termed employment contracts more than twice 
within six months. She continues and explains that because of this 
they risk losing the knowledge of these people when their contracts 
terminate within the next two months. If this happens, she says, new 
employees may have to spend weeks catching up on that lost 
knowledge. She suggests they add this risk to the database. The risk 
consultant rejects her proposition. “It’s too local, too small and 
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too specific for your project to include”, he says. “It’s not relevant 
for the overall programme. It relates to day-to-day operations”, he 
adds while stressing several times that she should handle this her-
self. The project manager looks frustrated and tries with other ar-
guments to persuade him, but the risk consultant refers to the pur-
pose of the practice: to assess risks relevant for the programme 
and not subprojects. After several minutes discussing this, they 
move on, the risk having been rejected”. (O15, 33) 
 
This exchange illustrates how risks related to day-to-day operations of subprojects 
are rejected because they are “not relevant for the overall programme” and thus a 
matter that the project managers should deal with on their own. These “types” of 
impure risks often come up at meetings but are always rejected with the same ex-
planation about being “too local, too small and too specific” for the programme. In 
this exchange, the project manager argued for including the risk of losing irre-
placeable knowledge because of not being able to extend the contract of some of 
her key employees. The project manager did not find the proposed risk “too local, 
small or specific”; this proposed risk was “real” for her and not something to be 
rejected; this situation had to be dealt with. The conversation, however, ended 
with the project manager having to accept that this could not be included and ap-
proved of as a risk. 
 
Some impure risks are later translated (back) into pure risks. The observation stud-
ies show that this has little to do with the “type” of impure risk proposed and more 
to do with the actors’ ability to change their description of the risk into something 
the practice can accept (O15, 34; O28, 8). The following abbreviated exchange has 
been taken from the above-mentioned workshop, where the project manager had 
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to accept the rejection of her proposed risk of losing employee knowledge. A few 
minutes later, another participant came to her support by arguing for more wide-
spread consequences than “just” day-to-day operations: 
 
““Can I add that I face this problem as well? I also think the ef-
fects are more widespread than just for our day-to-day opera-
tions”. The risk consultant asks him to elaborate. The project man-
ager argues that because many people find themselves in this 
situation, the entire subproject could be delayed, which could lead 
to increased cost and time delays for the entire programme. The 
participants discuss this for several minutes. Eventually, the risk 
consultant agrees to include the risk and fills out the cause, risk 
and effect description fields”. (O15, 34) 
 
The number of impure risks tends to increase over time. The most common expla-
nation given by the risk consultants is that if they begin to include all these uncer-
tainties, the calculated (pure) risk exposure would increase. If the risk consultants 
and the practice end up producing risk status reports showing increasing risk val-
ues, the argument goes, then the notion of risk management as a control device 
dissolves. If this happens, all sorts of political debates and actions can emerge be-
cause it may threaten the budget. If proposed risks are rejected, however, these 
risks cannot be entered into status reports, which means that they will “disappear”, 
at least temporarily, from the total risk exposure calculation. The observation stud-
ies show that some risks are excluded for such “political reasons” and thus indi-
cate the existence of another “type” of risk as well (O28, 5). 
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Through three exchanges, this section has shown how some uncertainties are 
translated into what we term impure risks, that is those uncertainties that have 
been proposed as risks by some actors, but which due to disagreement have been 
rejected from the practice. In summary across the different exchanges provided, 
this happens because the risk consultants equipped with the database, the projector 
and the mouse purify the boundaries of the practice. The risk consultants visualise 
the database on the projector screen in all meetings and utilise this when they ar-
gue against the risk owners who propose risks, which allows the consultants to re-
inforce their argumentation. The risk consultants, however, cannot always con-
vince the project managers about the impurity of the proposed risks, so while 
approx. 120 proposed risks end up being rejected and found impure for the prac-
tice, like the examples indicate, 100 of these still remain pure for the project man-
agers, who see them as “real” threats that need to be acted upon. Some of these 
risks are later translated back into pure risks as project managers gain more expe-
rience with the practice, but by far most of these are excluded. The next section 
looks into the effects of this mechanism as well as the role of inscription devices. 
 
6.6.5. The effects of the production of pure and impure risks 
This section looks into the effects of the processes of translating uncertainties into 
risks and shows how this practice has produced two overall interrelated effects: 
the first relates to purification, the second relates to the production of overflows. 
In describing the first effect, the produced status reports allow the practice to 
demonstrate its own success in achieving its objectives, i.e. purification, in terms 
of reducing negative events. The status reports visualise the uncertain part of the 
total invested capital costs, i.e. the ‘value at risk’, which shows decreasing risk 
values over the lifecycle of the programme. ‘Figure 6.2’ illustrates this develop-
ment over time for one of the larger subprojects and depicts the development of 
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both pure and impure risks. As described before, the ‘pure risk value curve’ (solid 
line) begins at a high level and then slopes downward over the years; the ‘impure 
risk value curve’ (dotted line), however, begins at a low level and then increases 
over time. The actual values for the pure risk value curve are confidential and have 
been left out, and the impure risk value curve has been made by us on the basis of 
our observations. It is important to stress that the value of impure risks cannot be 
calculated, and that these two curves cannot be compared uncritically. 
 
In describing the second effect, the about 100 out of 120 risks observed that were 
excluded and found impure come to represent overflows, that is, unexpected ef-
fects resulting from the boundary work of the consultants equipped with the risk 
database. These impure risks are handled outside the boundaries of the formal 
Time
Total 
risk 
value 
Pure risks 
Impure risks
Figure 6.2: The relationship between pure and impure risks
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practice.24 Outside these boundaries, those actors that proposed the risks that were 
excluded, typically the project managers, tend to construct their own localised risk 
management practices where they attempt to manage these risks. The following 
quote from one of the subprojects’ head project managers emphasises this: 
 
“We’re actually running two parallel practices of risk manage-
ment. We’ve got the programme’s practice. If you noticed, these 
are risks that can affect the political milestones and the pro-
gramme’s milestones, or the budget for that matter. We’ve also got 
our own risk management practices, well, they are not very well 
specified, and not everybody has them up and running, but they 
will have their own, what should we call it, “databases” too, and 
be managed by us, you know, off the record, escaping the attention 
of programme management; this practice will include our risks, the 
project’s risk, those that we find important...”. (I9, 71) 
 
This statement shows that some project managers construct their own parallel and 
local practices of risk management. In this statement, the project manager explains 
how the programme’s practice deals with the more comprehensive risks, those that 
can affect the highest level of the programme with its milestones and its budget. 
He explains that this practice cannot take into account the smaller subproject spe-
cific risks (the day-to-day operations risks), which causes them to construct local 
practices. These practices have their own “databases” and are “escaping the atten-
tion of programme management” and can thus include the proposed risks excluded 
by the practice. He later explained how these “databases” referred to other types of 
                                                 
24 We recognise that both pure and impure risks change form during the processes of constructing them, but this 
rarely happens at the same meetings, and therefore attempts are made to handle them outside the boundaries of the 
more formal practice before they are potentially translated (back) into pure or impure risks. 
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devices, such as Excel spread sheets or IT-logs, and described how project manag-
ers would then share the risk information by means of these tools.  
 
As the project manager suggested with the statement of “they are not very well 
specified, and not everybody has them up and running”, these local practices are 
troublesome for the project managers. This is because project managers: “... are 
responsible for allocating the sufficient resources… to risk management” 
(Banedanmark, 2013a, p. 9), but because impure risks are rejected, these resources 
must come from “non-approved” sources. In practice, the project managers have 
scarce resources for performing project management, which means that operating 
local “non-approved” risk management practice becomes problematic. The follow-
ing two quotes illustrate this; the first indicates the scarce resource issue, and the 
second shows what happens with many of the impure risks that are localised with 
project managers:  
 
“We think of so many risk assessments without ever writing them 
down. I wanted to introduce my own local practice, but I haven’t, 
simply because I would have had to take up my entire employee’s 
working hours which I neither have the time nor the money for be-
cause we are running on such a tight schedule”. (I9, 106) 
 
“The excluded risks are never handled. I have seen what happens 
with the risks that are left to the project managers; they end up on 
the project managers’ whiteboards on yellow post-its – and every 
time I walk by, month after month, I see more and more post-its un-
til they lie on the floor underneath the board.” (I11, 122) 
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In the period between 2009 and 2012, having their proposed risks rejected as im-
pure for the practice, the project managers, and others, have exerted more or less 
pressure on the framing of the processes of constructing risks. This was, for exam-
ple, evident at a risk workshop where the attending risk consultant rejected several 
risks, which caused six project managers to get enraged and to demand that the 
practice be adapted to their need (O15, 36). The discussion emerged because the 
project managers wanted to assess risks related to their impacts on the subproject 
at hand and not on the entire programme (thus criticising the cause-and-effect 
model). The project managers argued that they wanted to be able to include risks 
as ‘red’, despite the database requirement that ‘red’ risks needed to have million-
euro cost impacts. The participating risk consultant disagreed, showed them the 
database assessment categories and argued that the size of their subproject was too 
small to produce anything but ‘green’ risks. This discussion lasted for several 
minutes until the project managers began to argue for splitting the database into 
“local” project risk assessments and “global” programme risk assessment. The risk 
consultant rejected this suggestion, but after strong pressure from several partici-
pants lasting several minutes, the consultant promised to look into it. The project 
managers later received an edited assessment structure, but assessments produced 
using that edited structure were never admitted into the practice and the structure 
remained an informal one. 
 
In summary, the effects of the production of pure risks are that because the pure 
risks have been approved by programme management and the risk consultants as 
risks, they are made objects of systematic risk reduction and thus later acted upon. 
The production of pure risks further allows for the calculation of the ‘value at 
risk’, which can be used to demonstrate the success of the practice. In contrast, an 
effect of the production of impure risks is that local practices tend to emerge in 
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which some impure risks are acted upon, some are later translated into pure risks, 
but where most are never acted upon due to scarce resources and lack of manage-
ment approval. The production of impure risks is neither structured nor systematic, 
and if risk reduction happens, it is unstructured; the project managers deal with 
this as best as they can. In addition, these impure risks are the result of the purified 
practice with its (contested) boundaries and become the overflows of the practice, 
the rejected potential threats to the practice, the programme and its objectives. So 
far, however, these overflows have not turned into severe threats and have not led 
to the reframing of the practice, but it has been contested on several occasions, and 
pressure on the inscription device is intense. 
 
6.6.6. Epilogue 
In early 2012, the last of the major supplier contracts were signed, which meant 
that the first phase, the procurement phase, of the programme had been completed 
in keeping with the overall time schedule. At the end of that same year, this con-
clusion was reinforced regarding potential cost overruns as the Financial Act of 
2013 revealed calculated savings of EUR 500 million compared to the initial 
budget of EUR 3.2 billion (Transportministeriet, 2013). In the eyes of the public, 
to this date we can thus conclude that both the practice of risk management and 
the programme appear to be successful. At the same time, however, the govern-
ment decided to reduce the programme’s budget by exactly EUR 500 million, and 
with the actual design, test and roll-out phases still incomplete, we can only specu-
late as to whether this will not put even more pressure on the production (and re-
duction) of risks. It thus remains to be seen how the practice will cope with this, 
what will happen to the programme and not least what will happen if serious 
events that threaten the practice occur. In all circumstances, however, we will con-
tinue to follow the programme until its expected completion. 
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6.7. Discussion  
This paper contributes to the extant accounting literature on risk management 
through an examination of the processes of risk management focusing on the ques-
tion: how are uncertainties translated into manageable risks and what are the role 
and effects of risk management inscription devices. The following three subsec-
tions elaborate on our contribution: the translation of uncertainties into pure and 
impure risks, the role and effects of risk management inscription devices, and 
what happens when the risk management frame meets other frames. 
 
6.7.1. The translation of uncertainties into pure and impure risks 
This paper contributes to the literature on the distinction between uncertainties, the 
potentially infinite number of unknowns, and risks, the more limited amount of 
uncertainties that have been defined and constituted as such (Callon et al., 2009). 
The paper has shown that contrary to expectations, not all uncertainties were trans-
lated into risks despite representing events with potential positive or negative con-
sequences on project objectives. Some uncertainties were included as risks, but 
others were excluded because agreement could not be reached on how to include 
them. We termed those risks included the ‘pure risks’ of the practice and those ex-
cluded the ‘impure risks’ of the practice. In explaining why this happened, the pa-
per has shown that risk consultants in charge of the database and its distributed 
devices ended up purifying the boundaries between which uncertainties could be 
included and which could be excluded as risks. These inscription devices enforced 
the “meta-language risk description method” and the “traffic light assessment ma-
trix”, which framed the processes of producing risks. We have also shown that this 
distinction had implications for the subsequent management of risks, as only pure 
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risks became the object of systematic risk reduction, while impure risks tended not 
to be managed, and ended up as “post-its lying on the floor”. 
 
The distinction between pure and impure risks should not, however, be confused 
with the distinction between objective and subjective risks as described by much 
rationalist-cognitive and functionalist research (See Gephart et al., 2009). Neither 
should it be confused with Knight’s famous distinction between uncertainties as 
“unmeasurable entities” and risks as entities “susceptible of measurement” 
(Knight, 1921, I.I.25). This paper draws upon actor-network theory’s anti-
essentialist stance from which we do not understand risks as “out there”, but as the 
result of processes of constructing objects as risks. The distinction, then, repre-
sents an effect of the framing of the practice; this produces the realities through 
which practitioners understand the boundaries of what and what not to define as 
risks. This means that pure risks are pure for some and impure for others, and vice 
versa, which has less to do with risks being measureable versus unmeasurable and 
more to do with inclusion/exclusion mechanisms. It further shifts the focus away 
from the question of “objective” and “subjective” risks to that of risk acceptance, 
as all risks become constructs of negotiation. The risk value information that ac-
tors come to act upon thus depends on how risk boundaries have been set and 
function over time; something which cognitive and functionalistic researchers tend 
not to take into account. 
 
This paper adds empirical depth to the suggestion that contemporary practices of 
risk management cannot take the full range of uncertainties into account (Miller & 
O'Leary, 2007; Power, 2009). We show that the framed practice with its pro-
gramme/enterprise-wide and not cross-organisational-wide focus rejected the pro-
posed risks related to day-to-day operations and/or other entities’ objectives. The 
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practice did allow these non-enterprise risks to be proposed and judged, but when 
they came up for description and assessment, most ended up by being excluded; 
they often ended up on “yellow post-its” without being acted upon. In examining 
the practice, we cannot interpret that this mechanism represents an “intellectual 
failure”, but we do show that the practice became the result of controversies and 
negotiations rather than a deterministic machine-like calculation related to a pre-
existing risk appetite (Power, 2007, 2009). In combination we can add that these 
templates do remain “antithetical to the hybrid nature” of managing the full range 
of uncertainties (Miller et al., 2008, p. 944). 
 
In being more explicit about the excluded risks, this paper contributes to current 
risk management literature by shedding light on the potential types of impure 
risks, something which to our knowledge remains unexplored to date. The first 
type we found was ‘day-to-day operation risks’, that is those that were “too local, 
too small and too specific”. Objecting to that description, the observed managers 
argued that such risks in sum could be quite significant. The second type was 
those with effects on anything else but time and cost. The programme manage-
ment and the risk consultants argued that risks with effects on things such as 
‘quality’, ‘operations’ and ‘maintenance’ were outside the scope of the pro-
gramme. This led to astonishment and some frustration from the project managers. 
The third type was those that could not be identified using the cause-and-effect de-
scription model. This type led to the negligence of the project managers’ gut-
feeling and intuitive ideas of new risks based on their many years of experience; 
these had to be able to describe the specific causes and effects on this. We also 
found that an increasing ‘value at risk’ curve, according to the involved actors, 
could threaten the overall budget of the programme. This suggests a fourth type of 
impure risk also: those risks that are too politically sensitive to include. This latter 
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type is similar to the findings of Radcliffe (2008), who in relation to auditors 
pointed out that there are certain things you know not to know, such as secrets or 
taboos, and thus do not include. We do not claim that these types of risks are the 
only ones, and we suggest more research be conducted to more systematically as-
sess whether other types of impure risks can be identified. 
 
However, despite these types of impure risks, our observation was that managers 
adapted to the framing but tried to rephrase their descriptions of excluded risks to 
make them more consistent with the established parameters of the practice. This 
way, some of the impure risks became included in some other form later on. We 
therefore see how risk management can be seen as a “game of risk” where the 
rules (the framing) of the practice became the object of gaming that is so frequent-
ly reported on in the management accounting literature. 
 
6.7.2. The active role and effects of risk management inscription devices 
In recent years, the roles and effects of risk management inscription devices have 
begun to receive attention, but our knowledge of such devises remains limited, de-
spite the fact that studies have indicated that they are omnipresent. Jordan et al. 
(2013) found that technologies come to act as “mediating instruments”, which en-
able distributed actors to resolve different interests and build confidence with the 
project. In addition to the finding that the expert-operated risk database ended up 
doing more than verbally enable the management of risks as prescribed, the data-
base, due to the impure risks and the overflowing it co-produced, ended up con-
straining the processes of risk management. The database challenged the strate-
gists in charge of the database, that is, the risk consultants and programme 
management, by threatening their identities as “owners” and experts of the prac-
tice. In recognising that overflows are the norm and framework, the specific risk 
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boundaries-setting, the exception, the implications are that management should 
pay more attention to how they deal with impure risks. If not, they risk that propo-
nents of risks found impure end up frustrated and sceptical toward the formal and 
quite highly-invested practice. We thus agree with Jordan et al. that risk technolo-
gies serve as ‘mediating instruments’, but also that this concept needs to take into 
account the dual movement of both enabling and constraining the practising of 
risk management. 
 
The accounting literature has also shown how pre-existing cultures, rationales 
and/or contingencies can explain the impact of different dynamics and forms of 
practices of risk management across countries, sectors and companies (Arena et 
al., 2010; Collier & Woods, 2011; Mikes, 2009; Woods, 2009). This paper argues 
that an explanation of the practices of risk management depends less upon the pre-
existing rationales, cultures and/or contingencies and more upon the actual debates 
taking place during risk meetings. Our case resembles one where the enrolled ac-
tors were quite sympathetic to the whole idea of risk management and quite will-
ingly engaged in the developed practice. Not until the very moment when disa-
greements and concerns emerged did some of the actors realise that not all of their 
proposed risks could be accepted into the practice. It appeared as if the actors 
started by involving themselves in the practice with an open interest and used their 
common sense to assess what they were presented with in terms of the database 
and its interface. It was during the processes of risk management that they gradu-
ally developed the view that it was problematic when the expert-operated practice 
did not accept what they thought should be accepted. We saw no signs that their 
reactions to the introduced risk management originated from pre-existing struc-
tures etc. In future research, we recommend that more attention be focused on do-
ing comparative studies of organisations in similar conditional settings in order to 
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examine how uncertainties are translated into risks. If pre-existing structures, all 
other things being equal, remain the same, such research could look more deeply 
into the importance of the actual framing of the specific production of pure and 
impure risks. 
 
In relation to experts and risk management more specifically, Mikes studied how 
experts do boundary-work to: “define what is and is not their remit, often with re-
spect to competing or complementary fields of expertise” (Mikes, 2011, p. 227). 
She found that organisations exhibited a culture of either “quantitative scepticism” 
or “quantitative enthusiasm” and that the work of experts was contingent upon 
this. In complementing this finding, our paper shows that consultants become the 
risk experts who, besides defining their own field of expertise, also define and pu-
rify the boundaries of producing the actual risks. In taking charge of the database 
and both organising and running all risk meetings, the risk consultants added legit-
imacy to the practice which helped to settle controversies and disagreements about 
how to do risk management. An overflow was, however, that this caused the sup-
pression of debates and suggestions of new risks as project managers, among oth-
ers, did not feel comfortable challenging the experts. In a paradoxical finding, 
then, the work of experts entails the risk that significant uncertainties may not be 
treated as risks. This further indicates that experts both co-produce the stabilisa-
tion and the destabilisation of the practice at the same time. 
 
6.7.3. When the risk management frame meets other frames 
This paper has focused on the processes of risk management and the multitude of 
associations drawn between actors across formal organisational boundaries to the 
actual actors involved, from project managers to consultants and stakeholders. If 
we broaden the associations taken into account, this paper also shows that the 
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overall practice was entangled with the broader frame of ensuring the success of 
the programme. This contributes to Vinnari and Skærbæk’s finding: “that different 
frames have linkage points to other frames that open up unexpected realities and 
turmoil” (Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014, p. 518). In our paper, the risk consultants, for 
example, ensured that the project managers identified the effects of the risks on 
the programme’s objectives, i.e. its success criteria, before including them. This 
points to the observation that the success criteria of the programme may influence 
the judgment of the project managers when risks are constructed. At least during 
interviews the actors expressed that they were well aware that increasing the ‘val-
ue at risk’ curve indicated uncertainty of the achievement of the programme objec-
tives. If this is taken into account, it may explain why the ‘politically too sensitive’ 
risks, as mentioned before, were excluded, because if they had been included, this 
could have increased the ‘value at risk’ and potentially re-opened the government 
budget leading to potential political turmoil. It is thus evident that other frames at 
least momentarily entangle with the risk management frame. 
 
All the same, we argue that we lack research that looks into the implications of the 
interrelatedness between risk management frames and other frames, such as capi-
tal investment budgeting or value management. As all practices more or less de-
pend on the judgment of the people involved this means that practices depend on 
the various interests of actors, power relations between them, blame games when 
things go wrong, etc. These are all, to our knowledge, unexplored phenomena re-
lated to the actual processes of risk management. Such research, then, might ex-
pand our knowledge of how and why framing takes place the way it does, which 
in turn might explain why some risks come to be produced as pure while others 
are produced as impure. This gives rise to questions such as: Are impure risks sub-
ject to interest, or perhaps manipulation, and if so, do other frames shape the spe-
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cific designs made? We also suggest that more research should be conducted out-
side construction projects to examine the translation of uncertainties into risks in 
other types of organisations as well. This paper has not attempted to generalise the 
specific findings, but more research could pursue this line of inquiry; perhaps the 
same types of risks are excluded across organisations. 
 
6.8. Conclusion 
Over the last 70 years, all over the world governments have had to accept large 
cost overruns on capital investment programmes, the so-called mega-projects, be-
cause they have not been able to manage uncertainties properly (Flyvbjerg, 2009). 
In later years, governments, think-tanks, parliaments, standard-setting bodies, con-
sultants and ministries have been involved in applying extensive practices of risk 
management to such programmes in the hope of curbing such cost overruns. The 
overarching claim has been that these practices can improve management control 
and through this ensure the objectives of the programme. This paper examined the 
practice of risk management in one of the largest Danish capital investment pro-
grammes to date, the Signalling Programme, with capital costs of more than EUR 
3.2 billion. The programme involved the first Danish attempt at introducing risk 
management based on the promises and ideals of enterprise-wide controlled ‘good 
governance’ and value production in the transportation infrastructure sector. This 
paper sought to shed light on the dynamics and complexities of the processes of 
risk management in order to expand our knowledge about these processes and 
contribute to extant accounting literature on risk management. 
 
This paper looked into the processes of translating uncertainties into manageable 
risks, the cornerstone of the practice of risk management, and, in particular, shed 
light on the role and effects of risk management expert technologies. The paper 
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demonstrated that risk consultants equipped with the database management device 
embedded the framing of the practice and produced the boundaries within which 
uncertainties could be included and excluded as risks, i.e. these actors purified the 
processes of constructing risks for the practice. The paper theorised the included 
risks to be the pure risks and the excluded risks to be the impure risks of the prac-
tice and illustrated the consequences of this. The paper showed how pure risks be-
came the object of systematic and structured risk reducing actions while impure 
risks did not and became personal to individual managers who still found these 
risks relevant. These impure risks became overflows of the practice, which came 
to threaten its stabilisation; they led to controversies and discussions between the 
participants of the practice and put pressure on the strategic centre of the practice 
for changes. This paper identified four types of impure risks and advised future re-
search to examine this in more detail. The paper also advised looking more closely 
into how the risk management frame entangles with other frames. 
 
In conclusion, the programme examined here did not threaten to generate budget 
overruns, and the programme management was able to communicate the story that 
the programme was well below budget. If the uncertainties rejected as risks were 
to become materialised in some future, however, the programme could run into 
trouble both in terms of budget overrun and time delays. We cannot predict this 
for the remaining eight years of the programme, however, because at the same 
time events reducing risks could take place outweighing the impure risks pointed 
out here. At the same time, the effects of risk reducing actions are difficult to cal-
culate, as you often do not know whether risks would have incurred if nothing had 
been done about them from the outset. Risk management is a socio-technical prac-
tice imbued with controversy and disagreement about where and how the bounda-
ries for inclusion and exclusion of risks should be drawn. The idea of the bounda-
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ries within which risks are considered pure should be raised in the attention of 
strategic actors in risk management. 
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7.1. Abstract 
In light of the implementation of frameworks of enterprise risk management in 
large public infrastructure projects, this paper explores the relations between en-
terprise risk management and an in-depth examined practice of risk management. 
The paper demonstrates that by performing certain realities of ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’, enterprise risk management made the practice construct the risks 
that confirmed its propositions. It further shows that the practice had difficulty 
sustaining the propositions of enterprise risk management over longer periods of 
time because situations arose which undermined those propositions. In these situa-
tions, the paper shows that reconfiguring the risk management control system, re-
defining risk terminologies, and redistributing the identities of actors became key 
conditions for stabilising the propositions of enterprise risk management. The pa-
per concludes by stressing the importance of understanding the dynamic interac-
tion between material devices, language and identities of actors as conditions of 
long-term risk management success. 
 
Keywords: enterprise risk management, performativity, misfire, actor-network 
theory  
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7.2. Introduction 
In recent years, governments worldwide have attempted to improve the possibili-
ties for managing large public infrastructure projects by introducing enterprise risk 
management or similar holistically-focused risk management concepts. This de-
velopment has taken place because large public infrastructure projects historically 
have had trouble being completed on budget and thus have often turned into public 
expenditure scandals. Enterprise risk management applied to large infrastructure 
projects builds on the conception that project organisations carry out projects in an 
uncertain world faced with events that affect project objectives. It advocates that 
project organisations should construct an enterprise-wide integrated practice of 
risk management that is aligned with strategic organisational objectives and pro-
cesses and carried out throughout the lifespan of the project. If properly imple-
mented, this should enable the practice to identify, assess and reduce all material 
uncertainties, which all should be done in accordance with a pre-given risk appe-
tite. Enterprise risk management sets out the proposition that when project organi-
sations adhere to these precepts, this will provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of their objectives. In several countries, public agencies are now 
constructing practices of risk management relying on extensive frameworks of en-
terprise risk management and counting on them to provide that level of certainty 
of their objectives. 
 
The literature looking into the relations between enterprise risk management and 
practices of risk management has demonstrated that practices are disparate despite 
enterprise risk management’s clear-cut conception (e.g. Mikes, 2009; Power, 
2007). In explaining this finding, the literature has pointed toward contingencies 
such as ‘risk rationalities’ (Arena et al., 2010) and ‘calculative cultures’ (Mikes, 
2009), which shape this relation (or lack of it). The literature has also pointed to-
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ward the importance of risk experts and technologies in enabling and setting the 
boundaries of practices (Jordan et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011). In this respect, the lit-
erature has found that experts and technologies constrain the very practice they 
enable, which leads to certain types of risks being excluded (Themsen & 
Skærbæk, 2014). It may even be that practices of risk management produce unex-
pected uncertainties (Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014) or represent an “intellectual fail-
ure” (Power, 2009). It has thus also been proposed that enterprise risk manage-
ment could be less concerned with operational risk reduction and more with 
reputational management and/or an individualisation and responsibilisation project 
(Power et al., 2009; Power, 2013). However, as our knowledge about the mecha-
nisms of these practices seems incomplete, more research should inquire into the 
actual practices of risk management (Bhimani, 2009; Gephart et al., 2009; Power, 
2013; Van der Stede, 2011). 
 
The present paper argues that the current literature has missed out on the complex 
relationship between enterprise risk management and practices of risk manage-
ment by underemphasising the performative effects of frameworks of enterprise 
risk management. The concept of performativity may be defined as the contribu-
tion of theories, statements, etc., to the enactment of the realities that they describe 
(Callon, 2007; Law & Urry, 2004). This paper shows that risk management prac-
tices become more like how they are depicted by enterprise risk management, 
which means that they end up producing the risks that confirm its propositions. It 
also shows that risk management control systems become the key mechanism for 
reconfiguring the practice to those propositions during times of misfires, i.e. when 
enterprise risk management makes the practice produce risks that undermine its 
propositions (Callon, 2010). Such control systems facilitate a redefinition of risk 
terminologies and a redistribution of identities, which in turn allow practices to 
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overcome enterprise risk management misfires. This latter aspect has so far re-
mained underexplored in the literature, with researchers calling for more research 
into the conditions of performativity success during times of misfires (Butler, 
2010; Callon, 2010; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003). 
 
In making the above argument, this paper seeks to make a three-fold contribution. 
Firstly, it seeks to add to our understanding of the dynamics of practices of risk 
management by examining the performative effects of enterprise risk manage-
ment. Secondly, it seeks to move forward our understanding of the conditions of 
performativity during times of misfires, using risk management as an example. 
Thirdly, it deals with the current conventional expectation that enterprise risk 
management can provide “reasonable assurance for project objectives” by consid-
ering the relation between certainty and uncertainty. In reaching these conclusions, 
and in order to provide detailed descriptions of this relation, the paper draws on a 
longitudinal case study of a risk management practice. This practice relates to a 
Danish EUR 3.2 billion public infrastructure projects, called the Signalling Pro-
gramme, which refers to the total renewal programme of all Danish railway signal-
ling. It also represents the first Danish attempt at implementing risk management 
in large public infrastructure projects based on current worldwide best-practice en-
terprise risk management. The project can be expected to be subject of discus-
sions, negotiations and conflicts – especially because the government expects this 
practice to set a best-of-class risk management example for all other governmental 
organisations from departments and directorates to project organisations. 
 
The Signalling Programme was also the object of examination by Themsen and 
Skærbæk (2014), who examined the processes of producing risks and their effects 
from the time of the parliament’s decision to fund the programme in 2009 till im-
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mediately before contracts with the main suppliers were signed in early 2012. This 
paper goes beyond the scope of that paper by extending the perspective to examine 
the broader set of relations associated with the risk management practice and by 
also taking the period from 2012 to 2014 into account. This has been done because 
after the contracts with the suppliers had been signed, enterprise risk management 
misfired due to increasing risk values, which threatened its success. This devel-
opment led to controversies between the involved actors, including the strategic 
centre of the practice who began to discuss the purpose of risk management and 
how to reorganise the practice in order to reduce these risk values. The response 
came when the consultants operating the practice readjusted the risk management 
control system to allow more actors, such as the main suppliers, to be included. 
This helped to some extent, but not sufficiently; so after a period of turmoil, the 
consultants also embedded new risk terminologies, such as ‘sub-risks’ and ‘non-
approved risks’, into the control system and re-distributed the responsibilities be-
tween the involved parties. This ultimately reduced risk values and stabilised the 
practice. 
 
The rest of this paper has been structured as follows: The first section looks in 
more detail into the accounting literature on enterprise risk management and de-
scribes the concept of performativity and its conditions of success. The second 
section presents the case-based method including the benefits of choosing this 
method when examining the relationship between enterprise risk management and 
the world of practice. The third section gives an introduction to the Signalling 
Programme and the emergence of the enterprise risk management programme in 
large transportation infrastructure projects in the Danish public sector. The fourth 
section describes the findings, which have been divided into four subsections: the 
configuration of the risk management practice, the emergence of concerns, the 
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growth of concerns, the misfiring of the practice and the re-configuration of the 
practice. The fifth section summarises the findings and discusses their implications 
on current understandings of risk management, and the last section concludes the 
paper and sets out directions for future research. 
 
7.3. The accounting literature on enterprise risk management 
In recent years, the accounting literature has shown that risk management has been 
moved up on the public and private sector agendas to the point of transforming the 
fundamental nature of organisational management (e.g. Miller et al., 2008). This 
development has been stimulated by numerous transnational public and private 
sector standard-setting bodies who have promoted the same concept of enterprise 
risk management (Power, 2007). In these years, enterprise risk management has 
become an integral part of best-practice internal control and good governance 
across countries and organisations alike (Power, 2004; Spira & Page, 2003). This 
also follows from the literature on large infrastructure projects in which the ideals 
of enterprise risk management has become an increasingly important part of good 
project management (e.g. Winch, 2010). The following excerpt taken from the 
worldwide recognised “best-practice” COSO ERM framework defines the concept 
of enterprise risk management: 
 
”Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in 
strategy setting and across enterprise, designed to identify poten-
tial events that may affect the entity and manage risks to be within 
its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of the entity’s objectives”. (COSO, 2004a) 
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The above definition illustrates the key proposition of enterprise risk management, 
something that other frameworks resonate (Raz & Hillson, 2005) and which bears 
many similarities to common management control propositions (e.g. Mikes, 2009). 
It builds on the key proposition that by implementing enterprise risk management, 
organisations obtain reasonable assurance of being able to achieve their objectives. 
In more details, this objective can be obtained by setting out an input risk appetite 
and by following the iterative process of: risk identification, risk assessment, risk 
reduction, and monitoring and control, to make sure that the residual risk value 
can be contained within the risk appetite. Power has compared this basic concep-
tion to the logic of that of a thermostat: “…which adjusts to changes in environ-
ment subject to a pre-given target temperature” (2009, p. 849). Further, risk identi-
fication should follow a cause-and-effect logic between potential events and 
organisational objectives; risk assessment should be conducted by quantifying 
likelihood and impact probabilities of the events and by mapping and prioritising 
them using matrixes and maps; risk reduction should be planned, prioritised and 
carried out on the basis of those assessments; and monitoring and control should 
provide feedback to the process and adjust the practice to meet the pre-determined 
risk appetite. In capturing its core rationale, enterprise risk management thus re-
flects a long tradition of a functionalistic theorisation of uncertainty and risk (e.g. 
Bernstein, 1993; McGoun, 1995). 
 
The literature has also shown that enterprise risk management, when being applied 
to the world of practice, becomes: “...different things in different organizations, or 
even within the same organization, at different times” (Arena et al., 2010, p. 659). 
This stands in contrast to the otherwise clear-cut conception of the enterprise risk 
management concept. In explaining this discrepancy, Mikes (2009) found that dif-
ferent calculative cultures existed which were polarised around the enthusiasm or 
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scepticism towards risk measurement and modelling. She argued that these cul-
tures shaped management predilections towards risk management and served as 
important constituents of the fit between risk management control systems and or-
ganisational contexts. Arena et al. (2010) later argued that enterprise risk man-
agement introduced new rationalities which diverged as they encountered already 
pre-existing rationalities in the organisation. In this divergence, they found that 
risk experts and technologies were important for explaining how practices ended 
up being different. This was expanded upon by Mikes (2011), who found that risk 
experts, doing rhetorical boundary-work, were important for understanding the 
expansion and limitation of the different types of risk cultures. Jordan et al. (2013) 
further found that technologies served as ‘mediating instruments’, referring to 
Miller & O'Leary’s (2007) definition of this concept, which due to their generic 
construct enabled the building of confidence and the resolving of differing inter-
ests between people. 
 
In light of the above disparateness between practices, Themsen and Skærbæk 
(2014) further looked in depth into the specific processes of practising risk man-
agement. They found that besides limiting and expanding practices of risk man-
agement, consultants/experts, equipped with technical risk devices, ended up set-
ting up boundaries between what a practice considered acceptable as risk, and 
what not. They further found that this led to the unintended effect of rejecting cer-
tain uncertainties as risks, which turned some of these uncertainties into threats 
against the programme because they were never handled by the involved actors. 
Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014) also identified unintended effects when they con-
cluded that risk management, besides reducing uncertainties, also created unex-
pected uncertainties due to its entanglement with other frames important to actors. 
Related to this, Power (2013) also suggested that risk management could be more 
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about an individualisation and responsibilisation project aimed at getting managers 
to govern themselves rather than about actual risk reduction; and Power et al. 
(2009) further elaborated that risk management could be more about the manage-
ment of reputational uncertainties rather than operational uncertainties, which 
should be seen as a logic of organising rather than a discrete manageable object. 
 
In understanding the relationship between enterprise risk management and practic-
es of risk management, however, the current literature has tended to focus on ex-
plaining variations between practices and/or the effects generated by the practising 
of risk management. The literature has tended not to deal with the potential per-
formative relationship between frameworks of enterprise risk management and the 
resultant constructed practices around them. In taking this perspective, the current 
literature has missed out on whether differences between practices might be the 
result of different implemented frameworks of risk management rather than, for 
example, of the enabling and limiting effects of technologies, expert and/or calcu-
lative cultures. This is not to say that these elements are not important elements of 
the construction and operation of risk management practices, but it is to say that 
(enterprise) risk management may end up enacting the realities of risk manage-
ment practices in addition to the transformative work of experts, the enabling and 
constraining effects of technologies, etc. If a performative relationship exists be-
tween frameworks and practices of risk management, this means that we will have 
to rethink our understanding of what it means to practise risk management. 
 
7.4. The concept of performativity and its conditions of success 
In approaching the relationship between enterprise risk management and the re-
sultant practices of risk management constructed around its propositions, this pa-
per draws upon the concept of performativity as defined by constructivist litera-
232 
 
ture. This concept can be defined as the contribution of theories, statements, pre-
scriptions, etc., to the enactment of the realities that they describe (Callon, 2007; 
Law & Urry, 2004). It builds on the conception that when understanding the rela-
tionship between theories, prescriptions, statements, etc., and the world that they 
describe, they also bring about that world (Callon, 2007). In the accounting litera-
ture, this argument has been applied to explain how devices such as budgets or 
balance sheets shape organisational practices. Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010), 
for example, showed that accounting devices ended up rejecting, defending and 
changing corporate strategy by mobilising concerned groups of actors; Dambrin 
and Robson (2011) found that in the pharmaceutical industry, performance meas-
urement devices shaped drug representatives’ performance measurement practices; 
and Cushen (2013) found that budgets served as a performative mechanism 
through which top management could narrate specific realities and pass down in-
ventions. 
 
The concept of performativity breaks with the traditional understanding of theories 
as “true” descriptions of the empirical world “out there” and refocuses our atten-
tion instead on the conditions under which theories can be made to be successful 
(e.g. Austin, 1962). These conditions range from the linguistic (e.g. Austin, 1962) 
and social-symbolic (e.g. Bourdieu, 1991) to the socio-material (Callon, 2007). In 
bringing these conditions into the management literature, Ferraro et al. (2005, 
2009), argued for three overall but non-exclusive conditions: the promulgation of 
language, the shaping of organisational arrangements, and social behavioural 
norms. Callon (2007) argued for also taking material assemblages into account, 
such as “prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices [and] algorithms” (Callon, 
2005, p. 4). He also argued that with the move to examine the conditions under 
which theories becomes performative, rather than just descriptive, the focus 
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should rather be on the adjustment process between the world and the statement 
which produces that world, i.e. the bracketing of the world: 
 
“The actualization process is a long sequence of trial and error, 
reconfigurations and reformulations. But what makes this process 
possible is the performative dimension of the statement and the tri-
als they allow… The conditions of felicity of a (performative) 
statement, that is, its success, depend on this adjustment, an ad-
justment that is never given in advance and always requires specif-
ic investments”. Callon (2007, p. 320) 
 
In the above quotation, Callon (2007) further described that the adjustment pro-
cess always remains an open and continued sequence of trial and errors, reconfigu-
rations and reformulations. This statement means that a performative relationship 
tends to produce the phenomena and therefore sometimes can fail to produce what 
it anticipates (Butler, 2010). In other words, performative relationships must be 
open for situations of breakdowns at the very core of the concept. Callon (2010) 
has elsewhere described such situations as misfires, which refers to situations 
where theories, statements, and such, lead to unexpected outcomes.25 MacKenzie 
(2006) has also described such situations with his notion of counter-
performativity, which refers to situations where theories because of their applica-
tion make realities less like their depiction. In the academic literature, what those 
conditions are during times of misfires and how they interrelate remains some-
thing that we lack knowledge about (e.g. Butler, 2010; Callon, 2010). Dambrin & 
Robson (2011), for example, never looked into what those conditions could be de-
                                                 
25 Callon (2010) compares the notion of misfires with that of overflows. See Section 8.4 for more a more in-depth 
description of the concept of overflows (and its intrinsic linkage to the concept of framing). 
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spite finding that resistance did emerge that to some degree challenged the per-
formance measurement practice; and MacKenzie (2006) never examined the con-
ditions under which performativity could be re-established during times of coun-
ter-performativity. 
 
This paper firstly applies the concept of performativity to understand the relation-
ship between enterprise risk management (the theory of risk management) and a 
practice of risk management. It secondly examines the conditions under which the 
examined practice was successfully re-established according to the propositions of 
enterprise risk management during a period of misfiring and thus examines the 
conditions under which performative relations can be re-established during times 
of misfires. In relying on Callon’s understanding of the concept of performativity, 
this means examining how the practice was configured and reconfigured over time 
to reflect the world brought about by enterprise risk management. In more details, 
this means examining how human actors such as project managers, suppliers, con-
sultants, and management, and non-human actors such as control systems, were 
brought into the practice, the trial and errors that followed, the challenges that 
emerged, and how all of this related, or not, with the propositions and statements 
of enterprise risk management. It also means examining how identities or roles 
were (re)distributed between actors, how they carried out their work over time, the 
reports that ended being produced, the values calculated, and more. 
 
7.5. Method 
This paper makes use of an in-depth and longitudinal case study to examine the 
linkage between the prescriptions of enterprise risk management and a resultant 
constructed practice of risk management. I have chosen this method because it 
provides an opportunity to follow adjustments ‘in action’ as they take place over 
235 
 
longer periods of time. More specifically, I examine the Danish EUR 3.2 billion 
public railways infrastructure project called the Signalling Programme. This pro-
gramme deals with the total renewal of all Danish signalling equipment, ranging 
from basic train detection and point machines to the overall traffic management 
system as well as on-board train systems. I have chosen this programme because it 
was the first Danish attempt at implementing enterprise risk management, which 
meant that the involved actors were confronted with having to do something for 
the first time. In following this programme, I thus got the opportunity to provide 
detailed empirical descriptions about the development of a risk management prac-
tice where associations had not yet been stabilised. Ferraro et al. (2005) and 
MacKenzie (2006) have both argued that in order to account for performativity, 
some kind of historical perspective of the “before-and-after-the-theory-was-
implemented”-situation is required. This paper looks into the developments that 
occurred before, around, and after 2012, when the precepts of enterprise risk man-
agement misfired, and it thus adheres to this specific methodological point for ex-
amining performative relations. 
 
I have approached the case study by following the practice ‘in action’ and traced 
the associations between ‘the actors that did something’ according to actor-
network theory principles (Latour, 2005). In this relation, I have concentrated my 
data collection around those actors that were involved throughout the examined 
period and those either involved or concerned with the risk management practice. 
These actors were primarily the programme director, the head of secretariat, sev-
eral risk consultants and various project managers from the different subprojects. 
In extending the examination to the associations drawn between those actors not 
employed but still involved with the practice, I have also included different sup-
pliers, external consultants no longer affiliated with the programme and civil serv-
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ants from the ministries supervising the programme. In my approach, I continued 
to collect data up until the point where I did not learn anything about new associa-
tions being drawn (Latour, 1996). 
 
In drawing my conclusions and in order to cross-validate them, I have made use of 
three formal data collection techniques: non-participatory observations studies, 
semi-structured interviews and document analysis. I have conducted more than 40 
non-participatory observation studies in different types of risk meetings, ranging 
from operational risk identification and assessment meetings to overall manage-
ment approval meetings. In these meetings I have been able to observe the discus-
sions taking place around the (re)configuration of the practice. I have also done 19 
semi-structured interviews with different involved actors, such as the programme 
director, risk management consultants, project managers and more. These inter-
views provided me with the opportunity to ask questions about observations and to 
go more in-depth into the events that emerged and which caused concern in the 
meetings. All interviews were recorded and transcribed upon the interviewees’ ac-
ceptance. The document analysis includes the collection of the formal documents 
related to risk management, such as risk status reports, risk management plans, 
and risk strategy documents. These documents have helped me to follow the for-
mal adjustments made, the status and development of risks, and the calculation 
and visualisation of risk values. In sum, these techniques have allowed me, all in 
different ways, to follow the (re)configuration of the risk management practice 
constructed. 
 
In following this practice, I have also had access to the major risk management 
control system implemented to support the management of the practice. Themsen 
& Skærbæk (2014) established that this system, which was operated by consult-
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ants, purified the process of producing risks and was imperative for understanding 
the framing of the practice. I have built upon this observation and looked into the 
adjustments made to this control system during the period of the misfiring of the 
practice, as well as other sources, to understand how the practice was re-stabilised. 
I have also drawn upon more informal data collection techniques such as email 
correspondence and lunch-break and casual post-meeting conversations. The main 
purpose of adding these sources has been to gather information on which meetings 
to attend, which actors to interview and which events that sparkled concern. It was 
my source to keeping up with the events that took place in-between meetings, as 
the sheer size of the programme prevented me from observing all meetings and in-
terviewing all actors. Together, these more informal sources, including my access 
to the database, have improved my understanding of how the propositions of en-
terprise risk management were again made to come true. 
 
7.6. Background: The Signalling Programme and risk management 
This section describes the Signalling Programme’s involvement with key actors in 
the Danish public sector and how and why it came to be intertwined with the 
emergence of an enterprise risk management programme. The purpose of this is to 
describe the objectives that the constructed risk management practice was intend-
ed to meet. It all began in 1997 with the establishment of Rail Net Denmark 
(Banedanmark) as a separate state-owned enterprise under the auspices of the 
Danish Ministry of Transport (Transportministeriet). Rail Net Denmark manages 
the maintenance and development of the Danish railway infrastructure, including 
all railway infrastructure projects such as the Signalling Programme. The organi-
sation was established in response to pressure from the European Union in an at-
tempt to separate train operations from infrastructure ownership as part of making 
train operation more competitive. Up until that point, Rail Net Denmark had been 
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part of the Danish state-owned train operating company, Danish Railways, or 
DSB, which still today remains the largest train operator by far in Denmark. Rail 
Net Denmark employs more than 2,000 people and receives approx. one fourth of 
all annual government capital appropriations (Banedanmark, 2013b). 
 
In the years between 2000 and 2005, however, Rail Net Denmark became the ob-
ject of increasing criticism by the Danish Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet) 
and the National Audit Office of Denmark (Rigsrevisionen) for its “inadequate 
management accounting practices [my translation]” (Rigsrevisionen, 2002, 2004, 
2005). In 2005, the consequences of this became evident, as the condition of the 
Danish railway infrastructure had deteriorated to the point where train operators 
incurred so massive delays that reliable train operation was severely hampered. In 
the same year, the Danish parliament decided to grant approx. EUR 2.7 million to 
Rail Net Denmark to systematically assess how poor these conditions really were, 
and, if necessary, set up different investment strategies for dealing with the situa-
tion (Finansministeriet, 2005). Booz Allen Hamilton, a consultancy company, was 
contracted to make this assessment. In 2006 their report came back showing that 
the Danish signalling systems had aged to the point where many of the existing 
systems had overrun their technical service life (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a). 
The report suggested a total renewing strategy of all signalling equipment, which 
later that year prompted the Danish parliament to decide on and appropriate an-
other approx. EUR 13.3 million towards a more detailed investment proposal (Fi-
nansministeriet, 2006). 
 
At the same time, however, The Danish Ministry of Finance had grown sceptical 
of the calculation technique applied to forecast major Danish public infrastructure 
projects. At that time, the most common technique applied was successive calcula-
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tion; a method that based on statistics integrates cost estimates with risk analysis 
in order to arrive at a more precise total cost estimate. However, the Danish Minis-
try of Finance, had for some time experienced that projects budgeted using that 
principle tended to end up having incurred huge cost overruns (Finansministeriet, 
2010). The Ministry also knew that the same tendency was seen in projects abroad 
and that research had shown this to be the result of strategic misrepresentation, 
meaning that successive calculation and similar calculation techniques were open 
to political manipulation (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). As a result, the Danish Min-
istry of Finance decided to collaborate with the Danish Ministry of Transport on 
developing what was later to be called the “New Budgeting Method”. On 24 Oc-
tober 2006, this method was introduced in large transportation infrastructure pro-
jects under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport that had a separate appropria-
tion on the Financial Act or had been otherwise legislated on by the parliament 
(Transportministeriet, 2006). 
 
The “New Budgeting Method” introduced several new aspects into the budgeting 
of large infrastructure projects, including a ban on successive calculation, which 
was replaced by the use of experience-based costs from earlier projects 
(Transportministeriet, 2006). This meant that all risk estimates had to be excluded 
from budget calculations. In the recognition that cost overruns might still happen, 
however, an experience-based contingency reserve, or risk margin, of 30 per cent 
was to be added on top of the now risk-excluded budget. In the guidance docu-
ment accompanying the “New Budgeting Method”, it was further stated that pro-
ject management control practices had to be supported by a far more systematic 
approach to risk management (Transportministeriet, 2008). This was implemented 
to as far as possible prevent the use of the risk margin and to provide certainty for 
project objectives. Furthermore, it was stressed that this practice had to be imple-
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mented and operated throughout the lifetime of the project and rely on fixed oper-
ating and documentation procedures. Implementation of an IT-based risk man-
agement control system was made obligatory, along with a long list of more spe-
cific requirements. In this respect, the Ministry of Finance argued that risk 
management practices were to be constructed on the basis of best-practice risk 
management referring to, among other aspects, the before-mentioned COSO 
framework (Finansministeriet, 2007). 
 
The Danish Ministry of Finance, however, was uncertain about how to implement 
the “New Budgeting Method”, and it was at that time that the decision had to be 
made on whether to go ahead with a more detailed investment proposal of renewal 
the signalling equipment. Consequently, the Danish Ministry of Finance decided 
to take the opportunity to test the “New Budgeting Method”. It took approx. an-
other two years to complete the decision report, but on 29 January 2009, the Dan-
ish parliament decided to fund the EUR 3.2 billion programme to renew all Danish 
railway signalling before 2020 for the Copenhagen S-bane, and before 2021 for 
the regional lines, using the “New Budgeting Method” (Banedanmark, 2008b). 
The Signalling Programme thus ended up becoming the first Danish attempt at 
implementing an enterprise risk management practice with all it entailed. In 2010, 
the Danish Ministry of Finance declared the implementation of the “New Budget-
ing Method” a success, and today the Signalling Programme serves as a best-
practice illustration for the rest of the public sector of how to approach dealing 
with uncertainty, risk and risk management (Finansministeriet, 2010). 
 
The Signalling Programme has been structured as a separate project organisation 
under the management of Rail Net Denmark and the auspices of the Danish Minis-
try of Transport, and it employs more than 120 people on average. Its main advi-
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sors are Ramboll (Denmark), Atkins (Denmark), Emch+Berger (Switzerland) and 
Parsons Group International (UK), who have formed a consultancy conglomerate. 
The project has been organised into three major subprojects: regional lines east (f-
banen east), regional lines west (f-banen west) and the Copenhagen mass transit 
system (s-banen), and it covers the replacement of all signalling equipment from 
basic train detection and point machines over the overall traffic management sys-
tems to on-board train systems. It is scheduled to run from 2009 to 2020/21 and 
has been divided into four main project phases (see Appendix 3). The overall main 
objective of the project is to reduce signalling errors by 80 per cent on regional 
lines and 50 per cent on the transit system in order to reduce travel time and in-
crease train punctuality. In addition, an important requirement is that the project 
must be completed on time (several milestones have been established) and without 
exceeding the budgeted costs. This paper focuses on events happening before, dur-
ing, and after the shift to the design phase for f-banen. 
 
7.7. The performativity of enterprise risk management 
The following section contains the analysis and has been divided into four subsec-
tions which together illustrate how enterprise risk management ended up being 
performative on the practice of risk management. The first subsection begins by 
showing how several actors were brought into the practice and how this practice 
came to be configured according to the propositions of enterprise risk manage-
ment. This led to the enactment of a certain reality of ‘risk’ and ‘risk manage-
ment’. The second subsection shows how the practice and its involved actors actu-
alised this configuration over time, which led to the production of risks that 
confirmed the propositions of enterprise risk management. The third subsection 
shows how certain events caused the practice to misfire, that is, made the practice 
produce risks which undermined the propositions of enterprise risk management; 
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and the fourth and last section rounds off the analysis by describing how the prac-
tice overcame this misfire and again produced the risks required to demonstrate 
the propositions of enterprise risk management. 
 
7.7.1. The initial configuration of the practice of risk management 
In 2006, Booz Allen Hamilton had concluded that the most serious risk to the suc-
cess of the project was that Rail Net Denmark lacked the proper project manage-
ment skills within the organisation to handle such large and complex projects 
(Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006a). In 2009, when the programme had been finally ap-
proved, Rail Net Denmark responded to this risk by contracting one of their cur-
rent advisors, Ramboll, to construct and operate a risk management practice. In the 
months that followed, risk consultants from Ramboll started constructing such a 
practice. This subsection describes how the consultants carried out this configura-
tion work. This includes a description of how the consultants rhetorically defined 
notions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’, allocated specific roles to key actors, and 
invented an IT-based risk management control system to assist the practising of 
risk management. It also describes how the consultants configured these elements 
according to the precepts of best-practice risk management. 
 
“When we decided how we wanted to construct the practice, we 
agreed that we would follow PMBOK to define our risk terminolo-
gies. We just didn’t want people to question our understanding of 
risk management… There are so many ways [to construct a prac-
tice] and it is hard to tell what is right or wrong. But if we can 
agree that we use this approach, “that’s it”. It’s just more simple 
like that”. Senior Risk Consultant (I2, 66, 73) 
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As the above statement demonstrates, Ramboll wanted to configure the practice 
around an area that people were familiar with in order to avoid unnecessary ques-
tions about their approach. Ramboll therefore decided to follow the Project Man-
agement Institute’s Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), which to the actors involved 
was already a well-known “best-practice” framework they had applied in earlier 
large projects (I4; Banedanmark, 2007). In adhering to PMBOK, they defined 
‘risk’ as “…an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or neg-
ative effect on a project’s objectives” (Banedanmark, 2009b, p. 26), and ‘risk 
management’ as the practice “to increase the probability and impact of positive 
events, and decrease the probability and impact of events adverse to the project” 
(Banedanmark, 2009b, p. 2). These risks were furthermore described as those “that 
may impact the final performance and functions of the resulting systems as well as 
cost and time schedule for the programme”. In all aspects, their configuration of 
the risk terminologies to be used was consistent with the PMBOK enterprise risk 
management programme, and consequently it was also relatively easily approved 
by both programme management and the government (I2; I4). 
 
The consultants configured more than the terminologies of the practice; they also 
sought to include several key actors by giving them risk responsibilities. The con-
sultants described two main groups of actors and their roles: project managers as 
risk owners, and the risk consultants themselves as supervisors or experts. The 
project managers were described as those responsible for identifying and assessing 
risks in the relevant risk meetings and the subsequent reduction of these risks; and 
the risk consultants as those responsible for the management of the practice, which 
included calling meetings, preparing status reports and operating the risk man-
agement control system. The document also identifies people such as controllers, 
civil servants, suppliers, programme management and the secretariat as potential 
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risk owners, depending on the complexity of the risk. The consultants further de-
fined three types of meetings: risk workshops, where new risks were to be identi-
fied, risk follow-up meetings, where these risks were to be reassessed, and cross-
risk review meetings, where project managers across subprojects could meet to 
coordinate their risk assessments if needed. It was evident that these meetings 
were those in which the actual practice had to be carried out. 
 
The consultants also invented and implemented an IT-based risk management con-
trol system to assist them in managing the risk management process, such as to 
keep track of the identified risks and risk reducing measures and to generate over-
views of the current risk status. The features of this control system even allowed 
them to keep track of responsibilities and actions, to present plans for risk reduc-
tion, to provide documentation for what had been accepted and by whom, and to 
produce visualisations of current risk management progress. This latter feature in-
cluded producing tables with current ‘top ten risk’ lists and ‘value at risk’ curves, 
that is the total expected financial value at stake. To the strategic centre of the 
practice, the demonstration of decreasing ‘value at risk’ over time was imperative 
for risk management success, as it represented the residual uncertainty regarding 
the achievement of project objectives. In interviews with key actors in the prac-
tice, this was important, not because ‘value at risk’ represented any “true” value, 
but because its relative development over time demonstrated how the practice pro-
gressed. For the project managers, however, the more detailed descriptions of the 
risks was more interesting, as they focused on how risks could be managed as part 
of their other work routines, which meant that they used the ‘top ten list’, or more 
complete lists depending on the size of the subproject, more. 
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7.7.2. The actualisation of the world of enterprise risk management 
In the beginning, everybody involved was very positive towards the way that the 
practice had been configured and several risks were constructed and included into 
the practice according to the precepts of enterprise risk management. Thus it did 
not take long before the practice presented a significantly decreasing ‘value at 
risk’ curve, very much to the satisfaction of the strategic centre of the practice. At 
the same time project managers felt that practising risk management improved 
their project management abilities, so to them the practice was also a success.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows the development of the ‘value at risk’ curve for the regional lines 
subproject, which in its overall development also represents the development of 
the mass transit system subproject. The x-axis shows the indexed ‘value at risk’ 
(“1” points to the initial ‘value at risk’), while the y-axis shows the development 
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Figure 7.1: The Signalling Programme, Regional Lines (East + West),  
Project Proposal Phase: ‘Value at Risk’ calculation 
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over time. It has been indexed, as actual monetary values at risk are confident and 
shows the period from the initial investment report to the end of the project pro-
posal phase, which in practice turned out to be from approx. 2007 to the end of 
2009. To those involved, this curve demonstrated that the practice was indeed cre-
ating a higher degree of certainty of the objectives of the programme. 
 
About that time, however, concerns also began to emerge slowly. At the beginning 
of the project, these concerns were held only locally by individual project manag-
ers who found specific elements of the practice encumbering for their other job re-
sponsibilities. Some project managers, for example, did not always attend meet-
ings, did not prepare for the meetings, or expressed their frustration with the 
number of meetings. Others argued that the practice was only about compliance 
with management requirements, that the concepts of risk identification and as-
sessment were too subjective, or that the whole notion of risk management was 
flawed. The consultants dealt with these concerns through dialogue with the pro-
ject managers in risk meetings and workshops, where they were given explana-
tions of the purpose and relevance of the practice. This helped to reduce the con-
cerns before they turned into controversies, or outright conflicts, leaving “only” 
overall concerns about risk management. The following quote illustrates overall 
concern about risk management which did not destabilise the practice, but still ex-
pressed something that was believed to be troublesome by several actors: 
 
“To the best of my belief, risk assessment has the fundamental 
problem that it has to be within the limitations of the human psyche 
for what we can plan, which is a maximum of one year. This pro-
gramme runs 10 more years... It’s impossible to produce reliable 
assessments”. Risk Manager (I1, 159) 
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By the end of this phase, however, stronger concerns were voiced by more than 
just individual managers as the project progressed; concerns which were shared 
between project managers across the different subprojects. One of the major con-
cerns from the outset was that risks had to be entered one by one into the control 
system by the individual subprojects’ head project managers, even though some 
risks were shared among them. This meant that multiple versions of the same risks 
existed in the control system, which in turn caused problems for the project man-
agers having to identify which were theirs. In the worst case, this meant that the 
same risk was constructed multiple times, which led to frustrations among the pro-
ject managers, as they felt it was a waste of time. The consultants who had to do 
the actual entering of the risk information into the control system agreed; however, 
this time the consultants readjusted the control system’s underlying database to the 
effect that each of the two major subprojects (regional lines east and west here be-
ing considered as one) would have their own database (O1, 4). The consultants 
had to admit that this did not do anything to solve the problem that only one per-
son could access the database at a time, so on the long run another solution had to 
be worked out. 
 
While this was worked on, however, project managers more systematically began 
to develop concerns about how to do reliable risk assessments. In the original con-
figuration of the practice, the consultants had outlined that project managers in 
their capacity as risk owners should assess risks according to the extent to which 
they impacted on project cost, time, benefits, punctuality and reputation. However, 
the project managers found it almost impossible to assess the effects of risks on 
benefits and reputation, as this was too abstract for them. The argument was that 
because the project ran for such a long period and since no similar project had 
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been attempted before, they had no reliable information on which to base their as-
sessments. They did find it useful to assess effects on cost and time, because this 
was something they were used to doing, but it still caused problems for some of 
them. With the programme management’s approval, the consultants responded by 
encouraging discussions in meetings and by accepting that assessments relating to 
reputation and benefit did not have to be made: 
 
“We were told by programme management to cut down costs on 
risk management, and reputation and benefit were two of the cate-
gories the project managers were struggling with anyways, so we 
took them out. It made good sense at the time and people were 
happy”. Risk Consultant (O18, 16) 
  
Other project managers also had concerns about the actual options they could 
choose from when doing their cost and time assessments. In accordance with the 
traffic light assessment matrix of the control system, the project managers had to 
choose between fixed consequence and probability options (see Appendix 4 and 
5). For the smaller subprojects, in some situations this meant that all their risks 
would be grouped into the same field of the matrix, namely the lowest ranking or 
the “green” area. For the project managers, this led to concerns about whether 
programme management would even notice their risks, as particularly the larger 
subprojects often showed many more risks, which were even often categorised as 
“red”. The project managers, however, remained loyal to the practice during this 
period, and the concerns, albeit gaining in momentum, remained insignificant; 
they identified, assessed and reduced risks like the consultants asked them to in 
conformity with the framework. The consultants, again, also did their best to solve 
concerns as they emerged, and in collaboration with programme management they 
249 
 
managed to do so with only small adjustments to the practice, which did not chal-
lenge the core conception of the framework they were drawing on. 
 
7.7.3. Growing concerns and continued pressure on the practice 
In the subsequent two years, from approx. 2010 to 2012, the project entered into 
the procurement phase, which lasted until contracts had been signed with the main 
suppliers. During this period, the number of concerns increased, although they 
were still managed by the consultants and programme management without caus-
ing any major adjustments of the practice.  
 
Figure 7.2 shows the overall ‘value at risk’ development during the procurement 
phase (in practice, approx. from 2010 to 2012). The figure indicates that despite a 
small increase in 2010, ‘value at risk’ ended at the exact same index level as it had 
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Figure 7.2: The Signalling Programme, Regional Lines (East + West),  
Procurement Phase: ‘Value at Risk’ calculation 
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been at the beginning of the procurement phase. In general, this reflected that con-
tracts were signed below their expected costs, which had reduced the overall con-
cerns about the projects. This was evident from interviews, observations and 
presentation material, where actors expressed satisfaction with the contract negoti-
ations. It was evident that the programme director had managed to secure several 
biddings, which had allowed for an advantageous bargaining position. In this way, 
the Ministry of Transport could also report that Rail Net Denmark had been able 
to give back about EUR 500 million to the Ministry of Finance due to savings 
made during contract procurement (Transportministeriet, 2013). In the eyes of 
programme management, the consultants themselves, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Transport, the risk management practice had done well. 
 
In the midst of all this, however, the project had grown to involve more than 120 
employees, and the consultants were faced with an increasing number of risks that 
had to be described, assessed, followed up on, and recorded in the control system. 
This meant that still more risk information had to be processed, which made it al-
most impossible for the consultants to keep up. Recalling the earlier concerns ex-
pressed by project managers about this practice being a time-consuming exercise, 
the consultants and programme management began to examine how the practice 
could be made more efficient. In this respect, the identification and assessment of 
risks with positive effects had been attempted, but as project managers had prob-
lems identifying any, this effort had been stopped (I12). It also followed that as the 
project was following a best-practice project management framework, it implied 
an extensive practice of value management, which because of its focus on positive 
events overlapped with the risk management practice, which gave rise to interface 
problems (I12). As a result, the consultants also had concerns about how to in-
clude positive events again (I12). 
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Another characteristic of that period was that the programme management and the 
risk consultants became aware that the practice was vulnerable to biased, high-risk 
assessments. As prescribed by the “New Budgeting Method”, the practice was ex-
pected to involve stakeholders to broaden their perspective of the potential risks 
the project faced. In 2011, the programme management and the risk consultants 
therefore decided to involve one of the large train operators by inviting them to 
identify and assess what they found to be the risks of the project. To enable the 
train operator to return usable information, they were allowed access to the control 
system assessment structure. When the programme management and the risk con-
sultants received that assessment, however, the train operator had assessed the 
costs of the risks to be more than 50 per cent of the entire programme’s capital 
costs and multiplied the present ‘value at risk’ calculation considerably. In effect, 
this led the programme management to believe that these assessments had had to 
be biased and subsequently had them removed from the control system. The con-
sultants proposed to include them anyway, but programme management refused, 
as they expected this to give rise to unnecessary questions about the status of the 
programme. In sum, the situation led to concern about what to do if risks were 
suddenly given high assessments; the practice did not include any means to pre-
vent this from happening, apart from manual rejection by senior managers or ex-
clusion of actors: 
 
“We would love to have more dynamics, I mean that’s why we are 
doing this, but we need to have managed dynamics, and that is dif-
ficult, because, we would like to have as many people to make 
changes as possible, that’s what motivates them, that’s the right to 
do something, but this right entails that sometimes you can do 
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something that we maybe don’t appreciate – or where we have dif-
ferent views… I don’t mind increasing the value by five per cent or 
something like that if it means that it makes people do something or 
think, but I can see that it is extremely difficult to explain [and we 
need to be able to do that]”. Risk Consultant (I12, 693-704) 
 
The above quote illustrates that the risk consultants (and programme management) 
did not mind increasing the ‘value at risk’ calculation, which meant including 
highly assessed risks in terms of costs, but they insisted that such assessments had 
to be accompanied by good explanations and thus made on justifiable grounds. 
This meant that assessments made solely on the basis of project managers’ experi-
ences, hunches and feelings were considered biased and therefore had to be ex-
cluded. In consequence, more and more project managers started to game the as-
sessment categories of the control system by making up reasons for their hunches, 
experiences, etc. One of the more common strategies was for project managers to 
come up with reasons for increasing already existing risk assessments in order to 
increase management attention, like the previous example with the train operator 
illustrates, but they also sometimes made up reasons for reducing risk assessments 
in order to avoid having to report on them. It did not matter how this gaming oc-
curred, though; whenever discovered it caused concern with the consultants and 
programme management who needed the practice to produce assessments on justi-
fiable and documentable grounds. In some cases this resulted in conflicts with the 
project managers who started to question whether the practice had been made to 
show progress rather than for the purpose of actual risk reduction. In most cases 
this was just an expression of frustration on the part of the project managers, and 
they would later do their best to reduce risks; but during this period some (head) 
project managers began to develop their own local practices to complement the 
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formal practice, which indicates the onset of a slow breakdown of the specific 
world enterprise risk management had brought about. At this point, however, this 
had little effect and the ‘value at risk’ curve remained steady through this period. 
 
7.7.4. The misfiring of enterprise risk management 
In the first months of 2012, contracts were signed with the three main suppliers 
that were to implement the new signalling systems on the east and west regional 
lines and the mass transit system. In keeping with the “New Budgeting Method”, 
these suppliers were integrated into the project organisation in order to improve 
collaboration and knowledge sharing between the different parts of the organisa-
tion, which also included risk management. It did not take long, however, before 
the consultants became aware that they were having severe problems with the in-
clusion of the suppliers’ risk suggestions. The suppliers often had a different un-
derstanding of how to define and assess risks, and because they often demonstrat-
ed very detailed, technical expertise of the project, the project managers and the 
consultants had problems arguing against their risk suggestions. This meant that 
they were forced to include the risks by transforming them to fit the IT-control 
system structure. The consultants tried to deal with this by expanding and elabo-
rating on already existing risks whenever possible in order to avoid having to in-
crease the number or the value of them, but this proved difficult, and the number 
and value of the risks almost literally exploded. In other words, the practice began 
to misfire, meaning it had begun to generate uncertainty about whether risks were 
being handled, which in turn generated uncertainty about whether project objec-
tives could be met. 
 
Another related matter was that the suppliers would sometimes disagree with the 
project managers’ own risk suggestions during meetings, which led to conflicts 
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that were not always resolved and thus left risks hanging without risk ownership. 
It also often occurred that project managers and suppliers would argue as to who 
was financially responsible for paying for the risk-reducing measures, which also 
sparked unsolvable situations. In practice, outside the scope of risk management, 
the actors solved their issues in the best possible way, even though, as mentioned 
by one project manager, the cultural differences between suppliers from different 
countries often gave rise to conflicts. In the middle of all this, however, the con-
sultants were under pressure from programme management to solve this misfiring, 
as an increasing ‘value at risk’ at this rate would make risk management appear 
unsuccessful: 
 
“We have a problem, a real problem. Now that we have so many 
new risks coming in, we can now see that the risk value is increas-
ing which is because we are adding so many new risks. But that we 
have trouble managing; that we are having a lot of trouble manag-
ing; because we do not believe that it should increase. We believe 
it should decrease, but because we are dividing the risks a lot, it is 
increasing… We need to let them work with risks but we cannot do 
that if we don’t allow them to include them, assess them and so, but 
then the value goes up which we cannot have. It is something pro-
cess-like-technical-like that goes wrong and we do not have a solu-
tion for this yet”. Risk Consultant (I12, 341) 
 
As the quote illustrates, the consultants were confronted with what seemed to be 
an inherent shortcoming of the practice: whenever large risks were broken down 
into smaller ones, the aggregated assessments of these added up to be larger than 
the original assessment. The consultants, though, knew that the answer to this 
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shortcoming lay not with the control system’s calculations but with the new 
knowledge that the suppliers had brought with them. However, this did not reduce 
the severity of the situation – quite the opposite. It just proved that risk assess-
ments had been made too low to begin with, and thus it illustrated that the practice 
was not capable of making exact estimates of the uncertainty the project faced. In 
addition, the consultants knew from earlier events that increasing risk values with-
out basing it on solid arguments would disprove the predictions of risk manage-
ment and question its credibility to an unwanted extent. Also, they could not dis-
miss that the assessments made by the suppliers themselves were biased – on the 
contrary that seemed likely, as the suppliers had different interests in the project. 
The consultants, however, knew that the last risk report had been made just before 
the contracts were signed, so they had at least six months before the next one had 
to be prepared. This gave them a time window to turn the practice around.  
 
The consultants started to work out solutions. In this respect, the consultants had 
already for some months had programmers working on improving the manage-
ment control system to accommodate the increased number of people involved. In 
the month that followed, the risk management control system was decentralised by 
switching platforms from an Access controlled database to an online Internet-
based tool. This new control system still had the same structure, that is the same 
core elements, but it had been redesigned to let all risk owners (and more) be giv-
en user access. This allowed the risk owners to access the database themselves and 
then describe and assess risks on their own without having the consultants handle 
this process manually. The system still contained the cause-and-effect relation de-
scription fields, the assessment categories of cost and time, and the risk-reducing 
action field where risk owners could describe their risks. It also still required risk 
owners to be selected, deadlines for actions to be made, explanations to be given, 
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etc., but now users were able to operate the system by themselves, at a distance, 
and at the same time, which meant that the consultants could concentrate on moni-
toring and controlling the practice. The new control system further allowed much 
faster production of status reports and improved the possibilities for making statis-
tics, so it also made the procedures of monitoring and control faster than before. 
 
In the eyes of those involved, this new system was much better to work with, and 
apart from the situation that some operating systems and some browsers did not 
function with the system, the misfiring seemed to be handled. It did not take long, 
however, before the consultants became aware that by changing the system they 
had lost control over whether the involved actors filled in the fields of the control 
system loyally and did not game the system. In the weeks that followed, although 
risk consultants were still managing risk meetings, subprojects and their suppliers 
were entering either wrong, incomplete or no information into the system. At the 
same time the deadline for the next status report was approaching, and if this mis-
firing continued, not only the reported risk value but the entire risk practice would 
be scrutinised. Thus, contrary to its purpose, the practice had not reduced uncer-
tainty, but rather increased it further, and it was now heading straight down an un-
controllable spiralling path if something was not done. During this period of about 
three months, the ‘value at risk’ rose by more than 50 per cent, while at the same 
time it did not seem as if this development was going to change at all. Figure 7.3 
below shows this development for the early design specification phase of the re-
gional lines east and west combined. It continues where Figure 7.2 ended and 
shows how the ‘value at risk’ went up from index 0.23 to 0.39. 
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Furthermore, the rise in ‘value at risk’ was not made any better by the situation 
that actual events with negative effects on project objectives had started impact-
ing, despite having been taken into account by the risk management practice. Pihl 
and Son, a large Danish engineering company, for example, went bankrupt, which 
sent ripples throughout the construction sector and also led to unwanted time de-
lays and extra costs for some of the larger subprojects of the Signalling Pro-
gramme. In another example, the main supplier to the mass transit system project 
had installed a new communication unit on seven trains when one of them started 
to develop smoke. This led to the immediate grounding of all seven trains and re-
quired extensive rework by the contractor, which consequently led to severe de-
lays on the mass transit system subproject. The train operating company that 
owned the trains further explained that if just one more train had been grounded, 
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Figure 7.3: The Signalling Programme, Regional Lines (East + West),  
Design Specification Phase (early): ‘Value at Risk’ calculation 
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this would have forced them to change the timetable of the entire mass transit sys-
tem, which, in turn, would have led to a large media scandal and most likely polit-
ical interference. As this had already been mentioned as a potential risk prior to 
this event happening, this subsequently led to tensions between actors who started 
to question the capability of the risk management practice to actually cope with 
uncertainty regarding suppliers. 
 
The examples above illustrate two of the events that the actors thought had been 
dealt with by the risk management practice, but which now created new and unex-
pected uncertainty about the capability of risk management. In the first example, 
the involved actors questioned whether these events with great impacts but low 
probabilities, such as bankruptcies, could actually be caught by risk management 
practices; and in the second example, project managers started questioning the ca-
pability of risk management to deal with supplier-related risks as such risks were 
outside the direct control of the Signalling Programme. This latter question arose 
even though the exclusion of such risks was clearly consistent with enterprise risk 
management in being outside the scope of ‘the enterprise’. The world created by 
enterprise risk management had thus begun to crumble, and new uncertainties 
emerged that originated both from concerns held by involved actors and from out-
side events. The risk consultants and programme management knew that some-
thing had to be done to stabilise the practice, which, referring to the increasing 
‘value at risk’, meant to put an end to this development. 
 
7.7.5. The stabilisation of the predictions of enterprise risk management 
One of the first actions taken by the consultants with the acceptance of the consul-
tancy conglomerate, which had now been forced into being part of the misfiring, 
was to increase the number of risk management consultants dedicated to the pro-
259 
 
ject. In the months that followed, three more consultants were appointed to handle 
the subprojects, including the large number of smaller subprojects, and the suppli-
ers were also asked to appoint their own risk management responsible representa-
tives. These appointments were made to solve the problem that the subprojects 
were not providing proper risk information. The new risk consultants were given 
the job of overseeing the management control system information that was entered 
into the system, arranging more risk meetings and workshops, and assisting the 
project managers as best possible by providing them with feedback information on 
the risk management progress. In the beginning, this helped stabilise the infor-
mation that flowed into the system, as it forced the involved actors to produce the 
information in a way that was consistent with the control system structure. This, 
however, still did not resolve the situation of increasing risk values, as the risks 
that were entered into the system were still very technical and accurate and thus 
represented justifiable risks as prescribed by the practice. 
 
In dealing with this, the consultants had been considering how they could re-
establish their control of the practice while still maintaining the new, decentralised 
risk identification and assessment structure that came with the new control system. 
They then came up with the idea of dividing the concept of risk into “overall 
risks” and “sub-risks” while still adhering to the programme definition of risks as 
“events with positive or negative impacts on programme objectives”. They defined 
“overall risks” as those risks that affected the programme level of the project and 
thus programme objectives, while “sub-risks” were defined as risks that affected 
the subproject level of the project and thus sub-project objectives. As programme 
management only wanted to know about those risks that affected programme ob-
jectives, this allowed them to exclude “sub-risks” from the risk reporting. In the 
risk management control system, this further allowed them to exclude “sub-risks” 
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from risk calculation, which meant that they could be excluded from the concept 
of ‘value at risk’. In practice, the consultant team would now ask suppliers and 
project managers whether risks would have overall programme effects, and, if that 
was not the case, classify them as “sub-risks”. In consequence, as “sub-risks” still 
existed inside the control system, this allowed risk consultants to prepare monthly 
status reports on such risks to project managers, and still be able to exclude them 
from calculation. 
 
Another problem persisted, however; the project managers and suppliers were still 
able to add risks on their own and thus bypass the new concepts – which they of-
ten did. This led the consultants to introduce yet another risk concept distinction, 
which they called “approved” and “under review” risks, and this was to have wide 
consequences. As the terms indicate, approved risks were those risks that had been 
approved and thus included, while under-review risks were those that were pend-
ing, awaiting approval. In the months that followed, this solved the problem of in-
creasing risk values, and the practice was stabilised again to the effect that it was 
able to produce the results prescribed by enterprise risk management. This means 
that the practice was again able to produce reducing risk values, as these, as men-
tioned earlier, represented the generated level of relative certainty. Figure 7.4 
shows the development of the ‘value at risk’ curve for the whole design specifica-
tion phase just before the suppliers began adding risks (2012-Q1); how the risk 
value increased after suppliers had come aboard, but before new risk concepts 
were developed (2012-Q2); how these new concepts were enforced and ‘value at 
risk’ again began to decrease (2012-Q3 – 2013-Q2); and how the practice ended 
up being stabilised again (2013-Q2 and onwards). The red line shows the formally 
reported indexed values, which refer to those risks that were ‘approved’ and 
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‘overall’, while the blue line refers to those risks that were both ‘approved’ and 
‘non-approved’ as well as ‘overall’ and ‘subproject’-related. 
 
It took more than developing new concept distinctions, however, before the devel-
opment could be turned around; the concepts also had to be used by the people in-
volved. In making sure of this, the consultants had the programmes incorporate the 
new risk terminologies into the IT-based control system by creating new boxes 
where these options could be ticked. The consultants then applied this new system 
structure on all risk meetings, so the participants would be confronted with them 
on a day-to-day basis. In these meetings, this happened because the consultants 
made sure to demonstrate the system to the participants on a projector screen at 
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Figure 7.4: The Signalling Programme, Regional Lines (East + West),  
Design Specification Phase (whole): ‘Value at Risk’ calculation 
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the back wall of the meeting room. This happened without exception. The partici-
pants could then visually follow how their oral descriptions were translated into 
written words that fitted the system fields and ticked boxes showing their choices. 
The consultants would be the only ones operating the system, and they would set-
tle all discussions about risks that did not fit this structure by referring to the sys-
tem categories. It was evident from the many observation studies that this had an 
enormous effect. The participants described that this helped them “to understand 
what it means to do risk management”, something which became less and less rel-
evant as the project progressed, which shows that this embedding of the new risk 
terminologies had decisive effects. 
 
In collaboration with programme management and the head project managers of 
the different subproject, the consultants decided to let the two end-to-end manag-
ers from the three main subprojects handle the subsequent approval/non-approval 
of the risks. These two people were the two overall project managers responsible 
for the regional lines (east and west) and the mass transit system subprojects re-
spectively. In the period from 2012-Q3 and onwards, this principle was gradually 
being established and included organising regular risk approval meetings every 
second month, where decisions were made whether to approve or reject risks. The 
consultants would prepare lists of approved and non-approved risks, and they 
would discuss them thoroughly. The risks that were accepted would be returned to 
the project managers with the go-ahead to continue their risk reducing work, while 
the risks that were rejected were returned with comments on either to elaborate 
more on the description, or simply that the risks had been rejected. If this hap-
pened, however, the project managers could still add these risks as “sub-risk”, but 
then they would be excluded from calculation and reporting and thus not be re-
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ported further up in the organisation. This exercise was necessary in order to still 
being able to deal with those risks that were included outside risk meetings. 
 
The consultants also had to readjust the work-flow practices of all the involved ac-
tors. During this period, the consultants started to write new descriptions of these 
practices. One of the important parts was introducing three new layers of risk 
management into the practice: the discipline, the project and the programme man-
agement level. The discipline level consisted of the employees working on the 
subprojects who were now responsible for owning the risks and their risk reducing 
actions (unless the subproject was too small). The project level consisted of the 
project managers and the newly employed extra consultants who would participate 
in risk meetings together with those discipline managers who had identified or 
owned the risks. These risks would then be brought to the programme manage-
ment level, where an appointed head risk consultant would meet with the end-to-
end managers and/or programme management, as described above, to approve or 
reject the risks. To avoid too much information in programme level meetings, 
however, the project level risk consultants would pre-assess the discipline or pro-
ject managers’ descriptions and coordinate with them if changes were needed, in 
accordance with the new system structure. In all of the three layers, anyone could 
thus enter information into the control system using their user access rights, which 
were distributed to them through the system, but only the programme level had the 
highest level of access. 
 
The consultants, however, were now struggling with the inclusion of still more 
risk owners now that discipline managers had been included; these managers were 
unfamiliar with the structure of the practice (as were still many of the suppliers). 
In addition to operating the control system in the meetings, the consultants there-
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fore decided to supplement this by producing training pamphlets that could be dis-
tributed outside meetings, giving the discipline managers (and suppliers) infor-
mation on how to approach the practising of risk management. This material ex-
plained their roles as risk owners, how to formulate descriptions according to the 
cause-and-effect logic, the assessment categories, and the importance of doing 
risk-reducing actions. The consultants would then meet (this was not written) ap-
prox. every second month to coordinate the progress of the practice and catch po-
tential misfires before they happened (again). The consultants also had program-
mers add new auto-reminder functions to the control system to ensure that the 
participants did not forget their responsibilities; the system would now send out 
email reminders on the status of risk actions two weeks before their deadline 
(O33, 10). 
 
In the months that followed, the practice was stabilised again, and the actors were 
producing risks that adhered to the conditions established by enterprise risk man-
agement. The risk consultants were again able to produce decreasing risk values as 
postulated by enterprise risk management. Substantial investments had been spent 
on redeveloping the control system, employing more consultants, producing train-
ing material, increasing the number of meetings, etc., but the conditions had been 
re-bracketed. At present, the practice continues to produce consistent and decreas-
ing ‘value at risk’ curves, also between meetings. Approval managers still rely on 
risk approval meetings, but their workload is reduced as risk owners produce in-
creasingly consistent descriptions and assessments. At the same time, programme 
management and project managers alike commend the practice and the certainty it 
has added to the objectives of the project. The strategic centre expects that the pro-
ject will meet its objectives and to be able to hand over the project without any de-
lays or incurred costs. 
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7.8. Concluding discussion 
This paper has responded to the call for more research into “the particularity of 
risk management characteristics in specific organizational settings” (Bhimani, 
2009, p. 4) and the “dynamics of risk management” (Mikes, 2009, p. 37). I have 
looked in more detail into the linkage between enterprise risk management and a 
practice of risk management constructed around this while adhering to worldwide 
“best-practice” holistic risk management (Power, 2007). This practice was imple-
mented as a project management control system to provide “reasonable assurance” 
regarding project objectives (Transportministeriet, 2008). I have observed this 
practice ‘in action’ and looked into how it was configured and readjusted over 
time as events emerged which threatened the practice from meeting its objectives. 
The following section summarises the findings of the study, while drawing more 
explicitly on the concept of performativity, and looks into the theoretical and prac-
tical implications of the findings. It emphasises the different conditions needed for 
enterprise risk management success, in particular during times of misfires, and 
stresses the importance of continued mutual adjustment between risk linguistics, 
identities and IT-systems to achieve success in practice. 
 
7.8.1. The performativity of enterprise risk management 
This paper began by showing that through enacting certain realities of ‘risk’ and 
‘risk management’, enterprise risk management enabled production of the risks 
that confirmed its success. This happened primarily because the consultants who 
had been contracted to operate the practice configured the practice along the 
guidelines of the PMBOK enterprise risk management framework which was con-
sidered “best practice”. The consultants defined risks as ‘uncertain events with ei-
ther positive or negative impacts on project objectives’ and risk management as 
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‘the practice of managing these risks’. The consultants also defined the purpose of 
the practice (to provide reasonable assurance for the objectives of the programme), 
its main processes (identification, assessment, response and control), the roles of 
the actors (e.g. project managers as risk owners), the overall governance structure 
(programme board/management ownership, reporting formats, meeting types and 
frequency), risk categories and documentation requirements (project phase, risk 
type etc.), identification and assessment techniques (cause-and-effect meta-
language and traffic light assessment matrix), and implemented the calculating 
metric (‘value at risk’). The consultants thus configured the rhetorical boundaries 
of practice, drawing upon linguistics from the “best-practice” enterprise risk man-
agement vocabulary, which from the early stages of the project ensured the un-
problematic approval and acceptance of all involved actors. 
 
In this paper, however, I have also shown that the configuration of the practice de-
pended on more than just linguistic boundary-setting acts, or “discursive practic-
es”, such as those of defining, limiting and expanding the world of risk manage-
ment (Mikes, 2011). I found that the material assemblage, consisting primarily of 
the IT-based control system with its calculating metric and distributed status re-
ports, also had a part in configuring the practice. The control system was signifi-
cant, because the consultants embedded the rhetorical configuration of the practice 
into the control system and applied it in all risk meetings. In this sense, the control 
system was visible on a large projector screen on the back wall of the room where 
the meetings took place, to allow all participants could watch it, and because the 
consultants were alone in organising the meetings, and also in operated the control 
system (at the beginning of the project), they were able to ensure that only the in-
formation that fit the configuration was included. Overall, this allowed the con-
sultants to bracket out this particular world of risk management in order to enable 
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the predictions of enterprise risk management to come true, that is, to make enter-
prise risk management performative. 
 
In the first few years of the project, the involved actors adapted their production of 
risks to the configuration of the practice, which is evident when looking at the ac-
tual content of the risks, their assessments and the actions taken to reduce them. 
Consequently, it did not take long before the consultants, drawing upon the infor-
mation in the control system, were able to demonstrate the success of enterprise 
risk management through a decreasing ‘value at risk’ curve, which, in turn, further 
reinforced the adoption of that world. In this relation, Mikes (2009, 2011) argues 
that the reliance on either analytical or judgemental information systems depend 
on top management’s predilections for either quantitative enthusiasm or scepti-
cism. In this paper, I have found that the strategic centre supported the robust and 
hard nature of modelling (the ‘value at risk’ curve), thus being so-called quantita-
tive enthusiasts, while at the same time they distrusted this, which made them also 
quantitative sceptics. In explaining this apparent paradox, I found that the strategic 
centre was driven more by the precepts of enterprise risk management rather than 
their individual preference for either quantitative enthusiasm or scepticism. In this 
sense, they took the relative development of the ‘value at risk’ curve as hard evi-
dence of the status of the project (not just as a trend), while at the same time ac-
knowledging that absolute values were unreliable as an expression of any underly-
ing economic reality; they were rather best guesses. 
 
In elaborating more on this, I found that the day-to-day practice of risk manage-
ment could not be understood by focusing on top management or consultants 
alone, but had to be understood by considering all actors. This because the strate-
gic centre did not have reliable statistical data sets and relied on the judgements of 
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project managers, suppliers, discipline managers, and others, to provide descrip-
tions and assessments of risks. This meant that all actors were able to influence 
how uncertainties were described and assessed; all calculations were subject to 
judgement, as all “numbers were narratives” (Vollmer, 2007). In addition, these 
actors held different measurement attitudes, ranging from the strategic centre be-
ing the most enthusiastic to project managers being the most sceptical. Here, 
Mikes did not exclude the possibility that “alternative cultures could co-exist with-
in the same organization” (2011, p. 242), but she questioned whether this was 
more than a theoretical possibility. In the present paper, I have found that the prac-
tice managed to make these different “alternative cultures” co-exist without dis-
rupting its smooth operation. The following quote from a consultant serves as an 
explanation of why this was the case: “we could all agree that values should de-
crease over time” – an assumption which ‘enterprise risk management’ states re-
peatedly. 
 
Other researchers have demonstrated that the basic conception of current “best-
practice” risk management as being able to take all material uncertainties into ac-
count is flawed to the extent that risk management may end up generating new un-
certainties (Power, 2009; Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014). In this paper, I contribute to 
this discussion by showing that it is exactly because of this production of uncer-
tainty, which comes with the framing of any practice (Callon, 1998c), that the 
practice enables the production of certainty. We are indeed “acting in an uncertain 
world” (Callon et al., 2009), meaning that there are a lot of things that we know 
we do not know, but it is because of this knowledge that we adopt frameworks to 
help us get an overview of uncertainties and make them manageable. I have shown 
that it was because the practice adopted enterprise risk management that they be-
came equipped to produce a decreasing ‘value at risk’ curve and generate certainty 
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for the strategic centre, and because the practice concretised the meaning of ‘risks’ 
that project managers gained certainty regarding their ability to act on them. This 
might then produce new uncertainties, but this just goes to prove the usefulness of 
inaccurate models (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009). It is the bracketing of the world 
that enables, but also limits, the production of certainty and uncertainty. 
 
7.8.2. The misfiring of enterprise risk management 
In the first three years of the project, the practice performed enterprise risk man-
agement according to its precepts with success for most involved actors. However, 
the contribution of the present paper goes beyond establishing that theories, pro-
grammes, devices, etc. can have performative effects. This has been demonstrated 
elsewhere in the accounting literature to be the case, just outside the realm of risk 
management (e.g. Cushen, 2013; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Skærbæk & 
Tryggestad, 2010). These papers have shown how accounting devices such as 
budgets and performance measurement systems shape the practices they were 
meant to describe, which has sometimes created unexpected effects. The contribu-
tion of the present paper is to show how performativity can be re-stabilised during 
times of performativity misfires, as well as the conditions under which this can 
take place. This has been described both in and outside the accounting literature as 
something that we lack knowledge about (Butler, 2010; Callon, 2010; Dambrin & 
Robson, 2011), which requires following how this happens before, during and af-
ter the relevant period of time (Ferraro et al., 2005; MacKenzie, 2006). This sec-
tion follows up on the analysis sections that have dealt with the misfiring of enter-
prise risk management and how the practice dealt with this misfiring. 
 
From the very beginning, the strategic centre dealt with concerns that were mainly 
put forward by project managers who were worried about whether there would be 
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any benefits from doing risk management. Vinnari & Skærbæk (2014) and Arena 
et al. (2010) have argued that the practice of risk management may compete with 
other practices or other actors’ work responsibilities. In this paper, I have shown 
that project managers expressed concerns about whether risk management was 
relevant and whether it was feasible, and also that local practices sometimes 
emerged to complement the formal practice. This goes to confirm Vinnari and 
Skærbæk (2014) and Arena et al.’s (2010) finding, and I argue that this might be 
an area for further, more systematic research. In this case, those concerns were set-
tled when risk consultants engaged in dialogue and debate with the managers who 
expressed them in order to ensure their successful enrolment. It was not until the 
onset of outside, unforeseen events that enterprise risk management misfired. The 
misfiring happened during 2012 when the suppliers were included into the prac-
tice, because the practice continued to adhere to the precepts of enterprise risk 
management (they defined its basic conception, the procedures, definitions, devic-
es etc.), while the ‘value at risk’, rather than decreasing, began to increase dramat-
ically, while enterprise risk management had postulated the opposite relationship. 
In re-quoting MacKenzie (2006)’s definition of counter-performativity: enterprise 
risk management made the practice less like its depiction by enterprise risk man-
agement, which began to question the logic of enterprise risk management. 
 
In dealing with this, the present paper has demonstrated that in times of performa-
tivity misfires, the risk management control system became the all-pervasive actor 
through which the conditions of performativity success were stabilised. This tech-
nology allowed a re-definition of terminologies and re-distribution of responsibili-
ties, which in turn allowed the practice to overcome the misfire. This was evident 
because the practice could not be stabilised until the consultants, with the approval 
of programme management, decentralised the IT-based risk management control 
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system, which allowed more actors to be involved. This was not enough, however, 
as ‘value at risk’ still increased, but when terminologies were expanded and new 
roles distributed, and most importantly, when these changes were incorporated in-
to the control system, the practice re-stabilised and the ‘value at risk’ began to de-
crease as the project progressed. In practice, this happened because the notions of 
“approved” and “non-approved” risks and “sub-risks” and “overall risks” were in-
corporated into the control system, which managers were confronted with on a 
daily basis. Also, new responsibilities were given to actors: end-to-end managers 
were made risk approval managers, four new consultants were made risk experts, 
and discipline managers were included as risk owners. In combination, these 
changes were communicated through training pamphlets, a revised strategy docu-
ment and organisational work-flows figures, and exhibited on regularly held new 
meeting types. 
 
In contributing to the current debate on the conditions of performativity (e.g. 
Ferraro et al., 2005, 2009; Callon, 2007), the present paper demonstrates that lan-
guage (new risk terminologies), social norms (acceptance of the practice) and in-
stitutional arrangements (fixed meetings, work processes etc.) are important, but 
inadequate elements. In times of performativity misfires, technologies or calcula-
tive devices (the risk management control system) become the most important el-
ements for re-stabilising the prediction of enterprise risk management and thus its 
success. This finding was evident from the observation that the IT-based risk man-
agement control system became the mediator between all communication, all sta-
tus reports, all descriptions, all assessments, all actions and all ‘value at risk’ cal-
culations, thus, this device mobilised the entire practice. This implies an intrinsic 
linkage between language, identities/roles and material assemblages, where tech-
nology as part of the material assemblages are drawn upon to shape the language it 
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helps to enact. This technology, i.e. the control system, transformed the strategic 
centre who proposed the original risk language, to the effect that they ended up be-
lieving in the “new” language, which in turn gave them a higher degree of certain-
ty concerning the programme objectives. And this happened at the same time as 
the project managers, relying more on the day-to-day relevance of the practice ra-
ther than ‘value at risk’ or any other language, also came to believe this as they 
trusted the consultants as the experts who knew what was best. 
 
In contrasting this to Callon’s dual notions of framing and overflowing, technolo-
gies become the important device through which performativity can be achieved 
when dealing with what Callon termed ‘hot’ situations (Callon, 1998c, p. 260). In 
‘hot’ situations, the actual list of actors and their identities will fluctuate; the way 
effects are measured will become controversial, and “facts” and values become in-
tertwined. It is those situations in which the framing of the world itself comes un-
der critique; it is when the “possible states of the world” open up again and the 
bracketing of the world has failed. In the present paper, I have shown how the mis-
firing gave rise to the questions of who the risk owners were, how to calculate 
‘value at risk’ in future, how to maintain control with the practice, etc. Here the 
strategic centre had “to take action in order to produce an officially recognized 
body of knowledge” (Callon, 1998c, p. 261) – which they did by reframing the 
language, roles and technologies. The consultants had to find a way to re-bracket 
the world to match its precept with ‘enterprise risk management’ to allow progress 
to be demonstrated again, progress which without a stabilised frame would simply 
serve to illustrate a higher level of uncertainty, which was unacceptable. 
 
At the end of the examined period, the practice had been re-stabilised according to 
the precepts of enterprise risk management, and ‘value at risk’ calculations 
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showed decreasing values-at-risk. This indicates that the above taken actions re-
garding reconfiguration of the risk management control system, redefinition of 
risk terminologies and redistribution of identities managed successfully to realise 
the predictions of enterprise risk management. It should be noted here that I fol-
lowed the practice throughout the remaining part of 2013 and into 2014, and the 
practice still produced decreasing risk values. However, as the project runs until 
2020/21, many things may still happen, and there is no guarantee that the practice 
will not again incur another ‘hot’ situation. This illustrates Callon’s (1986) point 
that all framings are temporary and that stability is a cost investment to achieve. 
 
7.9. Future research and limitations of the current study 
In relation to future research on risk management, it is argued by this paper that 
more attention should be given to the performative role and effect of technologies, 
in order to understand the linkage between enterprise risk management and prac-
tices of risk management. The present paper has explored this linkage, focusing on 
enterprise risk management and one large infrastructure project, and thus it cannot 
present conclusive findings on other projects – or other organisations. It also fol-
lows that large infrastructure projects are often prone to new and unexpected un-
certainties, as they are often unique and thus depend on judgement calls by man-
agers. In contrast, many other organisations apply large statistical data sets on 
prior events, which all things being equal makes computing the outcomes of risks 
and preventing these more reliable. My argument is thus that it would be fruitful 
for other studies to examine whether enterprise risk management (or any other 
statement on how to do risk management) may also explain how other practices of 
risk management end up being configured and subsequently produce and manage 
risks. It may also make a difference that project managers have for decades prac-
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tised risk management as part of good project management, which could have an 
impact on the constructed practices in other types of organisations. 
 
To argue that enterprise risk management becomes performative is furthermore an 
empirical question, and this paper has not examined all empirical practices of risk 
management. It is thus indeed explorative, and more research into this should be 
conducted to verify whether other practices end up also confirming the precepts of 
enterprise risk management (at the same time as exhibiting different cultures, for 
example). Also, the Signalling Programme has been scheduled to be completed 
around 2020/21, which means that many more translations are bound to incur: will 
the actor-network examined here expand or retract and thus readjust even more, 
leading to new interesting developments? Will the programme of enterprise risk 
management itself even be translated into something else? Many questions arise 
which cannot easily be investigated. This paper is limited to a case study of a pro-
gramme in which risk management was implemented for the first time and thus 
not black-boxed. Others may expand on this research with other types of research; 
from in-depth examinations to more generalised accounts. This would add to the 
generalisability of the current findings and might shed even more light on the 
widespread use of risk management and how performativity works. 
 
This paper has sought to expand further on the conditions of performativity by in-
cluding the translations occurring around emerging concerns and technologies, 
hopefully adding to our understanding of the so far relatively unexplored phenom-
enon of the performativity of theories/programmes. There are, however, other in-
teresting areas related to risk management. It has not been examined explicitly 
here, but it appears that the more narrowly defined concept of risk covers only part 
of the larger concept of uncertainty. In relation to the concept of knowledge, this 
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could be interesting, because if only uncertainties made calculable, or risks, are 
considered knowledgably, some uncertainties which cannot be made knowable in 
the same way are excluded. Softer forms of knowledge, such as feelings or hunch-
es, are excluded, but it is a question whether that is in the best interest of the pro-
ject when it runs over a longer period of time, when the context surrounding the 
project itself is bound to change several times. If we further take into account that 
“the context”, the environment changes over time, this seems to be something that 
cannot be taken into account, as it requires that something has happened before it 
can made calculable and thus knowable. 
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8.1. Abstract 
Risk management devices and practices are routine parts of delivering large infra-
structure projects. Risk management places emphasis on quantifying risks and de-
veloping strategies to manage, control and mitigate them. This means that the con-
tribution by the on-going production of knowledge during project processes is 
limited; instead, knowledge is positioned as upfront input to planning and specifi-
cation. However, infrastructure projects are often characterised by long durations, 
by involving many actors at different stages, and by a high degree of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and complexity. This presents a problem for both risk management ap-
proaches and project managers: How can uncertain future conditions and unex-
pected events be reconciled with rational approaches to risk management? How is 
the production of new knowledge during project processes incorporated into risk 
management practices? What effects do risk management practices have on the 
on-going project? To address these questions, we draw upon two comparative case 
studies of large Danish infrastructure projects, using Callon’s (1998a) dual notion 
of framing and overflowing. The cases demonstrate the emerging uncertainties 
that challenge project and risk management objectives as new knowledge about 
the conditions are produced during project processes, and describe the activities of 
project actors to both perform risk management as required, but also manage 
emerging uncertainties and concerns. We conclude that dominant risk manage-
ment approaches neglect the wider range of uncertainties that emerge during pro-
ject processes and that overreliance on these approaches threaten the long-term 
value and effectiveness of the project. 
 
Keywords: Risk management; uncertainty; knowledge; infrastructure; project 
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8.2. Introduction 
 
“The [ideal knowledge] conditions required for it to be relevant to 
talk of risk are not met. We know that we do not know, but that is 
almost all we know: there is no better definition of uncertainty”. 
(Callon et al., 2009, p. 21) 
 
The assumption that large complex projects should be managed in order to reduce 
uncertainty and increase predictability is not new. What is relatively new, howev-
er, is that uncertainty reduction can and should be obtained through formal risk 
management approaches. We question both assumptions by addressing a more 
fundamental question about the role of knowledge in current risk management 
practices. Our argument and claim are that predominant generic risk management 
approaches tend to reinforce conventional ideas of project control whilst under-
mining other notions of value and relevance of built assets and project manage-
ment processes. These approaches fail to consider the role and potential value of 
knowledge production during the project process, instead seeing knowledge as in-
put to upfront planning and specification. However, relatively little research has 
been done on the effects of generic risk management approaches in complex infra-
structure projects. We examine ways in which actual project practices approach 
the question of risk management for the cases of large public hospital construction 
and infrastructure projects in Denmark. These projects are characterised by long 
durations and by involving substantial materiality, high uncertainty, ambiguity and 
complexity. Yet, they are also subjected to risk management that operates accord-
ing to a generic ‘best practice’ control approach – as if these hospital and infra-
structure projects are quite simple, predictive and similar in nature. The cases re-
veal the emerging uncertainties that challenge the project plan and the risk 
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management approach as new knowledge about the conditions are produced dur-
ing the project processes. 
 
In the next section we open up our inquiry by accounting for the predominant ap-
proaches to risk management according to the literature. We also position our own 
approach, being inspired by contributions to management and organisation studies, 
and more specifically by Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Next, we account for our 
case method. In the section that follows, we expand our study by inquiring into 
risk management practices in large infrastructure and construction projects and re-
veal their assumptions about knowledge and the ramifications these assumptions 
have for project and construction management. The cases reveal the emerging un-
certainties that challenge the project plan and the risk management approach as 
new knowledge about the conditions are produced during the project processes. 
The paper concludes by proposing a more dynamic understanding of the role of 
knowledge, considering the practical implications of uncertain knowledge condi-
tions as a prevailing condition for project and construction management rather 
than as something to be known in advance and reduced by risk management. 
 
8.3. Uncertainty and risk management according to the literature 
During the last two decades, scholars in management and organisation studies, so-
ciology and economics have developed a renewed interest in the concept of risk, 
dealing with classical notions such as gambling, occupational and operational 
risks, as well as more recent and encompassing notions such as ‘risk society’, 
’world risk society’ (Beck, 1992b, 1999), ‘enterprise risk management’, and ‘the 
risk management of everything’ (Power, 2004). Gephart et al. (2009) argue that 
risk has been a neglected topic in organisational studies and that organisational 
theory “tends to omit consideration of risk or relegate it to the status of unintended 
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consequences” (Gephart et al., 2009, p. 152). According to Power (2004), ideals 
about more and better control underpin the recent expansion of risk management 
practices across organisations and societies. Best-practice approaches to project 
management have long since promoted control and more recently extended the 
control with risk management. A key role and responsibility of project manage-
ment is to ensure ongoing monitoring and control so that the project can be exe-
cuted efficiently and accurately and delivered according to predictions. That is, 
according to a pre-set goal and plan (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Turner et al., 2010). The re-
duction of uncertainty to ensure execution according to this pre-set goal and plan 
is integral to the control ideal in ‘best-practice’ project management, and risk 
management is one of the most persuasive additions to this control. 
 
In the same period, an increasing number of scholars in project research have ad-
dressed a number of critical issues and limitations associated with uncertainty re-
duction and control, such as: the project’s lack of effectiveness and loss of rele-
vance in the wider stakeholder environment (Kreiner, 1995, 2014), the lack of a 
broader value-orientation (Morris, 2010), and the reduction of robustness and reli-
ability in organisational performance due to a false sense of control and certainty 
(Coutu, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). A key argument across several contribu-
tions concerns the conditions of knowledge in temporary project settings. Kreiner 
(1995), Lundin and Söderholm (1995), Engwall (2002), Jönsson (2004), Atkinson 
et al. (2006) and Lindkvist (2011) have all emphasised the contextual complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity of temporary project settings. Alongside these condi-
tions, van Marrewijk (2007) noted the prevalence of rituals and cultural values 
governing mega-infrastructure projects, and Winch (2010) noted the existence of 
wicked problems, that is, problems that are uncertain in the sense of being ill-
defined and without an optimal solution. In brief, then, the conventional control 
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approach to projects and project management has been drawn into question for be-
ing reductionist when dealing with uncertainty, biased in favour of predictability 
and efficiency in execution while disregarding the project context and longer term 
perspective after the project has been handed over and its results put to use. 
 
The distinction between uncertainty and risk is integral to the above discussion. As 
noted by Chapman and Ward (2011), uncertainty management can be better than 
risk management insofar as the former implies further consideration of potentially 
favourable opportunities, benefits and outcomes, in contrast to the more limited 
notion of risk management, which tends to deal with the unfavourable costs and 
outcomes. However, as also noted by Power (2004), there seems to be more to this 
distinction. When the economist Frank Knight (1921) introduced the distinction 
between uncertainty and risk, it was, according to Langlois and Cosgel (1993), to 
address a more fundamental uncertainty that went beyond assigning probabilities 
to more or less favourable outcomes. Knight here reserved the notion of ‘risks’ to 
events “susceptible of measurement”, meaning those events that we at least knew 
about in order to be able to classify their outcomes (Knight, 1921, p. I.I.25). In 
contrast, uncertainties referred to unmeasurable events, that is events of 
knowledge and conceptual categories that are unknown due to “the impossibility 
of exhaustive classification of states” (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993, p. 459). Thus, ac-
cording to a Knightian distinction, the concept of uncertainty is broader in scope 
and implication than the concept of risk – while the latter can be subjected to 
quantification and calculations, the former must be dealt with by judgement and 
intuition. 
 
Winch and Maytorena (2009, 2011) note that the distinction between uncertainty 
and risk was introduced into management and organisation research by the semi-
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nal work of James March and Herbert Simon and the Carnegie School. March and 
Simon (1958) questioned the contemplative ‘cold’ cognitive bias of much previ-
ous work on decision-making in organisations, especially associated with rational 
choice and subjectively expected utility theory. They argued that the simple model 
of a ‘superhuman’ rationality (cf. March & Olsen, 1975) should be replaced by a 
more nuanced and modest model of limited human cognitive abilities, or what 
they termed ‘bounded rationality’. They argued that this would to be closer to the 
empirical reality of organisational decision–making, which was characterised by 
limited knowledge, incomplete and ambiguous information, unawareness of all al-
ternatives, unstable and hard-to-define preferences, and conflicting and ambiguous 
goals and objectives. 
 
Simon (1983), building on that work, further proposed a model based on intuition 
and emotion, shifting attention from cold to ‘hot cognitions’. Hot cognitions are 
related to the positive outcomes that surprise and sudden discovery can bring 
about, as well as the excitement they provoke. March (1971) similarly describes 
‘technology of foolishness’ and distinguishes between exploration (of yet un-
known and hence uncertain worlds) and exploitation (within a relatively well-
known universe). March argued that the technology of rational choice is biased in 
favour of exploitation as it tends to assume perfect knowledge and given (exoge-
nous) goals. He proposes a technology of foolishness, because it encourages the 
(endogenous) exploration of new knowledge, including the possibilities of achiev-
ing more exciting goals. Serious matters like knowledge production and learning, 
innovation, new visions, goals and decisions can be facilitated by a technology of 
foolishness – by expanding outside the cognitive limits of rational choice. 
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Some more recent contributions have also addressed possible complementary per-
spectives on uncertainty and risk management. Flyvbjerg (2006, 2008) points to 
the usefulness and importance of better budgeting accuracy through the implemen-
tation of ‘reference class forecasting’, which includes systematic risk management 
in order to ensure better control with and predictability of large complex infra-
structure projects and their outcome. In contrast, Corvellec (2009) draws attention 
to the usefulness of silent, non-explicit and non-formalised risk management prac-
tices, and also Millo and MacKenzie (2009) point to the usefulness of focusing on 
inaccurate models and methods rather than on methods of improved accuracy. Ac-
cording to them, the success of a forecasting method can depend on its usefulness 
in practice and thus be independent of the method’s more or less predictive powers 
and expert knowledge. For example, organisational actors may adopt a particular 
forecasting method because it helps them to make fast and efficient calculations 
and decisions, and in turn justify those calculations and decisions, as well as to 
communicate with others about issues of mutual interest. This is a rather different 
utility than the classic argument about making reality and the project more certain 
by improving the accuracy of project management methods. 
 
In the accounting literature, three studies have further looked into the distinction 
between uncertainties and risks. Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014) found that a Finnish 
municipality’s practice of risk management in addition to reducing uncertainty al-
so ended up producing new uncertainties that would otherwise not have emerged; 
Miller, Kurunmäki and O’Leary (2008) found something similar when they 
showed that due to their narrow focus on “enterprise risks”, two practices of en-
terprise risk management ended up neglecting the wide range of uncertainties 
emerging from outside organisational boundaries; and when looking into one 
mega-project’s practice of risk management, Themsen and Skærbæk (2014) found 
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that only some uncertainties could be constructed as risks while others were ex-
cluded because the technologies invented to capture them operated with criteria 
that excluded them. These excluded uncertainties were still held as risks by local 
managers, who consequently tried to cope with them by inventing local practices 
using their own risk devices. As these local managers had neither the time nor the 
resources to deal with these risks, and because the risks did not get any manage-
ment attention, they were in effect, however, often not dealt with at all. 
 
8.4. An actor-network perspective on risk, uncertainty and knowledge 
Although the work of March and Simon is useful to identify forms of rationality 
beyond the objective, we contend that an understanding of risk and uncertainty re-
quires more that the consideration of objective, cold rationality on the one hand, 
and more subjective, emotive or hot rationality on the other. Risk management 
practices do not merely draw on different underpinning rationales to produce 
knowledge, they actively construct and reproduce approaches, techniques and 
tools that, as argued by Corvellec (2009) and Millo and MacKenzie (2009) above, 
may or may not claim to reduce uncertainty or quantify “real” risks. In order to 
further explore this, we draw on actor-network theory and the work of Callon, par-
ticularly the twin notions of framing and overflowing. 
 
Callon (1998a) draws on Goffman’s concept of the frame – the establishment of a 
boundary around a particular set of interactions or activities, along with a shared 
set of expectations, rules and artefacts which define the contours of the particular 
setting. But rather than seeing this as a process of separating what is inside the 
frame from what is outside, Callon (again, following Goffman) describes how the 
act of framing relies on the connections between frame and external environment, 
on the network of interdependencies with the outside world. Goffman’s example 
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of the theatrical performance relies on a set of understandings of what audience 
and actors should be doing (the rules), on the physical framework of stage and 
props, and on sets of devices to prompt actors, the audience and others (raising 
curtains, dimmed lights). These things maintain the framing, but also the connec-
tion to the outside. 
 
Framing is consequently a process that it requires resources and effort to maintain, 
but which can never be fully closed off from the outside. Overflows are therefore 
always present, ‘irrepressible and productive’ connections leading across the 
frame’s boundaries. Callon discusses two approaches to understanding framing; 
one in which the frame is considered the norm, and overflows are exceptions to be 
contained and managed, and one where framing is a more tenuous and problematic 
(and expensive) activity, and overflows are the norm. The former implies a lean-
ing towards closure, stabilisation and reduction of uncertainty, the latter implies 
that overflows are what makes the framing successful and productive. 
 
Framing is, then, a process that can lead to further establishment or stabilisation of 
a body of knowledge or set of practices, but which also in doing so causes over-
flows of concerns or issues that do not fit within the framing and act to de-stabilise 
or re-problematise the status of the included practices, knowledge and devices. 
The concepts of framing and overflowing point to a productive, dynamic relation-
ship where framing produces stabilisation of knowledge, but simultaneously acts 
as a conduit for overflows, or for re-problematisation. 
 
Alongside overflows, Callon develops the idea of 'hot’ and ‘cold’ situations. Hot 
situations are those where there are many overflows, where practices and 
knowledge are contested, and in which non-expert groups can be actively involved 
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in problematising scientific or expert knowledge and in articulating related issues. 
'Hot situations' involve strong emotions and are a response from actors who feel 
that their emerging concerns about the existing expert bodies of knowledge are ig-
nored, excluded or not sufficiently recognised. This problematises the idea of what 
constitutes expert (and by implication rational or cold) knowledge as hot situations 
arise, and suggests that the dynamics of knowledge production can extend beyond 
boundaries of expertise. A cold situation would be one where there are relatively 
few controversial overflows, and where practices and knowledge are less contest-
ed compared to hot situations. 
 
In terms of knowledge production in the case of risk and uncertainty, the process 
of framing / overflow implies the possibility of a transformation from a steady 
state (‘cold’) situation in which this best-practice body of knowledge is taken for 
granted by actors, towards a situation in which actors - through their interaction 
with the devices - starts to problematise and question this risk management 
knowledge and frame. In effect, such knowledge production becomes distributed, 
the cognitive processes transgress the human mind and skin, as it implies interac-
tion with different forms of representations of risk, inscribed into risk technologies 
and devices such as risk registers, risk matrices and risk calculations in spread-
sheets, which in turn are circulated in reports and memos that are discussed, 
judged and evaluated in the individual project organisation as well as across pro-
jects in the programmes. 
 
In our understanding, for better or for worse, the emphasis on risk can and should 
be examined empirically alongside a less instrumental notion of acting and per-
forming within uncertain knowledge conditions. We want to examine the dynam-
ics and effects of risk management and uncertain project conditions in order to go 
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beyond the contours of best-practice, rational notions of risk management. We 
draw on Callon and the concept of framing and overflows, as we do not see there 
is a choice between either rational notions of knowledge or more exploratory, hot 
or foolish approaches to understanding risk and uncertainty. We see rational and 
instrumental devices such as risk tools as particular framing devices, which 
through their actions produce different types of overflows and new, emerging con-
cerns in dynamic processes of stabilisation and re-problematisation. In doing so, 
we account for this active role of technical risk devices in the production of 
knowledge and emergence of concerns in framing and problematising emerging 
issues and unpredicted uncertainties. 
 
Below, we present empirical material from studies of two large infrastructure pro-
jects in Denmark; the Danish hospital construction programme, which represents 
one of the largest public infrastructure investment in the country with a capital 
budget of DKK 41.4 billion, and the 12-year, DKK 23.7 billion Danish rail signal-
ling infrastructure replacement programme, also one of the largest projects to be 
undertaken. Both cases illustrate the complex interplay between risk and uncer-
tainty in large projects as well as the tension between risk management producing 
knowledge about project conditions 'out there' and risk management performing 
and reifying those conditions. In the context of our work, we focus on risk man-
agement practices in projects, but complement this with a particular focus on the 
possible complex dynamics and exchanges between a more or less uncertain pro-
ject condition and the risk management practices that are used to manage those 
uncertain conditions. More specifically, we ask the following question: How do 
risk management practices shape project conditions for large infrastructure pro-
jects, and what are the ramifications for knowledge and project management 
roles? 
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8.5. Method 
In this paper, we draw on two comparative case studies of large infrastructure pro-
jects in the Danish public sector. Both cases are on-going in terms of data collec-
tion as the projects are still running. The first case relates to the construction of 16 
large hospitals, in the following called the Hospital Programme, which represents 
a complete structural overhaul of the entire Danish healthcare sector over the next 
approx. ten years. This series of related projects involves one of the largest Danish 
infrastructure investments to date in Denmark, which implies a high degree of un-
certainty regarding the achievement of its objectives. The Hospital Programme has 
a budget of DKK 41.4 billion, which is further broken down into a budget for each 
of the 16 hospital projects and runs from around 2008-12 to 2018-23 depending on 
the individual hospital construction project. In comparison, the second case relates 
to the total replacement of all Danish railway signalling, named the Signalling 
Programme, which represents the largest single capital investment to date in the 
Danish public railway sector. The Signalling Programme has a capital budget of 
DKK 23.7 billion and runs from 2009 to 2020/21. It consists of several small sub-
projects making up three larger ones: the regional lines west, the regional lines 
east and the Copenhagen mass transit system. These projects will be introduced in 
more detail in the analysis section. 
 
The Signalling Programme case relies on different information tracing techniques. 
It relies on the collection of written documents such as government white papers, 
consultancy reports, auditing reports, risk status reports and project status reports. 
It also relies on real-time access to the implemented IT-based risk management 
system that records the descriptions and assessments of risks-related information. 
This includes “outputs” from that system, such as risk overview lists broken down 
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according to individual risk owners and ‘value at risk’ charts demonstrating the es-
timated summed up cost effect of all risks over time. This material has served the 
purpose of reconstructing the activities and events of the programme and has also 
been a source to understanding the formal decisions taken. Another source of in-
formation comes from 19 semi-structured interviews conducted with key actors of 
the programme. The interviews served to get a better understanding of the work-
ings of risk management, the discussions leading up to the formal decisions taken, 
and the concerns that emerged. Lastly, the case also relies on observation studies. 
In the course of the period under study, more than 40 observation studies of an av-
erage duration of approx. 1½ hours have been carried out, of more than 70 differ-
ent people involved in risk management, most of them on more than one occasion. 
These observation studies served the purpose of following day-to-day risk man-
agement interaction, following how uncertainty was translated into risks and how 
knowledge was produced. In sum, the Signalling Programme has been followed 
from the political decision to go ahead with the project although observations and 
interviews have “only” been carried out over the last 4 years when the programme 
entered the procurement phase. 
 
The Hospital Programme case relies on the same type of data. The majority of ef-
fort has been put into collecting the many formal and informal documents relating 
to the programme and individual hospital projects. This includes government 
white papers, consultancy reports, risk reports and templates, power point presen-
tation slides, project description documents and many more. The documentary da-
ta is significant, given the extent of public domain reports and media coverage. 
The case also relies on interviews with actors from the Danish Regions, state cli-
ent organisation, and environment organisations involved in the design and con-
struction of several of the individual hospitals that are included in the programme, 
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along with attendance at public and closed meetings with project management, 
and documentary data. In total, the data comprise four public meetings lasting be-
tween 1 - 1.5 hours, one industry seminar on the hospital programme lasting ap-
prox. 2 hours, three industrial conferences on the hospital programme lasting be-
tween 4 – 7 hours, nine closed meetings with representatives from the hospital 
projects and the regions lasting between 1.5 – 4 hours. In contrast to the Signalling 
Programme, the authors have yet to negotiate real-time access to the risk manage-
ment databases of the hospital programme. However, both cases benefit from a di-
verse set of empirical materials such as risk estimates in spreadsheets, written risk 
guidelines, reports, interviews, meetings and informal conversations. 
 
Having conducted two in-depth and longitudinal case studies using observation 
studies, document analysis and interviews, we are able to examine actual practices 
of risk management in their situated setting, following the actors ‘in action’. In 
both cases, observations of risk management ‘in action’ focus on the issues that 
emerge as the projects become implicated in negotiating the programme’s control 
and risk management setup. This focus has allowed us to follow and reconstruct 
the unexpected dynamics and tensions emerging between the programme and the 
individual projects – something which is important given our research question on 
risk management practices and the focus on the uncertain knowledge conditions 
and the role of project management in large infrastructure projects. 
 
8.6. Risk management in practice: the Danish hospital construction pro-
gramme 
This section begins with a brief description of the background for the hospital pro-
gramme, followed by two sections that account for the development of the risk 
292 
 
management frame and the effects/overflowing and hot situations emerging from 
that frame. 
 
8.6.1. Background for the hospital programme 
In 2007, the Danish parliament agreed with the five Danish regions that the hospi-
tal infrastructure needed a “structural improvement” to “achieve the common ob-
jective of modern and sustainable health care” (Finansministeriet [Ministry of Fi-
nance], 2008). In more detail, the objectives of the project decided on were to 
improve the quality of patient treatment, reduce operating costs and increase flexi-
ble patient treatment. It was acknowledged that this had to be achieved through the 
construction and operation of fewer but larger hospitals, which would allow im-
proved specialisation as well as better internal working processes and capacity uti-
lisation. In the same year, the Danish parliament and the five Danish regions mu-
tually committed to spending DKK 41.4 billion on these new projects, of which 
approx. DKK 25 billion were to be funded from a newly created “Kvalitetsfond-
en”, and approx. DKK 17 billion to be funded by the regions themselves. To make 
sure that the new and improved hospital sector would achieve these objectives, the 
parliament and the regions appointed an expert panel. In 2008 and 2010, this panel 
proposed 16 new hospital projects to be constructed, ranging from significant re-
building and renovation of existing hospitals, over green field projects and univer-
sity hospitals to so-called ‘super hospitals’. 
 
8.6.2. The development of the risk management frame 
In the years that followed, the Danish Ministry of Health and the Danish Ministry 
of Finance both approved the construction of the hospitals, and the programme is 
now being implemented by the regions and is scheduled to run for the next 10 to 
15 years. In acknowledging that the involved projects were complex and unique to 
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each region due to demographic factors; and because the regions recognised the 
need for expert knowledge, the regions sought professional support. The consul-
tancy Ernst & Young was contracted to analyse current infrastructure project prac-
tices and propose best-practice recommendations on good project management 
when implementing large construction projects (Ernst & Young, 2008). In light of 
several public sector construction scandals where budgets had been exceeded due 
to poor management accounting practices, the regions were also aware that their 
practices risked being criticised for being inadequate. As a result, the consultancy 
KPMG was also contracted to help the regions to develop proper overall manage-
ment accounting principles and practices (KPMG, 2008a). KPMG devised five 
main principles, which the regions subsequently committed themselves to follow-
ing: strategic decision-making and construction supervision at a political manage-
ment level; development of a management manual, a competent construction or-
ganisation, systematic risk management, and independent quality assurance. 
Overall, the two reports established the guiding framework for the hospital pro-
gramme’s 16 construction projects, although leaving it to the individual regions to 
determine how these generic principles and recommendations were to be translat-
ed into action with the intended effect at the individual hospital construction pro-
ject level. 
 
Of the two, the KPMG report had the most widespread effects. KPMG had just 
handed over their report on the construction of the new Danish Radio Building to 
the Danish parliament (KPMG and Grant Thornton, 2008). This project had turned 
out scandalous, as it had been delayed by several years and had exceeded its budg-
et by DKK 1.7 billion, corresponding to approx. 57 per cent of the original budget. 
In collaboration with Grant Thornton, KPMG had been contracted to look into 
these matters, and their conclusion was that the deviations were due to “poor man-
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agement supervision” and “the lack of an effective management control system”, 
particularly “the lack of an effective risk management system” (KPMG & Grant 
Thornton, 2008, p. 26-32). More specifically, KPMG argued that management had 
failed to take all material uncertainties into account and had also failed to properly 
assess the likelihood and impact of those uncertainties that had been taken into ac-
count. This meant that the necessary measures to prevent cost overruns had not 
been taken and that “incomplete risk assessments therefore indirectly had contrib-
uted to the increase in the cost of the Danish Radio Building” (KPMG & Grant 
Thornton, 2008, p. 263). 
 
KPMG and Grant Thornton also showed that Danish Radio had relied on “succes-
sive calculation” to conduct risk management, but that the principle had been used 
incorrectly, which in turn ultimately had contributed to cost overruns.26 KPMG, 
however, had thoroughly investigated what went wrong and thus seemed well pre-
pared to advise the Danish regions on how they could apply risk management on 
the hospital projects. The KPMG report (2008a) here re-introduced the potential 
                                                 
26 “Successive calculation” is a systematic process employed to identify and assess all material uncertainties related 
to budgeting of project costs (and other things as well). It works by composing an analysis group that brainstorms 
on all possible uncertainties that could lead to budget deviations. This group then estimates the financial implica-
tions of these uncertainties by creating three scenarios: the most optimistic outcome (best case), the most pessimis-
tic outcome (worst case) and the most likely outcome (most likely case). These calculated financial outcomes are 
then added to all budget line items in order to arrive at three estimates: the best-case costs, the most likely costs and 
the worst-case costs of the project. Statistics  is then applied to calculate the different probabilities (fractiles) that 
the final costs will be kept within the budget. Here, the 50 percent fractile corresponds to the probability that the 
project has a 50 percent chance of being either more or less expensive than budgeted. In relation to the Danish Ra-
dio construction project, management had used the 50 percent fractile to calculate budgeted costs. KPMG and Grant 
Thornton, referring to the work of EMCON, argued that at least the 75 percent fractile should have been chosen, as 
the project, due to its innovative nature, faced more than a 50 percent probability that cost overruns would occur 
(with a 75 percent fractile there is “only” a 25 percent probability that the project will incur overruns). As KPMG 
and Grant Thornton also showed, however, not all material uncertainties had been considered, which meant that the 
estimation of costs was imprecise to begin with. 
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benefits of using “successive calculation” to deal with uncertainty, something that 
the appendix outlined in much detail (KPMG, 2008b). In relation to that, KPMG’s 
recommendations about systematic risk management were further emphasised by 
the National Audit Office of Denmark (NAOD) two years later (Rigsrevisionen 
[NAOD], 2010, p. 5). The NAOD, explicitly citing the KPMG report, urged the 
regions to increase their focus on systematic risk management in each of their pro-
jects in order to ensure control of project progress according to set milestones and 
capital budget. In a later report, the NAOD even reinforced this recommendation 
by also extending the responsibility for this to the Ministry of Health (Rigsrevi-
sionen, 2011). The following quote illustrates this: 
 
“The NAOD notes that construction projects of such scale and 
complexity involve risks. It is therefore essential that the Ministry 
of Health specifies and meets its responsibilities as manager of the 
grants and supervisor to ensure that the construction projects are 
implemented within the total budget framework. The regions 
should throughout the construction process be focused on risk 
management and ensure robust and competent building organisa-
tions in order to achieve the objectives set for the construction pro-
jects within the budget framework [Danish in original; our transla-
tion]”. (Rigsrevisionen, 2011, p. 2) 
 
What prompted the NAOD to conclude this was the disturbing news that the Min-
istry of Health had consented to the commencement of the construction of the 
largest of the 16 projects, The New University Hospital Århus, without having en-
sured that the project could be realised within the funds allocated to the construc-
tion of that project. Central Denmark Region had thus reported a significant risk of 
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having to spend approx. DKK 1.2 billion more than the approx. DKK 6.5 billion 
allocated to them. The NAOD largely attributed this to inadequate implementation 
of risk management throughout the five regions, but also to an inadequate ap-
proach to risk management by the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health had 
even contributed to the generation of “increased uncertainty regarding project suc-
cess” (Rigsrevisionen, 2011, p. 3), and the NAOD thus considered the relationship 
between the ministry and the regions as one of the most substantial risks for pro-
ject success (Rigsrevisionen, 2011, p. 19). In response to this, The Ministry of 
Health elaborated on KPMG’s 2008 report and introduced the requirement that the 
regions had to follow the “traffic light assessment matrix”, which is an assessment 
matrix that allows for the grading of the severity of risks into green (low), yellow 
(medium), and red (high). They also enforced the principle that the regions in fu-
ture had to assess all risks related to impacts on time, costs and quality and prepare 
a report on all of these aspects on a quarterly basis (Ministeriet for Sundhed og Fo-
rebyggelse, 2012). 
 
Taken together, the concerted efforts by the auditing company, KPMG, the Na-
tional Audit Office of Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Health resulted in a 
risk management frame of generic guidelines, which is also consistent with ration-
alist, generic approaches worldwide (Winch, 2010, Raz & Hillson 2005), such as 
the Project Management Institute’s Body of Knowledge (PMI 2004) and the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s Enter-
prise Risk Management - Integrated Framework (COSO 2004). 
 
8.6.3. Overflowing and emerging concerns in the building projects 
In the construction projects, much work and effort was being invested in trying to 
follow the “best-practice” guidelines issued by the NAOD, KPMG and the Minis-
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try of Health. In the Region of Southern Denmark, for example, Hospital South 
Jutland developed a risk manual that was circulated among the actors involved in 
that project. This manual defined the purpose of risk management, which was “to 
minimise the probability and impact of those risks that may influence the success-
ful execution of the project” (Sygehus Sønderjylland Aabenraa, 2011a, p. 3). In 
this context, ‘successful execution’ meant following the NAOD and KPMG “best 
practice” guidelines and delivering according to set project goals and objectives, 
i.e. on time, within project budget and according to set project quality objectives. 
In terms of further implications, it meant that other measures of success, for ex-
ample the subsequent operation of the hospital, were defined as being outside the 
scope of the risk management practice. 
 
The Hospital South Jutland further defined the formal standard risk management 
process as consisting of identification of risks, assessment of their impact and 
probability, risk-reducing measures, monitoring and control (Sygehus Sønderjyl-
land Aabenraa, 2011a, p. 8). They also defined that risk meetings had to be held at 
a minimum at the beginning of every month, or whenever the project entered new 
phases, and that a risk workshop had to be held right after the establishment of the 
risk management practice (Sygehus Sønderjylland Aabenraa, 2011a, p. 8). They 
also described the risk reporting format and reporting frequency: the project or-
ganisation had to be briefed every quarter, the steering group on an ongoing basis, 
and the Regional Council at fixed political milestones. In order to operationalise 
risk management, the hospital also allocated formal risk management responsibili-
ties; they appointed a risk manager from the project division to supervise the pro-
cess, allocated risk ownership to various people in the project organisation, who 
now had to “contribute proactively and reactively to risk management”, and ap-
pointed a risk steering group consisting of members from the risk owners, the risk 
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manager and a project consultant (Sygehus Sønderjylland Aabenraa, 2011a, p. 5 - 
6). Overall, Hospital South Jutland thus stayed loyal to the recommendations put 
forward by the NAOD and KPMG and implemented “best-practice” risk manage-
ment. 
 
During this period, concerns were emerging in the individual project organisations 
about how to best estimate and manage risks. In relation to the Hospital of South 
Jutland, new concerns emerged among members in the project team about whether 
the government could reduce funding (Sygehus Sønderjylland Aabenraa, 2011b). 
These concerns emerged because the government had reduced the budget by DKK 
188 million, which the risk practice had not foreseen and prevented. In an attempt 
to address this unexpected challenge and problem, the project organisation had 
listed this event into the risk database as a ‘risk’ for the project. This, however, 
gave rise to discussions, as “this risk has occurred; unless there is a new risk that 
the [construction] budget will be reduced, this risk should be deleted and reported 
as an occurrence” (Sygehus Sønderjylland Aabenraa, 2011b). As an actual occur-
rence, “it” should thus not be included as a ‘risk’ but rather as an ‘occurrence’. 
That it was included as a risk to begin with, however, illustrates that it appears to 
be challenging to identify what and what not to classify and list as a risk. It reflects 
that doing risk management is far from straightforward as it required those in-
volved to be taught the highly technical nomenclature of what ‘risks’ are, i.e., that 
the term only applies to future and not past occurrences; experiences should thus 
not be mobilised and included in the risk register. 
 
In relation to the Gødstrup Hospital project, the largest geographical hospital pro-
ject with a budget of DKK 3.15 billion under the management of Central Denmark 
Region, concerns emerged about the finer distinctions between ‘issues’ and ‘con-
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cerns’ (which should not be included) on the one hand, and ‘risks’ (which should 
be included) on the other. This distinction became an on-going subject of discus-
sion during the first year of the project, as the project organisation invested con-
siderable resources in manpower, time and training. As the head project manager 
explained, this was done with the purpose of establishing a proper understanding 
of risks in order to facilitate the work of the risk management organisation accord-
ing to the principles of the KPMG report. For further guidance, they had even con-
tacted the Danish Road Directorate, who had earned a reputation for implementing 
state-of-the-art-risk management in their infrastructure projects, following best-
practice bodies of knowledge, such as the Project Management Institute’s Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK). One core insight obtained through these contacts was the 
importance of the distinction between the not easily specified concerns and issues 
and the proper ‘risks’ about future events of which potential negative future out-
comes could be estimated with more certainty. In the Gødstrup Hospital project 
organisation, however, it had proved extremely difficult to implement this distinc-
tion, as project managers tended to list and include ‘issues’ in the risk database, 
which they should not: 
 
“Risk management is not about concerns [and issues, eds.]. It takes 
one year of training and education to understand this. I cannot 
stress how much explanation we had to give to convince people 
about this. It was not until we explained to them that risks were not 
about taking responsibility for when things go wrong that we man-
aged to convince them to do this”. Head project manager 
 
The head project manager further explained, which was confirmed by the control 
manual, that the purpose of risk management was to “execute the project accord-
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ing to the approved project proposal and goals without any surprises” (Region 
Midtjylland, 2011, p. 28). The application for project approval further stated that 
these objectives were to ensure “compliance with the capital budget”, “compliance 
with the planned time schedule”, and the requirement “that quality meets the vi-
sions and demands of the hospital projects” (Region Midtjylland, 2012, p. 50). It 
thus only included those future events that were considered to have an effect on 
the achievement of project objectives, and these only included cost, time and qual-
ity. In other words, in the light of the above quote, the very notion of a ‘proper 
risk’ to be included came to be part of the unexpected issues and concerns that 
emerged in relation to the risk management practice. 
 
The discussion about the distinction between issues and risks concerned uncertain-
ties about the classification of entities to be included into or excluded from the risk 
register. In relation to the allocation of funds to the different projects, the pro-
gramme applied another distinction which led to concerns and discussions about 
the justified grounds for these funds. The programme applied the distinction be-
tween ‘university’ and ‘non-university’ projects, where ‘university’ projects re-
ferred to hospitals that included research facilities and vice versa. This distinction 
had effects on the amount of allocated funds, because ‘non-university’ projects 
were assumed to be less expensive and thus received less funds per square metre. 
In practice, however, the situation that ‘non-university’ projects were classified 
and assumed to be less expensive was not always the case, which in turn generated 
new uncertainties. The Capital Region of Denmark’s New North Zealand Hospital 
with an approved budget of DKK 3.8 billion, for example, was classified as a 
‘non-university’ hospital and therefore approved at a correspondingly lower budg-
et per square metre than comparable ‘university’ projects. In this project, early ex-
aminations of the construction site had indicated that the ground below surface 
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was most likely a culturally rich area. It could not be determined with precision, 
however, what the consequences of discovering such areas would lead to. 
 
While the risk managers anticipated the possibility of a culturally rich ground, fur-
ther examination showed it to be more complex and rich than initially expected. It 
did not take much digging before it was revealed that extensive archaeological ex-
cavations would have to be commenced. The geological team had found that the 
ground contained massive chunks of ice dating back thousands of years, and it was 
estimated that these chunks of ice might contain relics from as far back as the 
Danish New Stone Age.27 As excavations commenced, the archaeologists began to 
locate old dwellings, artefacts and even an approx. 5,500-year old male corpse, 
presumably murdered. To make things even much more challenging from the per-
spective of maintaining the construction budget, the chunks of ice rested on large 
areas of clay, and there were also large holes in the ground, which meant that the 
ground was highly unstable and would require more work as well as a structural 
design below ground that was adapted to this complex and unstable ground condi-
tion. It would thus require even more detailed geological examinations as well as 
more construction design work before actual construction could begin. In sum, the 
unexpected complex geological conditions at the construction site resulted in a re-
vision of the cost estimate, adding DKK 100 million to the initially calculated and 
formally authorised budget. This new budget and insight also problematised the 
“university vs. non-university” distinction made by the expert panel and supported 
by the NAOD and became a strong concern for the project management. 
 
In the New North Zealand Hospital, this problematic distinction between ‘univer-
sity’ and ‘non-university’ project and its subsequent fund allocation scheme was to 
                                                 
27 In Denmark the New Stone Age, or the Neolithic Era, lasted approx. between 3,900 and 1,800 BC. 
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affect the actual construction and design work to be undertaken. The project or-
ganisation had designed a quite ambitious project with the aim of setting new 
standards for hospital quality, including a proper kitchen to allow the preparation 
of food at the hospital. This kitchen was considered to be an important aspect of 
the planned new and higher standard of health care. However, when the project 
management realised that the ground conditions at the construction site would in-
cur much higher costs than anticipated, they had to revise their plans. A value 
management exercise was conducted in order to ‘test’ the estimated budget against 
different levels of design ambitions. The project management team carefully 
worked out the test and even mobilised computer-based three-dimensional build-
ing models. The tests and experiments generated new knowledge and insights 
about the project conditions and also prompted the project management to formu-
late different design strategies and options. The first and more ambitious strategy 
dealt with a hospital project that included sufficient funding for a kitchen, but due 
to the estimated DKK 100-million increased construction costs, this would require 
extra funds. As the project and construction management explained, “This was a 
pure extra cost”. The second, less ambitious, option was to prioritise and downsize 
the project in order to meet the current ‘non-university’ budget. The extra funds 
were not approved in the ensuing negotiations with the expert panel and ministry, 
and the project management was forced to abandon the plan to build a kitchen; the 
hospital ended up being downsized by approx. 12,000 square metres, from 
136,000 to 124,000 square metres. As the project management explained: 
 
“We must keep the budget, this is very important to us, and also 
what we are expected to do, so we want the budget to be realistic 
from the start.” 
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This statement illustrates that the project management was well aware of the chal-
lenges when on the one hand aspiring for high ambitions and innovation in hospi-
tal design and health care and on the other hand abiding by controls and risk man-
agement principles that emphasised project execution and delivery according to a 
pre-set budget and project objectives. Similar risk management and downsizing 
took place in other hospital projects in the programme as well, with emerging con-
cerns and ensuing public debate about the quality and outcome of the projects and 
the programme. Against this backdrop, a special consultant responsible for risk 
management across the Region of Southern Denmark’s hospital projects consid-
ered it to be an extraordinarily difficult and uncertain task to estimate risks on a 
large and complex hospital construction project with a completion time 10 years in 
the future: 
 
“Frankly speaking, nobody knows for sure if we will be on, below 
or even twice beyond the budget or more [!]”. Risk Manager, Spe-
cial Consultant  
 
Another concern, which was even more critical for the projects, according to 
themselves, was the certainty and rigidity of the formal budget, which seemed to 
be “made in stone” and treated as such by the expert panel, the ministries and the 
parliament. In the different projects, this fixed nature of the budget was considered 
potentially detrimental for the completion of the hospitals, and not least the subse-
quent operation of them. The special consultant responsible for risk management 
quoted above explained that “it would have been better to have had more flexibil-
ity so that project plans and designs could have been adapted to new and still un-
known technological solutions and social and health trends”. But, even if long 
term operational advantages using alternative technological solutions could be 
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demonstrated using an impeccable investment calculus as support, it would not be 
possible within the budgetary constraints to negotiate for extra funds. Everything 
had to be accounted for within existing project budgets, the risk consultant ex-
plained, and added that the current risk management set-up appeared to be more 
concerned with bureaucratic control within the confined space of the individual 
construction project budget and less with the long-term quality, benefits and value 
for the operation of the new hospital. 
 
Over time this concern grew, and when the NAOD two years later produced a new 
report on the hospital projects’ management of state funds, they concluded that 
most projects in most regions had failed to consider whether the new hospital 
buildings could live up to the purpose of increased operational efficiency and ef-
fectiveness (Rigsrevisionen, 2013). In their conclusion, the NAOD wrote that “the 
regions have often not been able to account for the grounds on which key project 
decisions have been made”, and that now “there is a high risk that the regions have 
made decisions in the early phases that may make it difficult to realise the benefits 
[of the projects]” (Rigsrevisionen, 2013, p. 2). The regions responded by arguing 
that the savings would be met in all circumstances, because if projects failed to de-
liver operational savings, they would have their operational cost framework re-
duced by the required amount according to project commitment conditions. In re-
sponse to this, however, the NAOD warned the regions that if they proceeded 
along this path, they would be demonstrating “an unreflective management ac-
counting practice”, which could lead to “uncontrollable consequences” being a 
“direct violation of the project funding conditions” (Rigsrevisionen, 2013, p. 2). 
 
The NAOD had changed its focus from being primarily concerned with the project 
economy, the capital budget, and the risk of exceeding it, to now being concerned 
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with the longer-term ‘total economy’ of the operation of the future hospitals. The 
KPMG report from 2008 again became part of the argument. The NAOD remind-
ed the regions that total economy was a vital factor in public construction projects 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2013). Another reminder concerned the specific requirement for 
funding, namely that each project had to demonstrate a certain level of increased 
efficiency and effectiveness in hospital operation compared to a cost baseline de-
fined at the point of project approval. The NAOD thus urged the regions and pro-
ject owners to calculate the productivity gains and ‘total economy’. Uncertainty, 
however, was again recognised: 
 
“In connection with the projects, the possibility of using a calculus 
of total economy is limited due to the fixed budgetary frame for 
each construction, which may not be exceeded. This means that the 
regions can only implement solutions that are possible within the 
allocated frame [Danish in original; our translation]”. (Rigsrevi-
sionen, 2013, p. 31) 
 
The NAOD thus seemed to express concern that the longer-term total economy of 
the individual hospitals 'in use' might have to pay for the rigidities associated with 
the ‘fixed’ construction budget for each of the hospitals at project start. It thus ap-
pears that the rigidities of the risk control set-up, which the risk manager of one of 
the projects had warned against two years earlier, was about to return to the 
NAOD as an emerging and quite complex issue about risks produced by the cur-
rent risk management system itself. Although it was still framed in terms of the 
need for budget control and classic rational risk management for the individual 
project, the question of uncertainty and lack of flexibility in the long term had re-
entered the discussion, which gave rise to new uncertainties about the future value 
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of the individual projects when the hospital building was put to use. In addition, 
and relatedly, new concerns and uncertainties emerged about the usefulness and 
value of emphasising risks at the individual construction project level. 
 
The regions organised risk management in different ways. Some regions central-
ised risk management of their construction projects at the regional level, while 
other regions delegated risk management to the individual project level. The focus 
on the individual project was entirely in line with the NAOD and KPMG’s rec-
ommendations – all regions had to report on project risks at the level of the indi-
vidual construction project. Yet, project managers and risk managers also ex-
pressed concerns about the focus on the individual project. Some also questioned 
the related focus on the ‘total economy’ of the individual hospital when the build-
ing was put to use. A systemic understanding of public healthcare seems to under-
lie their concern: The hospitals in a region were mutually interdependent and had 
established a division of labour concerning patient treatments and capacity. Down-
sizing one hospital due to budget concerns related to an individual hospital project 
could generate complex and less desirable performance effects on a systemic lev-
el, not only in terms of the total economy across hospitals in a region, but also in 
terms of the region’s capacity and quality of treatment in a longer-term perspec-
tive. One risk manager referred approvingly to the regions that had managed to 
counterbalance this strong focus on the individual project risks by organising risk 
management at the regional level. In effect, such a risk management organisation 
would facilitate a more systemic understanding of risks across the individual con-
struction projects in the region’s project portfolio, rather than just subscribe to a 
narrow focus on the individual hospital. 
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To sum up, the hospital construction programme and projects show the complex 
dynamics of risk management, for example how new issues and uncertainties 
emerge due to the way risk management has been set up and performs. An integral 
part of this dynamics is the difficulty of the existing risk management framework 
to take into account actors’ knowledge and concerns that goes beyond the formal 
definitional notion of ‘risk’ as it is enforced through the distinction between ‘is-
sues’ (or out of project scope) and ‘risk’ (within the project scope). The distinction 
generates new uncertainties concerning what to classify as a proper risk. Related 
discussions concern classifications of the projects themselves, is it a relatively 
simple “non-university” project – or rather unexpectedly, a geologically complex 
and culturally rich project? Relations and concerns about the hospital in use, such 
as the design and quality of having a kitchen in the hospital becomes secondary to 
the emphasis on managing the project risks to ensure consistency between initially 
stipulated project goals and outcomes – and in particular those related to the cost, 
time and budget frame of the construction project. Quality, by contrast, appears to 
be a more complex and fragile phenomenon, being more difficult to measure and 
monitor during the project risk management processes. Quality and associated de-
sign ambitions also appears to be increasingly more uncertain as the short term 
risk management concern about keeping the construction budget becomes more 
important than the longer term value, the total economy as the NAOD wrote, of 
the future hospital in operation. 
 
8.7. Risk management in practice: the Signalling Programme 
 
8.7.1. Background 
In January 2009, the Signalling Programme came into being as the Danish parlia-
ment decided to fund a DKK 23.7 billion programme of renewing and replacing 
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all Danish railway signalling before 2020/21 (Transportministeriet, 2009a). The 
Signalling Programme here refers to the total programme of renewing all Danish 
railway signalling from basic train detection and point machines to overall traffic 
management systems. It came into being because the signalling systems had aged 
to the point where an asset-by-asset renewal would exceed total renewal costs in 
2024, which meant that it would be more expensive to do nothing. At the same 
time, about 39,000 trains per year were delayed, accounting for about half of all 
nation-wide train delays, because of the state of the existing signalling systems. In 
the years from 2000 to 2005, this prompted the National Audit Office of Denmark 
to look into Rail Net Denmark, the state-owned enterprise that owns and manages 
the railway infrastructure, which resulted in the organisation being criticised for 
having “inadequate practices of management accounting” (Rigsrevisionen [Na-
tional Audit Office of Denmark], 2002, 2004, 2005). Over the years, this had led 
to misinformation of the parliament as to the current state of the railways, the 
maintenance backlog, increased passenger traveling time and reduced train punc-
tuality. The Signalling Programme was launched in order “to ensure a robust and 
sustainable long-term agreement and a total prioritisation regarding the future de-
velopment of the rail network” (Finansministeriet, 2006). 
 
The Signalling Programme represents more than just a restoration of train regulari-
ty as a straightforward economic business case; it also represents the first Danish 
attempt at introducing an all-encompassing practice of risk management. In 2006, 
the Danish Ministry of Finance had grown tired of repeatedly having to deal with 
cost overruns on large infrastructure projects (Finansministeriet, 2010). In an at-
tempt to avoid this, the Ministry of Finance, in close collaboration with the Danish 
Ministry of Transport, had been inspired by developments from Norway and the 
UK, where “reference class forecasting” had been implemented (Transportminis-
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teriet, 2006). This concept replaced the existing practice of including risk esti-
mates when calculating cost estimates by a different practice of calculating cost 
estimates using historical prices and quantities. The Ministry of Finance then em-
phasised implementing an all-encompassing risk management practice in order to 
ensure that cost estimates could still be met. In acknowledging that large infra-
structure projects were unique in nature and consequently faced great uncertainty 
regarding achieving its costs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Transport also introduced a risk margin of 30 per cent that was to be added on top 
of the budget. This margin was not to be used unless under observation of strict 
rules, so much trust was put into the risk management practice in order to ensure 
that cost overruns would not happen and thus that project objectives would be met. 
 
The Signalling Programme runs from 2009 until 2020/21 and has been divided in-
to three main subprojects; the regional lines west, the regional line east, and the 
Copenhagen mass transit system. It also consists of several minor subprojects that 
are important for achieving the objectives of the three main subprojects. The pro-
gramme employs on average more than 120 people, of whom approx. two-third 
are externally hired consultants, which makes this project the most consultant-
dependent project in Denmark to date. As the Ministry of Finance and the Minis-
try of Transport were uncertain about know how to approach risk management, the 
actual risk management practice was designed by consultants. It uses the approach 
to risk management defined by the Project Management Institute’s Body of 
Knowledge (PMI, 2004), known as PMBOK, which represents one of the current 
“best-practice” approaches to project management worldwide, and it includes a 
large section on systematic risk management. 
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8.7.2. The development of the risk management frame 
 
“When we decided how we wanted to construct the practice, we 
agreed that we would follow PMBOK to define our risk terminolo-
gies. We just didn’t want people to question our understanding of 
risk management… There are so many ways [to construct a prac-
tice] and it is hard to tell what is right or wrong. But if we can 
agree that we use this approach, “that’s it”. It’s just more simple 
like that”. Senior Risk Consultant (I2, 66, 73) 
 
PMBOK was not the obvious choice of framework; but “we just didn’t want peo-
ple to question our understanding of risk management”, as the consultant said. 
PMBOK was chosen, however, and the practice was framed around that. This 
framing meant defining risks as “potential events with either positive or negative 
impact on project objectives” and risk management as “the systematic processes of 
managing risks”. The latter meant introducing the well-known iterative process of: 
“risk identification, risk assessment, risk reduction and monitoring and control” 
(see also last section) and integrating this with project processes throughout the 
lifespan of the project and the subprojects. It also meant drawing upon a cause-
and-effect based logic when describing risks, where actors have to define risks and 
link them to project objectives, as well as applying the “traffic light assessment 
matrix”, where risks are assessed using the probability times consequence logic 
and subsequently assigned the colour of red (high), yellow (moderate) or green 
(low) to prioritize their severity, and basing risk reducing actions on that prior as-
sessment. In selecting the categories on which to base the assessment of risks, the 
risk consultants decided that risks were to be assessed related to their impact on 
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cost, time and punctuality (quality), which also reflected PMBOK. In relation to 
the above, the consultants further specified the purpose of the practice: 
 
“The objective of the risk management process is to bring all pro-
ject risks to acceptable levels in accordance with the risk rating 
matrix. This means that risks rated as High [red] and Moderate 
[yellow] must be mitigated unless it is possible to demonstrate that 
the cost involved in reducing the risk further would be grossly dis-
proportionate to the benefit gained”. (Ramboll, 2009) 
 
In further framing the practice, the consultants also defined the different types of 
meetings that were necessary (risk workshops, risk follow-up meetings and cross-
risk review meetings), those to be involved (project managers, programme man-
agement and other stakeholders) as well as the reporting structure of the practice. 
The consultants distributed the responsibility of identifying, assessing and reduc-
ing risks to project managers, who were assigned the role of risk owners, while 
they retained the role as the experts managing the practice themselves. In order to 
keep track of the status of the identified risks and risk reducing measures and to 
generate overviews of the current risk status, the consultants then designed an IT-
based risk management control system. This IT-based system enabled the consult-
ants to better operate the practice, by for example keeping track of responsibilities 
and actions, presenting plans for risk reduction, providing documentation for what 
had been accepted, and by whom, and not least by visualising risk developed over 
time with the construct of ‘value at risk’, which demonstrated how large a per-
centage of the budget is at stake at any given time. It uses Monte Carlo simula-
tions to arrive at that total cost estimate, but relies on risk owners to actually pro-
vide the individual risk cost assessment that it uses to calculate total costs. 
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In the years between 2006 and 2009, the above framing and implementation of 
risk management was carried out, and during that time, in 2008, the Ministry of 
Transport was able to produce and proudly present a guidance document for all 
entities under its jurisdiction in charge of large infrastructure projects on how to 
do risk management (Transportministeriet, 2008). This document made explicit 
reference to the Signalling Programme and emphasised how this represented a 
best-of-class example of how to carry out risk management. In 2009, when the 
programme organisation was coming together and the programme entered the pro-
curement phase, most people involved, the consultants, the Ministry and manage-
ment alike, felt very confident about the capabilities of the practice. The National 
Audit Office of Denmark had also ceased been critical towards Rail Net Denmark 
and its lack of a proper management accounting practice (Rigsrevisionen, 2009), 
and by 2008-09, the Danish Road Directorate could similarly introduce risk man-
agement, heavily inspired by the Signalling Programme (Transportministeriet, 
2009b). In summary, the framing of the practice of risk management in the Signal-
ling Programme had thus been so successful that other practices were now also be-
ing framed along similar lines (See the previous section on Gødstrup Hospital). 
  
The following years as the programme left the programme definition phase and 
entered the procurement phase, which ended with the contracts for the three main 
subprojects being signed; the consultants operated the practice successfully. The 
project managers had been successfully involved in the practice and provided in-
put to the control system according to the way the practice had been framed. It al-
so helped that the consultants were able to show decreasing ‘values-at-risk’ and 
demonstrate changing risks at each status report deadline. This indicated to the 
programme management and the Ministry of Transport that the project was well 
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on track; and these actors, in turn, were very satisfied with the risk management 
and the progress of the project. 
 
8.7.3. Overflowing and emerging concerns on the Signalling Programme 
As the project moved further away from the initial project planning and specifica-
tion phases, concerns began to emerge. In the beginning, these concerns were 
mostly related to minor issues, such as some project managers finding the risk 
meetings a time-consuming exercise, or others finding the processes or the IT-
system confusing. Some of the project managers were sometimes reluctant to ac-
cept this new way of doing risk management. There were also concerns coming 
from the programme management and the consultants who had constructed the 
practice. The two quotes below illustrate a risk manager and a risk supervisor, re-
spectively, articulating such emerging concerns regarding the overall practice: 
 
”It is not all our project managers who work with risk management 
in the same way just because they are project managers on infra-
structure projects where you have to make this work. We are forced 
to constantly negotiate with some of them if we want them to accept 
their role, not least the risks themselves, the way we want them to 
do so…”. Risk Manager (I1, 279) 
 
“You have to recognise that doing risk assessments is uncertain, 
but that does not mean you should stop doing them… Employing 
the 5x5 matrix does limit that uncertainty... It’s not an exact sci-
ence; forget it... but with risk management you can calculate the 
level of uncertainty fairly accurately”. Senior Risk Consultant (I2, 
171) 
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In the early years, the consultants overcame these issues by organising regular 
meetings every second month, as well as risk workshops on a regular basis. These 
meetings and workshops allowed the consultants to enforce the framing through 
dialogue and rational argumentation with the project managers. However, as the 
project progressed further into contract negotiation, and later after the contracts 
had been signed, events started to take place which made project managers ques-
tion the reliability of the practice. These project managers would argue that the 
certainty generated by the practice had more to do with pleasing the governing 
bodies and less to do with reducing actual risks. One such event was the bankrupt-
cy of Pihl and Son, a major Danish contractor, who had been contracted to con-
struct two new traffic control centres. This event sent ripples throughout the con-
struction sector, as many small contractors whose businesses depended on Pihl 
and Son went down with them. It also meant that construction on the two traffic 
control centres came to a halt. It turned out not to have severe consequences after 
all, as construction of the two control centres was not a part of the critical path that 
needed to be followed for the entire project to be completed. The Signalling Pro-
gramme went back to the initial bidders for the contract and chose the second best 
bid, which meant that actual costs “only” increased by a few million, but the event 
did make project managers question whether having a formal practice of risk man-
agement could prevent such events. 
 
Another issue concerned the situation that several project managers realised that 
proposed risks could not be accepted if they could not be made measureable in 
terms of the cause-and-effect description logic mentioned above. This led to con-
cerns on multiple occasions, as project managers often had ‘gut feelings’ from pri-
or experience that could not be included, as the project managers were unable to 
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translate such feelings into “proper” risks. However, it was not the more experi-
enced project managers who expressed this concern; they were often able without 
any problems to make their felt uncertainties measureable. It was the new and 
comparatively inexperienced project managers with only a few years of project 
experience but still enough, according to themselves, to have ‘gut feelings’ about 
risks, who felt their concerns were neglected by the practice. In one case, for ex-
ample, a project manager was very sceptical of a newly signed contract with a 
supplier because he knew from prior experience that this supplier tended to make 
mistakes that could lead to delays. When he explained this to the consultant oper-
ating the practice, his perceived risk was excluded on the grounds that it could not 
be accounted for within the boundaries of the practice. Two years later, that same 
supplier made mistakes in both design and testing that caused several trains to be 
grounded by the traffic authorities. This situation almost turned into a major media 
scandal, as timetables came as close as possible to having to be completely 
changed (which would have resulted in longer traveling times, fewer trains, etc.). 
Fortunately for the project that did not happen. 
 
It was this type of situation, however, that made project managers express their 
concern about the capabilities of the practice, and its relevance, as it took hours of 
work. In that connection, the project managers would repeat that the project was 
scheduled to run for approx. 12 years, and because of its uniqueness, it could be 
prone to many such events. The lack of ability to accommodate such gut feelings, 
concerns, hunches, and intuitions of actors with years of experience was therefore 
seen as risky in itself. The following quotation problematises this: 
 
“The risk assessment, I am convinced, encounters the fundamental 
problem that it needs to be conducted within the framework of the 
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human psyche that allows us to plan maximum one year ahead. All 
things assessed after this becomes something we cannot, but still 
need to, work with. In the risk meetings we all reach this conclu-
sion. This troubles us”. Risk Manager (I1, 159) 
 
As the quote demonstrates, the central actors of the practice were aware of the 
problem, but over the course of the project it remained unsolved. This relates to 
one more concern held by the project managers, namely that once the initial pro-
ject description had been made, the budget had been locked, and the overall focus 
seemed to be on preventing cost overruns. This was evident to many, as the as-
sessment categories when assessing risks focused primarily on cost and time (as 
these were the two factors reported on) and not so much on punctuality, despite 
the situation that this had been included into the practice as a factor to be assessed. 
In practice, this meant for the project managers that the practice could only take 
those risks into account that they were able to qualify in terms of effects on, first, 
project objectives, and second, time, cost and punctuality. This gave rise concern 
on the part of project managers who wanted to take effects into account on later 
operations, such as increased maintenance costs or reduced operational quality. 
They also wanted to assess the effects of risks on the objectives of other entities, 
such as the small private train operators and/or on their own subprojects. These 
needs of the project managers, however, were dismissed by both consultants and 
the programme management as being “out of scope” and “merely concerns”. 
These proposed risks by local project managers were thus excluded as risks to the 
risk management practice. 
 
To illustrate this concern, a safety manager and a head project manager of a sub-
project discussed raising the cost impact assessment of a certain risk (classified), 
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because new events had taken place which had caused them to face new uncertain-
ties, the safety manager argued. The head project manager found such a high as-
sessment unrealistic. The two participants continued to discuss this, but the situa-
tion appeared deadlocked, as none of them was willing to give in to the other 
party. At that time, the safety manager had not mentioned that the impact he envi-
sioned would be on subsequent operations. As during the debate, the head manag-
er suddenly became aware that the reason for the proposed higher assessment re-
lated to such subsequent operations, the deadlock was broken. Now he could 
explain to the safety manager that because the practice focused on the objectives 
of the project and not on later operations, the higher assessment was irrelevant to 
the programme. The safety manager looked surprised, but as the head subproject 
manager's words were supported by a risk consultant, who explained to him that 
such were the rules of the practice, the discussion ended. In short, this situation il-
lustrates that when risks have effects on anything else but the capital budget (or 
the chances to meet it), such as later operations, they are excluded from the prac-
tice. 
 
Similarly, the project managers had to accept that events that were known to hap-
pen, or had happened, but the effects of which were unknown, were also excluded 
because they were outside the boundaries of the practice. This was evident as the 
practice is based on a best-practice framework of risk management in which such 
events are not considered to be risks at all; they are termed ‘issues’, or in this case, 
‘day-to-day operations risks’. The consultants further argued that because such 
events happened all the time, it would be too ambitious and too comprehensive to 
take them into account. The project managers argued that these so-called ‘issues’ 
represented the large majority of all risks and thus represented the majority of 
what they spent their time dealing with. Excluding them thus led to the alienation 
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of risk management from everyday work. The risk consultants listened to the pro-
ject managers’ arguments, but they still insisted that project managers dealt with 
them outside the formal practice of risk management. In effect, this made many 
project managers conduct their own simultaneous risk management practices 
bringing those “issues” into account, which, in turn, led to new uncertainty for the 
risk consultants regarding the completeness of the more formal practice. 
 
In summary, the Signalling Programme represents a case where risk management 
has been framed around a best-practice risk management framework with all that 
entails: from framing risks as “uncertain events with positive or negative impacts” 
to assuming the logic that risks can be reduced by defining a risk appetite, identi-
fying risks according to the logic of cause-and-effect, making assessments on 
time, cost and quality (punctuality), taking action based on such assessments, and 
monitoring and controlling the practice by producing risk values that indicate 
whether more or less action needs to be taken. It also entailed distributing respon-
sibilities to project managers as owners and risk consultants as expert knowledge 
producers framing when and how to have risk meetings and setting the agenda for 
such meetings. In this respects concerns emerged from especially project manag-
ers who were worried about the relevance of risk management, its ability to pro-
vide certainty, and the work it required. This was emphasised, either when events 
occurred that the practice had taken into account but which occurred nevertheless, 
or when events occurred that the project managers had raised as an issue but 
which could not be included because of the way risk management had been 
framed. The following section examines the similarities and differences between 
these practices and looks into the role of knowledge in risk management practices. 
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8.8. Developing the overarching frame – RM practices and overflowing across 
the two programmes 
With respect to the Signalling Programme, recent legislation had made it compul-
sory to implement risk management, and with respect to the Hospital Programme, 
the Danish Radio Building construction scandal had led KPMG and Grant 
Thornton to strongly recommend more systematic risk management. Rail Net 
Denmark, the organisation responsible for carrying out the Signalling Programme, 
recognised that they did not have sufficient competencies to manage the project 
and thus contracted with a consultancy conglomerate, of which one member, 
Ramboll, developed guidelines on how to practice risk management. This was 
similar to the Hospital Programme where two consultancy companies, Ernst and 
Young and KPMG, were contracted to develop both overall project management 
guidelines and more specific management accounting principles, one of which 
concerned systematic risk management. In the Signalling Programme, however, 
Ramboll were also made responsible for operating the practice, which was differ-
ent from the Hospital Programme, where the individual projects became responsi-
ble for operationalising the guidelines produced for them by KPMG. 
 
One of the major reasons for the decision to use consultancy firms in the two pro-
grammes was because the Ministry of Finance, and subsequently the two relevant 
responsible ministries, had developed a particular control ambition in close col-
laboration with consultancy companies in order to strengthen management control 
and prevent cost overruns through systematic risk management in large projects. 
This particular control ambition also appeared from government white papers on 
infrastructure projects which were circulated to the different ministries, direc-
torates and departments at the time when the decision had to be made whether to 
approve the projects for construction (See for example, Transportministeriet, 
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2006, 2008; and Finansministeriet, 2010). This control ambition was further sup-
ported by the National Audit Office of Denmark, which on several occasions had 
criticised the lack of adequate management control systems in Danish public insti-
tutions (e.g. Rigsrevisionen, 2004, 2005, 2011, 2013). At the same time, however, 
the Ministry of Finance lacked experience in implementing such procedures and 
left the two programmes with the challenge of figuring out how to do that on their 
own. In doing so, the programmes took on expert assistance by contracting consul-
tancy companies (albeit different ones) 
 
Despite the fact that these were different consultancy companies, they ended up 
recommending systematic risk management based on the same conventional ra-
tional risk management approach, the current best-practice approach seen across 
many organisations and sectors. In the Signalling Programme, Ramboll explained 
that they wanted to use a solution that people were already familiar with, so they 
drew upon the generic “best practice” Project Management Institute’s Body of 
Knowledge’ section on risk management. This entailed defining risks as “potential 
events with either positive or negative impact on project objectives” and risk man-
agement as “the systematic processes of managing risks”. The project objectives 
were defined as being completion on time and within costs and the achievement of 
increased punctuality (quality). Risk management meant defining a pre-given risk 
willingness and then identifying and assessing risks according to their impact on 
the project objectives, reducing these risks below the level of the willingness, and 
monitoring and controlling the entire process in order to provide feedback adjust-
ments as necessary. It further meant integrating risk management with other pro-
ject processes throughout the lifespan of the project and its subprojects. It was also 
recognised that no statistical data could be used to make the assessments, which 
meant that the practice relied on the ‘best’ judgment of the parties involved. 
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In the Hospital Programme, KPMG similarly drew on the conventional generic 
“best practice” approach to risk management, although being less focused on a 
“one size fits all” principle, as the purpose was to let the regions decide for them-
selves how they wanted to implement the practice. In their report, KPMG defined 
risks as being “potential events with either positive or negative impact on project 
objectives”, and risk management as “the continual assessment of project risks 
with the purpose of creating an overview of these so that the necessary actions can 
be taken according to pre-given risk willingness”. KPMG also stated that the level 
of risk willingness should be defined in relation to the project objectives of time, 
cost and quality, and that risk management should be conducted throughout the 
lifetime of the programme. The two programmes therefore came to bear many di-
rect resemblances to each other: the reliance on the generic “best practice” expert-
knowledge of consultants, the identification of risks related to project and project-
only effects, the assumption that uncertainties can be measured, categorised, plot-
ted, ranked and visualised into matrices, the definition of pre-given risk willing-
ness at the beginning of the project, and the rational planning and action-taking 
according to this throughout the lifetime of the project. Thus due to these similari-
ties, the two programmes also came to be situated within an overarching risk man-
agement frame. 
 
When it came to the operationalisation of these overarching principles, however, 
the two programmes went in different directions. In the Signalling Programme, 
Ramboll defined the different types of meetings that were necessary (risk follow-
up meetings, risk workshops and cross-risk review meetings) and the frequency of 
them. They also defined which actors were to be involved (project managers, pro-
gramme management, suppliers, etc.) and distributed their responsibilities (e.g. 
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project managers as risk owners and themselves as risk experts) and decided who 
were invited to meetings. They further set up the risk organisation, defined the re-
porting structure and produced the status reports, and they developed the training 
material and IT-based risk management system. In addition, the system allowed 
them to facilitate practices such as recording risks, keeping track of responsibili-
ties and risk reducing actions, documenting what was accepted and by whom, and 
not least categorising, prioritising, ranking and visualising risks according to the 
“traffic light assessment matrix”. The system allowed the practice to follow up on 
the risk willingness, which was defined from the outset as follows: risks graded as 
high (red) and moderate (yellow) should be reduced unless it was unfeasible to do 
so, while risks graded as low (green) could be accepted (unless they could be re-
duced without incurring extra costs). 
  
The Hospital Programme approached the operationalisation of the guidelines dif-
ferently, as the regions could decide for themselves which actual tools and princi-
ples to work with. In this respect, KPMG recommended “successive calculation” 
among other tools, something which the different regions decided to follow when 
they did their initial risk assessment. In integrating this across the individual re-
gional projects, they also defined which actors to include (project managers, pro-
gramme management, etc.) and allocated specific roles to them in order to make 
sure that the project objectives would be met. As the programme organisation dif-
fered from one region to the next, these responsibilities were distributed different-
ly, but the logic of having risk owners and risk experts/facilitators remained the 
same. In the beginning, they also had different reporting standards, but after the 
National Audit Office of Denmark had criticised the Ministry of Health for having 
neglected their oversight responsibilities, they also introduced the “traffic light as-
sessment matrix”. The different regions defined different levels of risk willing-
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ness, but the same logic about reducing high (red) and moderate (yellow) risks 
while to a certain degree accepting low (green) risks remained the same. It was 
much more individual from one region to the next how actual meetings, identifica-
tion criteria, etc. were organised. Some had monthly meetings while other had 
meetings at more irregular intervals. 
 
In contrast to what was the case of the Signalling Programme, KPMG’s recom-
mendation on the use of “successive calculation” and the regions’ subsequent 
adoption of them was unexpected. In 2006, the Ministry of Finance in collabora-
tion with the Danish Ministry of Transport had banned the use of “successive cal-
culation” in large infrastructure projects carried out under the auspices of the Min-
istry of Transport due to bad experiences with this principle across all types of 
construction projects. The use of “successive calculation” had led to massive cost 
overruns. In the Hospital Programme, however, this principle was promoted by 
KPMG in their reports as a solid tool to practice systematic risk management, and 
KPMG’s reports, in turn, were promoted by both the NAOD and the Ministry of 
Health. Considering the actual elements of “successive calculation” in the individ-
ual projects, however, this amounted to much the same basic conception. In these 
projects, risks were also defined as “events with impacts on project objectives”, 
although sometimes the focus was only on negative events, and sometimes only 
“surprising events”. In its basic logic, however, focus was still on the project and 
the same objectives of time, cost and quality. 
 
When we looked into the details of the practices, however, it was evident that at 
least one of them had been set up along the same lines as the Signalling Pro-
gramme. At Gødstrup Hospital, like many of the others, the project organisation 
had been unsure about how to develop their practices, which was why they con-
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tacted the Danish Road Directorate. As the analysis showed, a few years earlier 
the Road Directorate had adopted the Signalling Programme’s risk management 
approach, as the Ministry of Transport, supervising both organisations, promoted 
the Signalling Programme’s risk management approach as best-practice and intro-
duced it across the entire Road Directorate organisation. So, in unexpected ways 
the Signalling Programme’s practice found its way to the Gødstrup Hospital pro-
ject, and the two projects thus used the exact same tools and concepts. This shows 
that although risk management might be introduced as generic principles and 
guidelines by ministries and expert consultants, it needs to be executed locally in 
project practices, which in turn can generate local variances, or lead to very simi-
lar forms. 
 
The National Audit Office of Denmark was involved in both cases, although more 
actively in the Hospital Programme. In the years leading up to the parliamentary 
approval of the Signalling Programme, however, the NAOD was very active in 
criticising Rail Net Denmark, the organisation in charge of the Signalling Pro-
gramme, for having “inadequate management accounting practices”. In response 
to this criticism, and with the implementation of the “New Budgeting Method”, 
Rail Net Denmark introduced an all-embracing practice of risk management. This, 
together with other initiatives, silenced the NAOD, and a few years later they con-
cluded their examination of Rail Net Denmark, and today they still have not spe-
cifically published any reports on the progress of the Signalling Programme. In 
contrast, two major reports were produced on the Hospital Programme. The con-
clusion was that the regions exhibited “inadequate practices of risk management”. 
The NAOD acknowledged the work of KPMG and their focus on systematic risk 
management and thus recommended to the regions as well as the Ministry of 
Health that risk management should be implemented holistically. 
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The Signalling Programme and the Hospital Programme may have ended up fram-
ing the practices according to the same basic conception, but this did not only ena-
ble risk management; it also led to overflows due to the strong focus on project 
objectives. In both cases, those risks that could be defined as “events with effects 
on project objectives” could be included, but those related to, for example, “is-
sues” were excluded for being “out of scope”. This led to emerging concerns from 
groups of actors, especially project managers, who felt that this was difficult to 
understand. In the Signalling Programme, this occasionally meant that events were 
not taken into account, but still had “effects on project objectives”, such as when 
the project manager suggested that they could have collaboration issues with one 
of the new suppliers, which was rejected, but which did result in collaboration is-
sues, for example when the supplier made a design error which resulted in the 
grounding of several trains. Across the cases we found that possible and uncertain 
effects on the future operation tended to be excluded as ‘issues’ or considered ‘out 
of scope’ in relation to the defined project goals. The cases demonstrated that us-
ing conventional risk management led to a strong focus on risks related to the cap-
ital budget, either through increased direct costs or time delays that had indirect 
cost effects. 
 
The cases also further demonstrated that the NAOD actively promoted risk man-
agement across the cases. In 2013, however, the NAOD shifted their focus from 
having promoted risk management to pointing to a potential problem related to the 
fact that risk management had been applied only on project objectives. This meant 
that focus had been very much on the capital budget and less on what they termed 
the ‘total economy’, which therefore included later operational costs. This was one 
of the objectives of the Hospital Programme (also the Signalling Programme), 
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meaning that because of the strong focus on risk management and uncertainty re-
duction, aimed at the capital budget, the regions as well as NAOD, KPMG and the 
Ministry of Health had suddenly and together created the unexpected effect of 
producing new uncertainty regarding the achievement of another one of their ob-
jectives, that of the ‘total economy’, or a reduction in subsequent operational 
costs. In the Signalling Programme, this was also evident, but here the NAOD was 
absent. In the Signalling Programme it was clear from our observations that risks 
having effects or implications for later operations, maintenance or quality were 
excluded: the focus was on costs, time and punctuality, those aspects that had been 
identified at the beginning of the project. The two cases thus both demonstrate 
how a particular framing of what constitutes risks can lead to overflows and re-
problematisation of project conditions and thus create new uncertainty. 
 
8.9. Concluding discussion 
In this paper we have raised the question of how risk management practices shape 
project conditions for large construction and infrastructure projects and with what 
ramifications for knowledge and as project management roles. In addressing this 
question we have drawn upon actor-network theory and Callon’s (1998a) concep-
tion of framing and overflowing. 
 
Three conclusions come to the fore. The first involves what gets lost, or what 
overflows, through the framing and enforcement of rational risk management pro-
cesses. From the inability to include the ‘hunches’ of experienced engineers in the 
signalling case, to the threat of losing sight of the longer-term value of the hospital 
projects as the rigidities of budget and risk control close off more ambitious fu-
ture-oriented thinking, relevance is lost and a hot situation emerges. For the pro-
ject organisations, the rational risk management approach creates a serious dilem-
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ma and challenge. On the one hand, nobody knows what the project results will be 
ten or twenty years into the future. On the other hand, the rational risk manage-
ment approach presupposes that knowledge from the start of the projects and pro-
grammes. The risk consultancy companies, ministries and the NAOD go along 
with that superhuman knowledge assumption when giving primacy to consistency 
and integrity between project plans and outcomes, as if fundamental project uncer-
tainties can be reduced to identifiable (known) risks without any loss. The second 
conclusion concerns the problem of a focus on identifying the responsibilities for 
specific risks, promoting a short-sighted and self-interested approach to manage-
ment, as seen with the dismissal of operational risks as unimportant for the deliv-
ery of the capital programme in the signalling case. Both of these conclusions thus 
suggest the partiality of existing risk management practices, and the narrowness of 
their particular framings, the overflows from which represent in themselves poten-
tial longer-term threats to the societal and economic value of the projects. 
 
Our third conclusion is that both cases involve the application of calculative prac-
tices to very uncertain contexts. We are not necessarily dismissing the utility of 
existing risk management practices, but it does need to be recognised that this is a 
practice of trying to rationally calculate under uncertain knowledge conditions, 
and that there might be other more inclusive ways of thinking about risk and un-
certainty. For example, we have drawn attention to different risk policies in the 
Danish state and ministries, perhaps most notably how the state both promote and 
abandon ‘successive calculation’ across the two programmes, but also how the 
NAOD plays a more or less active role in promoting such risk management prac-
tices. Risk management in this case clearly transgresses the individual project and 
its management. It is a much more distributed collective form of cognition and 
calculation, which in effect implicates the NAOD, the Danish state and ministries 
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as well as the many consultancy firms. When these organisational actors promote 
certain risk management frames, with corresponding assumptions about 
knowledge, predictability and control, it might come at the expense of innovation, 
novelty and intelligent outcomes. Thus actors and agencies such as the NAOD 
might also put the programmes and projects at risk – the project risks are not inde-
pendent of the ways in which those risks are framed, but are integral to the frame 
and its maintenance. 
 
A related and practical question is how a risk management frame based on a 
‘technology of rational choice’ can be reframed and thus enriched with what 
March (1971) termed a ‘technology of foolishness’. We ask this question, since 
the latter seems to be in short supply and also because it seems to resonate with 
the emerging concerns and dilemmas that the project members encounter when 
working under those conditions, feeling that they have to carry all the burden and 
the responsibilities for the outcomes, as if they were solely responsible for the pro-
ject conditions as well. They are not alone in this, and cognitions and responsibili-
ties should be distributed accordingly so that the consultancy firms, ministries and 
public authorities that are active in making and maintaining the frame can be in-
cluded in it. One advantage of this extension and reframing is that the risk man-
agement devices put in place by the agencies to frame and condition project pro-
cesses and outcomes become more visible. A second advantage is that it 
acknowledges the fact that actors and agencies are reflexive, and that knowledge 
produced during the project processes can become a highly valuable resource, 
provided that the risk management devices can be reframed to take it into account. 
Our study shows this reflexivity and potential, but it also shows that the current ra-
tional risk management frame has difficulties in taking actors’ emerging concerns 
and thus their knowledge and reflexivity into account. This poses a particular chal-
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lenge and dilemma for project management roles and responsibilities: On the one 
hand the formal, prescribed role and responsibility to adhere to rational risk man-
agement, and on the other recognising the limitations of that frame and developing 
risk management practices that can better acknowledge the value of new innova-
tive ideas, knowledge and insights produced in the project process. Our work and 
findings side with the latter task and challenge of re-framing the conventional ra-
tional risk management. 
 
We began this paper with Callon’s reminder of what uncertainty is – something 
we do and cannot know. Embracing and responding to this in ways which com-
plement more instrumental notions of risk management may have significant im-
plications for risk management practice, but it may also produce significant bene-
fits for the delivery and overall value of large infrastructure projects. 
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9. Discussion and conclusion 
 
“It is a world of change in which we live, and a world of uncertain-
ty. We live only by knowing something about the future; while the 
problems of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we 
know so little”.  
– Frank Knight (1921, III.VII.4) 
 
This section begins by summarising the key findings from the three analytical sec-
tions that correspond to the three research papers. I have attempted not to summa-
rise the findings too much, as the whole purpose of case studies is to enable the 
capture of details rather than to provide a summarised account. I therefore refer to 
the three papers for more elaborate details of the findings made in this dissertation. 
The second subsection describes how this dissertation contributes to the academic 
literature, by linking the main findings from the three papers and the overall re-
search question put forward in the beginning of the dissertation. The third subsec-
tion follows up on this by elaborating on the implications of the contribution for 
the practising of risk management. The fourth section describes the limitations of 
this dissertation; and the fifth and last subsection sets out directions for future aca-
demic research. 
 
9.1. Summary of the main findings 
The first paper examined the processes of translating uncertainties and risks, but 
rather than defining these two concepts as either unmeasurable or measurable enti-
ties “out there”, the paper drew upon the anti-essentialist stand taken in actor-
network theory. This meant that the paper defined uncertainties as the things “we 
know we do not know” and risks as the more limited amount of uncertainties con-
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structed as such (Callon et al., 2009). In order to provide empirical detailed de-
scriptions of this, one of the largest Danish public capital investment programmes, 
the DKK 23.7-billion Signalling Programme, was followed. In relation to this pro-
gramme, examining the processes of translating uncertainties into risks meant ex-
amining how uncertainties were translated into “uncertain events with either posi-
tive or negative impacts on project objectives”, because that was how the 
programme management and the consultants contracted to manage the practice de-
fined ‘risks’. Their approach was inspired by the Project Management Institute’s 
Body of Knowledge (or PMBOK), which was (and still is) considered one of the 
best-practice frameworks for organising practices of risk management. In accord-
ance with this framework, ‘risks’ were defined as being describable through 
cause-and-effect relations and calculable through the logic of probability times 
consequence. 
 
Contrary to the expectation that uncertainties would either be made calculable, and 
thus included as risks, or not, and thus excluded as risks, the first paper found that 
we had to distinguish between two types of constructed risks: pure and impure 
risks. The paper showed that some uncertainties were indeed translated into “un-
certain events with either positive or negative impacts on project objectives”, but 
because the people who suggested them, typically project managers, could not de-
scribe or assess them according to the criteria of the formally established practice, 
they were deemed “mere” uncertain things and excluded as “risks”. The paper 
went on to show that for the actors proposing them, these uncertainties tended to 
be re-constructed as risks, but this time in localised and subproject-specific prac-
tices. In practice, however, because these risks had been excluded from the formal 
practice and thus lacked management attention and resources, local managers 
found them problematic to deal with: Some risks were reduced and some were lat-
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er re-described to fit the criteria of the formal practice, but most ended up as ‘yel-
low post-its’ on a whiteboard, increasing in number over time and creating new 
uncertainties for the practice as well as the entire programme. 
 
The paper also examined the reasons for this construction of pure and impure 
risks, and found that it was primarily the implemented IT-based risk management 
control system (the risk database) that created this distinction. This IT-based con-
trol system ended up purifying the processes of constructing and managing risks 
because it was present at all risk meetings and only allowed the inclusion of those 
risks that could be described in accordance with pre-established criteria (the pure 
risks). In these meetings, a visualisation of the system would be projected on the 
back wall of the conference room, and all the attendees would be watching it dur-
ing their description of risks. This IT-system would show the cause-and-effect risk 
description fields and the assessment category boxes that had to be filled in in or-
der for the risk to be recorded and included as such. If the participants were unable 
to provide this information, the proposed or described uncertainties would remain 
just that and never be included as risks. They would be excluded in spite of the 
finding that to the participants proposing them, they still represented “uncertain 
events with either positive or negative impacts on project objectives”. In relation 
to this finding, the paper also made findings regarding the types of risks included 
and excluded, the importance of understanding risk management within the larger 
budgetary frame, and the importance of understanding the work done by the risk 
experts: the risk consultants. 
 
In complementing the first paper’s focus on the translation of uncertainties into 
risks, the second paper focused on the relationship between the framework drawn 
upon to construct the practice, PMBOK, and the later practising of risk manage-
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ment. This paper continued the reliance on the Signalling Programme, but extend-
ed the period under examination to also include the period from 2012 to 2014 (the 
first paper focused on the period 2010 to 2012). As the paper focused more broad-
ly on the entire practice of risk management rather than the more specific process-
es of constructing risks, the paper also expanded the actor-network studied. This 
led to the inclusion of the main suppliers and the main train operator as “new” ac-
tors, and also to the inclusion of programme management and the governing state 
bodies to an even larger extent. As a result, the amount of observation studies, the 
number of interviews and the documents collected were almost doubled. The sec-
ond paper also focused on a situation where the practice of risk management was 
producing uncertainty rather than certainty and sought to explain the conditions 
under which the practice succeeded in overcoming this situation. 
 
The second paper arrived at three key findings. The paper showed firstly that the 
risk consultants and the programme management could produce certainty regard-
ing project objectives, not only by reducing actual risks, but by framing and re-
framing the way risk management was practised.28 In this sense, the paper showed 
how the consultants framed the practice of risk management in ways that enabled 
the production of increased certainty, which was to be demonstrated by the ‘value 
at risk’ curve. It then described how events took place that caused the practice to 
misfire, meaning that events caused the practice to produce increasing ‘value at 
risk’ curves (symbolising increased uncertainty), despite the fact that the practice 
was adhering to all the precepts of the PMBOK-framework. The paper then fol-
lowed how the consultants managed to turn the developments around in order to 
                                                 
28 It should also be pointed out that I am not saying that no risk reduction took place or that no risk reduction will 
ever be necessary. I am saying that I observed that despite the fact that risks were reduced, the ‘value at risk’ curve 
was still increasing, which indicated flaws in the logic of the implemented framework (as this curve was to produce 
decreasing ‘value at risk’ and thus generate increased certainty – and not the other way around). 
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be able again to produce a decreasing ‘value at risk’ curve without solely relying 
on the reduction of risks. I need to stress that I did not observe any attempts by the 
programme management and the risk consultants to suppress or otherwise manipu-
late with the established practice. It was evident that all these actors were con-
cerned with was to construct a practice that in the best possible way represented 
the underlying situation of the subprojects and the programme as a whole. 
 
The paper’s second key finding was that performativity success could be achieved 
during times of misfires by reconfiguring the technical risk device, risk terminolo-
gies and the roles of the key actors of the practice. The paper showed how this 
was evident, because the consultants operating the practice of risk management 
did not manage to curb the increasing ‘value at risk’ curve until the IT-based risk 
management control system had been adjusted. In this respect, the consultants al-
tered the system’s design and moved it from an Access-based platform managed 
centrally by the consultants to an online Internet-based platform. This allowed 
online access and gave all enrolled actors new user rights, such as individual ac-
cess to the production of status reports, individual options for adding and deleting 
risk-related information, change of risk ownership between users without the in-
volvement of consultants, etc. These changes to the IT-based control system were 
not sufficient, however, as the ‘value at risk’ curve continued to increase after the 
implementation of the changes. Consequently, the consultants incorporated new 
risk terminologies into the system, such as “approved” and “non-approved” risks, 
“overall risks” and “sub-risk”, and only allowed “approved” risks and “overall 
risks” to be included. As this was still not enough, the consultants re-distributed 
the roles of the actors, something which they managed to do by reconfiguring spe-
cific user rights into the control system. After these measures had been taken, the 
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‘value at risk’ began to decrease again, as proposed by the implemented PMBOK-
inspired framework. 
 
The third finding continues along the actor-network theory way of thinking by as-
serting that uncertainties will always be effects of the framing of any practice. The 
paper showed that uncertainties were not “out there” to be brought into the pro-
gramme through practices of risk management; rather they were produced through 
such (and other) practices. It might be that that which we know that we do not 
know can be defined as uncertainties, but they are not uncertainties for someone 
before they are brought into networks of associations. The paper showed this by 
describing some of the events that threatened the programme; these events were 
only considered risky because certain actors constructed them as such – and that 
only because these actors compared them against the pre-set/framed project objec-
tives. The same goes for the practice of risk management: It follows from the find-
ings that risk management also ended up producing unexpected uncertainties. This 
happened because of the way this practice was aligned with framed project objec-
tives. Events that ended up affecting these objectives, but which had not been tak-
en into account by the practice, or worse had been taken into account but had been 
rejected, created new unexpected uncertainties for the practice. 
 
Where the second paper’s third finding (the above) followed as a consequence of 
the findings related to the first two findings, the third paper sought to follow in 
more depth this linkage between (unexpected) uncertainties and risks under the 
conditions of managing large (mega) projects. More specifically, the third paper 
dealt with how practices of risk management shape project conditions, and with 
what ramifications for knowledge and project management roles. In carrying this 
out, the third paper extended the study to also include the Danish DKK 41.4-
337 
 
billion Hospital Programme consisting of 16 unique hospital construction projects. 
All these projects are managed by independent project organisations and are 
scheduled to run from 2008 to 2020, depending on the individual project. The 
third paper also drew on actor-network theory and more specifically applied the 
concepts of framing and overflowing, where the first paper mainly drew on purifi-
cation/inscription and the second paper mainly on performativity and misfires, 
even though these concepts are congruent (See Sections 6, 7 and 8 for references). 
Guided by this, the paper was structured into three sections: first, how the two 
cases’ practices of risk management were framed; second, the overflows or unex-
pected uncertainties this produced; and third, tracing their relations across the two 
programmes. 
 
The third paper made the key finding that dominant risk management approaches 
neglect the wide range of uncertainties that emerge during project processes, and 
that overreliance on these approaches threaten the long-term value and effective-
ness of the project. The paper showed this by demonstrating that both programmes 
applied rationalistic risk management approaches by stressing cause-and-effect 
logics and probability times consequence logics. These programmes presupposed 
that knowledge was malleable to calculable rationales following the “traditional” 
cognitive-rationalist perspective. This meant that knowledge was perceived as an 
input into up-front planning and specification and that the purpose of risk man-
agement was to facilitate improved control with project objectives. Actors and or-
ganisations were reflexive and recognised the up-front uncertainty, ambiguity and 
complexity that characterise large (mega) projects, which tend to run for several 
years. However, it was much more difficult to grant legitimate existence to this re-
flexivity beyond the programmes’ initial planning phases and into later project 
processes. The risk management frame here seemed to take on an active role by 
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emphasising control to ensure that the programmes progressed according to the 
pre-established plans and objectives. In this set-up, little or no legitimate role was 
left to reflexivity and knowledge production during project processes. This risk 
management frame in turn created the conditions for overflowing, emerging un-
certainties and concerns. 
 
The paper then demonstrated the emerging uncertainties that challenged project 
and risk management objectives and assumptions, as new knowledge about project 
objectives were produced during project processes. The paper described the activi-
ties of key project actors and how they performed risk management to the best of 
their ability, but how new and unexpected uncertainties emerged anyway. For ex-
ample, the paper showed how a ‘non-university’ hospital construction unexpected-
ly turned out to be more complex than planned due to particular geological and ar-
chaeological conditions at the construction site. Nobody could have anticipated 
these conditions and the effects they would have, as knowledge of this required 
that comprehensive excavations be carried out later. The project and construction 
management team had anticipated that excavations might reveal something, but 
nobody could have known for sure that an unearthed dwelling would lead to a 
downsizing of the square metres available for the hospital and subsequent project 
design.29 In this respect, the paper described many other unexpected uncertainties 
as well. It was evident that neither of the two studied programmes included project 
managers’ hunches, feelings and concerns, nor any risks that might have an effect 
on other aspects than project costs, time and specification. The programmes thus 
gave primacy to consistency and integrity between project plans and outcomes, as 
                                                 
29 Many other things than just archaeological excavations were at play, and the above is a simplified description of 
the situation, but there was no doubt that unforeseen events caused the initial project plans and thus the conditions 
for the project to be changed, something which the practice of risk management failed to take into account and 
which thus caused problems and challenges for the project management organisation. 
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if fundamental project uncertainties could be reduced to identifiable risks without 
any loss. 
 
The paper also substantiated the finding by describing how there was more to the 
framing of risk management than individual people’s calculated actions. It was ev-
ident from the two studied programmes that risk management was a distributed 
collective form of cognition and calculation. It was not just one or two actors who 
managed to mobilise the entire frame; this was the result of the collected effort of 
actors such as the National Audit Office, the Ministry of Finance, the different re-
sort ministries, large consultancies, and local project managers. In complex and 
dynamic ways, these actor-networks together promoted practices of risk manage-
ment, specified reporting standards, defined assessment metrics, etc. This created 
very strong networks of relations across the two programmes, across the public 
sector, which meant that individual project managers’ feelings, concerns, etc., 
which these framed practices left no room to include, had trouble being acknowl-
edged as legitimate risks to be included and taken seriously as risks. The paper 
thus also found that current risk management frames with their corresponding as-
sumptions about knowledge, predictability, and control come at the expense of in-
novation, novelty and intelligent outcomes. The paper showed this by demonstrat-
ing how these emerging concerns were not seen as positive opportunities for 
rethinking the programmes, but as “noise” preventing effective risk management 
and the achievement of the (pre-set) objectives and conditions of the programmes. 
 
The third paper concluded by proposing that frames of rationalistic risk manage-
ment should be extended beyond the programme organisations carrying them out 
to also include those actors who are already part of the networks that promote 
them. This would for example be the National Audit Office. To practitioners, this 
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would acknowledge the distributed nature of risk management and serve as a first 
step towards developing more comprehensive frameworks that would also take 
uncertainties emerging during project processes into account. These are now being 
rejected and suppressed unless they fit into the existing established frames. The 
paper thus ended by challenging the commonly used “best-practice” risk manage-
ment approach and argued that frameworks should embrace the broader notion of 
uncertainties. If this was done, it might produce significant benefits for the deliv-
ery and overall value of large capital investment programmes (and other types of 
projects / programmes organisations). 
 
9.2. Contributions of this dissertation 
This dissertation began by describing that risk management had proliferated as a 
worldwide state-of-the-art management control practice changing the very nature 
of what organisational management means across both the public and the private 
sector (e.g. Power, 2007). It described that the basic conception of risk manage-
ment was that organisations could achieve increased certainty regarding the 
achievement of their objectives through the reduction of risks. It was also shown 
that this basic conception reflected an understanding of ‘risks’ as pre-existing in 
nature; as facts “out there” to be identified and controlled through scientific meas-
urement and calculation and the knowledge produced through this. It was also 
shown that most organisations implemented practices of risk management inspired 
by the type of frameworks that incorporated the above conception, and which had 
risen to the status of “best-practice”. In the review of the current risk management 
literature, however, it was demonstrated that this proliferation of risk management 
had taken place without much knowledge of the (empirical) effects that practices 
of risk management generate once they are implemented and put into operation. 
This claim was backed, by for example referring to numerous accounting and 
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management scholars who had called for research into the particularities of risk 
management practices (e.g. Bhimani, 2009; Gephart et al., 2009; Mikes, 2011; 
Miller et al., 2008; Power, 2009; Van der Stede, 2011; Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014; 
Young, 2011). 
 
In an examination of the implementation of a risk analysis method, Rocher (2011, 
p. 78), for example, stated: “It would be interesting in the future to study how 
translations continue to work once a [risk] management device is implemented in 
an organization”. In reflection of the role of management accounting research in 
light of the recent financial crisis, Van der Stede (2011, p. 619) wrote: “After all, 
compelling evidence that governance, risk management, incentive systems and a 
myriad of other management (accounting) practices matter, and how they matter 
especially, will come from examining what really happens inside organizations.” 
In describing how uncertainties also emerge from outside of the formal boundaries 
of current risk management frameworks, Miller et al. (2008, p. 962) asked: “But, 
if hybrids are where so much of the action is, and if so many social scientists from 
so many disciplines have emphasised their importance for two decades or more, 
why are they not given greater prominence in risk management?”; and in examin-
ing the uncertainties of risk management, Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014, p. 519) 
wrote: “We suggest that, in the future, more empirical case studies be conducted 
on the effects of risk management inscriptions by studying in greater detail how 
risk management systems are translated into organisational practices.” 
 
It was also commented by Gephart et al. (2009, p. 142) that “the potential of [the 
current risk management] theories to inform studies of risk and organization has 
not been fully developed or realized”; and Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 340) even wrote 
that it seemed as if current risk management theories had informed governments to 
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implement risk management in mega-projects on “weak theoretical grounds”. In 
the literature, scholars were therefore bringing current risk management theories 
into question for being inadequate and/or incomplete and unable to explain the 
above-mentioned particularities of risk management practices. In being more spe-
cific about this situation, the review of current risk management literature led to 
the identification of four potential opportunities to advance our knowledge of risk 
management. The four avenues were: (1) studying the dynamics of risk manage-
ment practices over longer periods of time; (2) examining the processes of trans-
lating uncertainties into “risk objects”, focusing on the hybrid practices in which 
these processes take place; (3) looking into the enabling and constraining effects 
of technical risk devices; and (4) advancing accounting research into the study of 
risk management in large capital investment programmes (mega-projects).30 
 
This dissertation contributes by addressing these four avenues through an exami-
nation of two case studies of large capital investment programmes and by follow-
ing these over a longer period of time, and also going into the “messy” details of 
everyday interactions. The dissertation has thus on the one hand responded to the 
scholars within especially accounting research who called for research into the 
particularities of risk management practices and on the other sought to advance 
our understanding of practices of risk management in (public) mega-projects. The 
last subsection addressed the main findings of the three research papers; this sub-
section will now explain how this dissertation contributes to current academic 
(risk management) literature. This section further binds together the findings of 
the three research papers and the four avenues listed above with the overall re-
search question, which was: How are practices of risk management in mega-
                                                 
30 See Section 3.3: “Implications, tensions and opportunities”. These four avenues are non-exclusive, and there are 
more and interesting topics within risk management to focus on. These four stood out to me during my reading of 
the current risk management literature, however, which is why I have focused on them. 
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projects constructed, what effects are produced, and how can we understand them? 
The following three subsections should not be read as corresponding exactly in 
structure to the three research papers; the contributions go across these. 
 
9.2.1. The translation of uncertainties into pure and impure risks 
This dissertation first of all contributes to the academic literature on the relation 
between uncertainties (unmeasurable entities) and risks (measureable entities). 
The current risk management literature has shown that contemporary standards or 
frameworks of risk management tend to conflate this distinction (Froud, 2003; 
Winch & Maytorena, 2011). It has also been shown that solely relying on risk re-
duction to produce certainty can lead to unwanted consequences, such as loss of 
project relevance (Kreiner, 1995), the emergence of new and unexpected uncer-
tainties (Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014), a lack of broader value-orientation (Morris, 
2010), and a false sense of control (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The literature has 
also shown that managing uncertainties rather than exclusively risks may be more 
beneficial for organisations (Chapman & Ward, 2011), that the attention to matters 
of risks also takes place outside of formal and explicitly defined practices of risk 
management (Corvellec, 2009), and that uncertainties often emerge outside the 
limits of contemporary standardised frameworks of risk management (Miller et al., 
2008). This literature, however, has largely not considered this distinction from a 
constructivist perspective and examined ‘risks’ as constructs or effects of (local) 
networks of relations (Callon et al., 2009; Hilgartner, 1992). This means that the 
current risk management literature has tended to disregard examining the actual 
processes of translating uncertainties into “risky” objects, including the things that 
happen during such processes. 
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This dissertation contributes to the above literature by looking into the distinction 
between uncertainties and risks and by taking the above constructivist perspective 
to examine actual processes of translating uncertainties into risks as they take 
place “in action”. It contributes by introducing the distinction between pure and 
impure risks. This distinction does not just represent yet another analytical distinc-
tion; this distinction captures the finding that whether objects get classified as pure 
or impure generates different effects. The dissertation thus showed that some un-
certainties were rejected as risks (impure risks) because the way they were con-
structed did not fit rationalist notions of ‘risk’, despite the finding that they were 
constructed and understood as such by local actors. As these local actors had to 
manage these risks on their own (they were still perceived by them as threats 
against their local subproject objectives), this became troublesome as they now 
lacked programme management attention and had to be taken care of on top of the 
local managers’ other responsibilities. The distinction between pure and impure 
risks thus captures a so far by the current academic literature unexplored bounda-
ry-setting mechanism of risk management particularity. It points to the fact that 
practices of “best-practice” risk management are limited to the ways in which 
practices are constructed, which generate emerging new uncertainties that are not 
captured by them.31 
 
The dissertation also examined the reasons why impure risks ended up being pro-
duced, which pointed to the mediating role of risk management inscription devic-
es. In examining this aspect, the dissertation contributes to the ongoing academic 
                                                 
31 I am not saying that impure risks cannot be dealt with. It was evident that they were sometimes translated back 
into risks (made pure); sometimes they were dealt with through locally constructed practices; sometimes through 
informal manager-to-employee chats and through legal claims. What I am saying is that impure risks tend not to be 
dealt with, and that is the whole point; they could have been, but are not, dealt with, and that is problematic for a 
practice that claims to be able to produce increased certainty; it now also creates uncertainty. 
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debate about the role of technical risk devices. It has been argued by some schol-
ars that technical risk devices lie at the heart of practising risk management and 
that they represent key contingency variables for explaining the overall successful 
fit between organisations and environment (Beasley et al., 2005; Collier & Woods, 
2011; Gordon et al., 2009; Kleffner et al., 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Paape 
& Speklé, 2012). It has also been demonstrated that the adoption of technical risk 
devices can be explained by the work of experts, the culture of the organisation 
and/or pre-existing rationalities from already existing organisational (risk) practic-
es (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2009, 2011), and that these devices enable certain 
mechanisms such as the translation of disparate financial reports into comparable 
risk credit assessments or the confidence-building and resolution of different in-
terests (e.g. Jordan et al., 2013; Kalthoff, 2005). This dissertation contributes to 
this string of research by demonstrating that technical risk devices (or in my case 
the IT-based risk management control system, also called the risk database), be-
sides enabling risk management, also limit the boundaries of what can be accepted 
as (pure) risk and included into the practice. As a supplement to Mikes (2011), 
who examined the boundary-work of risk experts, this dissertation has thus shown 
that boundary-work also emerges as an unexpected effect of technical risk devices 
rather than only the intended work of human experts. 
 
9.2.2. The performative effects of risk management frameworks 
This dissertation also contributes to the accounting literature on performativity 
(e.g. Cushen, 2013; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; MacKenzie, 2006; Skærbæk & 
Tryggestad, 2010). This literature has shown that financial theories, accounting 
devices and economics can shape organisational practice and decision-making. 
This literature has further shown that situations also occur in which theories, mod-
els, devices, etc., produce the opposite effect, where these devices make practices 
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less like their depiction (MacKenzie, 2006, 2007). These latter situations are 
known as performativity misfires or counter-performativity (Callon, 2010; 
MacKenzie, 2006). The literature, however, has not yet examined the conditions 
under which misfires or counter-performativity can be overcome, or what is 
known as the conditions of performativity success during times of misfires 
(Butler, 2010; Callon, 2010). These conditions have been proposed as consisting 
of linguistic terminologies, social norms, institutional arrangements and material 
assemblages (Callon, 2007; Ferraro et al., 2005, 2009), but not empirically 
demonstrated. In the accounting literature and beyond, calls have therefore been 
made for research into the conditions of performativity success during times of 
misfires (e.g. Butler, 2010; Callon, 2010; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Skærbæk & 
Tryggestad, 2010). 
 
In response to the above calls for research, this dissertation makes two contribu-
tions to the current performativity literature: (1) it advances the study of performa-
tivity into the study of risk management, and (2) it demonstrates at least three key 
conditions and their linkages to re-establishing performativity success during 
times of misfires. In relation to the first point, the dissertation demonstrates the 
quite thought-provoking mechanism of risk management that certainty can be pro-
duced, not solely by reducing risky events, but by framing and re-framing the way 
risk management is practised. In relation to the second point, the dissertation 
demonstrates that reconfiguration of technical risk devices, risk terminologies and 
the roles of key actors is a key condition for performativity success during times 
of misfires. It also contributes by demonstrating the linkages between them during 
such times of misfires. It was evident that the reconfiguration of risk terminologies 
and risk roles was insufficient to re-stabilise the predictions of the implemented 
framework; these two mechanisms had to be adopted by the implemented control 
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system before successful performativity was achieved. This dissertation thus con-
tributes by expanding our knowledge of performativity and its conditions. 
 
9.2.3. The processes of risk management in mega-projects 
Lastly, the dissertation contributes to the scarce literature that has looked into risk 
management in mega-projects. The current risk management literature that does 
exist has focused on explaining the reasons for the apparently common fact that 
mega-projects tend to incur cost overruns and turn into public expenditure scan-
dals. This literature has shown how cost overruns can be explained by “optimism 
bias” (limited human cognitive capabilities) and “strategic misrepresentation” (po-
litical manipulation) during forecasting (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006; 2008; Lovallo & 
Kahneman, 2003). This includes promoting practices of risk management as insti-
tutional checks-and-balances to improve accountability and transparency and re-
duce incentives to manipulate such forecasts (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 2011). This litera-
ture has had an enormous effect on developments in public sectors around the 
world as governments, including the Danish government, have embraced the no-
tion of “reference class forecasting”. This literature, however, has based its find-
ings on two things: comparisons of budgeted and total project costs, and psycho-
logical experiments. These approaches both reflect cognitive-rationalist 
approaches which focus on human beings as rationalistic information processing 
units and neglect the social context within which the practice of risk management 
takes place. 
 
This dissertation contributes to this literature by pointing out that the processes of 
practising risk management cannot be overlooked, as these processes generate ef-
fects that influence both risk management and project conditions and objectives. 
On the basis of actor-network theory, the dissertation has demonstrated how risk 
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management must be understood not as individual cognitive phenomena, but as a 
distributed form of cognition and calculation that takes place in complex networks 
of relations. This enables the construction of risks, and the dissertation has found 
many risks to be identified, assessed and reduced; but it also limits the number of 
objects that can be considered “risky” due to its “super-rationalistic” knowledge 
assumption. Unexpected uncertainties emerged relating to both “softer” aspects 
such as prior experience, feelings, concerns, but also “harder” aspects such as 
events that had effects outside a narrow focus on “the enterprise” or “the project”; 
events that would cause political turmoil, and events that were “too small, too lo-
cal and too specific” or outside “time, cost and scope”. This dissertation thus con-
tributes by pointing out that so-called “best-practice” risk management often 
comes at the expense of innovation, concern for the wider stakeholder environ-
ment, intelligent outcomes and novelty, and thus risks losing its wider societal rel-
evance. 
 
9.3. Implications 
The findings of this dissertation have implications for the practising of contempo-
rary “best-practice” risk management. In the academic literature, scholars have 
suggested that the standards of risk management disregard the broader notion of 
uncertainties, which means that certain uncertainty-reducing aspects are left out 
(e.g. Miller et al., 2008). It has even been suggested that contemporary risk man-
agement represent an “intellectual failure” due to its narrow functionalist and ra-
tionalist assumptions (e.g. Power, 2009). This dissertation showed that uncertain-
ties (concerns, feelings and experiences) were indeed left out. This dissertation 
thus demonstrated that the logic of generic “best-practice” frameworks could in-
deed be described as “flawed”. This dissertation also showed, however, that 
frameworks were considered relevant and useful despite being “flawed” (thus con-
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firming Millo and MacKenzie’s (2009) findings). If practitioners (and others), 
however, believe that frameworks are indeed able to take everything, or just all 
material uncertainties, into account, then this dissertation have shown that they 
most likely cannot. Not only has the dissertation shown that some uncertainties are 
excluded, but the dissertation has also shown that not all risks can be taken into 
account; some risks are systematically excluded and end up becoming what was 
termed impure. 
 
But who holds those beliefs? I would have to say nobody. I have found no evi-
dence to suggest that people did not reflect on this limitation; they all recognised 
that risk management was not some type of exact science that could ensure project 
conditions and objectives. Contrary to expectations, however, this just adds to the 
relevance of my findings. In this dissertation, I have shown that whether people 
believed that all material risks could be taken into account mattered little; what did 
matter was the way the practice had been framed, because no one attempted on 
their own to challenge the pre-established way of practising risk management, 
which was that all material uncertainties had to be included. The project managers 
would say that they believed that because the consultants were the experts, they 
knew what was best; the consultants would say that they did what everybody else 
were doing; the programme management would say they were adhering to gov-
ernment ministries’ requirements; and the governing ministries would say that 
numbers mattered little, progress mattered more. In this setup, however, because 
the numbers were produced, they came to represent the practice, they came to 
symbolise progress which again signified the level of certainty produced. And be-
cause nobody could disagree with the fact that more certainty was better than less, 
those numbers, or more specific the ‘value at risk’ curve, was rarely challenged 
and disputed. 
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As the technical risk devices were important actors in understanding the construc-
tion and framing of the practice of risk management and the subsequent systematic 
exclusion of certain types of risks, I argue that practitioners should pay careful at-
tention to the ways in which they construct and apply such practices. I am not say-
ing that ‘uncertainties’ and ‘risks’ are not managed outside of formal practices of 
risk management. In practice, even impure risks might be taken care of through 
other types of practices such as value management or claim management. I am ar-
guing, however, that nobody can be satisfied with having practices, albeit “best-
practice” ones, that systematically exclude certain elements, in this case certain 
risks, which might be included by structuring the practice differently. According 
to my findings, it thus follows that organisations may benefit from supplementing 
“best-practice” risk devices with another dimension that is not structured by strict 
“scientific measurement”, but which acknowledges the deeply social, political and 
cultural dimensions of constructing risks. As I have shown, risks are not “out 
there”; practitioners construct risks “in here”, and when they do, they equip them-
selves with calculative devices (see also Callon, 1998b). 
 
Such a new dimension could be the inclusion of the broader notion of ‘uncertain-
ties’, the things we know we do not know, like experienced project managers’ gut 
feelings and intuition, or stakeholders’ more broad concerns of the societal rele-
vance of projects. These ‘uncertainties’ are by definition non-calculable (other-
wise they would be risks) and thus cannot be molded by rationalist assumptions of 
probabilities and consequences. The fact that they cannot be subjected like this to 
rationalistic ideas of calculation, however, does not mean that they cannot be spo-
ken about, described, written down, acted upon and reported on to governing min-
istries. The first step would therefore be to actually integrate this dimension into 
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the technical risk devices as they perform the practice they describe through their 
application. If this is to have any effect, however, it would also require that key 
public governing actors recognised the distributed nature of the practices of risk 
management beyond actual projects. It followed from the third paper that due to 
the strong influence of the National Audit Office and the Ministry of Finance, who 
had enforced “best-practice” risk management, this meant that the two pro-
grammes also did their very best to carry out risk management as required. It can 
therefore also be assumed that these actors need to accept the role assigned to 
them and either take the lead in redeveloping risk management or at least not pre-
vent others from doing so. 
 
In relation to the broader notion of uncertainties and the responsibilities of actors, 
this leads to an important aspect of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ that has not been 
dealt with in this dissertation. This aspect concerns the relation between risk and 
blame (e.g. Douglas, 1985; Hood, 2002; Skærbæk & Christensen, forthcoming). In 
my research for the three papers, I found no evidence to support the theory that 
‘blame games’ were taking place, but I did find much evidence to support that 
practices were being constructed around notions of distributing roles and thus also 
responsibility. It followed that terminologies like “risk owners” or “risk managers” 
were invented to frame an effective process of practising risk management. In the-
ory, this means that actors may end up taking the blame for events included into 
the control system of which they were listed as the risk owners. All things being 
equal, this may make sense because project managers are responsible for their 
subprojects, but when it is taken into consideration that certain types of risks are 
excluded in spite of the fact that they have been found relevant as such by those 
same project managers, this becomes troublesome. In theory, they are now respon-
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sible for risks that have been excluded, and as shown, such exclusion means that 
those risks are difficult to manage and thus often end up not being managed. 
 
In light of traditional managerial thought, both the two programmes followed did 
not calculate the breakeven of the costs and benefits of practising risk manage-
ment. As pointed out by the actors spoken with, however, this was also very diffi-
cult to estimate because risks that had been prevented, and thus that had not oc-
curred, could not be monetised. It was therefore difficult to figure out what the 
costs were of achieving the benefits of having formal meetings, an IT-based risk 
management control system, several consultants employed etc. All one was left 
with was the statement that when management was satisfied, the extent to which 
risk management was applied had to be appropriate. It can only be assumed, how-
ever, especially when one looks across the public sectors at large, that these costs 
must be substantial. It can therefore be speculated as to whether breakeven has 
been met or whether perhaps too much money are being spent on risk management 
public sector-wide compared to its realised benefits. 
 
In summary I argue that practitioners need to be aware of the limitations of risk 
management up front and develop more unstructured approaches to supplement 
the more cognitive-rationalist generic “best-practice” frameworks. This may ena-
ble such aspects as improved opportunities for learning, novelty and invention, 
and might, at least for public mega-projects specifically, benefit society, projects 
and consultancies to a larger degree. I am well aware that this will require dealing 
with many years of cognitive-rationalist thinking about the purpose of risk and 
project management, but when such projects reach a size where no one can foresee 
what will happen, it makes little sense to insist on pre-set objectives. More open 
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and flexible approaches are necessary – at least according to the findings in this 
dissertation. 
 
9.4. Limitations 
This dissertation can be said to have its limitations. The first one is the fact that I 
rely on case studies as my method. If one believes that science should be about 
proving or predicting things, then my research can be severely criticised for not 
doing that. In relying on case studies, I have not collected enough data across 
mega-projects (or other types of organisations) to be able to generalise, and conse-
quently I could be criticised for not being able to predict anything. In this sense, 
this dissertation is explorative and hypothesis-generating and lacks the sample size 
to be much else. In contrast, however, if one believes that science should be about 
promoting opportunities for learning, then I would argue that choosing (two) case 
studies does not seem like such a bad choice. This has enabled me to provide con-
text-specific knowledge which seems most relevant for both academics and practi-
tioners seeking to understand and learn more about “the particularities of risk 
management practices”. On the one hand I thus accept the limitation that I am un-
able to generalise, but on the other hand I reject the criticism that this should be 
the only purpose of theory, and thus also of making strong contributions. 
 
The second limitation concerns the fact that I have done only two and not more 
case studies, according to the logic that more must always be better than fewer 
case studies. In response to this, I do agree that more case studies, again, would 
provide me with better opportunities for generalising upon my findings, but I disa-
gree that case studies still cannot generate interesting contributions and opportuni-
ties for learning. That depends on the case studies chosen. In this dissertation, I 
have chosen the Signalling Programme because this programme was the first Dan-
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ish programme legally subjected to holistic risk management requirements and not 
just because this case represented “yet another one”. It thus represented what has 
often on a more positivist note been termed a “paradigmatic case”.32 It was further 
evident from talks with key actors from various ministries and public agencies that 
many other agencies were in the process of adopting the Signalling Programme’s 
way of approaching risk management, because they considered it the best-practice 
way to carry out risk management. In relation to my findings here, this means that 
lessons learned from this case study are likely to also be relevant to what is hap-
pening elsewhere in the Danish public sector – which again means that investigat-
ing only one case (or two) does not a priori imply limited relevance of findings. 
 
The third limitation refers to that of telling narratives. In this dissertation I have 
told stories about the construction of two practices of risk management (although 
one in more detail than the other) and the effects they generated over time. In do-
ing this, there will always be an element of subjectivity, as I had to interpret what 
the actors were saying and represent this in my selection and account of those sto-
ries. I also had to decide which actors I engaged with, as I could not read all doc-
uments, interview all actors or observe everything at all times. Even though I took 
my precautions and gathered as much information I could from as many actors as 
possible, there will always be the risk that had I just collected one more piece of 
information, then that would have changed my understanding of what happened. 
In a response to this, however, my claim is that all methods suffer from a degree 
                                                 
32 If one focuses on the role of consultants, the Signalling Programme represents an “extreme case” as well, as no 
other Danish project before this has spent such large sums on consultancy fees. In contrast, if one focuses on the 
application of current worldwide “best-practice” risk management frameworks, then this case also can be consid-
ered a “critical case”, as it may “falsify” or “verify” the predictions of the framework. This whole distinction be-
tween different types of case studies therefore depends on the perspective taken, and also to a certain extent goes 
against actor-network theory’s “criteria” for selecting case studies (see Section 5.2.). 
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of subjectivity; even quantitative methods require choices to be taken, hypotheses 
to be decided upon and data-analysing techniques to be carried out. At least I had 
the opportunity to consult with the actors I observed after I observed them and be-
fore writing the papers and this dissertation.33 
 
The fourth and last limitation concerns the specific aspects of risk management 
that I decided not to collect information on, despite the fact that this could also 
have been relevant. In this respect, two such aspects should be mentioned. The 
first relates to the fact that I made the decision not to follow the actual day-to-day 
work of project managers. As I described above, I decided not to do so because it 
only added little to my knowledge of risk management. I cannot eliminate the pos-
sibility that this could have revealed interesting findings. The second relates to the 
fact that I ended up not systematically following how actors actually carried out 
their risk-reducing actions. I followed how they decided upon them, the types of 
actions they decided upon, the result of having carried them out, and when, where 
and with whom they were carried out. I quickly realised, however, that thousands 
of such actions were being carried out, that these involved even more actors, and 
that most of them took place at the same time. For practical reasons, it was thus 
too difficult to follow these actions systematically. It would have been fruitful to 
do so, however, as this could have advanced our knowledge of the more specific 
trajectories that pure and impure risks take after their initial construction. 
 
9.5. Future research 
Overall, I recommend that still more research be conducted into “the particulari-
ties of risk management practices” that scholars in risk management have called 
                                                 
33 I have had reflections on this earlier in the dissertation, as there are opportunities to be gained, but also potential 
negative effects, which means that one has to strike a balance (see Section 5.4 with subsections). 
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for. In this dissertation, I have provided rich and detailed descriptions of risk man-
agement practices by following two such practices over four years (and still con-
tinue to do so). This means that all empirical findings will be local and related to 
those cases and thus that still more opportunities exist to promote our knowledge 
of risk management practices. This could be done by examining more mega-
project risk management practices, carrying out comparative case studies across 
countries, examining other types of organisations as well, etc. In these years, 
mega-projects are undergoing large changes in project and risk management, such 
as with the introduction of “reference class forecasting”. It might therefore still be 
beneficial to carry out more case studies in this area. That could be from a per-
spective of examining the translation of uncertainties into risks, the relationship 
between frameworks and practices of risk management, and the effects on 
knowledge and project management roles; but it might also be by examining other 
aspects, such as the outsourcing of risks or the interface between risk manage-
ment, and other project management practices, such as value-based management 
or quality management. 
 
It might also be beneficial to supplement the actor-network theory concepts I have 
drawn upon with different actor-network theory concepts in order to shed light on 
different mechanisms of risk management practices. I have relied primarily on the 
concepts of framing, overflowing, purification, inscription and performativity, but 
there are also other concepts, such as action-at-a-distance, matters of concern, the 
four moments of translation, and trials. In this dissertation I have focused on spe-
cific programmes (mega-projects) rather than the public sector at large and the de-
velopments taking place across public sector actors. In these years, standardisation 
appears to emerge, driven by consultancies, on how to do risk management across 
all types of public capital investment programme. A more specific future avenue 
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of research could be following the work of consultancies implementing that stand-
ardisation process across public sector entities and the effects this has on man-
agement control practices. The above-mentioned concept could add to the findings 
of this dissertation by shedding light on, for example, relations of maintaining cen-
tral government control, or by analysing ‘blame games’ when the project goes 
wrong. Hence, there are still many more interesting avenues to examine, and ac-
tor-network theory could be applied as one of them. 
 
In relation to the first paper, I recommend more research be conducted into the 
translation of uncertainties into pure and impure risks in order to examine the ex-
tent of this effect and how it is related to organisational objectives and conditions. 
This could be extended by taking into account more organisations across countries 
and sectors and/or by following the relationship between events taking place and 
their relation to pure and impure risks. This would provide new opportunities for 
learning more about the dynamics of risk management practice and allow more 
generalisable empirical findings. In this respect, the first paper established that 
four types of risks were excluded as impure for the practice. It would be interest-
ing to learn more about other types of impure risks, and I therefore also recom-
mend that more research be conducted along this line of inquiry. As I do not claim 
that these types of impure risks will be the only ones found across all types of or-
ganisations, but because I do claim that impure risks are effects of technical risk 
devices, this research could pursue following whether linkages exist between dif-
ferent types of technical risk devices and different types of impure risks. This re-
search could also in more detail follow the dynamic linkages between how risks 
are constructed as pure and impure and how such risks are managed over longer 
periods of time. 
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I also recommend that more research be conducted into the relationship between 
frameworks and practices of risk management. If frameworks can shape how risk 
management ends up being carried out, which the second paper showed, then this 
might be an avenue for developing more embracing frameworks. These frame-
works could open up to a broader understanding of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, which 
in turn could allow a broader and more dynamic practice of uncertainty/risk man-
agement. This would allow such aspects like concerns, feelings, hunches, gut-
feelings, etc., which are now being excluded, to be included, which then could be 
used to expand the view on project conditions (see previous section). In the two 
case studies carried out here, risk management served the purpose of preventing 
“bad things” from happening to already pre-existing project objectives and condi-
tions. In contrast, extending risk management frameworks could allow a redefini-
tion of project and risk management roles to also encompass possibilities for rede-
signing project conditions, the introduction of new ideas, new inventions etc. And 
because frameworks have performative effects, this means that practices would, at 
least theoretically, adapt to these extended framework predictions, that is, be more 
open to the larger notion of ‘uncertainties’ rather than to the narrow one of ‘risks’. 
 
I acknowledge that actor-network theory has certain limitations. One of them 
would be that inventing new normative frameworks of risk management requires 
supplementing the actor-network theory perspective. In actor-network theory the 
actors, not the observers, are in charge of the world-defining activity, which means 
that research that remains loyal to actor-network theory principles becomes de-
scriptive.34 Further research could therefore supplement the findings here with dif-
                                                 
34 The above statement is a bit simplistic, as actor-network theory claims (1) that also observers participate in the 
construction of the network they describe, which means that they also must be understood as actors and thus all 
things being equal must also be able to produce their own world-definitions; but (2) that this is a complex issue, be-
359 
 
ferent theoretical perspectives (and methods) to develop such normative frame-
works. This would serve both to advance current knowledge of how to approach 
risk management, but also to provide practitioners with new techniques, new de-
vices, and new tools. One requirement would be to let go of the strict cause-and-
effect logic (the cognitive-rationalist approach to human perception of risk) and 
embrace the broader notion of uncertainty by facilitating looser “risk” descrip-
tions. Another requirement would be to let go of the inscription of the multitude of 
conversations, controversies and conflicts into one-figure values or color-coding 
that takes place in any practising of risk management. This serves to highlight cer-
tain aspects, but it comes at the expense of the complexity of practice in which un-
certainties emerge and should not be suppressed to meet “scientific measurement 
models”. 
 
To sum up, in my opinion there is still much more to learn about risk management, 
and future research must insist on going into practice to flesh out these mecha-
nisms. With this dissertation, I have described how practices of risk management 
can be constructed, including what effects such practices produce and how we can 
understand them, but there are many more practices out there which generate ef-
fects. I can only hope now that others will take the lessons learned from this dis-
sertation and pursue this line of research to build upon my findings, but also to 
supplement them (dare I say translate them!) with new findings. In the words of 
Frank Knight, whom I quoted at the beginning of this section: “It is a world of 
change in which we live, and a world of uncertainty. We live only by knowing 
something about the future; while the problems of life, or of conduct at least, arise 
from the fact that we know so little”. But rather than attempting to reduce uncer-
                                                                                                                                                            
cause actors are those who are allowed to be so by other actors, which necessitates that the observer’s normative 
statements must be defined as such by yet a third actor and not himself. See Latour (2005). 
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tainty, and through this turn uncertainty into “the problem of life”, let us instead 
embrace the things “we know that we do not know”, work with uncertainty, turn it 
into opportunities; let us reinvent how we deal with risks; let us make models that 
are useful and relevant rather than “accurate”; and let us be guided by practice and 
pursue the vast amount of knowledge that can be learned from them. 
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11. Appendices 
 
11.1. Appendix 1: Annual Danish capital appropriations 2005 – 2014 
The following table shows the annual Danish capital appropriations from 2005 to 
2014 (Forslag til Finanslov / FFL) and the Danish Ministry of Transport’s (MoT) 
share of these. It demonstrates two notable things: first: annual capital appropria-
tions have approx. quadrupled over the course of the years; and second: the Minis-
try of Transport has on average received approx. 80 per cent of all annual capital 
appropriations. It should be noted that the numbers do not represent actual, but on-
ly budgeted, capital expenditure, as additional, or extra, appropriations given dur-
ing the years, potential relocation of funds between capital and operational ac-
counts, and unused funds due to capital savings have not been included. This, 
however, does not affect the overall two trends described above. 
 
Danish Annual 
Capital Ap-
propriations  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Avg. 
FFL 
(MDKK) 
4.582 5.145 7.282 7.317 8.588 11.768 10.351 14.714 17.353 19.034 106.133 
MoT share  
(MDKK) 
2.402 2.287 4.880 6.114 7.078 9.794 9.301 14.184 15.484 13.835 85.358 
MoT share  
(percentage) 
52 44 67 84 82 83 90 96 89 73 80 
 
Source: The information has been gathered from the Ministry of Finance’s Finan-
cial Act Database (See: http://oes-cs.dk/olapdatabase/finanslov/index.cgi). The 
following search criteria were employed: “Bevillingslov: Forslag til Finanslov 
(FFL), Overramme: Anlægsramme”. Latest search date: 1 September 2014.  
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11.2. Appendix 2: Signalling Programme, organisational chart 
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Source: Hand-out from I1, but see also Banedanmark (2008a, p. 182)
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11.3. Appendix 3: Signalling Programme, timetable 
 
Signalling Programme, Timetable 
Years 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
                                                    
Fjernbane Procurement Design Test Roll-out 
2021 (3 years) (3 years) (3 years) (4 years) 
S-bane Procurement Design Test Roll-out     
2020 (2 years) (2 years) (2 years) (6 years)     
  
Source: Banedanmark (2009a) 
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11.4. Appendix 4: Signalling Programme, ‘traffic light assessment matrix’ 
 
Risk ranking  
matrix 
Consequence 
Very 
low 
Low Moder-
ate 
High Very 
high 
1 2 3 5 8 
F
re
qu
en
cy
 
Almost 
certain 
6 6 12 18 30 48 
Highly 
likely 
4 4 8 12 20 32 
Likely 3 3 6 9 15 24 
Unlikely 2 2 4 6 10 16 
Very un-
likely 
1 1 2 3 5 8 
 
Source: (Banedanmark, 2008c, p. 49) 
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11.5. Appendix 5: Signalling Programme, risk classification 
 
Risk Classification 
Consequence Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
Cost F-bane 
(MDKK) 
< 15 15 – 150 150 – 750 750 – 1500 ≥ 1500 
Cost S-bane 
(MDKK) 
< 3 3 – 30 30 – 150 150 – 300 ≥ 300 
Time (Month) < 1 1 – 3 3 – 6 6 – 12 ≥ 12 
Punctuality  
F-bane 
< 0.1 % 0.1 – 0.5 % 0.5 – 1.0 % 1.0 – 2.0 % ≥ 2.0 % 
Punctuality  
S-bane  
< 0.05 % 0.05 – 0.2 % 0.2 – 0.4 % 0.4 – 0.7 %  ≥ 0.7 % 
Benefits Minimal or 
no conse-
quence to 
technical 
perfor-
mance or 
benefits. 
Minor reduc-
tion in tech-
nical perfor-
mance or 
supportabil-
ity. Minor 
impact to 
benefits. 
Moderate re-
duction in 
technical per-
formance or 
supportabil-
ity. Moderate 
impact to 
benefits. 
Significant 
degradation in 
technical per-
formance or 
major shortfall 
in supportabil-
ity. One of the 
four benefits 
will not be 
achieved. 
Severe degra-
dation in tech-
nical perfor-
mance. More 
than one of the 
four benefits 
will not be 
achieved. 
BDK-credibility Minimal or 
no conse-
quence to-
wards 
credibility. 
Minor degra-
dation in 
credibility in 
Ministry and 
among major 
stakeholders. 
Minor degra-
dation in 
credibility in 
Ministry and 
among major 
stakeholders. 
Beginning 
lack of confi-
dence from 
Ministry and 
major stake-
holders to-
wards BDK. 
Significant 
degradation in 
credibility in 
Ministry and 
among major 
stakeholders. 
Lack of confi-
dence from 
Ministry and 
major stake-
holders to-
wards BDK. 
Severe degra-
dation in cred-
ibility in Min-
istry and 
among major 
stakeholders. 
The signalling 
programme 
under admin-
istration by the 
Ministry. 
Probability Very un-
likely 
Unlikely Likely Highly likely Almost cer-
tain 
Numerical <0.01 0,01 – 0.05 0,05 – 0,2 0,2 – 0,65 0.65 – 1 
 
Source: Banedanmark (2009b, pp. 20-24 [own making]) 
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11.6. Appendix 6: Observation studies 
 
No. Type Project Length Month Year 
O1 Operational risk meeting S-banen 01:52 May 2010 
O2 Operational risk meeting GSM-R 01:15 June - 
O3 Operational risk meeting SPOR 20 01:56 June - 
O4 Operational risk meeting OI 01:14 June - 
O5 Operational risk meeting PMO 01:22 Aug. - 
O6 Operational risk meeting On-board 01:50 Aug. - 
O7 Operational risk meeting F-banen 02:20 Aug. 2011 
O8 
Cross-risk review  
meeting 
All 01:32 Aug. - 
O9 Operational risk meeting Prog. dir. + sec. 00:40 Sep.  - 
O10 Operational risk meeting SPOR 20 01:43 Sep.  - 
O11 Operational risk meeting Civil works 00:14 Dec. - 
O12 Operational risk meeting STM 01:22 Dec. - 
O13 Operational risk meeting GSM-R 02:24 Jan.  2012 
O14 Operational risk meeting F-banen 02:28 Jan.  - 
O15 Risk workshop GSM-R 02:21 Feb.  - 
O16 Operational risk meeting PMO 00:39 Mar.  - 
O17 Operational risk meeting Prog. dir. + sec. 00:56 Mar.  - 
O18 Risk workshop F-bane east 04:27 Nov. - 
O19 Operational risk meeting F-banen 00:37 Sep.  2013 
O20 Risk forum Risk man. Team 01:24 Sep.  - 
O21 Operational risk meeting Prog. dir. + sec. 01:16 Sep.  - 
O22 Risk forum Risk man. Team 01:21 Oct.  - 
O23 Risk sharing meeting RND + DSB 01:30 Oct.  - 
O24 Risk forum Risk man. Team 00:49 Nov. - 
O25 Risk approval meeting F-banen 00:38 Dec.  - 
O26 Risk approval meeting S-banen 00:42 Dec.  - 
O27 Operational risk meeting F-banen west 00:34 Dec.  - 
O28 Operational risk meeting Safety 01:01 Dec.  - 
O29 Risk status meeting S-banen 00:41 Feb. 2014 
O30 Operational risk meeting OHS 00:55 April - 
O31 Risk status meeting S-banen 00:28 April - 
O32 Operational risk meeting PMO 01:02 April - 
O33 Operational risk meeting OI 01:30 April - 
O34 Operational risk meeting Prog. dir. + sec. 00:59 May - 
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O35 Risk forum Risk man. Team 01:00 May - 
O36 Risk forum Risk man. Team 00:59 June - 
O37 
Cross-risk review  
meeting 
All 01:12 June - 
O38 Operational risk meeting PMO 00:18 June  - 
O39 Operational risk meeting OHS 01:13 July - 
O40 Operational risk meeting Prog. dir. + sec. 01:13 July - 
O41 Risk forum Risk man. Team 01:04 Aug. - 
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11.7. Appendix 7: Observed people 
 
No. Title Employer 
X1 Risk Manager Banedanmark, SP 
X2 Head Senior Risk Consultant Ramboll 
X3 Head Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, S-banen 
X4 Program Director Banedanmark, SP 
X5 Civil Servant Ministry of Transport 
X6 Head Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, OI 
X7 Vice Senior Risk Consultant Ramboll 
X8 Project Management Consultant Parsons 
X9 Financial Controller Banedanmark 
X10 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, GSM-R 
X11 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, GSM-R 
X12 Project Management Consultant PA Consulting 
X13 Head Project Manager 
Banedanmark, SP, SPOR 
20 
X14 Project Management Consultant Atkins 
X15 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, OI 
X16 
Programme Manager /  
End-to-End Manager 
Banedanmark, SP 
X17 
Joint Venture Senior Executive  
Consultant 
Ramboll 
X18 
Project & Risk Management  
Consultant 
Atkins 
X19 Head Project Manager 
Banedanmark, SP,  
On-board 
X20 Risk Consultant Trainee Ramboll 
X21 Head of Finance Banedanmark 
X22 
Project Manager /  
End-To-End Manager  
Banedanmark, SP, F-banen 
X23 Project Manager, Chief Engineer Banedanmark, SP, F-banen 
X24 Head of Safety Banedanmark, SP 
X25 Head of Secretariat, Senior Consultant Banedanmark, SP 
X26 
Project Director  
(Head Project Manager + Consultant)  
Ramboll, Civil Works 
X27 Project Management Consultant Atkins, STM 
X28 Project Manager 
Banedanmark, SP,  
Tech. Sup. 
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X29 Systems Manager Banedanmark, SP, GSM-R 
X30 Project Manager 
Banedanmark, SP,  
GSM-R Data 
X31 Head Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, GSM-R 
X32 Project Manager / Risk Manager Banedanmark (not SP) 
X33 
Budget Consultant (Geschäftsführer,  
Mitglied des Verwaltungsrates) 
R+R, Burger und  
Partner AG 
X34 Project Management Consultant NNE Pharmaplan, GSM-R 
X35 IT Project Manager 
Banedanmark, Teknisk 
Drift 
X36 Transmissions Manager 
Banedanmark,  
Teknisk Drift 
X37 Head of IT Operations 
Banedanmark,  
Teknisk Drift 
X38 Senior Project Consultant 
Jan Saugen AS,  
Oslo, Norway 
X39 
Project Manager, GSM-R Private Rail-
ways 
Banedanmark, SP 
X40 Programme Planner Banedanmark, SP 
X41 Project Manager Banedanmark 
X42 Director (also Head Risk Manager) 
Systems Railway Solutions, 
Supplier, F-banen East 
X43 
Project Migration Manager 
(Installation and Commissioning) 
Alstom, Supplier,  
F-banen East 
X44 
Traffic Management  
System Consultant 
Ramboll JV 
X45 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP 
X46 System Integration Manager Banedanmark, SP 
X47 Project Quality Safety Manager Alstom, Supplier 
X48 
Deputy Design and  
Development Design Consultant 
Ramboll JV 
X49 
Scheduler / Time Manager,  
Consultant 
Ramboll JV 
X50 Project Manager 
Alstom, Supplier,  
F-banen East 
X51 
Senior Chief Consultant, Safety Man-
agement 
Ramboll 
X52 Contract Management Consultant Atkins 
X53 Contract Manager Alstom, Supplier 
X54 Chief Execute Officer (CEO) Banedanmark 
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X55 Project Management Consultant Unknown 
X56 Migration Management Consultant Atkins Denmark 
X57 Risk Consultant Ramboll 
X58 Project Controls Manager Banedanmark, SP, S-banen 
X59 Project Controls Manager 
Banedanmark, SP,  
On-board 
X60 Project Manager Banedanmark 
X61 Risk Manager DSB, Stakeholder 
X62 Project Manager DSB, S-banen, Stakeholder 
X63 Project Manager DSB, F-banen, Stakeholder 
X64 
Deputy Project Manager and  
Risk Manager 
Thales-BBK, Supplier,  
F-banen West 
X65 Project Manager 
Banedanmark, SP,  
F-banen West 
X66 Head Safety Manager + Consultant Banedanmark, SP, Safety 
X67 Safety Management Consultant Banedanmark, SP, Safety 
X68 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, OHS 
X69 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, OHS 
X70 Planning Management Consultant Ramboll 
X71 Head Quality Manager  Banedanmark, SP 
X72 
Governance and IT management Con-
sultant 
Partner, Quant APS +  
Owner, Tuesdays APS 
X73 Project Manager Banedanmark, SP, OI 
X74 Senior Consultant Banedanmark, SP, OI 
X75 Organisation Development Consultant Qant APS, Partner 
X76 Change Management Consultant OI, SP, BDK 
X77 Project Manager, Risk Manager 
Banedanmark, SP,  
On-board 
X78 Risk Consultant Ramboll 
X79 Risk Consultant Ramboll 
 
Note: The names of the above persons, including when and where I met them, 
and how many times I have met them, have been anonymised for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
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11.8. Appendix 8: Interviews 
  
No. Interviewee Interviewer Length 
I1 Risk Manager Tim Neerup Themsen 01:43:57 
I2 Senior Risk Consultant - 01:05:56 
I3 Head Project Manager - 00:27:25 
I4 Programme Director - 01:14:07 
I5 Civil Servant - 01:02:54 
I6 Head Project Manager - 01:06:30 
I7 Senior Consultant - 01:34:25 
I8 Head of Finance - 00:50:16 
I9 Head Project Manager - 01:19:32 
I10 Financial Consultant - 00:53:05 
I11 Safety Manager - 01:12:45 
I12 Risk Consultant - 01:22:19 
I13 Civil Servant - 01:03:50 
I14 Civil Servant - 01:07:05 
I15 Supplier - 01:19:55 
I16 Risk Consultant - 01:18:22 
I17 Project Manager - 01:06:04 
I18 Head of Secretariat - 01:44:59 
I19 Governance Manager - 01:22:55 
 
Note: The names and initials of the above persons, including when and 
where I met them, and how many times I have met them, have been anon-
ymised for reasons of confidentiality. 
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